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SUBJECT: FRANCE - FOREIGN POLICY - GENERAL

RELATED PAPERS

FORMER PAPERS *PT. 6*

LATER PAPERS *Pt. 8.*

ARCHIVAL ACTION

RP

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Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared	Folio No.	Referred to	Date	Clearing Officer's Initial	Date Cleared
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File No.....

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NAA: A1838, 25/1/1 B

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NAA: A1838, 25/1/1 PART 7

STATEMENT OF REASONS UNDER SECTION 40 OF THE ARCHIVES ACT

CRSA 1838/2, Item no. 25/1/1 Pt 7
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* delete whichever is inapplicable

~~The item described~~ ^{folios 66-67, 217-218} above contains information that has been exempted under sub-section 33(1)(a) & (b) of the *Archives Act* 1983.

Facts on which the decision is based:

The documents contain information communicated to or shared with the Australian Government by a foreign government. It is possible that information in this file, if disclosed, could cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth of Australia.

Reasons for the decision:

Section 33(1)(a) of the *Archives Act* 1983 provides that a record is exempt if it contains information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the security, defence or international relations of the Commonwealth.

International relations are dependent upon an appropriate flow of information in confidence between one country and another. If disclosure of information were to lessen the confidence of another country in the Australian Government, that is sufficient ground for a finding that disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage international relations.

Section 33(1)(b) of the *Archives Act* 1983 provides that a record is exempt if it contains information or matter communicated in confidence by or on behalf of a foreign government, an authority of a foreign government or an international organization to the Government of the Commonwealth, to an authority of the Commonwealth or to a person receiving the communication on behalf of the Commonwealth or of an authority of the Commonwealth, being information or matter the disclosure of which under this Act would constitute a breach of that confidence.

Decision maker
Designation
Date

: gday
: ARS
: 12/3/02

Australian Archives
DOCUMENT REMOVAL ADVICE

Folio/s numbered 86-87, 213, 217-218
~~has~~ have been removed from this item.

Series/Accession No.: A1838/2 Item No.: 25/1/1 117

Document description: France - Foreign Policy - General

Reason for removal: s33(1) a & b

A copy/expunged copy has been inserted in place of folio/s _____

Number of folios removed: 5

Removed documents now controlled as: _____

Removed by: Jay Position No. 30118 Date 12/3/02

Pink - Item copy Yellow - Document copy Blue - Register copy

25 / 1 / 1

PT. NO. 7

FILE CLOSED

THIS PART OPENED ON APRIL 1965

THIS PART CLOSED ON 30 APRIL 1966

SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE ON FILE PART 8

4859/63

Name of Paper

Tribune

File No.

F25/1/1

Published at

Hamburg

Date

30-4-66

President de Gaulle's vision of Europe

THE GENERAL'S ROLE IN THE WEST'S GERMAN POLICY

DIE WELT

Hamburg, April 21

The dream of a united Europe of the Six is vanishing rapidly. It is being replaced by a new vision—a Europe united some day, somehow, and stretching, as General de Gaulle says, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

As in the immediate post-war years, when Western European integration seemed entirely within the bounds of possibility, a confederation including Eastern and Western European countries is being regarded as by no means impossible. It is even being described by important politicians in the Federal Republic as a likely way of solving the European—and consequently the German—question.

The difficulties within the European Economic Community are still far from being overcome. There is a crisis in the Atlantic Alliance, and the United States is being involved more deeply in Asia. All this has lent Eastern policy a greater urgency in the West.

INITIATIVE

The strongest initiative in this direction has recently come from Paris. Where previously it was the United States that was primarily interested in attempting to achieve a détente with the Soviet Union, it is now General de Gaulle. He sees the solution in a sort of European concert of nations, with France and the Soviet Union at the helm.

In connexion with the General's trip to Moscow, the American and British press are speculating as to what role

he might want Germany to play. Even the more serious newspapers are making assumptions that vary between expectations of a Franco-Russian non-aggression pact and an agreement on an ultimate pan-European security system. According to President de Gaulle's ideas, this new European adjustment would have to take place largely—or entirely—without American participation on the Continent.

GUARANTEE

It would, however, include a united but neutralised Germany, they believe. Russia and France would guarantee this status.


The French policy is aimed against the Atlantic Alliance to such an extent as to represent almost an ultimatum, and will doubtlessly lead to its being based more or less on far-reaching Franco-Russian arrangements. Looked at more closely, however, it becomes clear that there are limits to how far President de Gaulle can go in wooing Moscow, in so far as anything more does come of all this than merely the attempt itself and the attendant noncommittal courtesies.

These limits are set by the Soviets' estimate of France's political and military potential as what is really no more than a second-class power compared to the United States and the Soviet Union. They are also drawn from France's regard for economic realities, and the fact that if she wants to play an important role in Europe, France will not want to do without its economically and numerically stronger German neighbour.

President de Gaulle does rule autocratically, but, after all, he never goes beyond the point where he is sure of the approval of the majority of Frenchmen. This applies also in his policy of aloofness from America. But it is very doubtful that the French people would follow him if they began to see France becoming more and more isolated from the West and the Common Market possibly collapsing. French farmers would be particularly hard hit if this were to happen.

A "reversal of the Alliance", however, would not be without its effect on the EEC, where the Federal Republic would then see itself bound to draw the consequences from this

Continued on page 2



Name of Paper Tribune

File No. _____

Published at Hamburg Date 30-4-66

President de Gaulle's vision of Europe

Continued from page 1

action. Moreover, history never repeats itself to such an extent that former alliances can simply be renewed. A security agreement like the one President de Gaulle signed with Stalin in 1944 is probably just as unworthy of serious consideration today as would be a new "Rapallo".

Though the Federal Republic may be far from being President de Gaulle's favourite any longer, though the first bloom of 1963 may well have faded and the Federal Republic have grown more suspicious of the General, it is still completely fantastic to consider

France allied and collaborating with the Soviet Union.

Yet all plans to bring about a general rapprochement between Western and Eastern Europe deserve the closest attention. It is not only President de Gaulle's plans that point in this direction. He has merely made himself their chief spokesman.

For some time now, since the days of John F. Kennedy in fact, American policy planners have been considering a new pan-European security system. The Viet Nam conflict, however, has caused a rift between Washington and Moscow. President de Gaulle is exploiting this situation for his

own purposes in the assumption that Russia might be interested in a solution that would free her from military and political pressure on her western borders, interested because of the threatening rise of China and nationalist tendencies in the Eastern European countries.

Political journalism in the West is already touching upon a new play for Germany and her future status in Europe. Even in the Federal Republic more and more experts regard reunification as possible only in conjunction with a security agreement between Western and Eastern Europe. "Reunification... will only be possible

within the united Europe and with the dissolution of national borders," Herr Franz Josef Strauss has recently written in the Viennese newspaper, *Neues Forum*.

Herr Strauss insists, however, that as a preliminary stage a Western European confederation would be necessary. Should this founder on France's attitude, however, Moscow would prevent as stubbornly as ever the formation of a united Europe containing a united Germany.

So the vicious circle in Europe is far from being broken. Whether President de Gaulle's will or power is strong enough to smash it here or there remains to be seen. Any attempt to make a forecast would be idle speculation.

Ernst Ulrich Fromm




RESTRICTED

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

Memo No.: 642
File No.: 202/1

26th May 1966



The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

French Public Opinion on France's
National Interests

..... ENCLOSURES ATTACHED
We attach an article from France-Soir/Paris-Presse for 8th-9th May 1966 which reports the results of a public opinion poll by the Institut Français d'Opinion Publique on French opinion on the country's basic national interests. The poll was taken between 7th and 23rd April, that is, about a month after General de Gaulle's decision to withdraw from N.A.T.O. had been made known. In general the reputation of French public opinion polls has risen recently in consequence of the accuracy of the forecasts they made of results in the Presidential elections.


2. The poll revealed a fall here in the prestige of the United States. Only 22 per cent. of those interviewed had a high degree of confidence in United States ability "to direct Western affairs with wisdom", compared with 33 per cent. in 1963. Thirty-five per cent. thought that France and the United States had "close" fundamental interests, compared with 51 per cent. in 1964. On the other hand, 54 per cent. said France's interests were close to those of Great Britain. (A question on this subject was not asked in 1964.)

3. Opinion on relations with the Soviet Union was harder to judge. Some 34 per cent. thought that French and Russian fundamental interests were close (a rise from 22 per cent. in 1964). Nine per cent. (a rise from 7 per cent. in May 1965) thought France should "side" with the Soviet Union. (In this latter respect the United States still had the larger following in France, the corresponding percentages being 19, in 1966, and 14, in 1965.) On the other hand, the number who favoured a general treaty of co-operation with the U.S.S.R. fell from 66 per cent. in 1965 to 55 per cent. at the latest poll.

4. At a time when great official emphasis is being placed on France's need for independence, it is interesting to note that answers to the question: "Personally, taking into account the present world situation, do you think that France

...../...

d. W. [signature]
for



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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

Page 2.

should, on the whole, be on the side of the United States, of the U.S.S.R., or on neither side?" revealed that a slightly larger percentage had "taken sides" since May 1965. As mentioned above, the percentage of those questioned siding with the United States rose from 14 to 19 per cent. and the corresponding figure for the Soviet Union rose to 9 per cent., while the number who favoured taking neither side fell from 62 to 57 per cent.

5. You will notice, however, that France-Soir comments that the poll shows that the French are separating themselves more and more from the United States (mainly because of the latter's involvement in Viet Nam). It is also interesting to see the article's comment that N.A.T.O. problems have played a part in this process of separation because French policy on N.A.T.O. enjoys the support of a very large part of public opinion (a view with which we would agree).

G.B.F.
(G. B. Feakes)
Counsellor

RESTRICTED

8/9-5-66

57% DES FRANÇAIS NE VEULENT ÊTRE NI POUR MOSCOU NI POUR LES U.S.A.

indique un sondage de l'Institut Français d'Opinion Publique

Le sondage ci-dessous sur les rapports de la France avec les Etats-Unis, la Grande-Bretagne et l'U.R.S.S. a été effectué par l'Institut français d'opinion pu-

blique (IFOP) du 7 au 23 avril, c'est-à-dire juste un mois après que le général de Gaulle ait décidé de retirer la France de l'intégration militaire etlan-

tique, et pendant le débat de l'Assemblée nationale consacré à l'OTAN. On peut donc présumer que les personnes interrogées

connaissent la décision du général de Gaulle et en ont tenu compte dans leur prise de position. A côté, voici les réul-

QUESTION : En pensant aux problèmes internationaux actuels, quel degré de confiance avez-vous dans les Etats-Unis pour diriger avec sagesse les affaires occidentales ?

	Avril 1966	Juillet 1965
Très grande confiance	2 %	3 %
Assez grande confiance	22 %	33 %
Pas très confiance	23 %	36 %
Très peu confiance	23 %	17 %
Ne se prononcent pas	21 %	28 %
	100 %	100 %

2

QUESTION : A votre avis, est-ce que les intérêts fondamentaux de la France et de l'U.R.S.S. sont très voisins, plutôt voisins, plutôt différents, très différents ?

		Avril 1966	Avril 1964
VOISINS	Très	5 %	4 %
	Plutôt	29 %	18 %
DIFFERENTS	Plutôt	30 %	37 %
	Très	13 %	20 %
Ne se prononcent pas		23 %	21 %
		100 %	100 %

Et les intérêts fondamentaux de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne ?

		Avril 1966	Avril 1964
VOISINS	Très	10 %	11 %
	Plutôt	44 %	40 %
DIFFERENTS	Très	19 %	26 %
	Plutôt	5 %	8 %
Ne se prononcent pas		22 %	15 %
		100 %	100 %

(La question n'avait pas été posée en 1964.)

Et les intérêts fondamentaux de la France et des Etats-Unis ?

		Avril 1966	Avril 1964
VOISINS	Très	5 %	11 %
	Plutôt	30 %	40 %
DIFFERENTS	Plutôt	31 %	26 %
	Très	12 %	8 %
Ne se prononcent pas		22 %	15 %
		100 %	100 %

QUESTION : Personnellement, compte tenu de la situation mondiale actuelle, pensez-vous que la France devrait, dans l'ensemble, être du côté des Etats-Unis, de l'U.R.S.S., ou ni d'un côté ni de l'autre ?

	Avril 1966	Rappel mai 1965
Du côté des Etats-Unis	19 %	14 %
Du côté de l'U.R.S.S.	9 %	7 %
Ni d'un côté ni de l'autre	57 %	62 %
Ne se prononcent pas	15 %	17 %
	100 %	100 %

QUESTION : Seriez-vous favorable ou défavorable à la signature d'un traité général de coopération entre la France et l'U.R.S.S. ?

	Avril 1966	Rappel nov. 1965
Favorables	55 %	66 %
Défavorables	20 %	10 %
Ne se prononcent pas	25 %	24 %
	100 %	100 %

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Les Français veulent se « désengager »

Trois faits se dégagent des chiffres publiés par l'I.F.O.P. :

1 LES FRANÇAIS SE DETACHENT DE PLUS EN PLUS DES ETATS-UNIS.

En deux ans, pour la première question, en un an pour la seconde, les pourcentages ont évolué dans un sens défavorable aux Américains.

Pour la seconde question notamment (intérêts voisins ou non) il est probable que c'est l'engagement de plus en plus grand des Etats-Unis dans la guerre du Vietnam et l'évolution de la politique étrangère américaine en fonction de cette guerre, qui ont provoqué le renversement spectaculaire des pourcentages entre 1965 et 1966.

Le problème de l'O.T.A.N. a dû également jouer un rôle dans cette évolution, la politique de la France dans ce domaine ayant l'appui d'une très large partie de l'opinion.

2 LES FRANÇAIS SE RAPPROCHENT DE L'URSS MAIS AVEC PRUDENCE.

Entre 1964 et 1966, les chiffres ont évolué très nettement en faveur des Soviétiques, mais sans un renversement de majorité. Il apparaît, d'autre part que, pris dans leur ensemble, les Français sont un peu moins favorables en avril 1966 qu'en novembre 1965 à la signature d'un traité de coopération avec l'U.R.S.S.

3 LES FRANÇAIS SOUSHAIENT AVANT TOUT ET D'UNE FAÇON CONSTANTE PRENDRE DU CHAMP A L'EGARD DES DEUX GRANDS BLOCS.

La légère évolution en sens inverse qu'on peut constater entre mai 1965 et avril 1966 est due sans doute à la crise de l'Alliance atlantique provoquant chez certains Français des prises de position plus « engagées ».

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM *F25/1/1*

VB.

I.26779

FROM.

DATED: 30TH MAY, 1966.
2235 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS:

REC'D: 30TH MAY, 1966.
2237 LT

1598.

CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 163 WASHINGTON 59.
REPEATED BANGKOK MISC. 18.
REPEATED MANILA MISC. 19.

FROM WALKER.

S.E.A.T.O. AND FRENCH-THAI RELATIONS.

WHEN I SAW MANAC'H ON 27TH MAY, HE INTRODUCED THE SUBJECT OF THE SEATO COUNCIL MEETING.

AFTER CONFIRMING THAT FRANCE WILL BE REPRESENTED BY OBSERVERS ONLY (CLARAC AT THE COUNCIL AND RODIER AT THE MILITARY ADVISERS' MEETING) MANAC'H SAID THE FRENCH HAD APPROACHED THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, NEW ZEALAND AND PAKISTAN EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE OCCASION OF THE COUNCIL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN (AS AT MANILA AND LONDON) FOR CRITICISM OF ONE MEMBER BY OTHERS.

HE SAID THEY HAD NOT APPROACHED AUSTRALIA ON THIS MATTER AS WE WERE THE HOST COUNTRY AND OUR COURTESY WAS WELL KNOWN.

THEIR CONCERN WAS OVER THE POSSIBLE ATTITUDE OF THE THAI AND PHILIPPINE DELEGATIONS.

THANAT KHOMAN'S CRITICISM OF FRANCE IN THE PUBLIC OPENING SESSION IN 1964 HAD MADE A VERY PAINFUL IMPRESSION ON M. COUVE DE MURVILLE.

FRANCE DESIRED AS MUCH AS ANY MEMBER TO PREVENT SOUTH VIETNAM FALLING UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL: SHE DIFFERED ONLY ON THE METHODS.

2. MANAC'H SAID ALL FOUR GOVERNMENTS APPROACHED HAD RESPONDED AGREEING THAT THE OCCASION SHOULD NOT BE USED TO PUT ANY MEMBER GOVERNMENT UNDER ACCUSATION.

THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD EXPRESSED REGRET THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT BE REPRESENTED BY A DELEGATION AUTHORISED TO EXPOUND THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THE CONTRIBUTION OF A FRENCH DELEGATION WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL.

('VERY NICE OF OUR ENGLISH FRIENDS', MANAC'H COMMENTED.)

FURTHER THE UNITED KINGDOM HAD REPORTED A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BANGKOK AND THANAT KHOMAN IN WHICH THE LATTER HAD AFFIRMED THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF EXPRESSING CRITICISM OF FRENCH POLICY ON THIS OCCASION.

3. I ASKED MANAC'H WHAT FRANCE'S RELATIONS WITH THAILAND WERE LIKE TODAY.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

VB.

-2-

I.26779

HE REPLIED THAT THEY WERE REASONABLY GOOD THOUGH RATHER COOL.

HE MENTIONED THE RECENT OPENING OF A FRENCH CULTURAL INSTITUTE AT WHICH THANAT KHOMAN HAD MADE A VERY FRIENDLY SPEECH AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE WERE VARIOUS CURRENTS WITHIN THE THAI GOVERNMENT.

THANAT KHOMAN HAD RECENTLY TOLD THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD URGED THE DESPATCH OF TROOPS TO VIETNAM (IN ADDITION TO THE SMALL NAVAL UNIT SUPPLIED) BUT THE PRIME MINISTER THANOM HAD REFUSED TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL.

MANAC'H SAID SOME MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT SUCH AS THE PRIME MINISTER AND OF 'COURSE' PRINC WAN HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE GROWTH OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN THAILAND (NOW AMOUNTING TO FROM 12000 TO 18000 SOLDIERS) WHICH THEY FELT REDUCED THAILAND'S FUTURE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE ('THE THAIS TRADITIONALLY SEEK TO HAVE TWO CARDS TO PLAY'.)

THEY WERE ALSO CONCERNED OVER THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INCREASED MILITARY PRESENCE IN TERMS OF CORRUPTION AND IMMORALITY IN BANGKOK RESEMBLING, THOUGH STILL IN A MUCH LESS PRONOUNCED FORM, THE SOCIAL SITUATION IN SAIGON AS DEPICTED IN GUILLAIN'S RECENT ARTICLES IN LE MONDE.

(M PLEASE ADVISE COMMUNICATIONS
DUTY OFFICER WHETHER TELEGRAPHIC
RETRANSMISSION TO BANGKOK & MANILA
IS DESIRED.)

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

31ST MAY, 1966.

SEC	DEP SEC	FAS(1)	S&SEA	M&I	M@	DL	SAMT	MT@
FAS(2)	PACAM	AMSP	PPO	FAS(3)	AS(JIC)	INT	C&P	
ICR	PIO	L&T	FAS(4)	EAMEC	E	SAS(MS)		

BANGKOK	KARACHI	KUALA LUMPUR	MANILA	NEW DELHI	NEW YORK (UN)
PHNOM PENH	SAIGON	SEOUL	SINGAPORE	TOKYO	VIENTIANE
WELLINGTON					

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JDF

I.26740

FROM:

DATED: 28TH MAY, 1966
1309 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 30TH MAY, 1966
2308 LT

1599. CONFIDENTIAL.

F25/1/1

REPEATED LONDON 164 WASHINGTON 60 SAIGON 2.

FROM WALKER. VIETNAM CHINA, USSR AND ROUMANIA.

COMMENTING ON RECENT EVENTS IN DANANG, MANAC'H SAID (27TH MAY) MARSHAL KY HAD GAINED A SUCCESS ON THE SURFACE, THAT IS ON THE MILITARY LEVEL, BUT HAD ISOLATED HIMSELF FURTHER FROM THE POPULATION.

MR RUSH HAD TOLD THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR THAT THE AMERICANS HAD BEEN SHOCKED BY KY'S OPERATION AND WERE USING ALL THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT FURTHER DETERIORATION OF THE DOMESTIC SITUATION.

APPARENTLY (SAID MANAC'H) THEY WERE PRESSING KY TO BE MODERATE AND THE BUDDHISTS TO BE CALM, WITH THE RENEWED PROMISE OF ELECTIONS AS THE BASIS OF A COMPROMISE.

2. THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR WHO RECENTLY RETURNED TO PARIS HAD HAD INTERVIEWS WITH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AND M. COUVREUR DE MURVILLE AND HAD EXPOUNDED THE CHINESE POSITION IN THE SAME TERMS AS PREVIOUSLY, NAMELY, WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND RECOGNITION OF THE NATIONAL FRONT AS THE ONLY TRUE REPRESENTATIVE OF SOUTH VIETNAM, BEING IN CHINESE EYES THE ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITES TO ANY NEGOTIATION, THOUGH THE PROBLEM IS REALLY ONE FOR HANOI IF THEY WANT TO WORK IT OUT DIFFERENTLY THAT IS THEIR BUSINESS. THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE UNITED STATES IN GENEVA, PRAGUE, AND WARSAW FOR 10 YEARS WITHOUT AVAIL. THE UNITED STATES ENVISAGES CARRYING THE WAR INTO CHINA. THE CHINESE WOULD NOT THEMSELVES ATTACK THE AMERICANS BUT THEY WERE PREPARED FOR THE WAR.

3. NEVERTHELESS, SAID MANAC'H, THE FRENCH HAVE GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT PEKING HAS RECENTLY BECOME SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED WITH HANOI BECAUSE HANOI IS SHOWING INCREASING SIGNS OF INDEPENDENCE, ENCOURAGED BY ROUMANIA.

HE REFERRED TO A RECENT ROUMANIAN MISSION TO HANOI (OSTENSIBLY TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS ABOUT SOVIET AID DELIVERIES) WHICH ISSUED A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH NORTH VIETNAM DECLARING THE RIGHT OF GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNIST PARTIES TO MAKE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT DECISIONS ON MILITARY AND ECONOMIC MATTERS.

4. THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR TOLD MANAC'H AT DINNER TWO DAYS AGO THAT CHOU EN-LAI'S PROJECTED VISIT TO BUCAREST IS TO TAKE PLACE BUT THE DATE HAS NOT YET BEEN FIXED.

MANAC'H SAW THREE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING REASONS FOR THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE VISIT.

(A) DISPLEASURE WITH THE ROUMANIANS WHO WHILE RESISTING BREZNEV'S PRESSURE TO ACCEPT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTEGRATION, WERE ENCOURAGING HANOI TO BE EQUALLY MORE INDEPENDENT TOWARDS CHINA.

...2/

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

MB.

- 2 -

1.26740.

(B) A DESIRE TO VISIT CAIRO TO OFFSET THE EFFECTS OF KOS'YGIN'S OUTSPOKEN ATTACKS ON CHINA IN HIS RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH NASSER, AND

(C) A DESIRE TO COMBINE THE VISIT TO RUMANIA WITH WIDER EUROPEAN CONTACTS (MANAC'H SAID IN STRICT CONFIDENCE - PLEASE PROTECT - THAT THE DANISH AMBASSADOR IN PEKING HAD TOLD THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR THE CHINESE RECENTLY SOUGHT AN INVITATION FOR CHEN YI TO VISIT COPENHAGEN, AND THE MATTER HAD NOT YET BEEN DECIDED.)

5. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION, MANAC'H SAID THAT THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR HAD CONFIRMED THAT WHEN HE WAS IN PEKING THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT CONSULTATION AMONG AMBASSADORS CALLED IN FROM MANY POSTS ABROAD.

MANAC'H WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO MAO TSE TUNG IS NOW UNDER WAY BETWEEN CHOU EN-LAI AND CHEN PENG, A THIRD CONTESTANT (WHOSE NAME ESCAPES ME) HAVING BEEN ALREADY PUSHED ASIDE. ALL THIS AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF UNREST AMONG THE YOUTH AND THE MODERN TECHNICALLY MINDED ELEMENTS IN THE ARMED FORCES.

HE SAID FRENCH EXPERTS HAVE JUST COMPLETED A COMPREHENSIVE PAPER ANALYSING THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CHINA, WHICH HE PROMISED TO SHOW ME NEXT WEEK, AFTER IT HAS BEEN SEEN BY M. COUVE DE MURVILLE.

(M PLEASE ADVISE COMMUNICATIONS DUTY OFFICER WHETHER TELEGRAPHIC RETRANSMISSION TO SAIGON IS DESIRED)

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
HON. W. MCMAHON
SIR ROLAND WILSON
MR C. HEWITT
P.M.'s

31ST MAY, 1966.

SEC	DS	FAS(1)	S&SEA	M@	DL	SAMT	FAS(2)	UN	PACAM	EA
AMSP	FAS(3)	AS(JIC)	INT	ICR	PIO	FAS(4)	EAMEC	E	SAS(MS)	
BANGKOK	BONN	HONG KONG	KARACHI	MOSCOW	NEW DELHI	NEW YORK (UN)				
OTTAWA	PARIS	PHNOM PENH	SAIGON	SINGAPORE	TOKYO	VIENTIANE				
WASHINGTON										

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS **CONFIDENTIAL**
INWARD CABLEGRAM

EM

I.255525

FROM:

DATED: 23RD MAY, 1966
1853 LT

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

REC'D: 24TH MAY, 1966
0700 LT

4991. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED SAVINGRAM WASHINGTON, PARIS.

FROM EXTERNAL.

YOUR TELEGRAM 2842 - N.A.T.O.

ACCORDING TO PRESS SUMMARY, CHALFONT SAID THAT DE GAULLE'S "ILL-ADVISED" N.A.T.O. POLICY WEAKENED THE WEST'S BARGAINING POSITION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, SINCE THE LATTER WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE EFFECTIVELY WITH AN ORGANISATION IN DISARRAY.

Mr HOWEVER, GAULLIST LONG-TERM AIMS WERE ADMIRABLE.

N.A.T.O. SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED PERMANENTLY AS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE, SINCE THIS WOULD RESULT IN A CHANCE OF RESOLVING THE COLD WAR BEING MISSED.

IT SHOULD EVOLVE INTO AN ORGANISATION THAT WAS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING WITH THE EAST.

"IF WE REMAIN LOCKED IN THE PRESENT COLD WAR ATTITUDE, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL WHAT HAPPENS IN CHINA."

2. ON DISARMAMENT, HE SAID THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WAS INHIBITED BY THE SOVIET UNION'S POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTE WITH CHINA, AND WESTERN EUROPE'S PROBLEMS IN RESHAPING N.A.T.O. IN THE WAKE OF THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL.

THE NEXT YEAR COULD BE CRITICAL IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL, AND THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD THEREFORE TAKE POSSIBLE RISKS AND AGREE TO A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND A BAN ON UNDERGROUND TESTING.

3. CHALFONT'S REMARKS DO NOT APPEAR TO INDICATE ANY SHIFT IN THE BRITISH POSITION ON N.A.T.O., HIS STATEMENT, WHICH THE 'ECONOMIST' SAYS 'HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH THE RE-ORGANISATION OF N.A.T.O. THOUGH MUCH WITH ITS FUTURE OUTLOOK', ASSUMES THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF A UNIFIED ORGANISATION.

HIS PARTICULAR APPROACH TO THE N.A.T.O. PROBLEM DERIVES FROM HIS OVERRIDING CONCERN WITH THE NEED TO CONCLUDE AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE A NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT ON WHICH NO PROGRESS CAN BE MADE WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR SHARING ARRANGEMENTS IN N.A.T.O.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

24TH MAY, 1966.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) S&SEA DL FAS(2) UN PACAM FAS(3)
AS(JIC) INT ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E SAS(MS)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1

HG.

I.24698

FROM:

DATED: 18TH MAY, 1966
1900 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

REC'D: 19TH MAY, 1966
1040 LT

1919 CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA, REPEATED LONDON 154, PARIS 17
MOSCOW MISC 312.

FURTHER TO OUR SAVING 360 OF 8TH MAY.
BARBOUR (FRENCH DESK) SAID TODAY THAT AN INTERESTING FEATURE
OF COUVE'S VISIT TO ROUMANIA AND BULGARIA HAD BEEN THE VERY
CORRECT AND RESTRAINED RECEPTION GIVEN BY THE FORMER AS
COMPARED TO THE RATHER UNEXPECTED EFFUSIVE WELCOME FROM THE
LATTER.

2. THE ROUMANIANS RECEPTION OF COUVE HAS BEEN INTERPRETED AS
INDICATIVE OF THEIR WISH THAT ANY MOVE MADE BY THEM WITHIN THE WARSAW
PACT IS ENTIRELY AT THEIR OWN INITIATIVE AND NOT IN ANY WAY RELATED
TO THAT OF THE FRENCH IN NATO.

IT NOW SEEMS LIKELY THAT, IF IN FACT THE NOTE REPORTED TO HAVE
BEEN CIRCULATED IN MOSCOW IS OF ROUMANIAN ORIGIN (SEE OUR TEL 1901)
IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IN PREPARATION OR WOULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED WHEN
COUVE WAS IN BUCHAREST.

THE STIFFNESS OF THE ROUMANIAN RECEPTION WOULD SEEM
CONSISTENT WITH THE FACT THAT THE ROUMANIANS DID CIRCULATE THE
NOTE AND THAT THEY ARE ANXIOUS NOT TO GIVE AN IMPRESSION THAT THEY
ARE BEING INFLUENCED BY ANYONE ELSE, E.G., FRANCE.

3. BARBOUR SAID NOTHING OF ANY SPECIFIC NATURE HAD BEEN ACHIEVED
BY COUVE IN ROUMANIA AND BULGARIA.

THIS HAD BEEN ACCORDING TO PLAN.

WHILE IN BUCHAREST COUVE WAS TOLD THAT ROUMANIA UNDERSTOOD
THE FRENCH POINT OF VIEW ABOUT NATO AND THAT LIKE FRANCE,
ROUMANIA OPPOSED THE STATIONING OF FOREIGN TROOPS ON HER SOIL.

THE ROUMANIANS HAD BEEN NO MORE SPECIFIC THAN THIS.

4. AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE ROUMANIAN AUTHORSHIP OF THE NOTE,
BARBOUR ATTACHED SOME SIGNIFICANCE TO THE AFP REPORT OF TODAY
WHICH STATES THAT "EAST EUROPEAN SOURCES IN MOSCOW" HAD EXPRESSED
SURPRISE AT THE ROUMANIAN DENIAL YESTERDAY THAT THE NOTE HAD ITS
ORIGINS IN BUCHAREST.

HE INTERPRETED THIS TO BE A PRETTY GOOD INDICATION THAT IN
FACT THE ROUMANIANS HAD CIRCULATED THE NOTE.

5. BARBOUR SAID HE HAD SEEN AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT WHICH SAID
THAT THE ROUMANIANS VIEWED THEIR RELATIONS WITH FRANCE ON A
COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY BASIS WHEREAS THE FRENCH APPROACH TOWARDS
ROUMANIA WAS IN A BROAD EAST/WEST CONTEXT. ✓

THE ROUMANIANS WERE ANXIOUS TO KEEP GOOD RELATIONS WITH FRANCE
AND FOR THIS THEY WERE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE SOMEWHAT
STRINGENT TERMS UNDER WHICH VARIOUS CONTRACTS WERE NOW OPERATING.

...2

F

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

HG.

- 2 -

I.24698

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

19TH MAY, 1966


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SEC DS FAS(1) DL FAS(2) UN PACAM AMSP FAS(3)
AS(JIC) INT ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E@ SAS(MS)
LONDON MOSCOW PARIS



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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.Memo No. 517
File No. 202/1

3rd May, 1966

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.25/1/1
25/2French Prime Minister's Address to National Assembly

On 13th April M. Pompidou made a declaration of the Government's policy in the National Assembly. Set out below is a summary. Le Monde dated 15th April has printed the main passages.

Internal PolicyConstitution

2. M. Pompidou welcomed the censure motion deposited by the Opposition, (see our memorandum No. 512) which, he said, would "give the debate its full constitutional significance" in conformity with the 1958 Constitution. In this regard, he said that the 1965 presidential elections had shown that "if all the French people do not necessarily vote for de Gaulle (they) all attach the greatest importance to their right to choose directly the President of the Republic", and therefore had settled the question of whether or not the "supreme head of the executive, the inspirer of the major lines of French policy, the judge of governmental decision, should be the President of the Republic".

The Government

3. M. Pompidou said that the extensive Government reshuffle which followed the presidential elections was not caused by personal or policy disagreements. He considered that "stability should not exclude renewal and in the light of experience, a remaking of the structure of the Government had appeared desirable". M. Pompidou referred to the abolition of the Secretariat of State for Algerian Affairs and the Ministry of Cooperation, and the creation of Ministries of Equipment and Social Affairs. He said that the change in title to Ministry of the Economy and Finances (previously ^{regret} Finance and Economic Affairs) was significant. He expressed for M. Giscard d'Estaing's departure from the Government, but ^x hoped one day to see him again "directing the affairs of the country".

Ref. to ER

Economic and Financial Policy

4. M. Pompidou repeated that the Government's policy was based on two principles: maintaining a strong and stable currency, and expansion by the development and renewal of industrial equipment. In the field of incomes policy he

../foreshadowed

Mr Woodberry
ISW



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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

- 2 -

foreshadowed a Government bill which would assure the workers a share in non-distributed profits without compromising re-investment programmes.

Foreign Policy

Principles

5. M. Pompidou noted that as far as the Common Market was concerned France was ready "to open in due course the Common Market to neighbouring countries ready to accept its disciplines and notably Great Britain".

6. France did not forget its 200 years of friendship with the United States, whose "power is today still essential to the security of the Western world", and wished to maintain the 1949 alliance. But above all, he said, France wanted to be able to have its own policies, to assume its own responsibilities and so on.

Common Market

7. M. Pompidou recalled France's "intransigence" on questions of "the structure of Europe, of the competence of the Commission and the Council of Ministers", and of each country's need to be able to defend its vital interests, but reaffirmed that France wished to promote the Common Market as a whole, and looked beyond the customs union, to the setting up of a common economic policy. France was also ready to help the Kennedy Round forward, but all this depended on the setting up of the agricultural Common Market.

General de Gaulle's Visit to U.S.S.R.

8. M. Pompidou said that General de Gaulle's visit to the U.S.S.R. - returning the visit to France by Mr. Khrushchev - in no way represented a "reversal of alliances", but formed part of the French policy line of developing relations with "all countries, whatever their regime" and of fostering East-West relations. The constant improvement of relations with the U.S.S.R. was helping to "dissipate the climate of the cold war".

N.A.T.O.

9. M. Pompidou explained the French attitude to the present N.A.T.O. situation in the usual terms: conviction that none of the other allies were ready to discuss a real reform of the Organization; continued adherence to the Alliance; readiness to discuss the modalities for the withdrawal of bases and means of common action in case of "conflict within the framework of the Alliance"; evolution of the international situation since the Fifties. M. Pompidou dealt at some length with French objections to the "graduated response" (or "flexible response") strategy which, without French approval,

../had



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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

- 3 -

had progressively taken the place within N.A.T.O. of the "immediate massive reprisal" strategy. The former strategy, he said, would ensure the destruction of France: it would not discourage a determined aggressor and so would leave France open to invasion from which it would eventually be liberated by American atomic weapons with the certainty that whatever escaped destruction in the first place would be wiped out in the second.

10. France therefore preferred a system which would allow her to maintain her independence and to rely on her own atomic force to dissuade an eventual aggressor, while co-operating fully with her allies.

(11. In a separate memorandum we are giving a summary of the main speeches that were made in the National Assembly on the debate following on M. Pompidou's statement.)

Germany

12. M. Pompidou said he understood the reasons for German reactions to France's action in N.A.T.O. France had confidence in the German leaders and was ready to discuss the problem of stationing French troops in Germany. General de Gaulle's trip to Moscow would help to improve relations with the U.S.S.R. (which was the only way to achieve German reunification) and so served German interests as well as world peace.

13. Copies of this memorandum have been sent to London, Washington, Bonn and Brussels.

(C.A. Edwards)
Second Secretary

FROM:
AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE
NOUMEA.

AUSTRALIAN CONSULATE, NOUMEA

I. 212 72

File: 201.2.1

INWARD SAVINGRAM

SAVINGRAM TO:

SENT: 25.4.66

RECD: 3rd May 1966.

The Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA

NO. 1/66

SAV. No. 1

F25/1/1

Repeated to: London 2, Paris, 3, Suva 4, Washington 5, Wellington 6.

CONFIDENTIAL

FRENCH POLICY IN NEW CALEDONIA

On 15th April prior to leaving for a tour of Papua-New Guinea and a visit to Canberra, I called on the High Commissioner to obtain an up to date and authoritative statement of French policy in New Caledonia, and in the Pacific more generally. (I also wished to apologise for being absent from Noumea during the Anzac Day ceremonies in which I had invited him to participate.)

2. Although I had sought an interview of only 15 minutes, the High Commissioner kept me for an hour. As soon as I mentioned my visit to Papua and New Guinea, he said that Australian policy in Papua and New Guinea and French policy in New Caledonia were very different. He wished to speak frankly.

3. New Caledonia was and would remain French. The High Commissioner said that the French Government believed that colonialism was finished and that Territories must either be given independence, or closely associated with the Metropolitan power. There was no question of independence for New Caledonia; it would gradually become, in fact in most senses it was already, a Department of France. There was of course no reason why an Overseas Department should not have certain special local arrangements, but integration would be substantial. It was essential that education should become a part of the Metropolitan system and this had just been achieved here for secondary and higher education.

4. The reasons for this French policy, the High Commissioner explained, were many. Firstly, the population had a large European element (part of which was born in the Territory) and the native people constituted only about a half of the total population. Secondly, independence was not a practical proposition. The small population, isolation, size and limited resources of the Territory did not permit the creation of a viable independent state. Thirdly, the "egoism" of New Caledonia is French; the people are and wish to remain French; France wants New Caledonia to remain a member of the family. Fourthly, there was a real danger of serious racial strife in the Territory.

5. While there had not been many serious racial incidents in recent years, relations between the native people and the Caledonians (of European French origin) was one of uneasy truce. There was no doubt that many powerful Caledonians wished to keep the natives down; the natives were aware of this and would not accept it. The Administration (the Metropolitan French) were in a sense "disinterested"; they were, therefore, able to follow suitable policies and to assure calm and security.

6. The High Commissioner emphasised that in undertaking this task France was helping Australia. This cost France a great deal. New Caledonia was vital to Australian defence; if France were to fail or to withdraw, Australia would have to take over; she could not afford to allow an unstable, unviable independence to continue, since this would inevitably lead to a take over by Indonesia, Japan, China or some other power. I told the High Commissioner that there was substantial recognition of this in Australia, and that when we spoke in warm terms of the French presence in the Pacific we were not merely being polite.

CONFIDENTIAL

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INWARD SAVINGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL
I.21272

7. (It is rare to hear people here speaking of poor race relations, or even of a potentially dangerous situation. However, it is my belief that in a very few years, if the European population does not keep pace with the growth of the native population, the racial situation could be extremely difficult.)
8. The High Commissioner explained his approach to the problem. At present the tribus (or small reserved native areas grouping 4 to 10 families) were sufficient for the next 20 years or so. One or two tribus were overcrowded and some 20 out of well over a hundred would become so; but suitable adjustments could be made. Within the majority of tribus themselves, there was exploitable land which was not being worked. A Commission would be appointed to study the question.
9. One of the unfortunate features of New Caledonia at present was that the natives leaving the tribus were "lost"; they did not know how to live or conduct themselves in urban society; drunkenness and other social problems were serious. His aim over the next 5 years (he hoped to remain in charge that long) was to provide a good standard of primary education to all natives throughout the Territory and its Dependencies. The take over by France of responsibility for secondary education would release the necessary funds for this purpose. Every capable student would be encouraged to go to high school. There are at present only about 40 Melanesian students at secondary level; some of them were showing promise, they would be the elite of tomorrow. He believed that the spread of education would gradually prepare the next generation for full participation in urban life and the work force of the Territory; they would be able to hold their own with Europeans; the tribus would gradually become places for the aged.
10. Returning to New Guinea, I suggested to the High Commissioner that it was not so much that French and Australian policies were different, as that the problems were different. As he had pointed out, New Caledonia was a small area with a small population, half of which was non-native, and which was clearly unviable. In New Guinea we were faced with an enormous area, a growing population already 2 million and in close proximity to Australia. Our ~~own~~ population was only 12 million. For us to attempt to incorporate Papua and New Guinea into Australia would create more problems than it would solve.
11. We were therefore giving anxious thought to alternative solutions such as internal self-government, combined with a special relationship with Australia in defence, foreign affairs and economic matters. We were attempting to establish as quickly as possible sound basic political institutions and habits, but not so quickly as to lead to instability. I left with the High Commissioner the text of the statement by the Minister for Territories in the House of Representatives on 31st March, 1966.
12. The High Commissioner referred to the possibility of a greater Melanesia and of inappropriate ideas spreading down from New Guinea to New Caledonia. I suggested that there was no possibility in the foreseeable future of any greater Melanesian Federation; the differences between Territories and between peoples were enormous. It was not impossible, of course, that in the long run some association may be formed between Papua and New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. There had been regular contact for a very long time between the two territories. There seemed however no likelihood of any constitutional association, for example, between the Solomon Islands and Fiji.
13. Fiji, the High Commissioner thought, was the greatest problem in the Pacific. He believed that the present almost even balance of the two races and their own internal differences would avoid a major breakdown for the time being - but for how long?

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INWARD ³SAVINGRAM

I. 21272

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14. (I did not mention to the High Commissioner, but I did later during a brief call on the Secretary-General of New Caledonia, my surprise at the fact that France had no representative in Fiji and that Britain had no career representative in New Caledonia. The Secretary-General took the point thoughtfully, commenting that the French Territories were of course not uninterested in developments in the British territories.)

15. I referred to the useful, practical, regional role of the South Pacific Commission and asked what the High Commission thought of the British proposals. He said they were completely unacceptable; some slight adaptation of present arrangements might be possible. Greater participation by the Territories had already started.

16. In conclusion the High Commissioner referred to French determination to maintain the Condominium in the New Hebrides, adding that the future of the Group was perhaps the least clear of any territory in the Pacific. (A separate report by memorandum is being sent on this subject.)

17. Copies of this savingram have been sent to London, Paris, Suva, Washington, Wellington.

MIN & DEPT EA
MIN & DEPT DEFENCE

3rd May, 1966.

[Signature]
I. E. NICHOLSON.

SEC DEP SEC FAS(1) S&SEA DL FAS(2) UN PACAM ANSP FAS(3)
ICR PIO FAS(4) EAMEC E SAS(MS)

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

F25/1/1 209

MB.

I.20852.

FROM:

DATED: 29TH APRIL, 1966.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 30TH APRIL, 1966
0456 LT

1226. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 121, WASHINGTON 48.

S.E.A.T.O.

OUR 1167.

SECRETARY-GENERAL OF FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTRY (ALPHAND) TOLD ME AT LUNCH FOR VARGAS ON 25TH APRIL THAT NO DECISION HAD YET BEEN REACHED ON FRENCH REPRESENTATION AT S.E.A.T.O. MEETING IN CANBERRA.

HE SAID THAT DELAY IN REACHING DECISION AROSE FROM VERY FULL PROGRAMME ON WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ENGAGED.
(HE IS NOW IN BULGARIA).

ALPHAND SAID THAT FRENCH APPRECIATED THAT WE NEEDED EARLY ADVICE FROM THEM IF ONLY TO FACILITATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE.

HE CLEARLY IMPLIED THAT CHOICE LAY BETWEEN SENDING AN OBSERVER AND NOT SENDING ANYONE AT ALL.

FEAKES.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'s

30TH APRIL, 1966.

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SEC DS FAS(1) S&SEA M&I M DL MT FAS(2) PACAM AMSP PPO
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
208
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS

Memo No. 408

5th April, 1966

File No. 225/3

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.




Eastern Europe

Our memorandum No. 388 of 31st March refers.

2. It was reported in Le Monde dated 6th April that the Foreign Ministry had announced that M. Couve de Murville would visit Poland in May 1966.

for Strawn
(C.A. Edwards)
Second Secretary

RECORDED ATTACH



Mr Woodberry



CONFIDENTIAL 207

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.Memo No. 388
File No. 225/3
31st March, 1966The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.Eastern Europe

(25/1/1) On 28th March Mlle Malitchenko (Eastern Europe section at the Foreign Ministry) confirmed to us that M. Couve de Murville would be visiting Bucarest and Sofia (our memorandum No. 262 refers). She said the visits would take place in the last week of April, and that the discussions were expected to take the form of general tours d'horizon. No agreements or accords would be signed. M. Couve is also expected to pay return visits to his counterparts in Eastern European capitals other than Bucarest and Sofia, but Mlle Malitchenko said that the Ministry did not know if any plans had yet been made.

2. We took the opportunity to ask Mlle Malitchenko her opinion of the recent series of articles on Bulgaria by André Fontaine, the foreign editor of Le Monde (copies attached for convenient reference). She said that she thought that the first article - in which M. Fontaine emphasizes Sofia's independence from Moscow - was rather "optimistic". The French had noted various indications that the Bulgarian leaders were now taking a somewhat stronger stand where their national economic interests were at stake, but she considered that these signs indicated only a possible trend, not an accomplished fact. She said she had recently seen M. Fontaine very briefly and he had stated that the feature which most impressed him during his visit was the subject of the second article, the notable progress being made in the country areas, compared to the underdevelopment of the cities.

3. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Australian Embassy in Moscow.

(Signature)
(C.A. Edwards)
Second Secretary

W. Little
file Bulgaria
GP 1/2
Mr W. Woodhouse

CONFIDENTIAL

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LE MONDE - 6/4/66

**M. COUVE DE MURVILLE
SE RENDRA EN POLOGNE EN MAI**

Le Quai d'Orsay a annoncé lundi soir que M. Coudé de Murville se rendrait en Pologne dans la seconde quinzaine de mai. On sait que le ministre des affaires étrangères visitera à la fin d'avril la Roumanie et la Bulgarie.

Le bruit court toujours que le général de Gaulle pourrait, lui aussi, effectuer un voyage en Pologne, peut-être à l'automne. Mais aucune indication sûre n'a pu être obtenue jusqu'à présent à ce sujet.

CONFIDENTIAL 205
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS

Memo No. 388

31st March, 1966

File No. 225/3

25/1/1
The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Eastern Europe

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3. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to the Australian Embassy in Moscow.

COPY

(C.A. Edwards)
Second Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL



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
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.Memo No. 262
File No. 225/3

8th March, 1966

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.Eastern Europe

It was reported in Le Monde dated 6th-7th March that M. Couve de Murville would visit Bucarest and Sofia this year. The visit is expected to take place either just before or just after 1st May. M. Couve de Murville is expected to visit other Eastern European capitals this year, as well of course as accompanying General de Gaulle to Moscow in June, but no definite plans have yet been made.

2. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Moscow.


(C.A. Edwards)
Second Secretary
Mr Woodberry.

CONFIDENTIAL 203

File No. 25/1/1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with M.R. Dr Renato Dell'Olio, Italian Ambassador
 on 22nd February, 1966
 Officers Present Sir Laurence McIntyre

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

The Italian Ambassador came to see me today at his request. He said he had nothing particular to raise, but wanted to give me some impressions of his recent visit to Europe on leave.

France

2. Dr D'Isasca had spent some of his leave in France and had talked to a number of friends, including some senior French officials fairly close to General de Gaulle. One impression he had got from them was that de Gaulle's determination to furnish France with an independent nuclear deterrent (which the officials insisted would never be of any great magnitude, nor was it intended to be) was part and parcel of an obsession with the importance of keeping Germany down. This, on the Ambassador's reading, was ultimately fundamental to much of de Gaulle's thought and behaviour.

3. In general he had found French officials fairly relaxed about the future of the E.E.C. and not unduly worried about the voting in the Presidential election or about the Gaullist prospects in the 1967 parliamentary election. I asked the Ambassador whether this meant that the French as a whole expected the 1967 election to go favourably for de Gaulle. He thought not; he had sensed a good deal of uncertainty about the likely result. One important factor militating against de Gaulle was his lack of an organised party. The men around him, while "superbly skilful" in negotiation and in putting his policies into effect (especially in their handling of the press), were in fact technicians united only in their devotion to de Gaulle and lacking any organised political base.

Support for European unity

4. I asked the Ambassador whether he felt that there was any waning of support for the concept of European political unity throughout the rest of the E.E.C. countries and Europe as a whole. He said that, while he would not want to be

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D.L. Br.

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FOLLOWING POSTS:

✓ Mr Lawrey
 ✓ Mr Borden
 ✓ Dr Thomson

Report prepared by *Lawrey*

(L.R. McIntyre)

ACTION:

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✱

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quoted, his firm belief was that any appreciable movement towards European political unity was out of the question for a generation at least. The ideal would remain, and lip-service would continue to be paid to it. But de Gaulle had reminded the Europeans of the basic strength of nationalism and national interests, and little if any real progress towards supranationalism was unlikely in present circumstances. The Common Market was another matter; this had gone so far that not even France could reverse it, even if France should wish to do so. (He had been told, incidentally, that British entry into the E.E.C. was unlikely for three or four years at least).

Vietnam

5. The Ambassador commented on the French Government's attitude towards Vietnam. He thought it was consistent with the French manner of thought and the French way of presenting an argument. There were two elements in French thinking about Vietnam - emotional resistance to acceptance of the possibility that where France had failed other countries could succeed, and ~~logic~~ ^{French ~~attitudes~~ ~~attitudes~~}. It was this latter which largely governed the French intellectual's approach. He had persuaded himself that a clear-cut settlement could not be reached by force; therefore why not give up the idea of force and go all out for negotiations on the basis of the facts of life as he saw them.

6. As for the Italian Government's attitude, the Ambassador sensed that his people were not altogether happy with the situation and were uncertain about the facts of it. They could not be sure, for example, whether the Americans were sincere in wanting negotiations or were merely using efforts towards negotiations as a pretext to justify increasing use of force. But they were not really looking for clarification on this; on the whole they preferred to hope for the best and maintain a public stand in full support of American actions. I said that there was no question in our minds of the sincerity of American efforts to find a basis for negotiation. But at the same time the Americans were foreclosing no options; they were determined to be prepared for a long struggle of attrition if necessary.

New Italian Government

7. After a brief exchange about Indonesia, in which the Ambassador retains an interest since his visit there last year, and where he agrees predictions are still idle, I asked him how he thought the new government in Italy was taking shape. He said, again asking particularly not to be quoted, that the trend in Italy was in reality no longer towards the left of centre but rather towards the right. The whole tone of political life was in his view becoming conservative. The movement back towards the right would become evident, he thought, in the new government which was likely to be announced in the next few days. He attributed this largely to the personalities of Saragat and Moro. Saragat as president exerted tremendous influence behind the scenes, and he had succeeded in putting the Socialists in a more or less contented frame of mind. Moro, though an unimpressive and far from forceful figure, had the virtue of being conscious of his own limitations. He had carried the art of compromise to successful lengths, and his principal achievement had been in winning over the financial and industrial community, who had taken away most of the real power and influence formerly exerted by the large land-owners. The economic situation was generally good in Italy, and while there were plenty of personal

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political rivalries there was not a great deal of active discontent around the country.

8. The Ambassador had talked to President Saragat before his departure about the latter's forthcoming visit to Australia. The President had mentioned Vietnam, and had said that whatever his own personal misgivings about American and Australian policies he would assure the Australian Government that Italy stood firmly behind America.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CANBERRA

18 FEB 1966

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

Memo No.: 141

9th February 1966

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211/1 }

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Foreign Policy Issues in Presidential Elections

You will have seen the article "When the troops break ranks" in The Economist of 8th-14th January, which is devoted in part to assessing the foreign policy lessons of the recent presidential elections. A copy is attached for ease of reference.

.....

2. The article summarizes the attitudes of the leading candidates to foreign and European policy questions along lines with which we agree, with certain relatively unimportant reservations. We agree with The Economist's statement that the foreign policy lessons of the election are the "hardest" to assess.

CLOSURES ATTACHED

3. The success of M. Lecanuet certainly seems due to the attitudes he expressed on European and Atlantic questions. (On the other hand, it is impossible to be sure that many of M. Lecanuet's supporters did not vote for him for reasons only indirectly associated with the attitudes he expressed on these matters. They may have voted for him because they disliked certain authoritarian tendencies in General de Gaulle's Government or his domestic policies and preferred M. Lecanuet to the other Opposition candidates.) The Economist cites the La Vie Française poll as revealing a split among the right on European policy. This seems to us a risky conclusion to make from the poll. Other factors which would influence the attitudes of businessmen to General de Gaulle include their hostility to the "stabilization policy" which the businessmen claimed had prevented them from putting their investment programmes into practice.

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4. The Economist states that "most people voted for or against General de Gaulle for reasons unconnected with his foreign policy". One of the polls of the Institut Français de l'Opinion Publique indicates that the questions which people here consider are within the competence of the Head of State are:

- (a) Political stability (mentioned by 40 per cent. of those questioned).
- (b) Respect for democracy (mentioned by 39 per cent.).
- (c) Foreign policy (38 per cent.).
- (d) National defence (35 per cent.).
- (e) Social affairs (35 per cent.).

In general we continue to believe that among those who voted for General de Gaulle many did so for reasons which included support of his foreign policy : in short that the vote for General de Gaulle was not unconnected with his foreign policy. (On the other hand, we feel that, on the whole, people voted for M. Mitterrand because they were dissatisfied with aspects of General de Gaulle's Government unconnected with foreign policies.)

5. The impression one forms here is of wide support for General de Gaulle's foreign policy, that is, support extending well beyond those who voted for him in the Presidential ballots. It may well be that the disagreements of those who differ from him on European questions is tempered by the fact that on other foreign policy questions (Viet Nam, relations with the United States and with the Soviet Union, etc.) their views are closer to the General's than to those of the Governments of the Five.

6. In consequence, the idea of European unity may now find fewer supporters here than it would at a time when there were relatively fewer and less important differences on foreign policy between France and the Five. If it is interpreted in this sense, we agree with the statement in The Economist that: "It is an equal oversimplification to argue that the concept of European unity attracted only a fraction of the electorate".

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Counsellor

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FRANCE

When the troops break ranks

FROM OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENT

GAULLISM goes on. Next week a reshuffled Pompidou government will carry on the general's business. At the same time, all the parties are busy preparing their strategy for the next round (the elections in 1967) on the basis of the lessons of the last. Of all the lessons, the foreign policy one is probably the hardest to assess. One must steer clear of easy propagandist conclusions. It is absurd to suggest that because President de Gaulle was forced into a second ballot his foreign policy was rejected by most Frenchmen. It is an equal oversimplification to argue that the concept of European unity attracted only a fraction of the electorate.

Even after the first ballot, when it became obvious that many of his traditional supporters had deserted him for the Atlantic and European banners of M. Lecanuet, General de Gaulle yielded nothing of substance to win them back. He stuck to his idea of national greatness based on an independent nuclear deterrent. He gave his blessing to the Atlantic alliance, so long as it remains necessary, but he reiterated his determined opposition to any form of military integration and to the present structure of Nato. Above all, he showed no change of heart on the European question. Once again he vaguely suggested that Britain and Spain would one day join the community (all other candidates explicitly welcomed Britain's entry), but he made it perfectly plain that he rules out the idea of supranational institutions.

There is no question for him of moving beyond co-operation between nation-states. Admitting publicly the failure of the Franco-German treaty, he argued that even this co-ordination of policies would prove very difficult. One of his chief lieutenants, M. Michel Debré, the former prime minister, was even more specific. In a radio debate with M. Mendès-France, he poured scorn on the European Commission and, in answer to a question, proclaimed that France would oppose any nuclear scheme involving west Germany. Since General de Gaulle stood firm under the strain of the electoral campaign, it would be foolish to expect him to do anything more than make tactical concessions in negotiation with his common market partners.

M. Lecanuet's views are diametrically opposed to this. He emphasised the value of the American alliance. He even dared to defend American policy in Vietnam which, in the present French mood, was exceptional. His platform centred on European integration. At all his meetings he presented an integrated Europe as the solution to France's political as well as to its economic problems, as its only chance of real influence and independence. He was not blind to the price that would have to be paid. In an interview given to *L'Express* he admitted that a common defence policy would involve German participation in a European nuclear force.

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M. Mitterrand's foreign policy slides in somewhere between that of his two rivals. On Europe he sounded as orthodox as M. Lecanuet. He defended the spirit of the Rome Treaty and pledged himself to supranational institutions. The only concession to his communist supporters was a verbal one. He spoke against *L'Europe des monopoles*. Yet even here his medicine was supranational; only a European assembly elected through universal suffrage would, he argued, keep the Eurocrats in check. But on the Atlantic issue M. Mitterrand was closer to General de Gaulle. He, too, criticised American policy in Vietnam and Santo Domingo. He, too, argued that the alliance was fine but Nato would have to be reshaped. The only difference was that he would renegotiate the treaty more politely. He, too, insisted on coexistence and the new possibilities of co-operation with eastern Europe.

M. Mitterrand also spoke against building up a national deterrent and in favour of signing the test ban treaty. But he promised to scrap the *force de frappe* and not to keep it as a European dowry. In an interview given to *Le Nouvel Observateur* he said that "to grant to Germany, to any degree whatsoever, a military force of an atomic nature would mean creating an immense danger to peace."

It is not surprising if M. Mitterrand's position appears ambiguous. After all, he was supported by two parties with conflicting foreign policies. The leadership of the Socialist party is faithfully Atlantic and European (though it should not be forgotten that the party was split from top to bottom over German rearmament at the time of the European Defence Community debate in 1954). The communist leaders cannot be suspected of harbouring similar feelings. Though they attribute the motives behind General de Gaulle's foreign policy to the "inner conflicts among capitalist states," French Communists have in the last year or so welcomed several aspects of gaullist policy as "positive." So have the Russians.

The elections marked the spectacular re-entry of the Communists into French politics. By reaching their decision for domestic reasons, and against the apparent interests of Soviet foreign policy, French Communists have seriously weakened the old accusation that they are merely puppets of Moscow. They had to pay a price for it. From the moment they chose not to put up a candidate of their own but to back M. Mitterrand they knew they would have to make concessions on foreign policy. They had accepted earlier on that they would not insist on their partners promising to withdraw from the Atlantic alliance. They then had to swallow several bitter European pills and they began to alter their own strategy. While sticking to his analysis that the common market is an organisation run by monopolies against the interest of the working class, M. Waldeck-Rochet argued that the Communists must admit that it exists and is viewed favourably by other parties of the French left. Therefore the left must

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Throughout the campaign the Communists tried to stress the points they had in common with their partners, such as coexistence, disarmament and opposition to *L'Europe des monopoles*. Yet they could not conceal the basic differences. Whereas M. Mitterrand praised the principle of supranationality, they talk of independence in almost gaullist terms. While he proclaimed his faith in the common market, they echoed with vituperations against "the little Europe of the Six, with its German hegemony under American tutelage."

Where will the Communists go from here? One possibility is that they will try to work within the framework of the community. This in itself would raise a lot of questions (one problem would be that the communist party is illegal in Germany), and

it would mark a significant shift in policy. Another possibility is that they will play on the fear, still existing among the left wing in France, that the liberal framework of the common market, and the political colouring of west Germany, will give the community a permanent Christian Democrat bias. The Communists could launch the slogan of the "United Socialist States of Europe," and then struggle against supranational encroachments not in the name of nationalism but for the sake of potential communist-backed governments in France or in Italy. Finally, they could simply go back to their open hostility to the European community. This they will do if they are thrown back into isolation. The choice between the first two possibilities will arise if the left-wing parties decide to turn their superficial unity during the presidential elections into a true electoral pact for the parliamentary elections next year.

WEST GERMANY

Bouquet of thorns for the chancellor



FROM OUR BONN CORRESPONDENT

ALTHOUGH he is aware the end may be near, Dr Adenauer continues unrepentantly to indulge his whim for Erhard-baiting. "I am now ninety," he remarked in the course of one of a series of newspaper interviews published to mark his birthday on January 5th. "At ninety you can still be fresh in body and mind. Yet you must reckon that today or tomorrow it will all be over. There's an end to everybody." In the same bout of public communing, Dr Adenauer announced he would give up the chairmanship of the Christian Democratic Union at the party's conference in March.

Nowhere was there a word to encourage Herr Erhard's wistful looks at that useful seat. And, still more painful for the chancellor, Dr Adenauer told *Die Welt* on January 3rd he was convinced that the time was ripe for Christian Democrats and Social Democrats to govern the country for a while together. This is a prospect in which the present chancellor, an avowed opponent of such a coalition, would no longer be seen at the Palais Schaumburg. Casual-like, Dr Adenauer disclosed that when he visits Paris on January 24th and 25th (in connection with the preparations for the French edition of his memoirs) he will be having a talk with President de Gaulle. He will thus be beating Herr Erhard to it by a matter of hours. "Tactless?" he was asked. But of course not. Purely coincidental.

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INTERNATIONAL REPORT

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FRANCE

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GAULLISM goes on. Next week a reshuffled Pompidou government will carry on the general's business. At the same time, all the parties are busy preparing their strategy for the next round (the elections in 1967) on the basis of the lessons of the last. Of all the lessons, the foreign policy one is probably the hardest to assess. One must steer clear of easy propagandist conclusions. It is absurd to suggest that because President de Gaulle was forced into a second ballot his foreign policy was rejected by most Frenchmen. It is an equal oversimplification to argue that the concept of European unity attracted only a fraction of the electorate.

Even after the first ballot, when it became obvious that many of his traditional supporters had deserted him for the Atlantic and European banners of M. Lecanuet, General de Gaulle yielded nothing of substance to win them back. He stuck to his idea of national greatness based on an independent nuclear deterrent. He gave his blessing to the Atlantic alliance, so long as it remains necessary, but he reiterated his determined opposition to any form of military integration and to the present structure of Nato. Above all, he showed no change of heart on the European question. Once again he vaguely suggested that Britain and Spain would one day join the community (all other candidates explicitly welcomed Britain's entry), but he made it perfectly plain that he rules out the idea of supranational institutions.

There is no question for him of moving beyond co-operation between nation-states. Admitting publicly the failure of the Franco-German treaty, he argued that even this co-ordination of policies would prove very difficult. One of his chief lieutenants, M. Michel Debré, the former prime minister, was even more specific. In a radio debate with M. Mendès-France, he poured scorn on the European Commission and, in answer to a question, proclaimed that France would oppose any nuclear scheme involving west Germany. Since General de Gaulle stood firm under the strain of the electoral campaign, it would be foolish to expect him to do anything more than make tactical concessions in negotiation with his common market partners.

M. Lecanuet's views are diametrically opposed to this. He emphasised the value of the American alliance. He even dared to defend American policy in Vietnam which, in the present French mood, was exceptional. His platform centred on European integration. At all his meetings he presented an integrated Europe as the solution to France's political as well as to its economic problems, as its only chance of real influence and independence. He was not blind to the price that would have to be paid. In an interview given to *L'Express* he admitted that a common defence policy would involve German participation in a European nuclear force.

M. Lecanuet took away a good number of gaullist votes and forced the general to a second ballot. At this, at least half his supporters returned to the gaullist ticket. But neither ballot provided a fair yardstick of popular support for the European idea

since most people voted for or against General de Gaulle for reasons unconnected with his foreign policy. All the same, it is now certain that the French right is divided on the European question. The *patronat* is clearly split (a poll taken by *La Vie Française* on the eve of the first ballot among chairmen of the 100 biggest private companies gave General de Gaulle 48 per cent of the vote and M. Lecanuet 44 per cent). M. Lecanuet has not given up the fight. He is launching a new movement with European integration still his main slogan. He may not be a match for the legendary figure of the general; he is likely to prove a tough challenger to his successors.

M. Mitterrand's foreign policy slides in somewhere between that of his two rivals. On Europe he sounded as orthodox as M. Lecanuet. He defended the spirit of the Rome Treaty and pledged himself to supranational institutions. The only concession to his communist supporters was a verbal one. He spoke against *L'Europe des monopoles*. Yet even here his medicine was supranational; only a European assembly elected through universal suffrage would, he argued, keep the Eurocrats in check. But on the Atlantic issue M. Mitterrand was closer to General de Gaulle. He, too, criticised American policy in Vietnam and Santo Domingo. He, too, argued that the alliance was fine but Nato would have to be reshaped. The only difference was that he would renegotiate the treaty more politely. He, too, insisted on coexistence and the new possibilities of co-operation with eastern Europe.

M. Mitterrand also spoke against building up a national deterrent and in favour of signing the test ban treaty. But he promised to scrap the *force de frappe* and not to keep it as a European dowry. In an interview given to *Le Nouvel Observateur* he said that "to grant to Germany, to any degree whatsoever, a military force of an atomic nature would mean creating an immense danger to peace."

It is not surprising if M. Mitterrand's position appears ambiguous. After all, he was supported by two parties with conflicting foreign policies. The leadership of the Socialist party is faithfully Atlantic and European (though it should not be forgotten that the party was split from top to bottom over German rearmament at the time of the European Defence Community debate in 1954). The communist leaders cannot be suspected of harbouring similar feelings. Though they attribute the motives behind General de Gaulle's foreign policy to the "inner conflicts among capitalist states," French Communists have in the last year or so welcomed several aspects of gaullist policy as "positive." So have the Russians.

The elections marked the spectacular re-entry of the Communists into French politics. By reaching their decision for domestic reasons, and against the apparent interests of Soviet foreign policy, French Communists have seriously weakened the old accusation that they are merely puppets of Moscow. They had to pay a price for it. From the moment they chose not to put up a candidate of their own but to back M. Mitterrand they knew they would have to make concessions on foreign policy. They had accepted earlier on that they would not insist on their partners promising to withdraw from the Atlantic alliance. They then had to swallow several bitter European pills and they began to alter their own strategy. While sticking to his analysis that the common market is an organisation run by monopolies against the interest of the working class, M. Waldeck-Rochet argued that the Communists must admit that it exists and is viewed favourably by other parties of the French left. Therefore the left must

fight "within the European institutions" to obtain a change of policies.

Throughout the campaign the Communists tried to stress the points they had in common with their partners, such as coexistence, disarmament and opposition to *L'Europe des monopoles*. Yet they could not conceal the basic differences. Whereas M. Mitterrand praised the principle of supranationality, they talk of independence in almost gaullist terms. While he proclaimed his faith in the common market, they echoed with vituperations against "the little Europe of the Six, with its German hegemony under American tutelage."

Where will the Communists go from here? One possibility is that they will try to work within the framework of the community. This in itself would raise a lot of questions (one problem would be that the communist party is illegal in Germany), and

it would mark a significant shift in policy. Another possibility is that they will play on the fear, still existing among the left wing in France, that the liberal framework of the common market, and the political colouring of west Germany, will give the community a permanent Christian Democrat bias. The Communists could launch the slogan of the "United Socialist States of Europe," and then struggle against supranational encroachments not in the name of nationalism but for the sake of potential communist-backed governments in France or in Italy. Finally, they could simply go back to their open hostility to the European community. This they will do if they are thrown back into isolation. The choice between the first two possibilities will arise if the left-wing parties decide to turn their superficial unity during the presidential elections into a true electoral pact for the parliamentary elections next year.

WEST GERMANY

Bouquet of thorns for the chancellor



FROM OUR BONN CORRESPONDENT

ALTHOUGH he is aware the end may be near, Dr Adenauer continues unrepentantly to indulge his whim for Erhard-baiting. "I am now ninety," he remarked in the course of one of a series of newspaper interviews published to mark his birthday on January 5th. "At ninety you can still be fresh in body and mind. Yet you must reckon that today or tomorrow it will all be over. There's an end to everybody." In the same bout of public communing, Dr Adenauer announced he would give up the chairmanship of the Christian Democratic Union at the party's conference in March.

Nowhere was there a word to encourage Herr Erhard's wistful looks at that useful seat. And, still more painful for the chancellor, Dr Adenauer told *Die Welt* on January 3rd he was convinced that the time was ripe for Christian Democrats and Social Democrats to govern the country for a while together. This is a prospect in which the present chancellor, an avowed opponent of such a coalition, would no longer be seen at the Palais Schaumburg. Casual-like, Dr Adenauer disclosed that when he visits Paris on January 24th and 25th (in connection with the preparations for the French edition of his memoirs) he will be having a talk with President de Gaulle. He will thus be beating Herr Erhard to it by a matter of hours. "Tactless?", he was asked. But of course not. Purely coincidental.

Herr Erhard's next big engagement is the one in Paris. Dr Adenauer has already declared that he will try to interest President de Gaulle in the beauties of Herr Strauss's particular vision of an independent European nuclear force, founded to begin with on Anglo-French resources. The suspicion that Dr Adenauer voiced to *Die Welt*, of a secret understanding between the

United States and the Soviet Union, most probably at Germany's expense, is the sort of stuff that the French president would like to hear, but will not, from the chancellor himself.

Herr Erhard talked about his forthcoming Paris encounter to President Johnson in Washington before Christmas. The two agreed that there might be grounds, since General de Gaulle's unenthusiastic re-election in December, for hoping to find the French president in a more accommodating mood. Be that as it may, Herr Erhard, who will be accompanied by Herr Schröder (*bête noire* to both General de Gaulle and Dr Adenauer), will no doubt try to show that his own strength of purpose is not fading. It is being busily put about here in Bonn that Herr Erhard, in the hope of mitigating President de Gaulle's objections to Germany playing any kind of nuclear part, will repeat two questions to which he received sympathetic replies from President Johnson. The first: is it really wayward of Bonn to want to participate in nuclear deterrent arrangements designed to prevent a war in which Germany would be the first victim? The second: would Germany's renunciation of a say in western nuclear defence achieve the end of partition?

It would enhance Herr Erhard's authority in dealing with General de Gaulle if he could go to Paris as chairman-elect of the Christian Democratic Union. He would thus be seen to have at his disposal all the wires of internal power that once led from Dr Adenauer. But, it seems, Herr Erhard recognises it would be futile now to stand for this office. This is not a consequence simply of Dr Adenauer's intrigues. It has been established that a majority of the party, disappointed in Herr Erhard's leadership, would like to insure against his further loss



Roses for the ex-chancellor

of popularity by projecting some alternative leaders. The most likely successor to Dr Adenauer as chairman of the CDU is present Dr Hermann Dufhues, a former minister of the interior in North Rhine-Westphalia, who has been the party managing chairman since 1962. He Dufhues is 57, Herr Erhard nearly 60. There are others who would prefer Herr Rainer Barzel. Still in his early forties, Herr Barzel is the party's confidently ambitious leader in the Bundestag, and already being spoken of as a potent chancellor.

The chancellor's diminished prestige, being further undermined by fresh consideration, both in public and behind the scenes, of the advantages of an immediate coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. Such a government, its caveassers submit, would be able to carry through legislation requiring a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag; financial and electoral reforms, and definition of government powers in the event of a national emergency, are the problems chiefly in mind. Dr Adenauer is by no means all

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

192

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I.3285

FROM:

DATED: 21ST JANUARY, 1966
1703 LT

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 22ND JANUARY, 1966
1004 K

193.

RESTRICTED.

25/1/1

YOUR 111.

AS BACKGROUND YOU COULD REFER TO OUR MEMORANDUM DT/805/231/2
OF 1ST DECEMBER 1965 ON FRENCH TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE.

2. WE WERE INFORMED TODAY BY OFFICIAL AT FRENCH MINISTRY OF
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS THAT LIST OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS WHICH WILL BE
LIBERALISED FOR IMPORT FROM EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES IS EXPECTED TO
BE PUBLISHED ABOUT END OF JANUARY.

WE HAVE FEW DETAILS AS THE LISTS ARE NOT YET FINALISED,
BUT IT IS EXPECTED THAT THEY WILL NOT REMOVE FROM RESTRICTION ITEMS
WHICH ARE UNDER RESTRICTION FOR GATT COUNTRIES.

IN FACT BEST INDICATION WE COULD GET WAS THAT ABOUT 200 ITEMS
WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SUBJECT TO RESTRICTION WHEREAS FOR GATT THE
LIST IN THIS AREA IS ABOUT 70 ITEMS.

3. LIBERALISATION MEASURES ARE ACKNOWLEDGED AS BEING PRIMARILY
A POLITICAL GESTURE.

IN TRADE TERMS IT IS NOT THOUGHT THAT THE MEASURES WILL RESULT
IN FRANCES IMPORTS FROM EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES BEING SUBSTANTIALLY
INCREASED.

PRESENT IMPORTS OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS FROM EASTERN EUROPE ARE
ESTIMATED TO ACCOUNT FOR ONLY ABOUT 0.5% OF FRANCES TOTAL IMPORTS.

4. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTS THAT COMMUNIST CHINA WILL BENEFIT
FROM LIBERALISATION BUT THAT FINAL DECISION BY GOVERNMENT HAS NOT
YET BEEN MADE AND THIS IN ADDITION TO TECHNICAL WORK OF FINALISING
LISTS IS CAUSING THE DELAY.

KOJEVE, WITH WHOM WE ALSO SPOKE, PROVIDED THE INFORMATION ABOUT
NUMBER OF ITEMS IN COVERAGE AND SAID THAT HE FELT FULL EXTENT OF
PROPOSED LIBERALISATION WOULD BE EXTENDED TO CHINA.

5. WE SHALL ADVISE FURTHER WHEN MORE DEFINITE INFORMATION IS
AVAILABLE.



MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

F
General
For Secret.

22ND JANUARY, 1966

SEC DS FAS(2,4) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR PIO ER

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No. 25/1/1

DATE 10 JAN 1966

SUBJECT

FRANCE - FOREIGN POLICY

FOR ~~THE MINISTER~~

(For Information)

The re-election of President de Gaulle makes it opportune to look again at the probable directions of French foreign policy in the immediate future.

2. Although the unexpectedly high vote against President de Gaulle in both phases of the elections indicates considerable dissatisfaction with his administration, there is not much evidence to suggest that the general aims of Gaullist foreign policies are a significant factor in this dissatisfaction. Indeed, the more "difficult" aspects of these foreign policies - the attitudes towards supra-nationality and majority voting in the EEC and towards the dominant position of the U.S. in NATO - are French as much as Gaullist. Furthermore, de Gaulle's past history suggests that he is unlikely to abandon what he regards as major principles for mere popularity which in any case cannot now be of much interest to him except insofar as it may influence the voting for the National Assembly elections in 1967. His domestic programme will no doubt be designed to minimise losses in these elections.

3. It is unlikely therefore that there will be significant change in foreign policy, at least in the short term, that is, before 1967. It is more difficult to foresee the longer-term outlook for it is obscured by the prospect that after 1967 de Gaulle may have to govern France with a hostile National Assembly. Such changes as there may be are likely to be tactical.

4. In the short term we can probably expect a more flexible approach to EEC problems, e.g. French encouragement for a "gentleman's agreement" that decisions on matters previously agreed unanimously may not be over-turned by majority vote and that matters affecting the vital interests of members should not be subject to majority vote. While such an agreement would constitute a de facto amendment to the Rome Treaties, there are some indications that other members of the EEC may be willing to accept this, at least while de Gaulle remains in power. The agreement would still enable France to retain a wide field for manoeuvre against supra-nationalist tendencies, whilst at the same time permitting the EEC to proceed with the full implementation of the agricultural common market, which is France's primary interest in the EEC. We assess that the prospects of the U.K.'s entry into the EEC within the next two years remain unchanged (unless there is a change of government in the U.K.).

5. President de Gaulle has already given evidence of a tendency to be more flexible in his approach to EEC problems. Since his re-election France has agreed to participate in a meeting with the Foreign Ministers of its five EEC partners at Luxembourg on 17th-18th January, 1966 when future working arrangements will no

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doubt be discussed. The EEC Commission will not be represented at this meeting.

6. We expect that there will be little or no change in French policy towards NATO. Following the French Presidential elections, there is likely to be a stiffening of the determination of members to resist any French-dictated changes in the Organisation. But President de Gaulle cannot afford to press his demands to a premature and unsuccessful conclusion since France then would be left with virtually no option between withdrawal and reversion to more active participation under existing arrangements, neither of which he would want at this time. Recent French practices such as reduced participation, obstruction of strategic planning and sniping from the sidelines are likely to continue in preparation for what will probably be a general re-appraisal in 1968-69 by NATO itself of its structure and organisation rather than a consideration of French proposals as such.

Alan Renouf
(A.P. Renouf)
First Assistant Secretary
Division IV

Europe Section
B.W. Woodberry:kw

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12/1/66*

CONFIDENTIAL



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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CANBERRA
File No. 2 JAN 1966
25/1/1
NOM. INDEX

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

Memo No. 22
File No. 201/1

7th January, 1965

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

General de Gaulle's New Year Message

..... We attach the text of this message as published
in Le Monde of 2nd-3rd January, 1966.

C. A. Edwards
(C. A. Edwards)
Third Secretary



MR Woodberry

année qui fut celle de notre fusée Diamant, de
nos premiers satellites, des succès de nos savants,
notamment dans le domaine de la biologie molecu-

l'année qui fut celle de notre fusée Diamant, de
nos premiers satellites, des succès de nos savants,
notamment dans le domaine de la biologie molecu-

LES VŒUX DU PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

« C'est dans la sérénité, dans la confiance et dans l'ardeur
que nous souhaitons une bonne année à la France »

déclare le général de Gaulle

Voici le texte de l'allocution prononcée vendredi à 20 heures par le général de Gaulle (1) :
« Pour la France, la nouvelle année peut et doit être l'année de la sérénité, de la confiance et de l'ardeur.

» L'année de la sérénité. Car il n'y a pour nous, actuellement, ni angoisses au-dedans, ni combats au-dehors. Certes, comme nous sommes un peuple très vivant, en plein essor de progrès, mais s'obligeant lui-même à avancer en bon ordre, nous avons, dans l'ensemble, des difficultés à vaincre et, dans le détail, des désirs qui ne sont pas encore comblés. Mais les troubles profonds qui nous étreignaient naguère : confusion politique permanente, faillite imminente, subversion menaçante, ne sont plus que de mauvais souvenirs, à moins même qu'on ne les ait oubliés. En fait, nous sommes établis sur des institutions stables et qui viennent d'être confirmées, sur des finances et une économie assainies de fond en comble, sur une défense nationale dont ceux qui ont à l'assurer ne s'occupent pas d'autre chose.

Ne pas être intégrés dans une guerre qui ne serait pas la nôtre

» En outre, si dans le monde les hégémonies rivales mettent nombre de peuples en état de pénible tension, si d'effrayants moyens de destruction entretiennent les inquiétudes, si quatre des cinq puissances mondiales sont impliquées directement ou indirectement dans divers conflits et, notamment, dans celui qui sévit en Asie, nous ne sommes, nous, engagés nulle part et nous faisons le nécessaire pour que nous ne soyons pas intégrés le cas échéant, dans une guerre qui ne serait pas la nôtre.

L'année de la fusée Diamant

» L'année de la confiance. Car ce que nous avons récemment réalisé pour régler nos lourds problèmes nous convainc qu'en définitive nous en viendrons à bout. Notre industrie démontre, en ce moment même, que sans protectionnisme et sans inflation elle est capable de se transformer en fait d'organisation, de concentration de productivité, pour faire face à tous les risques de la concurrence internationale. Ce qui est fait et ce qui est en cours pour que notre agriculture ait sa bonne place dans notre économie, pour que ses exploitations, ses productions, ses marchés, s'adaptent aux exigences modernes, pour que ceux qui en font leur vocation ne soient pas désavantagés dans leurs conditions d'existence, nous prouvent que nous y parviendrons. Ayant, comme nous l'avons fait, bâti tant et tant d'écoles, de collèges, de lycées, d'universités, recruté autant de maîtres, entamé d'aussi larges et profondes réformes de l'enseignement, nous sommes certains dorénavant de réussir notre immense entreprise d'éducation nationale. Au terme d'une année qui fut celle de notre fusée Diamant, de nos premiers satellites, des succès de nos savants, notamment dans le domaine de la biologie moléculaire,

du classement de notre procédé de télévision en couleurs au premier rang du concours mondial, nous sommes fondés à attendre beaucoup de nos recherches scientifiques et techniques.

» Puisque nous avons, en 1965, construit 410 000 logements, installé 210 000 nouveaux postes téléphoniques, allongé nos autoroutes de 176 kilomètres, implanté dans toutes nos régions quelque 500 usines de plus, c'est que nous sommes en bonne voie pour doter notre pays de l'équipement économique et social qu'il lui faut. Enfin, notre expansion étant, à l'heure qu'il est, partie pour un bond en avant, nous avons toutes raisons de compter que dans les douze mois qui viennent, et comme l'indique notre plan, le niveau de vie des Français s'élèvera de 4 %.

» A l'extérieur, partant de l'indépendance retrouvée et sans renverser pour autant nos amitiés ni nos alliances, nous pouvons : reprendre l'organisation du Marché commun des Six, mais dans des conditions qui soient équitables et raisonnables et avec l'espoir que, sur une telle base, d'autres voisins s'y joindront ; développer davantage encore avec les pays de l'Est nos rapports économiques, scientifiques, techniques et politiques ; entretenir avec la Chine des relations multipliées ; resserrer les liens d'amicale coopération que nous tissons entre notre peuple et ceux d'Afrique, d'Orient, d'Asie, d'Amérique latine.

C'en est fini des tâtonnements

» L'année de l'ardeur. Car c'en est fini des doutes, des tâtonnements, des renoncements ! Tout en nous gardant de céder à l'illusion et à l'outrecuidance, nous savons maintenant qu'il y a dans nos têtes, dans nos cœurs et dans nos mains tout ce qu'il faut pour que la France parcoure une étape décisive de son progrès, pour qu'elle apporte plus de justice encore dans la répartition entre tous ses enfants du produit du travail national, pour qu'elle exerce au milieu des nations — comme c'est son génie de le faire — une action exemplaire de compréhension et de paix. Après un siècle où nous avons subi tant d'épreuves, manqué tant d'occasions, accumulé tant de retards, voici qu'enfin, en mettant en œuvre un État stable et efficace, en nous servant à fond de nos moyens, en y ajoutant ce qu'apportent la science et la technique, en voulant que notre peuple soit un bon compagnon pour tout autre pays du monde, nous sommes sans doute en train d'accomplir une des plus fécondes et réelles réussites de notre Histoire.

» Françaises, Français, c'est donc dans la sérénité, dans la confiance et dans l'ardeur que j'adresse à chacune, à chacun de vous mes meilleurs vœux pour 1966 et que, tous ensemble nous souhaitons une bonne année à la France.

» Vive la République ! Vive la France ! »

(1) Ce texte est celui qui a été prononcé. La version écrite comportait quelques variantes. Elle parlait notamment du conflit qui « sévit en Asie » et de la nécessité d'« établir » avec la Chine des relations multipliées.

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RESTRICTEDAUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
BRUSSELS 4

2 E.A. [Signature]

Record of Conversation with: M. Spaak, Minister of Foreign
Affairs
on: 13th December, 1965.
Officers Present: Mr. R.L. Harry
Subject: European Developments

I asked M. Spaak whether he would care to forecast the likely developments in Europe during the next month or so. In particular I would appreciate anything he could tell me about any likely moves before the 19th December. I assumed that there were not likely to be any concrete developments.

M. Spaak said that he thought it was unlikely that the French Government would make any announcements in this period. There is nothing that General de Gaulle could add to what he said about the reform of NATO and nuclear matters. As regards the European Economic Communities, the talks between Mr. Colombo and M. Couve de Murville had not got very far.

I asked whether the French were continuing to insist that any meeting of the six Governments should be elsewhere than in Brussels. M. Spaak said this was so, but the question of place of meeting was relatively unimportant; the real problem of substance was the question of majority voting and he thought the Five could not make any concession. He thought the French election would have the result rather of hardening the French position and the position of the Five was also hardening. General de Gaulle was unlikely to be affected by the result of the first round of balloting. He would probably attribute the falling-off in support as due to American influence, and this would further harden his attitude.

When I asked whether he thought progress would be made in January, M. Spaak simply said that it was clearly necessary to make progress; the Community could not stay where it was and clearly January would be a crucial month.

R.L. Harry

25/1/1

RESTRICTED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

186

PJG

I.58295

FROM:

DATED: 23RD DECEMBER, 1965
1822

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 24TH DECEMBER, 1965
0708

3494 UNCLASSIFIED.

(F) 25/1/1

REPEATED WASHINGTON 198, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK 81,
LONDON 499.

THE FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF LE MONDE'S EDITORIAL TODAY WHICH
COMMENTS ON U.N.G.A. WHOSE CLOSURE, IT SAYS, WAS OVERSHADOWED IN
FRANCE BY THE ELECTIONS AND VIETNAM WHERE "THE FIRE GETS
WORSE EACH DAY."

2. THE FIRST MERIT OF THE ASSEMBLY WAS THAT IT WAS HELD, AFTER
19TH ASSEMBLY WAS REDUCED TO SILENCE BY UNITED STATES - U.S.S.R.
CONFRONTATION.

THE ASSEMBLY RECEIVED THE BLESSING OF THE POPE, WHOSE SPEECH
WAS WIDELY HEARD, BUT WHICH WAS LIMITED IN IMMEDIATE EFFECTIVENESS
BY THE UNFAVOURABLE CIRCUMSTANCES.

THE ASSEMBLY PLAYED THE ROLE OF FORUM, BUT DID NOT INTERVENE
IN THE SPREADING CONFLICTS.

THERE WAS NO DEBATE ON VIETNAM, BUT THE ASSEMBLY SHOULD NOT
BE BLAMED FOR THIS, AS THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
WHICH INSISTS THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IS IN ITS
EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE, REMAINED SILENT.

U THANT AND FANFANI, WHO TRIED TO ASSUME THE UNITED NATIONS
RESPONSIBILITIES, HAD THEIR FINGERS BURNT.

ASSEMBLY THUS SHOWED THE U.N.O'S TRAGIC LACK OF POWER, LARGELY
DUE TO ITS LACK OF UNIVERSALITY.

PEKING'S PRESENCE ON SECURITY COUNCIL HOWEVER WOULD
NOT SETTLE EVERYTHING, THE GREAT POWERS MUST ACCEPT ARBITRATION
AS THE MEANS OF SETTLING DISPUTES.

MAYBE THE GREAT POWERS ARE LEARNING THE COST OF ENFORCING
JUSTICE BY THEMSELVES.

THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF A UNITED NATIONS
PEACE SERVICE COULD INDICATE THAT THE TASK WORLD POLICEMAN
IS BEYOND ITS POWER AND THAT IT MUST COME BACK TO A DEMOCRATIC
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

3. THE UNITED NATIONS THEREFORE MIGHT HAVE ANOTHER CHANCE,
BUT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO PLAY ITS ROLE IN FAVOUR OF PEACE
UNLESS IT GIVES MORE IMPORTANCE TO THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLES OF
THE "TIERS MONDE" TO RISE OUT OF THEIR MISERY AND UNDER-
DEVELOPMENT, THAN TO THE PREOCCUPATION OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED
POWERS TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITIONS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

23RD DECEMBER, 1965

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA MI M DL
INT UN@ PACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E AFME ICR PIO AFME
ICR PIO MT ER

25/1/1 185
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

PJG

I.57864

FROM:

DATED: 21ST DECEMBER, 1965
1713

REC'D: 22ND DECEMBER, 1965
0721

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

3462 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 492, WASHINGTON 194.
FROM WALKER.

CONVERSATION WITH FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER.

ON 20TH DECEMBER I WAS SEATED NEXT TO M. COUVE DE MURVILLE AT A LUNCH GIVEN BY THE NUNCIO TO COMMEMORATE THE CLOSING OF THE CONCILE.

GENERAL DISCUSSION AROUND THE TABLE WAS MOSTLY ABOUT THE ELECTIONS AND COUVE COULD NOT BE DRAWN TO SAY MUCH TO ME.

2. ON VIETNAM, HE REMARKED THAT THE WAR WOULD GO ON FOR A LONG TIME.

HE DISMISSED AS RIDICULOUS THE ITALIAN REPORTS ON NORTH VIETNAMESE WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE.

"EVERYONE KNOWS THAT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES IS NOT A PRE-CONDITION BUT WOULD BE THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATION, AND THE AMERICANS ARE DETERMINED TO STAY."
HE SAID MATTERS WOULD BECOME MORE GRAVE WHEN THE WAR IS EXTENDED TO CHINA.

I SAID, "YOU SPEAK AS THOUGH THAT WERE INEVITABLE," TO WHICH HE RELIED, "YES, AND TO THAILAND, TOO."

THE AMERICANS HAVE ALREADY A VIRTUAL OCCUPATION OF THAILAND AND SEEM TO BE PREPARING FOR A SORT OF SECOND FRONT INVOLVING LAOS."

I ASKED ABOUT CHAUVEL'S MISSION BUT COUVE MERELY REPLIED, "HE'S NOT BACK YET."

3. I ASKED HIM WHAT WAS THE REACTION OF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO RUSK'S AND MCNAMARA'S EXPOSES ON VIETNAM AND CHINA AT THE N.A.T.O. MEETING.

COUVE REPLIED, "APART FROM FRANCE - AND THE UNITED KINGDOM - NO EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT IS INTERESTED IN ANYTHING OUTSIDE THE CONFINES OF EUROPE."

ONE MUST NOT HAVE ANY ILLUSION ON THAT."

4. ON THE RESUMPTION OF COMMON MARKET NEGOTIATIONS HE WOULD ONLY SAY "WE SHALL HAVE TO SEE."

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M'S

22ND DECEMBER, 1965

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) S&SEA M DL INT UN
PACAM AMSF EA EAMEC E ICR PIO

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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

Name of Paper TIMES.

Published at LONDON.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

File No.

Date

Europe

154

25/1/1

10/12/65

FRANCE LOOKS FOR SIGN FROM BRITAIN

READINESS TO JOIN THE SIX 'MUST BE PROVED'

From Our Own Correspondent—BONN, DEC. 9

M. François Seydoux, the French Ambassador, told the foreign press in Bonn today: "When we in France see how difficult it is already for the countries of continental Europe to fashion a European Europe, we appreciate how much more difficult it must be for a country like Britain."

He had been asked whether there were grounds for believing, after Mr. Heath's talks in Paris recently, that the standpoint of France on Britain's entry into Europe would be more favourable than it was three years ago.

"The answer", he said, "depends more on the British than the French Government. One can only build a united Europe when the countries which are interested want a European Europe."

This was not a criticism of Britain's close ties with the United States. A greater degree of independence had been achieved in those of France with the United States in the past few years, but the disagreements between the two countries had been exaggerated in the press. France had shown unmistakably where she stood in the Cuban crisis. She would do so equally unmistakably in the future.

ELECTION REBUFF

Naturally this united Europe must have good contacts with the United States. "The French Government—indeed any French Government—will be ready to take up Britain in the Common Market as soon as Britain herself demonstrates her readiness to join it," he said.

He would be greatly surprised if the French Government, and he himself who had been always a confirmed Anglophile, did not welcome any drawing closer between Britain and Europe.

Asked whether there was any likelihood of a change in General de Gaulle's standpoint on defence and foreign policy following his election rebuff, M. Seydoux said: "When General de Gaulle takes up a position, in certain questions, it is usually because he considers it best both for France and for others. There is therefore no reason why, as the candidate who got more votes than any other in the elections, he should change his mind."

Questioned on German participation in the Atlantic Nuclear Force, he replied: "We consider that it will be even more difficult for the German Government to solve all outstanding issues like reunification if Germany has access to nuclear power. General de Gaulle believes that France should as far as possible, contribute to the establishment of peace and order in Europe, in order to help to solve these outstanding problems."

The question was not what kind of a German participation, but what the consequences of such participation would be, and whether it would make more difficult the solution of problems which are even more important to Germany than participation in nuclear defence.

Asked how France felt about the McNamara special committee, he said: "If one refuses an invitation to dinner oneself, one does not feel very happy about

other people doing so." M. Seydoux emphasized the importance to France of a solution of the agricultural problems in the Common Market. One could not have a common market if agriculture were not incorporated in it.

If there was any possibility of a compromise in Brussels which safeguarded French interests, then he did not see why the Six should not get together to work it out, perhaps in January.

COMPENSATION ACT 'CONSTITUTIONAL'

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT
BONN, DEC. 9

The Federal Government has rejected the claim of victims of Nazism that cuts in appropriations for compensation, contained in the Bill safeguarding the budget, were unconstitutional. Herr von Hase, the state secretary in the press and information office, said yesterday that these appropriations, of the order of DM.1,900m. (£170m.) for next year, were as large as those for 1965.

The law did not affect in any way current claims for payments such as pensions. Certain lump sum payments and ex gratia payments would, in certain circumstances, be paid out in instalments, without in any way reducing the amount of the claims.

The Bundestag passed the Bill at its second and final readings today.

Name of Paper ECONOMIST.


File No.

Published at LONDON.

Date

FRANCE AND RUSSIA

To Moscow via Bonn



FROM OUR PARIS CORRESPONDENT

It was red carpets all the way for M. Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister, who ended his five-day journey to Russia on Tuesday. In his travels from Leningrad to Sochi, the French minister had long conversations not only with his Russian counterpart Mr. Gromyko, but also with President Mikoyan, Mr. Kosygin, the prime minister, and Mr. Brezhnev, the party chief. The Russian press went out of its way to stress the importance of the visit. Yet the communiqué published at the end of the tour contained nothing that could cause any real alarm in Washington or in Bonn.

In fact, it revealed nothing unexpected about the views of the two countries. But the traditional phrases expressing satisfaction over the recent improvement in mutual relations and the hope of further progress were not the routine exercises they usually are in such communiqués. The change in Franco-Soviet relations has been one of the most significant diplomatic developments of 1965. Admirers of General de Gaulle praise him for the foresight and continuity of his policies. They may have conveniently forgotten France's cool reaction to Mr. Macmillan's Moscow journey back in 1959, and how many charges of appeasement were then voiced in gaullist quarters. Even shorter memories would be needed to forget more recent statements by General de Gaulle himself about Russia's "totalitarian" empire and its permanent threat to Europe. But circumstances have now changed, and gaullist diplomacy has shown masterly adaptability.

The background of previous hostility is needed to understand the true meaning of the present honeymoon. When General de Gaulle returned to power in 1958 he immediately made a bid for a place among the top leaders of the world. Since his memorandum of September that year failed to bring into existence what he at first sought, a triumvirate that would direct the whole western alliance, the general turned to Europe as a potential lever. "Europe," in his view, was to be based on a Franco-German alliance. The threat to his plans at this stage was the prospect of an understanding being reached between Moscow and Washington, an agreement that might have revived the Russo-American "condominium" which had taken shape at Yalta. To prevent this development, France had to present itself as the staunch defender of west German interests.

It is true that as far back as 1959, General de Gaulle recognised the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern frontier. But this recognition was tied to the very distant hope of reunification. It is equally true that, at about the same time, the general launched the now fashionable idea that Chinese pressure would drive Russia westwards. But Mr. Khrushchev was driven in the direction of Washington, not of Paris. As he saw it, a west European coalition

such as the general sought was bound to be dominated by Germany and was, therefore, a still more repelling prospect than the present alliance dominated by the United States.

The "German phase" in gaullist foreign policy reached its climax in September 1962, during the general's triumphant tour of west Germany. There followed a series of moves that still fitted neatly into the grand design. Britain, too Atlantic-minded and too competitive, had to be kept out of the continental coalition and was duly vetoed in January, 1963. The Franco-German treaty was signed the same month. Five months later, France refused to join the test ban treaty negotiations in Moscow. In January, 1964, the two great outsiders—China and France—resumed diplomatic relations. But by that time a new phase in gaullist policy was already beginning.

General de Gaulle had realised by then that west Germany was even less suited than Britain to be France's partner in a bid to challenge America's leadership. He discovered, also, that he was not dealing with a junior partner, but with a country economically more powerful and more dynamic than his own. The immediate task became to prevent Germany from gaining military superiority as well. Resurrecting France's traditional fear of German might, the general thought also of France's traditional remedy—the eastern counterweight. Publicly, the turning point came last February when General de Gaulle proclaimed that Germany could only be reunited by agreement with its neighbours: an agreement that would define the limits of Germany's military power as well as its frontiers.

At this stage the Russians at last became interested. They had been unimpressed by gaullist disputes with Washington, French tactics of obstruction in Nato, and quarrels within the common market, so long as the general's policy still seemed to rest on a Paris-Bonn axis. Now they saw the makings of a bargain. Undoubtedly the war in Vietnam, which enforced at least a pause in Russo-American negotiations, helped Mr. Khrushchev's successors to reach a decision; but it was the switch in the French position over Germany that was vital. Events started moving fast after February. Moscow sent one of its top diplomats, Mr. Zorin, as ambassador to Paris. He was followed there, in April, by Mr. Gromyko on an official visit. As token of their good intentions, the Russians opted for the French system of colour television. And now they have greeted M. Couve de Murville with particular warmth.

Both countries are naturally thinking of their own interests, and basic differences remain. The French refused to include anything in the communiqué that might have looked like an implicit recognition of east Germany. The Russians have no enthusiasm for the gaullist concept of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. They do not see eye to eye on disarmament, the Russians attending and the French boycotting the Geneva conference. Given this, it is interesting that they agreed to put into the communiqué a sentence which (briefly and in very general terms) acknowledged the risks involved in the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Clearly, both had Germany in mind. France is not only opposed to all western nuclear schemes but has also refused to attend the meeting of Nato defence ministers, to be held in Paris on November 29th, on the grounds that it is not interested even in the idea of forming a permanent committee to discuss nuclear problems. Opposition to all or any German participation in nuclear schemes may drive the French still closer to Moscow.

But how much closer? Next year, after the presidential election, France is expected to launch its major diplomatic offensives on both the European and the Atlantic fronts. Only then will it be possible to say whether General de Gaulle has merely been using the Russians to frighten Bonn into a more gaullist frame of mind, or whether France is indeed trying to build a new policy on the ruins of the grand design.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

162

LES

I.56158

FROM:

DATED: 10TH DECEMBER, 1965.
2115

REC'D: 11TH DECEMBER, 1965.
2359

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
ROME.

849 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED SAVINGS LONDON, PARIS, BRUSSELS, BONN, THE HAGUE.

FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO ROME.

FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH PRIME MINISTER MORO'S ADVISER WHO WAS PRESENT AT HIS TALK WITH COUVE DE MURVILLE YESTERDAY, 8 DECEMBER, TOLD ME THAT COUVE HAD "SHOWN GREAT GOODWILL". "HOWEVER", HE ADDED, "THIS MAY BE BECAUSE FRANCE IS BETWEEN TWO ELECTIONS."

2. I SUGGESTED THAT NOW GENERAL DE GAULLE WOULD PROBABLY MODIFY HIS ATTITUDE.

"THAT IS A CHARACTERISTIC ANGLO-SAXON VIEW" HE REPLIED, "DE GAULLE IS JUST AS LIKELY IF HE WINS HEAVILY NEXT WEEK TO BE EVEN STIFFER."

HE SAID ITALIANS INCLINED HEAVILY TO A THIRD POSSIBILITY, I.E. THAT DE GAULLE WOULD NOW BE MORE BENEVOLENT TOWARDS EUROPE AND TAKE IT OUT ON NATO.

STIRLING.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M.'S

12TH DECEMBER, 1965.

A/SEC FAS(1 2 3 4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN PACAM
EAMEC E@ ICR PIO PPO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *TIMES.*

File No. *25/1/1*

Published at *LONDON.*

Date *8-11-65*

**DEATH SENTENCE FOR
AIDING GESTAPO**

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, Nov. 7

Sentence of death was passed yesterday on Jacques Vasseur, accused of collaborating with the Gestapo in Angers during the Second World War. The court gave its verdict at the end of a trial that lasted more than a fortnight, and in the course of which some 190 witnesses, almost all of them former members of the French Resistance, were heard. Vasseur, the court was told, had spent 17 years in hiding in his mother's house.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANBERRA.

Name of Paper *Le Monde*File No. *25/1/1*Published at *PARIS*Date *19-10-1965*

— L'aide soviétique à Chypre.
— Répondant à la question d'un parlementaire, le porte-parole du gouvernement chypriote a précisé que l'U.R.S.S. avait fourni à Chypre des armes pour une valeur de 10 millions de livres sterling, dont la moitié seulement serait payée par le gouvernement, l'autre moitié étant un don du gouvernement soviétique. — C.F.P.

Emotion dans la presse américaine à propos d'un prétendu « plan français » sur la réforme de l'O.T.A.N.

Les deux journaux américains publiés à Paris paraissent lundi avec des titres sensationnels sur les affaires atlantiques. Le *New York Herald Tribune* parle d'un « plan français pour chasser les Etats-Unis d'Europe », tandis que le *New York Times* évoque, sous un titre plus discret, ce même plan, et annonce que Washington abandonne le plan de flotte atomique. Renseignements pris, il y a dans les deux cas pas mal d'exagération.

1) Le « plan français » se résume en fait à un article paru dans le dernier numéro de *Politique étrangère*, publication semi-mensuelle du Centre d'études de politique étrangère. Signé XXX, cet article expose sous le titre « Faut-il réformer l'atlantique ? » un projet envisageant la « superposition de deux systèmes » l'un, atlantique, excluant toute intégration mais comportant la « coordination permanente des stratégies de dissuasion », l'autre, européen, « s'inscrivant dans une zone assez marquée d'intégration », et unissant les nations « liées par une réelle communauté de destin ».

Ce deuxième système écarterait la participation de l'Allemagne à la décision d'emploi de l'arme atomique, étant entendu que le problème se représenterait en cas de constitution d'un gouvernement européen, que la France garantirait à la République fédérale une garantie d'intervention atomique et s'engagerait à promouvoir sa réunification dans ses frontières actuelles par tous les moyens en son pouvoir. L'auteur de l'article paraît ne pas s'émouvoir outre mesure de l'éventualité d'un retrait des troupes américaines d'Europe comme conséquence de l'adoption de son plan.

La publication de cette étude paraît avoir provoqué une certaine émotion dans certains milieux, où l'on en attribue volontiers la paternité à l'Elysée. En fait, nous sommes en mesure d'indiquer qu'elle est l'œuvre d'un petit groupe de fonctionnaires et de non-fonctionnaires, qu'elle n'a été commandée par personne ni soumise à personne, et qu'on ne

saurait sans se méprendre lourdement y voir l'expression des intentions du gouvernement français. Il est exact qu'elle se situe dans la ligne de la pensée atlantique, mais rien ne permet d'affirmer que le chef de l'Etat serait d'accord avec les suggestions avancées, notamment lorsqu'elles ont trait à l'intégration militaire européenne, à l'éventualité d'un gouvernement de l'Europe ou à la garantie atomique française à la République fédérale.

Au point où en sont les choses, un seul fait est sûr concernant les projets du général de Gaulle à l'égard de l'atlantique : deux reprises au moins, au cours de cette année, il a averti Washington que la France ne demeurerait pas au sein de l'O.T.A.N. au-delà de 1969 si celle-ci, à cette date, n'avait pas été considérablement transformée pour tenir compte de ses propres conceptions. Il aurait laissé entendre à M. Bohlen que des propositions précises seraient formulées l'an prochain et que sa faveur allait à la substitution à l'alliance multilatérale de traités bilatéraux.

2) Quant à la force nucléaire atlantique, aucun élément nouveau n'est intervenu ces jours derniers. On cherche toujours à arrêter la liste des membres du comité restreint suggéré par M. McNamara, lors de sa visite à Paris au début de l'été, pour étudier ce problème. Si les dirigeants américains ont bien pratiquement abandonné tout espoir de ressusciter la force multilatérale, ils savent parfaitement qu'au-delà constitué le nouveau gouvernement fédéral celui-ci va relancer la question. Aussi écartent-ils toute idée de renonciation publique à l'idée d'une force collective, attendant la visite du chancelier Erhard au mois de novembre pour fixer leur position quant à une éventuelle solution de rechange. Si beaucoup en effet sont convaincus de la nécessité de celle-ci, sa complexité apparaît à tous et la religion du président Johnson, qui aura en tout état de cause le dernier mot, est loin d'être faite.

A. P.

Memo No. 932
File No. 211/1



22nd October, 1965

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Foreign Policy Speech

.... With reference to our telegram No.2706 of
21st October we attach Le Monde's text of M. Couve de
Murville's speech of 20th October in the National Assembly.

2. In his initial review of the international
situation M. Couve de Murville made inter alia the following
points:-

(i) The international situation is dominated by the
problem of Asia, which can only be solved by way of genuine
independence, self-determination, neutrality and non-
interference in the internal affairs of other states.


(ii) In former Indochina, as in the Indo-Pakistan
dispute, one cannot but feel unhappy at a situation where
negotiations are envisaged in the absence of the great
power closest to the areas of conflict and perhaps most
affected by the decisions that may be reached. Chinese
exclusion from the United Nations and in practice from all
international negotiations creates a situation of unreality.
It will be immensely difficult to reach settlements with
Chinese concurrence, but the earlier the effort is started
the better.

(iii) Peace in Europe, and hence the world, will only be
really assured by a general European settlement, including
a German settlement. To this end France will continue its
efforts to establish closer relations with the countries of
Eastern Europe.

3. The major section of the speech, devoted to the
Common Market, contains an unusually clear and concise
account of the French case. As stated in our telegram No.2706
the essential points are:-

- (a) "Political" agreement is necessary between the six
governments before any discussions can be resumed
on concrete and technical problems, including
agricultural financing.
- (b) France requires an "overall revision, which would
permit the definition of the normal conditions of
cooperation between the Six, covering of course for
France her essential interests and firstly her
agricultural interests".

../(c)



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M. J. J. J.
82

- 2 -

- (c) French opposition is repeated to the political proposals and functioning of the Commission, which should seek to bring together the views of members, but not impose its own, and to the proposed majority vote system in the Council.

G. C. Lewis
(G. C. Lewis)
First Secretary

25/1/1

177

INWARD CABLEGRAM

EM

I.47043

FROM:

DATED: 21ST OCTOBER, 1965.
1800.AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.REC'D: 22ND OCTOBER, 1965.
0620.2706. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

REPEATED BRUSSELS 26, GENEVA 53, BONN 12, THE HAGUE 12, ROME 42.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER, COUVE DE MURVILLE, IN COURSE OF DEBATE YESTERDAY IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKE FURTHER ON FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMMON MARKET CRISIS. NO OFFICIAL TEXT YET AVAILABLE BUT DESPITE VARIOUS DIFFERENCES OF EMPHASIS IN PRESS REPORTS, FOLLOWING ARE ESSENTIALS:

1. FRANCE REQUIRES 'POLITICAL' AGREEMENT AMONGST SIX GOVERNMENTS BEFORE RESUMPTION OF ANY DISCUSSIONS ON CONCRETE AND TECHNICAL PROBLEMS INCLUDING AGRICULTURAL FINANCING.
2. FRANCE SEEKS AN 'OVERALL REVISION OF THE NORMAL CONDITIONS OF COOPERATION' BETWEEN THE SIX COVERING INDEED FOR FRANCE HER ESSENTIAL INTERESTS AND NOTABLY AGRICULTURE.
3. DE MURVILLE REPEATED FRANCE OPPOSITION TO POLITICAL PROPOSALS AND METHODS OF FUNCTIONING OF COMMISSION AND THE PROPOSED MAJORITY VOTE PROCEDURE IN THE COUNCIL.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
A/MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

22ND OCTOBER. 1965.

A/SEC FAS(2,3,4) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR ER PIO

25/1/1 76
UPI-9

BY WELLINGTON LONG

BONN, OCT 19 (UPI)--GERMAN LEADERS ARE BEGINNING TO LOSE HOPE THE FRENCH WILL END THEIR BOYCOTT OF THE COMMON MARKET THIS YEAR, DIPLOMATIC SOURCES REPORTED.

FRANCE HAS ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR IT WILL NOT SEND A DELEGATION TO THE MEETING OF THE COMMON MARKET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS OCT 25-26, THE SOURCES SAID.

EVEN SO, THE OTHER FIVE--GERMANY, ITALY, BELGIUM, THE NETHERLANDS AND LUXEMBOURG--INTENDED TO GO THROUGH THE MOTIONS OF A MEETING. THE COMMON MARKET HIGH COMMISSION, WHOSE ZTECHNOCRATS+ FRENCH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE FINDS SO OBJECTIONABLE, WILL ALSO PARTICIPATE.

BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PAUL HENRI SPAAK HAS PROPOSED TO GIVE THE FRENCH AN OUT BY CALLING FOR ANOTHER COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING IN NOVEMBER, THIS TIME WITHOUT THE HIGH COMMISSION, TO DISCUSS INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY OF ROME WHICH ESTABLISHED THE COMMON MARKET.

THE INITIAL OPTIMISM THAT SPREAD WHEN SPAAK FIRST CIRCULATED HIS PROPOSAL HAS FADED. THE GERMANS, AT LEAST, NOW DOUBT THE FRENCH WILL ATTEND THAT MEETING EITHER, DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID. F

UPI-10

ADD COMMON MARKET BONN XXX SOURCES SAID.

ONE INDICATOR OF THE FRENCH INTENTION IS SAID TO BE APPARENT PARIS₂ WILLINGNESS TO HAVE THE SIX FOREIGN MINISTERS APPROVE THE COMMON MARKET₂S 1966 BUDGET IN WRITING RATHER THAN AT A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, THE SOURCES SAID.

THIS AT LEAST MEANS FRANCE IS WILLING TO KEEP THE COMMON MARKET OPERATING AT ITS PRESENT TEMPO FOR THE TIME BEING.

BUT THE COMMON MARKET NATIONS ARE MAKING NO PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CRITICAL +KENNEDY ROUND+ INTERNATIONAL TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS.

THE CRISIS ALSO HAS DAMPENED ENTHUSIASM OF THOSE MEMBERS OF THE SEVEN-NATION EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (EFTA) WHO HOPED THE TWO GROUPS MIGHT NOW START COORDINATING TARIFF POLICIES.

DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER PER HAEKKERUP, WHO THIS SUMMER SPOKE OF NEGOTIATING JOINT TARIFF GUIDELINES, NOW IS SAID TO BELIEVE THE MOST THE EFTA COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WILL PROPOSE AFTER THEIR COPENHAGEN MEETING LATER THIS MONTH IS SOME ARRANGEMENT FOR COMMON TREATMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS.

UPI-11

DUI2:52A

THIRD COMMON MARKET BONN XXX PATENT RIGHTS.
CHANCELLOR LUDWIG ERHARD, ASSUMING HE IS REELECTED, IS IN NO HURRY TO MEET DE GAULLE TO DISCUSS THE CRISIS. HE IS SAID TO BE STILL ANGRY AT DE GAULLE₂S SEPT. 9 PRESS CONFERENCE

AND HIS SUBSEQUENT RECEPTION OF THE POLISH PRIME MINISTER WHICH ERHARD BELIEVES CUT INTO HIS VOTE IN THE SEPT. 19 ELECTION.

ERHARD PLANS TO POSTPONE A MEETING UNTIL THE REGULAR FRENCH-GERMAN CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT SESSION IN PARIS IN MID-JANUARY.

THE GERMANS THINK THE FRENCH PROBABLY WILL BOYCOTT ALL COMMON MARKET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETINGS UNTIL AT LEAST THEN.

ERHARD IS A FIRM BELIEVER IN THE COMMON MARKET, AND PERHAPS FOR THAT REASON REFUSES TO BELIEVE IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE MANY CONCESSIONS TO DE GAULLE.

THE CHANCELLOR, DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID, DOES NOT SHARE DE GAULLE₂S BELIEF THAT THE TREATY OF ROME SHOULD BE AMENDED. HE IS UNWILLING TO MAKE ANY WRITTEN UNDERTAKINGS ABOUT THE MAJORITY VOTE RULE WHICH DE GAULLE FINDS SO DISTASTEFUL ALTHOUGH HE WOULD GIVE AN ORAL PLEDGE NOT TO USE THE RULE TO OVERRIDE SOMEONE MEMBER₂S VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS.

NEITHER IS ERHARD WILLING TO UNDERMINE THE POSITION OF THE COMMISSION, WHICH HE CONSIDERS AN IRREPLACEABLE +MOTOR+ OF THE SIX-NATION COMMUNITY.

DUI

21/1/8 175

WRO
ATTN: ALIAN
DUBLIN

INWARD SAVINGRAM

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
DUBLIN.

In reply quote No.

201/2/1/2

To: External Canberra ... SAV/6/65

4th October, 1965.

London
Paris
Bonn
Brussels
The Hague
Rome
Moscow

... SAV/7/65

Rec'd: 12th October, 1965
1340

45112

MONTHLY POLITICAL SUMMARY: SEPTEMBER, 1965.

INTERNATIONAL.

Anglo-Irish Trade Talks.

The process of clarifying attitudes to the possibility of a free trade area between Britain and the Republic continued during September. Fine Gael renewed its request for a full-scale debate on the issue before the Government became committed and was joined by Labour spokesmen. Fine Gael also issued a policy statement setting out the conditions it considered should be met by any agreement. The three cardinal principles are that there must be an equitable balance of advantage between the two countries; Ireland must not become excessively or irrevocably dependent on one country; and the maintenance and future expansion of employment must not be endangered. While the Government could accept all three (they are all open to differences of interpretation) they would have more difficulty swallowing some of Fine Gael's specific conditions. The first of these is the removal of the British import levy with effect from the entry into force of the agreement. Britain has made it quite clear that there can be no exception to the application of the levy.

2. The Federation of Irish Industries has also issued a report on a detailed study it has made of the question. It compares the prospect unfavourably with that of entry into the E.E.C., sees a danger of static or declining employment and concludes that it will have to oppose the agreement unless the advantages to agriculture are overwhelming and Irish industry is guaranteed access to the British market now and in the future free of tariff and quota restrictions and import levies.

3. The National Farmers' Association has come out in favour of the proposal.

4. The absence of any major Government statement on the negotiations for some weeks and its refusal of an early Dail debate led to some speculation that the negotiations were on the point of foundering. When eventually Lemass did make a statement, he admitted that it was still an open question whether the negotiations could be successfully concluded. He was equally uncertain how long it would take to reach finality - make or break. He did, however, indicate that discussions would resume at official level in the first fortnight of October with the object of presenting a final draft for discussion between himself and Harold Wilson in late October or early November.

U.S. Air Rights into Dublin.

5. A formal request for talks on air traffic rights was made by the United States on 15th September and talks will be held in the first week of November. (Under the present agreement they must be held within 60 days of the request). Three U.S. airlines - P.A.A., T.W.A. and Seaboard and Western Airlines - have given notice of their intention to apply for traffic rights.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

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6. In the middle of the month the Government unexpectedly agreed to replace the 42nd Bn. which was due to be withdrawn from UNFICYP by early October. The diminution of Irish participation nevertheless continues since the 42nd Bn. of 650 men is to be replaced by an Infantry Group (5th) of some 400 - 500 men. Repatriation of 42nd Bn. was completed by the end of the month and the 5th I.G. will leave in the first week of October.

United Nations Affairs.

7. The U.N. figured prominently in the news, with the Pope's visit to the Assembly attracting a great deal of attention. The Taoiseach announced that he would go to New York to hear the Pope speak and the leaders of Fine Gael and Labour accepted his invitation to accompany him.

8. The progress of the Irish motion on authorizing and financing peace-keeping operations has been followed closely. Ireland has sent 14 officers to UNMOGIP to help supervise the ceasefire between India and Pakistan ordered by the Security Council.

Diplomatic Representation in Ireland.

9. The Portuguese Legation has been up-graded to Embassy level with the former Minister becoming the first Ambassador.

10. It is reported that New Zealand is to accredit its High Commissioner in London as Ambassador to the Republic.

Exclusive Fishing Zone.

11. Ireland has extended its exclusive fishing zone to 12 miles with certain exceptions in favour of Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Netherlands and Spain.

DOMESTIC.Dissolution of the Clanna na Poblachta.

12. The Clanna Poblachta, one of the small parties which lost heavily at the last election, has accepted the fact that it now serves no useful purpose and has dissolved. Its one elected representative in the Dail became an independent.

Economic.

13. The economic situation continues to cause disquiet. The August trade figures showed a further jump in imports which more than offset an improvement in export figures. The Government is reported to be reviewing its programme of expenditure on capital works and the Minister for Finance is negotiating an international loan for \$ 25 m. in New York. The Government is also raising a Stg. £22.5 m. stopgap loan at home in addition to the annual national loan of a similar amount in November. The banks are to find £20 m. of the stop-gap loan and the public the balance.

14. Labour relations remain bad. Although the printers, after 10 weeks, accepted terms well short of their initial demands and the busmen finally accepted the Labour Court's recommendations of August, other strikes broke out. The latest affects a section of post office telephonists in three centres including Dublin. For the present at least, other postal workers' unions are not in sympathy with it and pickets have had little effect.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
MIN. & DEPT T. & I.
P.I.

13th October, 1965

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A/SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INF UN PACAM AMSP
C&P EAMEC E AFME PIO MT ER ICR PPO

25/1/1.

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*Extract from London Telegram No 33
dated 28th September 1965.*

2. M. Spaak as mediator between France and E.E.C. T.27/9.

M. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, is launching a new plan to win France back to the Common Market conference table. His idea is to hold a meeting of the Governments of the Six in November, but without the Brussels Commission. This concession, he hopes, would persuade General de Gaulle to allow his Ministers to resume the dialogue while preserving the framework of the Common Market. Diplomatic

that France will be tempted back so quickly. It is generally believed that nothing can be done to resolve the crisis caused by the French boycott until after the French elections.

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25/1/1

EEC 171

From WKHC received 6/10 1965

File

NOTE

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE OF 9 SEPTEMBER, 1965.

1. The Press Conference was a depressing and negative performance even by the General's standards.
2. In one breath he set up France as "the champion of international co-operation"; and in the next he developed his intention of withdrawing France still further from the framework of her alliances with her Atlantic and European partners. It is France which will suffer most from this self-imposed isolation.
3. General de Gaulle seems to find it increasingly hard to hide the obsession that all his partners are conspiring against him. The Anglo-Saxons to dominate France by means of NATO, and their reserve currencies; and the Five to override French interests in the E.E.C.
4. Much of what the General had to say was a repetition of the familiar Gaullist themes, with even greater emphasis than before on the pursuit of France's solitary grandeur; and a good deal of time was spent in justifying the performance of the Fifth Republic. Perhaps the most important section of the Conference was the General's statement of the French attitude towards the Common Market. This can have given the Five no cause to hope for an early and easy solution of the present crisis. The Commission is directly attacked for its abuse of power and for usurping the functions of the member governments. The Five are implicitly accused of bad faith. The completion of a common agricultural policy is made the condition for French agreement to return to the negotiating table. And the very basis of the Community, the Treaty of Rome itself, is called in question. The clear implication is that its supra-national features, including the provision for majority voting, must go. How long the crisis will last de Gaulle refuses to specify. But he makes it plain that the next move is up to the Five and that he is in no hurry for a settlement.
5. Britain, in one of those patronising asides dear to the General is mentioned in the same breath as Spain as one of those countries which do not wish to lose their sovereignty and which might "one day" join a confederation of states which would allow a future entente of the whole of Europe. But all this is a long way off in the General's scheme of things.
6. The French attitude towards NATO is re-stated, but with no more precision than on previous occasions. So far as France is concerned, the "subordination called integration" which NATO involves will cease at the latest in 1969. This leaves the nature of French moves to achieve this end and the time-table wide open.

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7. The General made only a brief reference to international monetary reform, re-stating the French objection to the privileged status of the dollar. That the General's ideas on this subject have not changed is strongly suggested by the absence of France ("the champion of international co-operation") from the arrangements announced on 10 September between the Bank of England and the Central Banks of all the other members of the Group of Ten, Austria, Switzerland and the Bank for International Settlements.

8. The General's threats to the E.E.C. and his attitude to the Community and to his partners in it are worth contrasting with Her Majesty's Government's policy of seeking to extend European economic co-operation on as wide a basis as possible, for example by the initiative which led to the present work within EFTA designed to lead to the establishment of closer relations between the Association and the Community. The British record and views on European integration and international co-operation generally differ considerably from General de Gaulle's behaviour towards the E.E.C., NATO and the United Nations. The British aim remains the eventual creation of a wider European market, open to all those countries which wish to take part. But the British see this as based essentially on trust between equal partners, and neither it nor the prospects for fruitful co-operation between EFTA and the E.E.C. are improved by the line taken by the General at his press conference.

9. With regard to his threat to NATO, the following points are noteworthy:-

- (a) Integration in NATO provides the only assurance, under conditions of modern warfare, of convincing deterrence and effective defence. We regard NATO as of indefinite duration.
- (b) If France did break with NATO, her Allies would be put to great inconvenience and expense, but NATO would still go on. It would be France who would suffer most by depriving herself of NATO facilities.
- (c) The British are always ready to consider constructive proposals for the improvement of NATO. But General de Gaulle has produced none.

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File No.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with M.R. M. Francois J.L.P. Briere, French Ambassador
 on 28th September, 1965
 Officers Present Sir Laurence McIntyre

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

M. Briere called on me today at his request.

2. Recalling that he had talked with the Minister not long ago, and subsequently with Mr Doig, he wondered whether we had yet reached any considered conclusions about the possible effects of General de Gaulle's latest press conference (He made it fairly evident that he did not much approve of the President's chosen technique for making his views known). I said that we had been very interested to get - and were indeed still getting - reflections on General de Gaulle's statement from our posts in Europe and America; but that it was perhaps premature at this stage for us to try to assess all that it might mean for the future. We had gathered that it had caused a good deal of anxiety throughout the rest of the B.E.C. We were still studying the possible effects it might have for us in Australia.

3. In the discussion that followed on the India/Pakistan and Malaysia/Singapore/Indonesia situations the only noteworthy point was M. Briere's statement of his understanding that General de Gaulle had now come back to a posture of support for the United Nations. This was consistent with the General's well known belief that the real substance of the United Nations should be recognised as resting in the Security Council, and in particular in co-operation within the Council of the permanent members. Now that the Soviet Government was apparently showing willingness to co-operate in some respects (e.g., on the India/Pakistan situation) the General was evidently disposed to take more interest in the United Nations. The Ambassador had just heard that M. Couve de Murville was to go to New York - ostensibly because the Pope would be making a visit (General de Gaulle, of course, being "a deeply religious man"), but also to explore the possibility of further co-operation. M. Briere noted that this would be the first time M. Couve had visited New York for the General Assembly since 1962.

4. The Ambassador gave no indication that he knew enough to link M. Couve's visit with the possibility raised in New York telegram U.N. 1345.

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FOLLOWING POSTS:ACTION:Report prepared by L.R. McIntyre

(L.R. McIntyre)

CHECKED

Mr. L. McIntyre
 we should consider quieting Secy

Acting Sec and perhaps Minister in association

3 am open minded as to whether it is done by

UN or E.A.M.E.C. consulting other Brs

PL speak later in week. 3 may raise

at Monday meeting. Bring secret report of what General

c 7M
 29/9

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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BW

I.43640

FROM:

DATED: 4TH OCTOBER, 1965

1855

REC'D: 5TH OCTOBER, 1965.

0456

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BONN.

512 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 73, BRUSSELS 49, PARIS 11, THE HAGUE 6,
ROME 8 (LONDON PLEASE PASS LAST TWO POSTS) SAVINGRAM WASHINGTON
50, GENEVA 14.

E.E.C.

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ON 1ST OCTOBER CLARIFIED PREVIOUS
STATEMENT (OUR TELEGRAM 509) ABOUT AMENDMENT OF ROME TREATIES.

THIS COURSE WAS NO MORE THAN A LEGAL POSSIBILITY OPEN TO
E.E.C. IF ALL MEMBERS WANTED IT,
BUT

(A) IT WAS 'NOT THE POLITICAL INTENTION OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'.

(B) 'IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE THAT THERE ARE NO
GROUNDS FOR ALTERATION OF THE TREATIES'.

(C) THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH COMMISSION'S ROLE TO BE IMPAIRED
BUT 'CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE COMMISSION'S RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS
CAN BE IMPROVED'.

(D) GOVERNMENT AGREED TO SPAAK PROPOSAL FOR COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS MEETING IN NOVEMBER BUT COMMISSION SHOULD NOT BE
EXCLUDED FROM MEETINGS WHEN MATTERS WITHIN ITS COMPETENCE
WERE DISCUSSED. //

2. VON STEMPER (EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, FOREIGN MINISTRY)
TOLD KIRTLEY 4TH OCTOBER

(A) ABOVE WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT, IN SPITE OF PRE-OCCUPATIONS
WITH CABINET FORMATION, CHANCELLOR WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR HIS
POSITION THAT NO CONCESSIONS AGAINST ROME TREATIES SHOULD BE MADE.

(B) MEETING IN (D) - ABOVE WOULD BE OPPORTUNITY TO
ASCERTAIN FRENCH INTENTIONS.

DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE WAS NEITHER CLEAR NOR A
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS.

WHEN LUNS AND SPAAK HAD QUESTIONED COUVE IN NEW YORK ABOUT
GENERAL'S INTENTIONS, HE HAD CONFESSED HE DID NOT KNOW THEM.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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(C) GOVERNMENT HELD FIRMLY THAT MACHINERY EXISTED UNDER TREATY TO DEAL WITH DE GAULLE'S SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS.

IT WOULD NOT AGREE TO A CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTS OUTSIDE THE TREATY FRAMEWORK.

LATTER WOULD IMPLY WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WITH CONTENTS OF THE TREATY.

SOME THOUGHT FRENCH HAD READY A COMPLETELY NEW TREATY DRAFT ELIMINATING POLITICAL ASPECTS OF EEC PROVIDING FOR PURELY TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT.

THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO CANCELLATION OF ALL MOVES TOWARDS INTEGRATION, SHIFTING OF ORGANS OF CONSULTATION FROM BRUSSELS TO PARIS, AND FRENCH HEGEMONY OVER WESTERN EUROPE.

IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FIVE.

(D) THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF 9TH SEPTEMBER WAS NOTABLY AMBIGUOUS AND MIGHT MERELY INDICATE FRENCH DESIRE FOR A REVISION CONFINED TO CERTAIN SPECIFIC AREAS E.G. AGRICULTURE AND MAJORITY VOTING.

BUT 'WORD FOR WORD' ANALYSIS BY VON STEMPER'S OFFICE LED TO MUCH MORE DRASTIC INTERPRETATION THAT IT MEANT A REPUDIATION OF THE TREATIES AND OF BASIC CONCEPTS OF INTEGRATION EMBODIED IN THEM.

3. VON STEMPER WAS THEREFORE CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS A MOMENT OF CRISIS FOR E.E.C.

UNTIL JANUARY ORGANISATION COULD CONTINUE BY USE OF WRITTEN PROCEDURES.

THEN HOWEVER THERE WOULD BE DECISIONS OF SUBSTANCE - ON KENNEDY ROUND AND ON AUSTRIA - WHICH COULD NOT BE DEALT WITH BY THIS METHOD.

FIVE WOULD THEN HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY MUST GO THEIR OWN WAY WITHOUT FRANCE.

POSSIBLY FOR SOME MONTHS FURTHER IN 1966 THEY COULD BY VARIOUS DEVICES DEFER A BREACH.

BUT EVENTUALLY IF FRANCE SHOWED NO WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A MEETING OF FIVE AND A DECISION TO REVISE TREATY ON A NEW BASIS WITHOUT FRANCE.

THEY COULD ALSO CONSIDER FRESH INITIATIVES E.C. AN APPROACH TO E.F.T.A.

DURING PERIOD OF WAR OF NERVES FOREIGN MINISTRY EXPECTS INTENSIFIED PRESSURE ON DE GAULLE FROM FRENCH ECONOMIC AND PARTICULARLY AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS.

4. VON STEMPER AGREED THAT SUCCESS FOR FIVE IN TRIAL OF STRENGTH WITH PARIS, REQUIRED UNITED RESOLUTION AND TACTICS.

(THIS HE BELIEVED WAS THE CASE).

SPAAG FOR EXAMPLE HAD BEEN UNCERTAIN AT FIRST BUT NOW CONSIDERED FRENCH HAD CLEARLY VIOLATED THE TREATIES.

THE FEELING IN ALL FIVE CAPITALS WAS THAT THEY SHOULD JOINTLY RESIST FRENCH PRESSURE FOR ANY AMENDMENT.

5. ASKED WHETHER GERMANY MIGHT AGREE TO CONCILIATE FRANCE BY RENOUNCING PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY VOTING, VON STEMPER REPLIED THAT PRINCIPLE HAD ALREADY PROVED ITSELF AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN PRODUCING CONSENSUS.

IT WAS AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF TREATY AND ITS RENUNCIATION COULD NOT BE EASILY ENVISAGED PARTICULARLY WHEN ALTERNATIVE WOULD AMOUNT TO RIGHT OF VETO BY INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.43640

6. LATER MINISTERIAL DIREKTOR MEYER-LLINDENBERG TOLD ME
(A) GERMAN HOPE THAT FRENCH MIGHT ACCEPT GENTLEMAN'S
AGREEMENT THAT MAJORITY VOTING WOULD NOT BE ABUSED WAS BASED
ON CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR UNANIMITY ON SOME MATTERS AFTER
JANUARY, 1966.

A COUNTRY WHICH FELT ITS VITAL INTERESTS IMPAIRED BY MAJORITY
RULE IN A SPECIFIC CASE COULD EFFECTIVELY COUNTER WITH THREAT
OF VETO IN A MATTER REQUIRING UNANIMITY.

(B) COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN ABSENCE OF COMMISSION COULD
DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT (SUCH AS FUTURE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF
E.E.C.) IN WHICH THE RIGHTS OF THE COMMISSION WERE NOT
SPECIFICALLY LAID DOWN BY TREATY.

(C) FOREIGN MINISTRY DID NOT EXPECT FRENCH TO ACCEPT
SPAAG PROPOSAL FOR SUCH MEETING BEFORE FRENCH ELECTIONS.

THIS WAS ALSO IMPRESSION COUVE DE MURVILLE HAD GIVEN SARAGAT
IN NEW YORK.

BLAKENEY.

? Fanfani

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
A/TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

5TH OCTOBER, 1965.

SEC FAS(2,4) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR PIO ER

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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FILE No. 727/2/4/5

DATE 17 SEP 1965

SUBJECT PRESIDENT de GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE - E.E.C. ASPECTS

FOR THE MINISTER
(for information)Copy: THE SECRETARY
(for information)

On 9th September President de Gaulle held one of his biannual press conferences at which he made inter alia references to the European Economic Community.

Background

2. On 1st July a meeting of the E.E.C. Council of Ministers broke up following disagreement over the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy. Since then France has restricted her participation in E.E.C. activities. Although the meeting ostensibly broke up because of differences over the financing of the C.A.P., one of France's objections was to supranationalist concepts involved in proposals by the E.E.C. Commission. The Commission had in fact made a package proposal which, if accepted, would have meant the establishment of a supranational European Community from 1st June, 1967, three years before the scheduled date. President de Gaulle is firmly opposed to the assumption by the Commission of power over E.E.C. members. Giving the Commission the control of community funds as had been proposed would have gone a significant way in this direction. In de Gaulle's view, the Commission's duties should be simply to prepare for and carry out the decisions of the Council of Ministers and to reconcile the views of the member countries.

De Gaulle's Remarks at the Press Conference

3. The following is a summary of the main points relating to the E.E.C. which General de Gaulle made at his Press Conference on 9th September, 1965 :

(a) The Rome Treaties:

The three treaties were concluded "before French recovery in 1958" and "cover, above all, everything the other nations sought". They contain "certain errors or ambiguities of principles" detrimental to French interests.

(b) Agriculture

President de Gaulle defined as an "equitable" Common Market one in which agricultural products "should come into the Common Market at the same time as industrial products but with their own particular conditions". He said that, "the Treaty of Rome clearly fixed the conditions for the industrial area which was of importance to our neighbours but did not establish these for the agricultural area in which we were most interested". He went on to say that the inclusion of agricultural products for practical purposes as an integral part of the Community was for France a sine qua non condition "because unless it is fulfilled we would bear more than our neighbours the very heavy burden of supporting

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our agriculture".

(c) Commission.

De Gaulle spoke of "the supranational tendencies of the Brussels Commission" and described as "unrealistic" the concept of a European Federation "ruled by a technocratic body, stateless and irresponsible". He said the Commission has "suddenly shed its political reticence and laid down conditions ... which would have the effect of giving to it, alone, a budget which might have amounted to 20,000 million francs ... thus making it a great independent financial institution".

(d) Voting.

De Gaulle referred to the Treaty of Rome's provision that the decisions of the Council of the Ministers of the Six would be taken by a majority vote from 1st January, 1966. "This means that France's hand could be forced in all economic and consequently social and often even political matters and that in particular what seemed to have been achieved in agriculture could be jeopardised at any moment whether France liked it or not".

(e) Parliamentary control of Budget.

In referring to the Commission's proposals of March 1965 over which the Meeting had broken down on 1st July. De Gaulle noted that an enormous budget would be "submitted to the European Assembly for examination". But intervention by this Assembly which is initially consultative and where members have never been elected for the purpose would only aggravate the unsatisfactory character of what was proposed."

(f) Confederation.

De Gaulle said that France "offers the alternative" (to the concept held by Member countries of a European federation in which the Member countries "would lose their national identity") "of organised co-operation between States evolving without doubt towards a confederation".... He said that this was the only plan which "would one day allow other countries, like England and Spain, to join, because these countries, just like ours, do not want to lose their sovereignty".

(g) The Future.

De Gaulle said that "whatever happens there will be a delay, the length of which no one can foresee... However it may turn out, France for her part is ready to participate in any exchange of views which other Governments may propose to her. The occasion arising (France) envisages renewing the Brussels negotiations as soon as the incorporation of agriculture is to the Common Market is really accepted..."

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...3/

Comments.

4. In the light of the above background, de Gaulle's references to the Commission, the European Parliament and the Common Agricultural Policy were not unfamiliar, if somewhat sharper than had generally been expected. However, what does seem to be a new development is that de Gaulle has in this statement publicly thrown doubts on continued French acceptance of the Rome Treaties establishing the E.E.C., the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom. In particular, he has referred with misgiving to the provision of the Treaties that many decisions of the E.E.C. Council of Ministers should be taken by qualified majority vote from 1st January, 1966.

5. De Gaulle's remarks at his press conference show that the crisis precipitated on 1st July, 1965 is more serious than was felt in most quarters at the time. His remarks suggest strongly that France's differences with the other members of the E.E.C. relate not so much to the mechanics of financing the Common Agricultural Policy (i.e. control over and use of proceeds from the levies upon imports into the E.E.C.) as to the progress of the E.E.C. towards a supranational organisation. De Gaulle appears in fact to have used disagreement over the common agricultural policy as a pretext for achieving a fundamental objective, namely, to halt the movement towards supranationalism within the E.E.C. in accordance with the Rome Treaties. The timing of de Gaulle's move was no doubt determined by the consideration that this objective would have been much more difficult to achieve after the E.E.C. moved on from unanimity in voting, which it was scheduled to do on 1st January, 1966.

6. De Gaulle's statements suggest that there will be at least a protracted pause in the development of the E.E.C. It may not be able to progress much further towards its goals while de Gaulle remains in power in France. But in our view it remains unlikely that de Gaulle would wish to dismantle the very substantial Common Market structure which has already been developed or to withdraw from the Communities in their present form. Nor does President de Gaulle's statement exclude the possibility that further limited progress could be made if greater benefits to France in the agricultural sector was forthcoming. Such further progress would, in the French view, need to eschew the trend towards supranationalism or what President de Gaulle has described as "a European Federation ... ruled by a technocratic body, stateless and irresponsible", and would be limited by his concept of "organised co-operation between states evolving without doubt towards a confederation". It is of interest that, in his Press Conference President de Gaulle described this latter concept as "the only plan which would one day allow other countries, like England and Spain to join, because these countries, just like ours, do not want to lose their sovereignty. This plan alone would allow us to conceive of a future entente for the whole of Europe."

7. A halt to the development of the E.E.C. will be a great disappointment to the hopes of those in Europe (and elsewhere) who have been looking towards the gradual submersion of national sovereignty in the Western European economic sphere and eventual political federation. But given de Gaulle's attitudes as now revealed, it seems clear that a halt is inevitable.

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8. At this stage it is too early to assess with any confidence the effects on Australian interests of this latest French position. Insofar as it implies a halt to the further development of the economic community and in particular to the common agricultural policy, it should mean a limiting of further damage to our wheat exports from a greatly increased and highly subsidised French production and export. But on the political side, and in the longer term, we cannot feel easy about a development which will halt and could reverse progress towards political unity in Western Europe.

Alan Renouf

(Alan Renouf)
First Assistant Secretary
DIVISION IV.

Economic Relations Branch
A.G.D. White/MMcS

CONFIDENTIAL

727/2/4/161
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

SW

I.43136

FROM:

DATED: 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
1714

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

REC'D: 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
0322

8477

CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED GENEVA 96.

FOR CARMODY FROM COOK.

MINISTERIAL MEETINGS - LONDON - 4TH AND 5TH OCTOBER.

AT MEETING WITH BOARD OF TRADE AND CRO OFFICIALS ON
27TH SEPTEMBER WE WERE INFORMED THAT FOLLOWING BRITISH
MINISTERS WILL BE PRESENT-
JAY PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF TRADE.
REDHEAD MINISTER OF STATE, BOARD OF TRADE.
CLEDWYN HUGHES " " CRO
HOY PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE.

PLUS SOMEONE REPRESENTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WHEN THE NATIONAL PLAN IS BEING DISCUSSED.

JAY WILL TAKE THE CHAIR BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE WILL
BE CALLED AWAY DURING THE FIRST MEETING, IN WHICH CASE REDHEAD
WILL TAKE OVER.

2. MINISTERIAL MEETINGS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 10.30 AM 4TH
OCTOBER AND 3 PM (OR POSSIBLY EARLIER) 5TH OCTOBER.

MEETINGS OF OFFICIALS ARE SCHEDULED FOR 3 PM 4TH OCTOBER
CONTINUING, IF NECESSARY AND CONVENIENT TO SIR ALAN
WESTERMAN, ON MORNING OF 5TH OCTOBER.

3. A TENTATIVE AGENDA WAS DRAWN UP:-

- 1) NEW ZEALAND/AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT - GATT ASPECTS.
- 2) " " " " -BILATERAL EFFECTS.
- 3) UNITED KINGDOM/AUSTRALIA TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1957.
- 4) SHIPPING.
- 5) NATIONAL PLAN.
- 6) KENNEDY ROUND.
- 7) GENERAL QUESTION OF PREFERENCES.
- 8) EEC CRISIS.

4. I DISCUSSED THIS AGENDA WITH MR MCEWEN PRIOR TO HIS
DEPARTURE FOR GENEVA ON TUESDAY MORNING.

HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVES TO SUGGEST BUT ASKED THAT SHORT
BRIEFING NOTES ON EACH ITEM BE PREPARED AND SENT TO HIM TO
ARRIVE GENEVA MORNING OF 29TH SEPTEMBER.

THESE WERE DONE, DRAWING LARGELY ON THE SECRETARY'S
BRIEF, AND DESPATCHED LATE LAST NIGHT.

5. THE FOLLOWING IS A SHORT SUMMARY OF THE NOTES PREPARED
FOR MR MCEWEN.

IF YOU HAVE ANY ALTERNATIVES, COMMENTS OR ADDITIONS,
I ASSUME THAT YOU WILL CABLE US IN GOOD TIME BEFORE THE
SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL ON SATURDAY ,2ND OCTOBER.

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.43136

ITEM 1.

- A) WE TRAVERSED THE POINTS MENTIONED IN THE BRITISH AIDE MEMOIRE OF 28TH AUGUST.
- B) OUR REBUTTAL TO THESE ARGUMENTS (IE THAT THE AGREEMENT COMPLIES WITH ARTICLE XXIV) WAS THEN SET OUT.
- C) OUR "LEGAL" POSITION UNDER UNITED KINGDOM/AUSTRALIA TRADE AGREEMENT.
- D) YOUR REPLY OF 24TH SEPTEMBER TO AIDE MEMOIRE.
- E) REFERENCE TO UNITED STATES AIDE MEMOIRE OF APPROXIMATELY 22ND SEPTEMBER.

ITEM 2.

- A) BRITISH POINTS (IN SAME AIDE MEMOIRE) ABOUT EFFECT OF AGREEMENT ON THEIR TRADE, SUCH AS REVERSE PREFERENCES, ETC.
- B) REFERRED TO YOUR REPLY OF 24TH SEPTEMBER SUGGESTING THAT THESE POINTS COULD BE DISCUSSED DURING MINISTERIAL VISIT TO LONDON.

ITEM 3.

- A) PRESENT STATUS OF AGREEMENT.
- B) SUGGESTED POSSIBLE POINT FOR DISCUSSION WAS BRITISH MINISTERS VIEWS ON TIMING OF NEW NEGOTIATIONS.
- C) SUGGESTED TIMING WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON CLOSER FINALITY BEING REACHED IN KENNEDY ROUND.

ITEM 4.

- A) REFERRED TO REPORT "INSIDE CANBERRA" OF 26TH AUGUST.
- B) INDICATED THAT YOU WOULD BE PREPARING FURTHER BRIEFING FOR THIS ITEM (I HAVE SINCE RECEIVED MESSAGE ON THIS FROM ELLIS).

ITEM 5.

- A) GENERAL SUMMARY OF PLAN IS GIVEN (MR MCEWEN INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE RAISING WITH BRITISH MINISTERS ALL ASPECTS OF THE PLAN AND NOT NECESSARILY CONFINED TO AGRICULTURE).
- B) AGRICULTURE'S PART IN THE PLAN.
- C) OUR REACTION TO THE PLAN - INITIALLY PESSIMISTIC.
- D) POSSIBLE POINTS FOR CLARIFICATION WITH BRITISH MINISTERS - PARA 14 (PAGES 5 AND 6) OF SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF.
- E) FOUR POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION TO BE PURSUED - PARA 20 (PAGES 8 AND 9) OF SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF.

ITEM 6.

- A) AUSTRALIA/UNITED KINGDOM POSITION (PARTICULARLY TABLING OF OFFERS ON 16TH SEPTEMBER).
- B) GATT CEREALS GROUP, DAIRY GROUP AND MEAT GROUP - PARAS 21 TO 35 (PAGES 9 TO 13) OF SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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-3-

I.43136

C) MINISTER ASKED FOR MORE GENERAL STATEMENT OF PRESENT STATE OF
LAY IN KENNEDY ROUND, WHICH WE HAVE ASKED DONOVAN TO PREPARE.

ITEM 7.

- A) PRESUMED DISCUSSION ON BILATERAL PREFERENCES QUESTION WOULD OCCUR UNDER ITEMS 3 AND 6.
- B) ASSUMED OPPORTUNITY COULD BE TAKEN UNDER THIS ITEM OF DISCUSSING OUR L.D.C. PREFERENCE PROPOSAL WITH BRITISH MINISTERS.
- C) SUMMARY OF PRESENT POSITION OF GATT WORKING PARTY.
- D) UNITED KINGDOM ATTITUDE (OUR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE, HONG KONG).

ITEM 8.

- A) BACKGROUND TO CRISIS.
- B) COMMISSION'S RESPONSE.
- C) FRENCH ATTITUDE AFTER 30TH JUNE.
- D) ATTITUDE OF COMMISSION (AND PRESUMABLY OTHER FIVE).
- E) POSSIBLE POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH MINISTERS

- (I) BRITISH ASSESSMENT OF CRISIS.
- (II) POSSIBLE EFFECT OF BRIDGE BUILDING BETWEEN EFTA AND EEC.
- (III) POSSIBLE EFFECT OF BRITAIN'S FUTURE RELATIONS WITH EEC.
- (IV) KENNEDY ROUND IMPLICATIONS.

6. BUTTER-PREFERENCE OUR CABLE 8309.

COMMENT IN SECRETARY'S BRIEF INDICATED THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAD NOT FULLY EXAMINED PROPOSED SYSTEM.

WOULD LIKE TO RECEIVE YOUR ADDITIONAL COMMENTS BEFORE FRIDAY IN ORDER THAT MINISTER AND SECRETARY CAN BE BRIEFED BEFORE THEY COMMENCE THEIR TALKS WITH BRITISH MINISTERS.

A/MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT P.I.(C)
A/TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
E.A.
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

30TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.

A/SEC PAS(2,4) UN PACAM AMSP EAMEC E PIO ICR ER

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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F 727/2/4/5

JDF

I.43273

FROM:

DATED: 29TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
1930

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.

REC'D: 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
2123

295. CONFIDENTIAL.

SAVINGRAM LONDON 17 PARIS 17 BONN 20 HAGUE 23 ROME 23
WASHINGTON 18 GENEVA 13.

E.E.C. - SPAAK PLAN.

SPAAK'S CHEF DE CABINET, DAVIGNON, CLARIFIED FOR ME TODAY CERTAIN POINTS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN CLEAR IN SPAAK'S EXPOSITION IN HIS DEBATE WITH MAURICE SCHUMANN (MY 291).

2. SPAAK'S CONCEPT IS THAT THE MINISTERS OF THE FIVE AT THEIR MEETING ON 25 -26 OCTOBER, WHEN IT IS ASSUMED FRANCE WILL NOT BE PRESENT, WILL ATTEMPT TO REACH AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES ON WHAT THEY COULD EXPECT AS A SETTLEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL FINANCEMENT. THEY WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO SAY TO FRANCE, THROUGH FANFANI "WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT WITH YOU ON THE AGRICULTURAL ISSUE, IF YOU WILL MEET WITH US".

3. THE AGENDA FOR THE SESSION, WITHOUT THE COMMISSION PRESENT, WOULD THEN INCLUDE AS ITS FIRST ITEM "CONSIDERATION OF THE AGRICULTURAL FINANCEMENT PROBLEM". HOWEVER, A DECISION COULD NOT BE TAKEN BY THE MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT SUCH A SESSION, NOT ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF THE COMMISSION, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE TECHNICAL MINISTERS (AGRICULTURE AND FINANCE) WOULD NEED TO BE PRESENT IN ORDER TO CONCLUDE A FINANCIAL REGULATION. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS COULD THEN PROCEED TO EXAMINE ANY FRENCH PROPOSALS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN THE LIGHT OF THE BARGAIN STRUCK ON AGRICULTURE.

4. THERE MAY BE SOME INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS IN NEW YORK DURING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND CONCEIVABLY BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL MINISTERS DURING THE CURRENT BANK AND FUND SESSIONS, BUT IT IS NOT INTENDED TO BROACH THE MAIN SUBSTANCE UNTIL NOVEMBER.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JDF

- 2 -

I.43273.

A/MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
A/TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C.&E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

1ST OCTOBER, 1965.

A/SEC FAS(2,4,) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR PIO ER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

2 White 156
727/2/4/1

JDF

I.43273

FROM:

DATED: 29TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
1930

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.

REC'D: 30TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
2123

295. CONFIDENTIAL.

SAVINGRAM LONDON 17 PARIS 17 BONN 20 HAGUE 23 ROME 23
WASHINGTON 18 GENEVA 13.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JDF

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I.43273.

A/MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
A/TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

1ST OCTOBER, 1965.

A/SEC FAS(2,4,) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR PIO ER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GD

I.43579

FROM:

DATED: 1ST OCTOBER, 1965.
1625

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BONN.

REC'D: 2ND OCTOBER, 1965.
0740

509 RESTRICTED.

REPEATED LONDON 72, BRUSSELS 47, PARIS 10, HAGUE 5, ROME 7
(LONDON PLEASE PASS HAGUE AND ROME)
SAVING WASHINGTON 49, GENEVA 13.

E.E.C.

WITH ERHARD AND MAIN POLITICAL LEADERS FULLY ENGAGED IN
TRYING TO GET AGREEMENT ON COMPOSITION AND POLICIES OF A NEW
GOVERNMENT, NO STRIKING INITIATIVE CAN BE EXPECTED FROM CURRENT
CABINET WHOSE TENURE EXPIRES PROBABLY LATER THIS MONTH.

STATEMENTS OF POSITION ON SUCH POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE ISSUES
AS E.E.C. AND FRANCE ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN AS ANODYNE AS POSSIBLE.

2. THUS GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ANSWERING PRESS THIS WEEK ON
"SPAARK PLAN" (BRUSSELS 290) MADE OBVIOUS POINTS THAT :

(A) TREATY OF ROME PERMITS MEETINGS OF MINISTERS AS DISTINCT
FROM COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

(B) BONN IS READY TO EXAMINE IN COMMON WITH OTHERS THE QUESTION
OF AMENDING TREATY WHICH MUST ALWAYS BE A POSSIBILITY IF THE
SIX AGREE.

3. OUR PRESENT IMPRESSION IS THAT GOVERNMENT THINKING
INCLINES TO MAKING REAL EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE FRANCE WITHIN
LIMITED: TO AVOIDING A "SHOWDOWN" ON THIS AS MUCH AS ON
NATO: BUT TO TAKING NO INITIATIVES ITSELF AT THIS STAGE.

4. WE MAY HAVE MORE SPECIFIC COMMENTS FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY
EARLY IN WEEK.

A/MIN. & DEPT TRADE
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
A/TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

2ND OCTOBER, 1965.

A/SEC FAS(1 2 3 4) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR PIO
PPO ER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL

BW

I.43640

FROM:

DATED: 4TH OCTOBER, 1965

REC'D: 5TH OCTOBER, 1965.
0456

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BONN.

512 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 73, BRUSSELS 49, PARIS 11, THE HAGUE 6,
ROME 8 (LONDON PLEASE PASS LAST TWO POSTS) SAVINGRAM WASHINGTON
50, GENEVA 14.

E.E.C.

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ON 1ST OCTOBER CLARIFIED PREVIOUS
STATEMENT (OUR TELEGRAM 509) ABOUT AMENDMENT OF ROME TREATIES.

THIS COURSE WAS NO MORE THAN A LEGAL POSSIBILITY OPEN TO
E.E.C. IF ALL MEMBERS WANTED IT,
BUT

(A) IT WAS 'NOT THE POLITICAL INTENTION OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'.

(B) 'IT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE THAT THERE ARE NO
GROUNDS FOR ALTERATION OF THE TREATIES'.

(C) THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH COMMISSION'S ROLE TO BE IMPAIRED
BUT 'CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE COMMISSION'S RELATIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS
CAN BE IMPROVED'.

(D) GOVERNMENT AGREED TO SPAAK PROPOSAL FOR COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS MEETING IN NOVEMBER BUT COMMISSION SHOULD NOT BE
EXCLUDED FROM MEETINGS WHEN MATTERS WITHIN ITS COMPETENCE
WERE DISCUSSED.

2. VON STEMPER (EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, FOREIGN MINISTRY)
TOLD KIRTLEY 4TH OCTOBER

(A) ABOVE WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT, IN SPITE OF PRE-OCCUPATIONS
WITH CABINET FORMATION, CHANCELLOR WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR HIS
POSITION THAT NO CONCESSIONS AGAINST ROME TREATIES SHOULD BE MADE.

(B) MEETING IN (D) - ABOVE WOULD BE OPPORTUNITY TO
ASCERTAIN FRENCH INTENTIONS.

DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE WAS NEITHER CLEAR NOR A
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTS.

WHEN LUNS AND SPAAK HAD QUESTIONED COUVE IN NEW YORK ABOUT
GENERAL'S INTENTIONS, HE HAD CONFESSED HE DID NOT KNOW THEM.

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(C) GOVERNMENT HELD FIRMLY THAT MACHINERY EXISTED UNDER TREATY TO DEAL WITH DE GAULLE'S SPECIFIC COMPLAINTS.

IT WOULD NOT AGREE TO A CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENTS OUTSIDE THE TREATY FRAMEWORK.

LATTER WOULD IMPLY WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WITH CONTENTS OF THE TREATY.

SOME THOUGHT FRENCH HAD READY A COMPLETELY NEW TREATY DRAFT ELIMINATING POLITICAL ASPECTS OF EEC PROVIDING FOR PURELY TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT.

THIS WOULD AMOUNT TO CANCELLATION OF ALL MOVES TOWARDS INTEGRATION, SHIFTING OF ORGANS OF CONSULTATION FROM BRUSSELS TO PARIS, AND FRENCH HEGEMONY OVER WESTERN EUROPE.

IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FIVE.

(D) THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF 9TH SEPTEMBER WAS NOTABLY AMBIGUOUS AND MIGHT MERELY INDICATE FRENCH DESIRE FOR A REVISION CONFINED TO CERTAIN SPECIFIC AREAS E.G. AGRICULTURE AND MAJORITY VOTING.

BUT 'WORD FOR WORD' ANALYSIS BY VON STEMPEL'S OFFICE LED TO MUCH MORE DRASTIC INTERPRETATION THAT IT MEANT A REPUDIATION OF THE TREATIES AND OF BASIC CONCEPTS OF INTEGRATION EMBODIED IN THEM.

3. VON STEMPEL WAS THEREFORE CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS A MOMENT OF CRISIS FOR E.E.C.

UNTIL JANUARY ORGANISATION COULD CONTINUE BY USE OF WRITTEN PROCEDURES.

THEN HOWEVER THERE WOULD BE DECISIONS OF SUBSTANCE - ON KENNEDY ROUND AND ON AUSTRIA - WHICH COULD NOT BE DEALT WITH BY THIS METHOD.

FIVE WOULD THEN HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEY MUST GO THEIR OWN WAY WITHOUT FRANCE.

POSSIBLY FOR SOME MONTHS FURTHER IN 1966 THEY COULD BY VARIOUS DEVICES DEFER A BREACH.

BUT EVENTUALLY IF FRANCE SHOWED NO WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A MEETING OF FIVE AND A DECISION TO REVISE TREATY ON A NEW BASIS WITHOUT FRANCE.

THEY COULD ALSO CONSIDER FRESH INITIATIVES E.G. AN APPROACH TO E.F.T.A.

DURING PERIOD OF WAR OF NERVES FOREIGN MINISTRY EXPECTS INTENSIFIED PRESSURE ON DE GAULLE FROM FRENCH ECONOMIC AND PARTICULARLY AGRICULTURAL INTERESTS.

4. VON STEMPEL AGREED THAT SUCCESS FOR FIVE IN TRIAL OF STRENGTH WITH PARIS, REQUIRED UNITED RESOLUTION AND TACTICS.

(THIS HE BELIEVED WAS THE CASE).

SPAAG FOR EXAMPLE HAD BEEN UNCERTAIN AT FIRST BUT NOW CONSIDERED FRENCH HAD CLEARLY VIOLATED THE TREATIES.

THE FEELING IN ALL FIVE CAPITALS WAS THAT THEY SHOULD JOINTLY RESIST FRENCH PRESSURE FOR ANY AMENDMENT.

5. ASKED WHETHER GERMANY MIGHT AGREE TO CONCILIATE FRANCE BY RENOUNCING PRINCIPLE OF MAJORITY VOTING, VON STEMPEL REPLIED THAT PRINCIPLE HAD ALREADY PROVED ITSELF AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN PRODUCING CONSENSUS.

IT WAS AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF TREATY AND ITS RENUNCIATION COULD NOT BE EASILY ENVISAGED PARTICULARLY WHEN ALTERNATIVE WOULD AMOUNT TO RIGHT OF VETO BY INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.43640

6. LATER MINISTERIAL DIREKTOR MEYER-LLINDENBERG TOLD ME
(A) GERMAN HOPE THAT FRENCH MIGHT ACCEPT GENTLEMAN'S
AGREEMENT THAT MAJORITY VOTING WOULD NOT BE ABUSED WAS BASED
ON CONTINUING REQUIREMENT FOR UNANIMITY ON SOME MATTERS AFTER
JANUARY, 1966.

A COUNTRY WHICH FELT ITS VITAL INTERESTS IMPAIRED BY MAJORITY
RULE IN A SPECIFIC CASE COULD EFFECTIVELY COUNTER WITH THREAT
OF VETO IN A MATTER REQUIRING UNANIMITY.

(B) COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN ABSENCE OF COMMISSION COULD
DISCUSS ANY SUBJECT (SUCH AS FUTURE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF
E.E.C.) IN WHICH THE RIGHTS OF THE COMMISSION WERE NOT
SPECIFICALLY LAID DOWN BY TREATY.

(C) FOREIGN MINISTRY DID NOT EXPECT FRENCH TO ACCEPT
SPAAG PROPOSAL FOR SUCH MEETING BEFORE FRENCH ELECTIONS.
THIS WAS ALSO IMPRESSION COUVE DE MURVILLE HAD GIVEN SARAGAT
IN NEW YORK.

BLAKENEY.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
A/TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

5TH OCTOBER, 1965.

SEC FAS(2,4) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR PIO ER

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/1

P113

150

POSSIBLE PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE

FOR THE MINISTER

Background

At his press conference on 9th September President de Gaulle discussed, among other things, France's attitude to the European Economic Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The full text of his statement is not yet available but from extracts we have received and reports from posts it is clear that this latest exposition of his views is regarded by his European allies as another significant set-back to the cause of European integration.

2. For the first time General de Gaulle attacked the Rome treaties themselves. He said that the ^{Rome Treaty establishing the} treaties clearly ^{Common Market} fixed the conditions for the industrial area which was of importance to France's neighbours but that ^{they} it did not establish those for the agricultural area in which France was most interested. Agricultural products should come into the Common Market at the same time as industrial products but with their own particular conditions.

3. France ^(the said) had long supported the idea of "grouping the states of Western Europe" and had for seven years actively supported the building up of the economic community but could not accept a different concept of a European federation integration.

in which the member countries would lose their national identity and be ruled by a stateless and irresponsible technocratic body. Resumption of the Brussels talks would depend on a solution to the agricultural questions satisfactory to France and an end to the ideas of a supra-national organization dominating the Six. France would support as an alternative, organised cooperation between European states evolving "without doubt" towards a confederation.

4. On NATO General de Gaulle restated his view that the present alliance imposed a subordinate role on European countries. He indicated that if France were to continue to be a member after 1969 (when members may elect to withdraw from the Organisation) some prior revision would be necessary of the role of individual member countries under the treaty.

Suggested Answer

If a question is asked, you may wish to draw on the following :-

(a) Although the full text of General de Gaulle's statements is not yet available it is clear from the excerpts we have received and from the reactions in the relevant European capitals that this latest exposition of the General's views is widely regarded in Europe as a significant additional set-back to the cause of European integration.

3.

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(b) So far as NATO is concerned General de Gaulle indicated that if France were to continue as a member of NATO after 1969, when members may elect to withdraw from the Organisation, some prior revision of the role of individual member countries would be necessary. In his view the present arrangements impose an unacceptable subordinate role on European member countries.

(c) My Department is examining the implications for Australia of the General's statements. Meanwhile I would not wish to comment on differences of opinion between European countries about their relations with each other and their role in the Atlantic Community, which are of course matters for decision by the European countries themselves. We would, of course, regret any developments which might impair the cohesion of the ~~movement towards~~ Western alliance.

(J. Plimsoll)
Secretary

PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE - EEC ASPECTS

On 9th September, President de Gaulle held one of his biannual press conferences at which he made inter alia references to the European Economic Community.

Much of what de Gaulle said was well known. Not unexpectedly, he spoke in critical terms of the "supranational demands of the Brussels Commission". He referred to France's well known viewpoint that it was a "sine qua non" for France that agricultural products be an integral part of the Community. He said "What we wanted yesterday and what we want today is a Community that is fair and reasonable. Fair ; that means that agricultural products, allowing for their own particular conditions, should be included in the Common Market concurrently with industrial goods. Reasonable ; that means that nothing which is important at present in the organization and later in the operation of the Common Market of the Six should be decided and, even more, applied except by the responsible public authorities in the six States, that is, the Governments controlled by the Parliaments".

De Gaulle spoke of France's opposition to the concept of a European federation which "would be ruled by some technocratic, stateless and irresponsible Areopagus". He spoke of the alternative, a Confederation which he suggested would one day make possible the adherence of countries such as Britain or Spain which "like ours, could in no way accept the loss of a sovereignty".

What does seem to be a new development is that de Gaulle publicly threw doubts for the first time on continued French acceptance of the Rome Treaties which he noted "were concluded before France's recovery in 1958". In particular he referred with misgivings to the provision of the Treaty setting up the European Economic Community that many decisions of the EEC Council of Ministers should be taken by qualified majority vote from 1st January, 1966.

Comment

De Gaulle's remarks at his press conference suggest that although there will be at least a protracted pause in the development of the European Economic Community, it remains unlikely that he would want to dismantle the very substantial Common Market structure which has already been developed, or to withdraw from the Communities in their present form. Nevertheless, the press conference does show that the crisis initiated on 1st July, 1965, is more serious than was felt in most quarters at the time. His remarks suggest strongly that France's differences with the other members of the European Economic Community relate not so much to the mechanics of the financing of the common agricultural policy as to the progress of the European Economic Community towards a supranational organization.

Latest reports from European capitals suggest that there may be a developing disposition among other members of the EEC to avoid a head-on clash with France and to concentrate on maintaining unimpaired the existing EEC structure against the day of President de Gaulle's departure from the scene when further substantial progress should again be possible. It is, however, worth recalling that President de Gaulle has indicated, in his press conference and subsequently, that he continues to attach high importance to a Common Market in agriculture (with consequent benefits to French agriculture) if that can be achieved without compromising his overall political principle.

CONFIDENTIAL

4.

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The interruption of discussion on a European Agricultural Policy as a result of General de Gaulle's action has, of course, considerable internal political significance in France where, more than 20 per cent of the population being engaged in agriculture, the farmers' vote is of great importance. The National Federation of Farmers' Organisations (FNSEA) made known its position on 16th September, when it declined to endorse any candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, but expressed views clearly opposed to those of General de Gaulle. The National Council of the FNSEA reaffirmed its adherence to the Common Agricultural Policy provided for in the Treaty of Rome. Following the crisis of 30th June, it said, the Farmers' Organizations have refrained from any premature comment, not wishing to hamper the French Government if negotiations were resumed, but General de Gaulle's press conference now made it clear that the essential cause of the crisis was not any difference on agriculture policy. But it would be the farmers who bore the brunt of the consequences, and their serious anxiety would not be allayed by any new promises or general statements but only by concrete decisions for a resumption of the European negotiations as well as for an internal farm policy very different from that which is to be found in the proposed 1966 Budget and the draft of the Fifth Plan. The FNSEA announced an intensive propaganda campaign "to educate public opinion on the dramatic consequences for agriculture and the whole French economy of the cessation of negotiations, and on the alarming developments in French agriculture over the past few years".

CONFIDENTIAL

5.

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25/1/1
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In reply quote No.

AUSTRALIAN MISSION TO THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
BRUSSELS 4

Memo. No. EEC/181

14th September, 1965.

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA→ for European Br 482
(original as 27/2/4/5)De Gaulle's Press Conference

We had a conversation on 13th September with Prince Werner de Merode. Until two weeks ago he was Counsellor/Minister (for six years) at the Belgian Embassy in Paris. He is now in charge of the Foreign Ministry's Directorate for European Integration.

2. He had watched De Gaulle's press conference on T.V. with Fayat. Fayat's subsequent statement to the press ("the fundamental problems linked with the evolution of European construction which have been raised by President De Gaulle and the way in which they have been posed will not fail to cause much concern to the chancelleries of Europe in the coming months") had been most carefully considered. There was no reflection in it of Fayat's "anger" with De Gaulle's "mis-statements of fact" and his "contemptuous and arrogant tone". De Gaulle had chosen to "confront" his partners in the Six and the Commission as publicly as possible. The situation called for the most serious consideration and further official statements by Belgium were unlikely until Spaak's return from holidays on 15th September. Even then, Merode did not expect that Spaak would have much to say until he had seen Luns (in The Hague on 16th September) and consulted the Germans and the Italians. We should also keep in mind the possibility that Spaak might try, eventually, to play some sort of mediatory role in the impasse that had now been reached. Spaak's attitude to France at the Council meeting of 30th June had been conciliatory. He still wanted a "supranational" Europe but realised that it could not be achieved for the time being. He had regarded the Commission's proposal to give the European Parliament control over the funds from the levies and duties as premature and ill-advised and had taken the stand that there should not have been a meeting of the Council without the French on 28th July. No doubt considerations such as these were in the minds of "various high officials in Paris" when, even before the press conference, they had told the Belgians that they would probably need Spaak's mediatory services after 9th September. However, in Merode's view it was far too early to be thinking of Spaak as a possible mediator. In the present situation Spaak would want, first of all, to have the closest possible consultations with his Ministerial colleagues in Benelux, Germany and Italy.

3. What was the significance of the press conference? In Merode's view, the declarations on NATO were not unexpected and were relatively unimportant. After all, the "essential things" about NATO were the American nuclear umbrella over Europe and U.S.

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forces in Germany. These had not been placed in jeopardy at least for the time being.

4. The declarations on "Europe", however, were of the highest importance. In this case the "essential things" were the treaties establishing ECSC, Euratom and EEC. De Gaulle had called for their revision, on his terms, thereby placing in jeopardy all that had been built up by the Europe of the Six. The crisis that he had thereby provoked was immediate. Unfortunately, it was unlikely that the Five could reach a common position to meet it before the German elections. In the meantime, it was clear that the French would attend no more meetings involving new decisions (although they might agree to written procedures when it suited them - as it had in the case of the accreditation of a new Ambassador of Togo to the EEC) and that the work of the Commission would stagnate. If the deadlock lasted long enough the Common Market could simply decay.

Monnet ?
5. However, it was possible that De Gaulle may have gone too far this time. Some of his statements were so palpably false. Schumann must be turning in his grave over the remarks about the purpose of the ECSC and Manet had already come out with a strong statement. France had derived substantial benefits from the Common Market and was likely to gain further substantial benefits in the field of agriculture. The French farmers knew this and De Gaulle's European agricultural policy was already under heavy fire. In fact, said Merode, "our best hope" for the moment in helping to alleviate the crisis is that "Pisani may resign". This, in Merode's personal view, was "a distinct possibility". If it came to pass it could not but blow some of the wind out of De Gaulle's sails and help towards an eventual settlement of the impasse. For the moment, however, the issue which De Gaulle had opened up, the very structure of the treaties, was so fundamental that no way out of the impasse could be seen. There would obviously have to be great diplomatic activity among the Five in the coming months. It was too soon to say what could be done about the present situation.

6. We are giving this memorandum the usual EEC distribution with copies to Vienna, Athens and Lagos.

(K. Desmond)
First Secretary

KD/CL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
21 SEP 1965
No. 25/11

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
ROME.

In reply quote No.
Memorandum No. 872.

16th September 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

On 14th September I asked Dr. Giorgio Vecchi of the North Atlantic Treaty Office of the Foreign Ministry what were the Italian reactions to the Press Conference of General de Gaulle on 10th September.

In his reply Vecchi referred almost exclusively to two aspects of General de Gaulle's speech : his references to the Common Market and to NATO. He discussed other unrelated matters later.

He said that generally nothing new about the General's thinking had emerged from the speech. He described it as generally disappointing and negative in its approach.*

The Common Market

Vecchi said he had just read a cable sent by Sig. Fanfani to the Foreign Ministry and the Italian missions to the Common Market countries. In it Sig. Fanfani asked that proposals be submitted to him for a solution of the agricultural fund problem. He answered affirmatively to my question whether this meant that Italy was now intending to make proposals to the other Common Market countries to end the deadlock. Vecchi said that Sig. Fanfani had also asked that new efforts be made by the Italian missions to secure the agreement of all the Governments of the Six to a high level conference (Vecchi explained that the cable did not say whether the Conference was to be of Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers or Undersecretaries). He thought Sig. Fanfani probably had in mind a Foreign Minister's Conference like the one he unsuccessfully proposed earlier in the year, the failure of which had greatly disappointed the Minister. The exact level of the Conference, Vecchi said, was not so important as the necessity for a resumption of common discussions by the Six.

NATO

Vecchi described the General's remarks on the future of NATO as a declaration that France would leave NATO in 1969, although when I asked whether this really could be deduced from these remarks, he agreed there was some ambiguity in them.

Vecchi said that he personally shared the British view that a proper legal construction of the Treaty did not justify the view that the Treaty would automatically terminate in 1969.

He said there was a difference of opinion among the NATO countries as to whether the running should now be left to the General to decide whether France should remain a party to the Treaty or whether the other members of the Alliance should call a conference to discuss the future structure of the alliance. Those who held the latter view, including Denmark and Italy, did not want the General, in the event of his securing an adjustment in the Organization, to appear as the dictator of the terms of the Treaty.

* See our cable 570 for the stronger reaction of the Director General of Economic Affairs ..2

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PS

3
MAD
Jm

M. Woodberry

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL (42)

The Area of NATO involvement

I asked Vecchi what Italy thought about the proposals that NATO should involve itself outside the Treaty Area, i.e. in Latin America, Africa and Asia. He said such proposals raised the problem of consultation. Italy did not want to be committed politically and more importantly, militarily in an area where important decisions might be made by some other Power in the Alliance without proper consultation with Italy. Furthermore NATO was from the Italian point of view a European security arrangement and Italy saw no point in being involved in areas where she had no experience or interest. He qualified this by saying Latin America and Africa were of some importance and interest to Italy although South East Asia was not. I questioned the correctness of this view in regard to South East Asia by saying that wherever the Great Powers were involved in a balance of power conflict, as in South East Asia, there surely Italy, as an ally of the West, was involved also. He admitted this was true and said that one of the first things that Sig. Fanfani did when he became Foreign Minister was to telephone the Italian Ambassador in Saigon to ask him to convey certain views, which he did not elaborate, to Mr. Cabot Lodge and General Maxwell Taylor. (sic).

MLF and ANF

Vecchi then turned to the subject of the MLF and ANF. He said the Italian Government hoped that new vitality would be given to the discussion of both these proposals after the German elections.

He described the Germans twice as "a great danger to Europe" and he said the great fear was that right wing people like Strauss might come to dominate the Government.

The ANF proposal he described as a clever and successful counter by the British to the American MLF proposal. Its weakness, in his view, was that it did not go further than the existing arrangement under the Montreal agreement.

Proposed Nuclear Non-Dissemination Agreement

Vecchi said he was pessimistic about the future for the Italian proposal for a provisional non-dissemination agreement by the non-nuclear powers. Not only was the Soviet Union opposed to it because of its preoccupation with the danger of Germany, but the "neutral" countries had come out against it.

Rumours of Indonesia exploding Chinese Atomic Weapon

Vecchi asked for a comment on a cable just received by the Foreign Ministry from the Italian Ambassador in Manila reporting the rumour that Chinese technicians would shortly explode an atomic weapon off West Irian. I said it was the first I had heard of it. (A similar rumour was published next day in the Italian papers as a UPI despatch reporting the claim of a Hong Kong newspaper). Vecchi described the Indonesians as "the most irresponsible people".

Australian Access to NATO classified documents

Before the substantive discussion began Vecchi observed that he understood that the proposal that Australia should formally be allowed to receive classified NATO information was still under consideration. While he knew that, in fact, Australia, "so closely tied to Britain", did receive some information, it was of course true that the formality remained to be completed.

(G.J. Coles)
Third Secretary.

Copies of this memorandum are being sent to London, Washington, Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Bonn and Athens.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1

141

CONFIDENTIAL

FW.

I.41569

DATED: 20TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
1116.

FROM:

REC'D: 20TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
2126.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

2360. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 363 WASHINGTON 133 NEW YORK 53 NEW DELHI
MISC 28 (CANBERRA PLEASE PASS) KARACHI 2 (CANBERRA PLEASE PASS)

FROM WALKER.

INDIA-PAKISTAN-CHINA.

LUCET (WHO IS GOING TO WASHINGTON AS FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN
NOVEMBER) DINED AT THE EMBASSY TO MEET SOME AMERICAN FRIENDS ON
18TH SEPTEMBER.

IN DISCUSSING KASHMIR HE TOLD ME THE FRENCH FOUND THEMSELVES
VERY CLOSE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM ON THIS MATTER.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSION WAS DIFFICULT AND DELICATE.
THE FRENCH CONSIDER IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO STOP HOSTILITIES:
THERE MUST BE A REAL ATTEMPT TO MAKE SOME ADVANCES ON THE BASIC
PROBLEM OF KASHMIR.

THE FRENCH ARE AGAINST PROCEEDING TOO RAPIDLY IN THE DIRECTION
OF SANCTIONS.

2. LUCET COMMENTED THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS
ALMOST IDENTICAL WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE SOVIET CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD EXPRESSED TO HIM FAIRLY
STRONG SUPPORT OF THE INDIAN POSITION, AS WELL AS CONCERN OVER
CHINESE INTENTIONS.

3. IN REPLY TO MY QUESTION WHETHER FRANCE WAS OBTAINING ANY
LIGHT ON CHINESE INTENTIONS THROUGH THEIR DIRECT DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS LUCET COMMENTED THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN PEKING
(PAYE) FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO GET ANYTHING OUT OF THE CHINESE
FOREIGN MINISTRY EXCEPT THE USUAL STREAM OF PROPAGANDA.

A SUBSTANTIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WAS ONLY POSSIBLE WITH PEOPLE
AT THE VERY TOP, ON OCCASIONS SUCH AS M. MALRAUX' RECENT VISIT.
(MY 2212).

4. LUCET CONSIDERED UNLIKELY THAT CHINA WOULD MOUNT A FULL-SCALE
INVASION OF INDIA AND NOTED THAT THEIR 'ULTIMATUM' THOUGH TEMPORARY
WAS IMPRECISE AS REGARDS THE CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE.

(MR BULLOCK PLEASE ADVISE
COMMUNICATIONS DUTY OFFICER
WHETHER TELEGRAPHIC RETRANSMISSION
TO KARACHI AND NEW DELHI IS DESIRED)

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

20TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) S&SEA M DL SAMT INT UN SA PACAN
AMSP EA BAMEC E PPO ICR MT PLO CR C
COLOMBO HONG KONG KARACHI NEW DELHI OTTAWA WELLINGTON

UPI-179

MONTREUX, SWITZERLAND, SEPT. 17 (UPI)--FRANCE TODAY SUPPORTED
A COMMUNIST MOVE TO HAVE COMMUNIST CHINA REPLACE FORMOSA
AT A UNITED NATIONS SPECIALIZED AGENCY CONFERENCE.
THE COMMUNIST DEMAND WAS MADE AT THE PLENIPOTENTIARY
CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
(ITU) HERE.

FRENCH MINISTER OF POSTAL SERVICES JACQUES MARETTE SAID
HIS COUNTRY SUPPORTS THIS DEMAND.
+WE WISH THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND NOT NATIONALIST
CHINA TO PARTICIPATE AT THIS CONFERENCE,+ HE SAID.

D01120A

25/1/40

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1

135

MH

I.41387

FROM:

DATED: 17TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
1830

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 18TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
0651

2352 UNCLASSIFIED.

REPEATED BRUSSELS 22 GENEVA 50 LONDON 359.

PLEASE REFER TO OUR TELEGRAM NO 2295 ON GENERAL DE GAULLE'S
PRESS CONFERENCE.

FOLLOWING WEDNESDAY'S MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS,
THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION QUOTED DE GAULLE AS HAVING SPOKEN
ON THE COMMON MARKET AS FOLLOWS

"GENERAL DE GAULLE (IN THE COUNCIL) THE EFFORTS THAT FRANCE HAD MADE
PARTICULARLY OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS TO ENSURE THE INCLUSION OF AGRIC-
ULTURE IN THE COMMON MARKET.

WHILST THE INTENTION OF THE ROME TREATY WAS TO INCLUDE
AGRICULTURE, THIS WOULD HAVE REMAINED A PIOUS WISH IF THE GOVERNMENT
HAD NOT DURING THIS LAST FOUR YEARS APPLIED ALL ITS ENERGY TO
TRANSFORM THE WISH INTO REALITY.

IT HAS BEEN OUR STRONGEST DESIRE THAT AGRICULTURE SHOULD ENTER
INTO THE COMMON MARKET AND WE HAVE FOUGHT FOR SOME YEARS FOR THIS
OBJECTIVE AND WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO SO, SO THAT ITS INCLUSION
WILL BECOME IRREVERSIBLE - NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE INCLUSION OF
AGRICULTURE IN THE COMMON MARKET WILL BRING SIGNIFICANT ASSISTANCE
TO OUR AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRY, BUT BECAUSE WE ARE CONVINCED THAT
THE COMMON MARKET CANNOT CONTINUE IF AGRICULTURE IS NOT INCLUDED
AND IF THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE ECONOMIES OF MEMBER COUNTRIES IS NOT
GUARANTEED IN THIS WAY.

THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT DESPAIR OF ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE
AND IT WILL ACT IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE OBJECTIVE WILL BE ACHIEVED
SO THAT IT CAN NO LONGER BE QUESTIONED."

ON THE FOLLOWING DAY AT GHENT FAIR IN BELGIUM, THE FRENCH
MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE, MONSIEUR PISANI, IS QUOTED AS HAVING
SAID:

.../2.....

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.41387

"WE WANT TO BUILD EUROPE, BUT WHAT WE ARE ASKING IS THAT
PRACTICAL AND POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS BE REACHED.
THE DESTINY OF A PEOPLE CANNOT BE AT THE MERCY OF AN
INTERNATIONAL MAJORITY VOTE AGAINST ITS WILL."

PISANI'S COMMENTS WERE, WE UNDERSTAND, OFF THE CUFF AND
NO TEXT IS AVAILABLE.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

18TH SEPTEMBER, 1965

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) PACAM AMSP PIO EAMEC E ICR PPO ER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1

187

MH

I.41386

DATED: 17TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
1757

FROM:

REC'D: 18TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
0643

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.

274 UNCLASSIFIED.

REPEATED PARIS 69, REPEATED SAVINGRAM BONN 51, ROME 18,
LONDON 12, (LONDON PLEASE PASS SAVINGS).

E.E.C.

AT GHENT FAIR YESTERDAY FRENCH MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE,
AFTER RECALLING FRENCH RELUCTANCE TO PROCEED TO THE SECOND STAGE
OF THE COMMON MARKET IN DECEMBER 1961 BECAUSE SHE CONSIDERED
"EUROPE" I.E. THE COMMUNITY) NOT YET SUFFICIENTLY MATURE,
REFERRED TO THE CRISIS OF 30 JUNE LAST.

2. HOW, PISANI ASKED, COULD FRANCE BE EXPECTED TO SUBSCRIBE
TO WHAT WAS PROPOSED WHEN AS A COUNTRY WITH (AGRICULTURAL) SURPLUSES
SHE RAN THE RISK OF SEEING THE SYSTEM ADOPTED REOPENED EVERY YEAR.

3. NOR COULD FRANCE ADMIT THAT THE DESTINY OF HER PEOPLE MIGHT
BE AT THE MERCY OF A MAJORITY.

" WE COULD NOT", HE ADDED " ACCEPT FOR CEREALS MAJORITY
PROVISIONS WHICH THE DUTCH WOULD NOT ACCEPT AS REGARDS THE
EXISTENCE OF THE PORT OF ROTTERDAM".

FRANCE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO "EUROPE" HE CONCLUDED, BUT WANTED
MORE REALISTIC AND POSITIVE IDEAS.

4. THE BELGIAN MINISTERS FOR MIDDLE CLASSES, D'ALCANTARA,
WHO APPARENTLY HAD NO WARNING OF PISANI'S INTENTION TO RAISE THIS
ISSUE) RECALLED IN REPLY THAT BELGIUM HAD ALWAYS PLAYED THE ROLE
OF CONCILIATOR AND DREW ATTENTION TO THE FACT THE DECISIONS IN THE
E.E.C. WOULD NOT BE BY A SIMPLE MAJORITY BUT BY A QUALIFIED MAJORITY
WHICH WAS NOT THE SAME THING.

HE ADDED THAT IT WAS CERTAINLY POSSIBLE TOMODITY COMMITMENTS
UNDERTAKEN BUT THIS REQUIRED THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN STEPS AND
SOME CARE.I.

HARRY.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

18TH SEPTEMBER, 1965

SEC FAS(2,4) PACAM AMSP PPO EAMEC E ICR PIO ER

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1

GCL.

I.40697

FROM:

DATED: 14TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.

REC'D: 15TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
0338.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

2308.

CONFIDENTIAL.

PRIORITY.

REPEATED GENEVA 48, BRUSSELS 21, LONDON 352.

FRANCE/EEC/GATT

1. DUE DEPARTURE OF WAHL AND FACT THAT REORGANIZED BRANCH IN MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DEALING WITH EEC MATTERS NOT YET FULLY OPERATIVE CORKERY SAW BRUNET (DEPUTY TO WORMSER) ON 13TH SEPTEMBER TO DISCUSS FRENCH ATTITUDE TO EEC AND KENNEDY ROUND.

2. AS YOU WILL KNOW, BRUNET CERTAINLY CANNOT BE DESCRIBED AS EXCESSIVELY NATIONALISTIC: AND AMONGST OTHER THINGS HE HAS SERVED IN FRENCH MISSION IN BRUSSELS: IT IS THEREFORE OF SOME IMPORTANCE TO REPORT BRUNET'S FIRM VIEW THAT IN LAST SIX MONTHS OR SO COMMISSION CONTRARY TO ITS PREVIOUS BEHAVIOUR HAD BEEN UNDULY AGGRESSIVE AND IN FRENCH EYES ACTED IN SUPRA NATIONALISTIC WAY.

HE WAS PARTICULARLY CRITICAL OF ATTITUDE WHICH ON ONE HAND HAD OFFERED (THROUGH COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS) FRANCE A "QUITE GOOD DEAL" ON AGRICULTURAL FINANCING BUT HAD SOUGHT TO SECURE AS PART OF THE PACKAGE FRENCH AGREEMENT OR ACQUIESCENCE FOR INCREASED ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE COMMISSION.

BRUNET DESCRIBES THIS ATTITUDE AS QUITE NONSENSICAL.

3. BRUNET CONFIRMED IMPRESSION GIVEN BY WAHL THAT CERTAINLY NO WORK WAS IN TRAIN OR PROPOSED ON ANY FRENCH INITIATIVES AND THAT THE POSITION WAS AS DE GAULLE HAD STATED IT AND NO MORE AND NO LESS.


SOME BACKGROUND PAPERS PREPARED BY OFFICIALS FOR PRESS CONFERENCE HAD DEVELOPED LINE OF THOUGHT THAT FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION SHOULD BE SOUGHT IN A WIDER CONTEXT THAN THAT OF EEC.

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE DESPITE REFERENCE IN SPEECH TO BRITAIN AND SPAIN THAT DE GAULLE HAD ACCEPTED THIS THESIS.

BRUNET BELIEVED THAT DE GAULLE'S ATTITUDE TO BRITAIN IN EUROPE HAD NOT CHANGED AND THERE WAS NO TRUTH AT ALL IN A BRUSSELS PRESS REPORT THAT FRENCH HAD SOUNDED BRITISH OUT ON ALTERNATIVES TO EEC.

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CONFIDENTIAL



INWARD CABLEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

MC.

- 2 -

I.40697

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IN HIS VIEW THE TWO CONDITIONS SET OUT IN FINAL PARAGRAPH OF DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT (SATISFACTION TO FRANCE ON AGRICULTURE AND REPRESSION OF SUPRA NATIONAL TENDENCIES IN E.E.C. COMMISSION) CONSTITUTED THE ONLY FRENCH CONDITIONS FOR THE OPENING UP RESUMPTION: BRUNET REPLIED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS TO BE THE CASE.

HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SECOND OF THESE CONDITIONS HAD BEEN RATHER VAGUELY WORDED BUT THOUGHT THAT THE SUPRA NATIONAL ELEMENT WAS THE ESSENCE OF IT AND GAVE FIRMLY AS HIS VIEW THAT RESUMPTION E.E.C. ACTIVITY AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION WAS NOT CONDITIONAL UPON PROGRESS TOWARDS SOME OTHER KIND OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENT.

5. ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THE TWO CONDITIONS AS SUCH, BRUNET DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRESS COMMENT AND WHAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS OF E.E.C. REALLY THOUGHT.

ON THE LATTER, SOME TIME WOULD NEED TO ELAPSE BEFORE ANY ASSESSMENTS COULD BE MADE BUT IT WAS OFTEN THE CASE THAT THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS WERE MORE IRRITATED OR AFFRONTED BY THE MANNER IN WHICH THINGS WERE DONE OR SAID BY DE GAULLE THAN BY THE SUBSTANCE OF THEM.

HE ARGUED THAT WHAT FRENCH WANT IS ESSENTIALLY VERY SIMPLE, NAMELY A REAL SETTLEMENT ON AGRICULTURE AND AN END TO SUPRA NATIONAL PRETENSIONS.

WHILST SOME MONTHS WOULD NEED TO ELAPSE, AT LEAST UNTIL NOVEMBER, HE HELD PERSONAL OPINION THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD FINALLY ACCEPT SUFFICIENT OF FRENCH CONTENTION ON THESE TWO POINTS.

HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD ACCEPT THE FIRST BECAUSE FRENCH CALIMS WERE REASONABLE AND FAIR: THEY WOULD COME TO ACCEPT THE SECOND BECAUSE THEY THEMSELVES ALREADY REALLY SHARED IT.

6. WHILST GIVING THIS PERSONAL OPINION, BRUNET IS AWARE THAT PROLONGED STAGNATION FOR E.E.C. COULD LEAD TO DISINTERGRATION AND HIS OWN VIEW IS THAT TO AVOID THIS MOVEMENT FORWARD IS NECESSARY BY MARCH 1966.

HE SEES SOME DILEMMA FOR FRENCH POSITION IF FUSION OF EXECUTIVES IS NOT CARRIED THROUGH ON 13TH JANUARY BECAUSE PRESENT COMMISSIONERS THEN CONTINUE AUTOMATICALLY IN OFFICE.

7. ON KENNEDY ROUND, HE SAID THAT WYNDHAM WHITES FORTHCOMING VISIT TO PARIS COULD NOT HAVE COME AT A WORSE TIME BECAUSE THERE WAS LITERALLY NOTHING TO SAY.

HE SAID CATEGORICALLY THAT COMMISSION WOULD NOT BE SUBMITTING EVEN TOKEN OFFERS ON SEPTEMBER 16TH.

HE DID NOT SEEM TO BE CONCERNED ONE WAY OR THE OTHER AS TO WHETHER OTHER COUNTRIES SUBMITTED OFFERS ON THAT DATE.

WE TOOK OPPORTUNITY OF REMINDING BRUNET AGAIN THAT WORTHWHILE CEREALS ARRANGEMENT WAS THE MAJOR BENEFIT THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DERIVED (FOR US) IN KENNEDY ROUND AND IN AN ENDEAVOUR TO DRAW HIM SAID THAT PRESENT STAGNATION MADE THIS PROSPECT RECEDE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1

183

MC:

I.40698

FROM:

DATED: 14TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
1729

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 15TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
0431

2309. CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

REPEATED LONDON (FOR TREASURY) 353 GENEVA 49

1. IN ADDITION TO POINTS ON EEC/GATT REPORTED OUR 2308 THE DISCUSSION WITH BRUNET BRIEFLY COVERED FOLLOWING:

(A) IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION WE CONFIRMED YOUR STRONGLY HELD VIEW TO SEEK A WAIVER AS GATT COVER FOR INTRODUCTION L.D.C. PREFERENCES AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICAL REQUIREMENT.

HE ASKED IF WE KNEW HOW AMERICANS WOULD VOTE ON SUCH APPLICATION: TO WHICH QUESTION WE WERE UNABLE TO REPLY BUT TOOK OPPORTUNITY OF SECURING CONFIRMATION THAT FRANCE WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF WAIVER.

(B) DISCUSSION WITH FOWLER HAD NOT BEEN OF SUBSTANCE.

FRENCH HAD TOLD HIM THAT EXPECTED SURPLUS IN FRENCH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SECOND HALF OF YEAR (WHICH WILL APPROXIMATE THAT OF FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1965) WOULD BE LARGELY CONVERTED INTO GOLD.

BRUNET SAID AMERICANS HAD SEEMED TO ACCEPT THIS WELL ENOUGH PARTLY BECAUSE HE FELT THEY WANTED TO HEAR REPLY - WHICH HAD BEEN GIVEN BY GISCARD D'ESTAING - THAT FRENCH BELIEVED FUTURE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBSTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM SHOULD BE CONDUCTED IN THE PARIS CLUB.

NOT BEING SURE OF OUR GROUND IN THIS AREA WE SIMPLY NOTED WHAT BRUNET HAD VOLUNTEERED.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT M.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

15TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.

SEC FAS(2,4) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E PIO INF ER

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Record of Conversation with the French Ambassador (M. Francois J.L.F. Briere)
 on 14th September, 1965
 Officers Present The Secretary

MAIN SUBJECT(S):

1. GENERAL DE GAULLE'S SPEECH
2. KASHMIR: INDIA/PAKISTAN.

1. The French Ambassador called on me this morning at his request.

General de Gaulle's Speech

2. He asked me what the Australian reaction had been to General de Gaulle's speech. I said that what the General said had not come as a great surprise to us, because most of it seemed to us to be inherent in what the General had been saying earlier, but we had not known, of course, that it was to be said and in such terms at this particular moment.

3. I continued that, in assessing the speech, we would be interested to see what repercussions there were in other European countries. The reactions of other European countries were just as important as the substance of General de Gaulle's speech.

4. I went on to say that, in some respects, the speech might make the position easier for Britain if Britain wanted to draw closer economically to Europe. In effect, General de Gaulle was proclaiming that economic co-operation among European countries should not be dependent upon political integration or upon greater political ties among European nations. This might make it easier for Britain to work with Europe ~~and~~ countries without cutting across its associations with Commonwealth countries.

5. The Ambassador asked me what I thought about France's attitude towards NATO. I said that there were some points on which I was not clear. It seemed to me that the General had not faced up to two points. In the first place, though it was all very well to talk about the right of a country to take measures for its own defence, it was a fact in the modern world that no country, no matter how large, could defend itself except in association with others. General de Gaulle did not seem to have clarified how he was working out the implications of this, which was what NATO had been designed to achieve.

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FOLLOWING POSTS:ACTION:

Report prepared by J. Plimsoll
 (J. Plimsoll)

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In the second place, none of us wanted Germany to become a nuclear power. Australia did not; France did not; and the present West German Government did not. NATO was one of the mechanisms whereby Germany was given a say in its own nuclear defence without itself having control of nuclear weapons. General de Gaulle had not covered this point.

6. I went on to say that several countries in Europe were rather apprehensive about the possibility of Europe being dominated by France and Germany. I detected some such feeling in Italy. I remarked that I thought the French Government should pay some attention to these susceptibilities.

India/Pakistan Differences

7. The Ambassador asked me about Australia's attitude to the fighting between India and Pakistan. In reply, I referred him to Australian public statements, which indicated that we were remaining impartial. I said it was very difficult to attribute responsibility. It depended how far back one went. The cause of the immediate fighting had been declared by the Secretary-General to be Pakistan armed infiltration into Kashmir. The French Ambassador commented that a report he had seen from the French Ambassador in Pakistan confirmed the Secretary-General's view.

8. We had some further discussion about the situation, but it did not add anything new.

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Europe Sec.
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AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION
52, WESTON STREET, YARRALUMLA, A.C.T.

September, 1965.

TWELFTH PRESS CONFERENCE HELD BY GENERAL DE GAULLE
AS PRESIDENT OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC
IN PARIS AT THE ELYSEE PALACE
ON SEPTEMBER 9, 1965

Indian-Pakistani Conflict.

Question: General, what do you have to say about the current crisis between India and Pakistan?

Question: I would like to broaden my colleague's question on the Indian-Pakistani subject. I would like to know if France, which is allied with Pakistan in the framework of the SEATO Treaty, for example, should take a stand for its partner or, on the contrary, preach conciliation?

Answer: On the question you have asked me about the deplorable conflict that is now taking place between Pakistan and India, I will simply say this to you today: once again, it is deplorable. For the time being, a procedure has been started in the normal way by the United Nations Organization, and particularly by its Secretary-General who is on the scene, and it can be hoped that his steps will lead to the establishment of a cease-fire. This will, of course, be only a temporary solution.

Economic and Social Situation - 1

Question: General, after the summer, we hear conflicting judgments on the country's economic situation. Some are optimistic, the others pessimistic. Could you tell us what you think about it, and, more precisely, what prospects the Fifth Plan could open up in this respect?

Answer: I do not think that the studies, the discussions, the conclusions on our
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economic and social situation, on the conditions of our development, on the goals that we must attain, on the action that we must therefore take, have ever been so methodical and so thorough as they have been this year. The formulation of the Fifth Plan by the General Commissariat and its various committees, the collaboration of the Regional Economic Development Committees, the decisions taken by the Government, the debates which have been held or which are going to open in the Economic and Social Council so that it may formulate its opinion on the proposed provisions to Parliament, so that this body can make them into law--all this followed closely by all the information media--this has made it possible to establish, with full knowledge of the facts, the direction and the choices that will determine our national activity for five years.

There has undoubtedly been decisive progress made in planning such as we adopted and instituted it at the time of the Liberation, in the wretched state in which we then found ourselves, which was then fairly neglected during the time when our economic life depended to a great extent on loans from abroad, and which was finally put into effect and honored since we regained our independence in this field as in the others.

But, one can be independent in two very different ways. Either by closing oneself in behind ramparts and, when it's a matter of economics, behind customs barriers; or by confronting the means and capacities of others, that is, when speaking of trade, by opening and multiplying commercial relations. Because, for us, accustomed as we are to protectionism out of long facility, the needle of rivalry is healthy in our effort of transformation; because, on the other hand, the new markets are outside our country; because, lastly, throughout the world, presence follows merchandise and we want to be present everywhere; because of this--provided that precautions are taken toward one or another country that is encumbered by its surpluses, and while practicing preference with respect to our partners in the European Common Market or those of the African States to which we are linked by special agreements--we have chosen to live henceforth in competition.

Still, we must meet this competition and derive profit from it. That is to say everything depends on what our production system is worth in terms of the others. Thus, our collective effort over the next five years will have the primary goal of making this system decidedly competitive. France's independence and economic strength directly depend on it, while the rise in the national income and in the standard of living will be its consequences. Now, in face of the industrial and agricultural capacities that surround us, adapting our means requires a vast investment effort.

Investment: at the State level, that implies that what it devotes to

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operating the government and public services be reduced as much as possible in relation to what it does for the country's equipment. In addition, among the expenses in this last category, priority must be given to those that improve national productivity the most directly, I mean principally scientific research, all types of transport and communications, technical education, vocational training.

Yes, in the years to come we shall see France in a good position among the leading nations in the world in terms of personnel and means for invention and experimentation. We shall see her actively push forward the construction of her highways, however exceptionally good and numerous her secondary roads are, and develop her telephone network. We shall see her classical schools, as befits a country that wants to have numerous and high-caliber trained personnel at all levels of its activity. We shall see her guarantee more broadly to her youth and her adults the possibility, either of learning a trade well, of changing it, or of improving skills, for modern evolution requires constantly improving the output of businesses, employing as best possible the ever-growing numbers of young people, increasing the mobility of French workers between regions and occupations, and, in particular, offering fast and worthy outlets in industry or the tertiary sector to those who find themselves unneeded in agriculture. Of course, what is already progressing in other branches--housing, hospitals, sports, etc--must be actively continued, but taking into account what must be first done for infrastructure and the human and material equipment of national production, upon which, in the long run, everything depends.

Investment, which from budget to budget thus absorbs an increasing part of the public sector's expenditures, is also the categorical imperative for all private enterprises. Whether the latter move by self-financing or by recourse to the financial market, this is the only opportunity--but what an effective one--for them to acquire machinery that will make them competitive, since our economy is open to international trade. Now, while in this regard inflation and higher costs in the past could offer certain unhealthy facilities, to the point that our entire economic, financial, monetary and social system was tottering on the edge of the abyss, the necessary is now being done and will continue to be done so that henceforth these poisoned springs will run dry.

On the contrary, savings--revived by price and currency stability and by a balanced budget, are again becoming the great reservoir from which prosperity is drawing. It will naturally be, for the next few years, one of the State's vital tasks to encourage the growth of savings rather than that of consumption, to help make the resources thus formed more active through profit-sharing and more easily accessible to the businesses that are worthy of it, with the essential criteria for them being concentration and organization. Let us remark that this broad section by

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the State to increase the capacity of national equipment--either in the private sector, in the public or semipublic business sector or in the sector directly under its administration--implies that the information furnished to its highest bodies must be more comprehensive and better coordinated. Three high committees, composed of a very small number of qualified people, will be set up for this purpose as soon as the Fifth Plan begins to be implemented.

As the threat of general war ceases to smother the world and brutal conquest to tempt the strongest, progress will become a world-wide aspiration. Science, technology and industry will open up to each developed country the opportunity to strengthen this hope and to spread it. The speed of communications and the multiplicity of contacts among peoples will create in all a growing desire to deal with one another. Thus, competition will more and more be the springboard of a legitimate ambition. That is why France wants to have the means for this.

The Common Market.

Question: What, in your opinion, are the causes of the Common Market crisis and how do you think it can be ended?

Answer: What happened in Brussels on June 30 with regard to the agricultural financial regulations has brought to light not only the persistent reserves of most of our partners toward the inclusion of agriculture in the Common Market, but also certain basic errors or ambiguities that appear in the treaties on the economic union of the Six. That is why, sooner or later, the crisis was inevitable.

The three treaties, which respectively set up the E.C.S.C., Euratom and the Common Market, were concluded before France's recovery in 1958. They therefore made allowance primarily for what the others requested. Thus the E.C.S.C., independently of the French-German rapprochement which it was meant to express, consisted basically in restoring to Germany the disposal of its coal and steel and in giving Italy, which has a natural lack of coal and iron, the opportunity to obtain them inexpensively so that it could, in turn, provide itself with a large metallurgical industry. As regards Euratom, that institution was designed to pool everything that

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had been or was to be done in the field of atomic energy--of which France, owing to the early start she had made, was to provide the greatest share--and then to control the production of fissile materials with a view to preventing their military use, although, of the Six, our country alone was in a position to manufacture nuclear weapons. As for the Treaty of Rome, lastly, it fully governed the conditions for the industrial community that was the prime concern of our neighbors, but in no way governed those for the agricultural common market, in which we were the most interested.

On the other hand, each of the three treaties instituted an appearance of an executive in the form of a commission independent from the States--although its members were appointed and remunerated by them--and an appearance of a legislature in the form of an Assembly bringing together members of the various parliaments, yet without their electors having given them any mandate that was not national. This claim held by a technocracy, for the most part foreign, destined to infringe upon France's democracy in settling problems that dictate the very existence of our country, obviously could not suit our purposes once we were determined to take our destiny into our own hands.

Who can ignore that the idea of grouping the States of Western Europe together from the economic and, I might add, political standpoints, has long been ours? To verify this, one need only turn back to the statements I made on this subject during and immediately following World War II, at a time when no one else was speaking about it, and then on numerous and solemn occasions, but also to all the deeds actually accomplished toward this end by my Government. As far as the economy is concerned, we indeed think it is true that the organized adjustment of the respective activities of the countries located on both sides of the Rhine and the Alps corresponds to the fact that they are close neighbors; that, from the standpoint of production, they are both similar and complementary; and that it is in keeping with the conditions of our times to create entities more vast than each of the European States. In addition, France, who is making great strides forward and whose currency has become one of the world's strongest, has every reason to cast off her former protectionism and open herself progressively to competition. That is why, for seven years, we have very actively helped to build the Economic Community, which was created in theory in 1957, but until 1959 existed only on paper, because the chronic deficit in the French balance of payments prevented the organization from taking a start on anything other than its discussions. But, what we wanted yesterday and what we want today is a community that is fair and reasonable.

Fair: that means that agricultural products, allowing for their own

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particular conditions, should be included in the Common Market concurrently with industrial goods. Reasonable: that means that nothing which is important at present in the organization, and later in the operation of the Common Market of the Six, should be decided and, even more, applied, except by the responsible public authorities in the six States, that is, the Governments controlled by the Parliaments.

Now, we know--heaven knows that we know!--that there is a different concept of a European federation in which, according to the dreams of those who conceived it, the countries would lose their national personalities, and in which, furthermore, for want of a federator--such as, in the West, Caesar and his successors, Charlemagne, Otto I, Charles V, Napoleon and Hitler tried to be, each in his fashion, and such as in the East, Stalin tried to be--would be ruled by some technocratic, stateless and irresponsible Areopagus. We know also that France is opposing this project, which contradicts all reality, with a plan for organized cooperation among the States, evolving, doubtless, toward a confederation. This plan alone seems to France to be consistent with what the nations of our continent actually are. It alone could one day make possible the adherence of countries such as Britain or Spain which, like ours, could in no way accept the loss of their sovereignty. It alone would make the future entente of all of Europe conceivable. However--and whatever the ulterior motives concerning political theories might have been--it could seem that the very long and meticulous negotiations in Brussels were on the verge of a successful conclusion. Of course, we had the utmost difficulty in persuading our partners to agree in practice to making agricultural products an integral part of the Community. Now, everyone knows that this is a sine qua non to us, for, if this condition is not met, we would remain burdened with the very heavy weight that supporting our agriculture represents for us--more than for our neighbors--and we would consequently be handicapped in industrial competition. We therefore felt obliged, in January 1962, to agree to passage to the second stage of the Treaty, that is, to a substantial reduction in customs barriers, only on condition that the commitment to settle the agricultural problem be formally entered into by the Six, particularly from the financial standpoint, no later than June 30 of that year, on terms and according to a timetable that were explicitly stipulated. While there were some tears and some gnashing of the teeth at that time, we were able, at the last minute, to gain the support of our partners and we had reason to believe that they would honor their commitments on schedule.

On the other hand, while noting that the very heavy international apparatus built at great cost around the Commission was often overlapping with the competent services of the six Governments, as the work progressed we had officially recognized the competence of the Community's civil servants and had noted that they

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refrained from excessive infringements on the only responsibilities that were valid, that is, those of the States.

It was too good to continue to the end. For, in Brussels on June 30, our delegation came up against a refusal with regard to final drafting of a financial regulation in accordance with the commitments made. A little earlier, moreover, the Commission, suddenly emerging from its political reserve, had formulated on the subject of this regulation conditions intended to give itself its own budget, which would have amounted to as much as four billion dollars, with the States handing over to it the levies and customs receipts that would have made it literally a major independent financial power. It is true that, according to the authors of the draft, this enormous budget, which the States would supply at the expense of their taxpayers but which they would not control, would be subject to examination by the European Assembly. But the intervention of this body, which is essentially consultative and whose members have never, in any country, been elected for that purpose, would only aggravate the usurpatory character of what was demanded. Be this as it may, the combination--premeditated or not--of the supranational demands of the Brussels' Commission, of the support that several delegations declared themselves ready to give them and finally of the fact that some of our partners at the last moment went back on what they had previously accepted, forced us to bring the negotiations to a close.

I must add that in the light of this event, we more clearly measured the situation in which our country would risk finding itself if one provision or another initially provided for by the Rome Treaty were actually applied. Thus, in the terms of the text, the decisions of the Council of Ministers of the Six would, beginning on January 1, 1966, be taken by majority vote; in other words, France would be prepared to see her hand forced in any economic matter--therefore social and often even political-- and, in particular, what would have seemed gained in the agricultural area could be, despite her, placed at stake again at any moment. In addition, from that time on, the proposals made by the Brussels Commission would have to be adopted, or not, as is by the Council of Ministers, without the States' being able to change anything, unless miraculously they were unanimous in drafting an amendment. Now, we know that the members of the Commission, in the past appointed by agreement among the Governments, are from now on in no way responsible and that, even at the end of their mandate, the unanimous consent of the Six will be required to replace them, which in fact makes them irremovable. We see where we could be led by such a disposal of ourselves and of our Constitution, which stipulates that "French sovereignty belongs to the French people, which shall exercise it through its representatives and by means of referendums," and makes no provision for any kind of exception.

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This is where things stand. Of course, it is conceivable and desirable for work to start again one day on that great undertaking, the Community. But this will happen, possibly only after a delay whose extent cannot be foreseen. For who knows if, when and how the policy of each of our five partners--considering, of course, certain electoral or parliamentary situations--will finally be adapted to the requirements that have, once again just been evidenced?

Whatever the case, France, for her part, is ready to participate in all exchanges of views that would be proposed to her on this subject by the other Governments. If necessary, she envisages resuming the Brussels negotiations, once the inclusion of agriculture into the Common Market is truly adopted and there is a desire to put an end to the claims that abusive and fanciful myths are setting against common sense and reality.

International Relations

Question : Mr. President, France's diplomacy is based on the principle of national independence. The opponents of this principle say that it is outdated. Can this policy of national independence be reconciled with the aspirations of the peoples for greater unity in Europe ?

Other questions were asked on NATO, Europe, the Eastern countries and South-east Asia.

Answer : We are in a century that has reached the two-thirds mark in its course, no more. However, since the turn of the century, the world has undergone changes unprecedented in their pace and their scope. Everything leads one to think that the trend is going to continue. For a whole series of facts of far-reaching significance is ⁱⁿ the making to reshape the world.

In this series of facts, there is : the accession to sovereignty of a large number of States that have been created, restored since the war and, simultaneously, the unfolding of their reciprocal quarrels; the preponderant power acquired by two countries, America and Russia, which induces them to compete with each other and to align under their respective hegemonies the peoples within their reach; the extremely profound gestation that is taking place in enormous China and that destines her for a leading role in the world; the existence and increase in nuclear weapons capable of destroying great nations suddenly and utterly; finally and above all, the general driving force for progress that the opportunities of the modern industrial age are opening up in each region of the earth. In short, the world, in full evolution, is filled both with almost infinite hopes and gigantic dangers.

Confronted with this situation, what can France's role be ? But first, must France have a role ? There is no lack of people, as you know, who think not. According to them, we -- no longer being able to act by ourselves politically, economically, technically and militarily --

should henceforth allow ourselves to be led by others. Moreover the ideologies are there to cover up this renouncement. Thus some in our country, employing the screen of the International, would like to submit to Moscow's obedience. Others, invoking either arbitrary theories or the convenience of interests, profess that our country should efface its personality in international organizations made in such a way that the United States can exercise in them, from within or without, a preponderant action which, by definition, we have only to conform. It is in this way that those people conceive our participation in the United Nations or NATO and desire that we see ourselves dissolved in a federation called "European" which would actually be "Atlantic".

I do not think -- as you can well imagine -- that this sort of national abdication would be justified. I do not think that the French people, in its overwhelming majority, holds this as consistent with the awareness it has of its own worth, nor even with simple good sense. Doubtless, France no longer appears to be the gigantic nation that she was in the times of Louis XIV or of Napoleon I. Doubtless also, the brutal collapse of 1940 -- although it was preceded, during the First World War, by an admirable deployment of the capacities and merits of our country, and although it was followed, during the Second, by the impetus of the Resistance, the success of the Liberation and the presence upon victory -- this collapse left, in many minds, the imprint of doubt, if not of despair. Doubtless, the unsubstantiality of yesterday's regime had thwarted the national recovery. But this recovery is now evident, even impressive. We are a people that is rising as are rising the curves of our population, our production, our foreign trade, our monetary reserves, our standard of living, the spread of our language and culture, the might of our arms, our achievements in sports, and so on.. Our government shows evidence of a stability and an effectiveness that, for so very long, had not been known of it. Lastly throughout the world, France's capabilities, what she does, what she wants to do, are at this time arousing an attention and a consideration that sharply contrast with the indifference or the commiseration which, in the past, too often surrounded her. In short, we can, and consequently we must, have a policy that is our own.

Which policy ? Above all, it is a question of keeping ourselves free of any vassalage. It is true that, in many areas we have the best reasons for associating with others. But on condition of retaining our self-determination. Thus, so long as the solidarity of the Western peoples appears to us necessary for the eventual defense of Europe, our country will remain the allies of her allies but, upon the expiration of the commitments formerly taken -- that is, in 1969 by the latest -- the subordination known as "integration" which is provided for by NATO and which hands our fate over to foreign authority shall cease, as far as we are concerned. Thus, while working to unite the States on both sides of the Rhine and the Alps from the economic, political, cultural and strategic viewpoints, we are making sure that this organization does not deprive us of our free will. Thus believing it right for an international system to regulate monetary relations, we do not recognize that the currency of any particular State has any automatic and privileged value in relation to gold, which is, which remains and which must remain, under the circumstances, the only real standard. Thus, having been, with four other powers, founders of the United Nations, and desiring that it continue to be the meeting place of the delegations of all peoples and the open forum for their debates, we do not accept being bound, be it in the financial area, by armed interventions which contradict the Charter and to which we have not given our approval.

Moreover, it is by being this way that we believe we can in the final analysis, best serve the allies of free peoples, the European Community, the monetary institutions and the United Nations.

Indeed, the independence thus regained is enabling France to become, despite the ideologies and hegemonies of the colossi, for all the racial passions and prejudices, above and beyond the rivalries and ambitions of nations, a champion of cooperation, failing which, the troubles, the interventions, the conflicts, that lead to world war would go on spreading. Now, France is, par excellence, qualified to act in this way. She is so by her nature, which leads her to human contacts. She is so through the opinion

that has historically been held of her and that opens to her a sort of latent credit when the universal is involved. She is so by the fact that she has freed herself of all the colonial holds she formerly exercised over other peoples. She is so, finally, because she appears to be a nation with free hands whose policy is not being determined by any pressure from without.

Moreover, we do not limit ourselves to extolling cooperation in principle. We put into practice everywhere we can under conditions that are naturally appropriate to the situation of our various partners. This is true for almost all the nations of Africa that were formerly linked to us, as well as for Rwanda and the Congo (Leopoldville) and in Asia, for Cambodia and Laos — each of these States having become independent and having determined its relations with us through special agreements for its development agreements among which the most recent, but not the least important, governs French-Algerian petroleum relations. Our goal is that this also be true for the various countries of Latin America — toward which so many deep affinities incline us, and whose advent to the ranks of an economically powerful, a politically independent and a socially free continent is henceforth necessary for the balance and the peace of the world; where already Mexico, and two months ago Chile on the occasion of President Frei's visit, decided to link their progress more closely to ours. We hope that this will be true, to an increasing extent, as we recently pointed out during the trips to Paris of King Hussein and President Helou, for the peoples of the Orient, from Istanbul to Addis Ababa and from Cairo to Kabul, in accordance with the human and natural reasons that have woven between them and us a traditional friendship.

It is true that, in order to provide in turn the means for living with dignity and for progress to the two billion men who do not have them, an effort that goes beyond the possibilities of France is required. Very fortunately, among the well supplied countries, others besides us are also doing their share, although ours is the largest in proportion to our resources. But how much this aid, which is scattered and often opposed, would gain if it were combined on a large scale. In particular, what role could

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be played in this regard by a Europe that would want to unite. Specifically, the appeasement of our old torn continent, the rapprochement of all the peoples that inhabit it, and finally their cooperation for their own development and the development of others -- these constitute the essential goals -- even if long term ones -- of French policy.

Thus with Germany, despite so many wounds suffered and grievances accumulated, we have concluded a treaty -- even if up to now it remains in a stage of cordial potentiality in many domains -- however provides for periodic meetings between the two Governments and is bearing fruit in such areas as culture and youth contacts. Thus with five of our neighbours we have formed the beginnings of an economic community, which we want to hope will one day be possible to complete, and we have proposed to them organizing at least political cooperation.

Thus our contacts and our exchanges are multiplying with the countries of the East, each of them, of course, being treated only in consideration of its national personality. In this respect, we attach great importance to the new trend of our relations with Russia. We are pleased with the results achieved on the occasion of President Maurer's visit with respect to French-Rumanian relations. With great pleasure we are going to receive President Cyrankiewicz, hoping that his presence here will serve the practical rapprochement of the French and Polish peoples, friends and allies at all times in their history. We do not hesitate to envisage that the day will come when, in order to achieve a constructive entente from the Atlantic to the Urals, all of Europe will wish to settle its own problems and, above all, that of Germany, by the only means that will make it possible to do so -- that of a general agreement. On that day, our continent could once again assume in the world for the good of all men, the role which is worthy of its resources and its capacities.

Under very different conditions, but guided by the same inspiration, we believe that in Asia the end of the fighting now going on, then the satisfactory development of peoples, can be attained only by establishing

relations, by opening negotiations and by achieving a "modus vivendi" among the powers whose direct or indirect responsibility has since the end of World War II been committed to the events of the southeast of that continent that is China, France, America, Russia and Britain. But we also believe more firmly than ever that the primary condition for such an entente, would be the effective end of all foreign intervention, and therefore the complete and control neutralization of the zone in which there is fighting. This is what France, for her part, subscribed to in 1954. This what she then strictly observed. This is what she considers necessary, since the United States intervened in Indochina after the departure of France's forces. But it is all too obvious that this is not the road to be followed.

That is why all speculation on the hypothesis of mediation by France is groundless. At present, she has nothing else to do but reserve herself for later, and if it happens, that the time ever comes to do so, for the possibility of being useful, particularly in Peking, Washington, Moscow and London, with regard to the contacts which would be necessary to reach a solution, to the controls that would be needed to guarantee it and to the aid that would then have to be given to the unfortunate countries that she has certainly not forgotten.

Moreover, the same entente of the same powers that have the means for war and peace is, for the historic period in which we are living, indispensable to the understanding and cooperation that the world must establish among all its races, all its forms of government and all its peoples, without which it will sooner or later head for its own destruction. It happens, actually, that the Five States of which the destiny of Southeast Asia depends, in the final analysis, and which moreover, are those that possess atomic weapons, together founded twenty years ago the United Nations Organization and are the permanent members of its Security Council. They could tomorrow -- if they so desired and naturally once they came together -- see to it that this institution, instead of being the theater of the vain rivalry of two hegemonies, becomes the framework in which the development of the whole world would be considered and in which the conscience of the human community would thereby grow stronger. It is obvious that at this time such a project has a chance of coming into being. But if the rapprochement, then the agreement of the leading nations responsible for the world, should ever appear possible toward this end, France for her part would be quite prepared to cooperate in it.

This is, as a whole, the policy of our country. Assuredly the goals which it has set are long-range. This is due to the dimension of the problems which face the world of our times. But this is also due to the fact that France, no longer caught up in fruitless undertakings, nor dependent on what others do, nor induced to run at any moment and in all directions behind passing fancies, is henceforth capable of pursuing extensive and continuous designs. This is what she is doing abroad, while working at home to build her new power.

France's Institutions

Question: At the end of your seven-year period of office, and looking toward the forthcoming presidential election, can you pass judgment on the institutions of the Fifth Republic and particularly on the role of the President of the Republic?

Answer: The system of government that the country adopted seven years ago, and to which everything makes it possible to think it hereafter will adhere, is the system of the national majority, I mean, of that which emerges from the nation as a whole, expressing itself through its undivided and sovereign mass.

Once a nation is formed, once there are fundamental geographic, ethnic, economic, social and moral elements within it that are the texture of its life, and, once outside, it comes into contact with foreign influences and ambitions, there exists for that nation, despite and above its diversities, a group of conditions vital to its action and, ultimately, to its existence and that is the general interest. It is moreover, the instinct it has of this general interest which cements its unity and it is the fact that the State conforms to it, or does not, that makes its political endeavors worthwhile or incoherent. In a modern democracy, turned toward effectiveness and, in addition, threatened, it is therefore vital that the nation's will be expressed globally when it concerns destiny. Such is indeed the foundation of our present institutions.

Undoubtedly, under yesterday's system, the people were periodically called on to elect an assembly that held the sovereignty; but this was naturally done only on a limited scale, in such a way that the results had a partial significance and, therefore, a debatable and questionable one. Indeed, in practice only the parties, that is, organizations formed to promote special tendencies and to support the interests of one or another category, proposed candidates to the electorate. What is more, they did this in election districts that differed from one another in terms of regions and inhabitants. It is true that they sometimes happened, for the voting period, to combine their hostilities in a coalition in order to exclude adversaries, but these were only negative steps. In fact, Parliament, which was given the right and the duty of deciding alone and without recourse what was vital for the nation and of being the exclusive source of power, consisted in a juxtaposition of rival, even opposed groups, from which a majority could emerge only on condition of uncertain and fallacious combinations. It is understandable that such a system, whatever was the worth of the men who found themselves part of it, was not normally able to do its work and accomplish all the firm and constant designs

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that constitute a policy, nor, all the more, to bear France in the major contemporary dramas.

Doubtless, the Constitution which the French, enlightened by numerous lessons, gave the Republic in 1958, attributes the legislative power and right of control to Parliament. For, in public life, debates and a balance are required. But the entirely new and vital thing that our Constitution includes is, on the one hand, the advent of the people, as such and collectively, as the direct source of the power of the Chief of State and, if need be, as his direct recourse, and, on the other hand, the attribution to the President, who is and is alone the representative and the mandatary of the nation as a whole, of the duty to trace out the nation's conduct in the essential domains and the means to acquit itself of this task. It is by virtue of this twofold institution and because it has fully functioned, that the present system has possessed the stability, authority and effectiveness which enabled it to solve the grave problems which confronted France and to conduct its affairs in such a manner that today its situation appears, in all respects, as better and more solid than yesterday.

Yes. The fact is that the President of the Republic, called upon and supported by the confidence of the entire nation, acted in conformity with the burdens and responsibility which, in our system, are those imposed upon him by his office; when, during the past seven years, he determined the orientation of French policy within and without; when he controlled its progress; when he took the supreme decisions on the problems which involved destiny and which therefore implied that so many Gordian knots be cut. This was the case with the domains of the institutions, of the security of the State, of national defense, of the country's general development, of economic, financial and monetary stability, and so on; with the Algerian affair, with Europe, with decolonization, with African cooperation, with our attitude toward Germany, the United States, Britain, Russia, China, Latin America, the Orient and so on. On the other hand, in asking the country, on four occasions, to express its approval by means of the referendum, by proceeding once with the dissolution of the National Assembly, by applying, during an alarming crisis, Article XVI, the Chief of State simply used the means which the Constitution gave him in order to see that, under grave circumstances, the nation itself decide on its own fate, and to assure the proper functioning and the continuity of the public powers; all this in opposition to some who think, as Chamfort did, "that sovereignty resides in the people, but the people should never exercise it."

There was mention of "personal power." If what is meant by that is that the President of the Republic has personally taken the decisions which it is

.../...

incumbent upon him to take, that is entirely correct. In what post, high or low, does the person who is responsible have the right to shirk his duty? Moreover, who ever believed that General de Gaulle, being called to the helm, should be content with inaugurating flower shows? For example, when the Algerian problem preoccupied-- this is the least one can say--all of France, to whom else did one assign, in a single voice, the task of solving it? But if what is meant is that the President has isolated himself from everything and everyone and that, in order to act, he listened only to himself, the evidence of how much advice and consultation surround him is being ignored.

Up to now, during the seven-year period, the Chief of State convened the Council of Ministers 302 times, the limited interministerial councils 420 times, received in his office the Premier 505 times, the Presidents of the Assemblies 78 times, one or another member of the Government nearly 2,000 times, the Presidents or Rapporteurs of the Parliamentary Committees or the group chairmen more than 100 times, the chief government officials, experts and union leaders about 1,500 times-- all this not counting the letters, memoranda and reports that were sent to him by one or another of the persons responsible and the study of dossiers. Again, with respect to foreign problems, some 600 hours of conversations with foreign Heads of State or of Government and a thousand talks with their Ministers or Ambassadors largely completed the President's information. In any case, no important measure has been taken at his level until after deliberation around him with those who were familiar with the elements for it and would assure its implementation. This was, moreover, quite natural, for public affairs are today too varied and too complex to be treated in any other way. In their respect, the risk lies much less in edicts launched from ivory towers than in endless examination from which no decision emerges.

However, it is above all with the people itself that he who is their representative and guide keeps himself in direct contact. For in this way the nation can know the man who is at its head, discern the ties which unite it to him, be acquainted with his ideas, his acts, his plans, his concerns, his hopes. In this way, at the same time, the Chief of State has the opportunity to let the French people feel, whatever their regions and their categories may be, that they are all citizens of one and the same country in the same capacity; to know, by going there himself, where souls and things stand; and lastly, to gain a feeling, in the midst of his compatriots, of what their encouragement obligates him to do.

I do not believe that such contacts have ever been multiplied so much in

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seven years. Thirty addresses delivered to the entire country over radio and television; 12 press conferences broadcast in their entirety; 36 speeches solemnly delivered during public ceremonies; a series of trips--apart from at least 200 official appearances in Paris--made to the 94 Departments of Metropolitan and Overseas France, during which the Chief of State saw, with his own eyes, at least 15 million Frenchmen; invited all the members of Parliament, all the constituted bodies, all the General Councillors, all the Mayors of France, to confer with him; visited about 2 500 communes, including all the main ones; responded in the town hall to the welcome of nearly 400 Municipal Councils and 100 000 notables; spoke from the dais in more than 600 localities to the assembled population; talked with so many people that it is impossible to count them and shook countless hands.

In short, the President of the Republic, designated by the national majority, is henceforth the keystone that covers and solders the edifice of our institutions. Could it be disputed that, through this, the public powers are not holding themselves in balance. The cohesion of the Government -- which in seven years, moreover, counts only two Premiers, each of the invested supported and maintained by the confidence of the Chief of State -- is a new and exemplary fact in relation to the discordance of the perilous assemblages that the Ministries of the past were. From that, in the public life and in the country's administration, a continuity and an effectiveness the progress of which is evident.

At the same time, and for the first time in the history of the Republic, there is an assured majority in Parliament, because a national majority having been formed in the country around the President, this capital event could not fail to have consequences during the general elections, despite the diversity inherent in tendencies, in people and in election districts. Thus the legislative work accomplished since 1958, from the economic, social, financial and administrative standpoints, as with respect to civil law, education, equipment, defence and so on, includes a body of exceptionally important and coherent reforms, while the budget has always been adopted before the end of the year, which never happened in the past. Lastly, in the ordered framework in which the powers exercise their responsibilities without jolts, the State bodies, the civil service, the diplomatic corps, the armed forces find themselves able to accomplish their task normally and objectively.

Perfection is not of this world. But, in relation to what existed yesterday, the French State appears at present to be entirely transformed in

in terms of solidity and capacity. No one in the world mistakes this. Before three months have passed, the country will say, through its vote, if it intends to see again the practices of the past, or if it desires that the new system assure, tomorrow as today, the conduct of the national life. For, each one feels and knows that this will indeed be the stake of the Presidential election.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you and I am honoured to salute you.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LOM

I.43217

FROM:

DATED : 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
1851AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.REC'D : 11TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
0538262. RESTRICTED.

REPEATED SAVINGRAM PARIS 11, GENEVA 9, ROME 116, THE HAGUE
16, BONN 14.

DE GAULLE'S CONFERENCE - BELGIAN AND EEC REACTIONS.

THE ONLY OFFICIAL BELGIAN REACTION IS A STATEMENT BY FAY T
AS ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER THAT "THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS LINKED
WITH THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN CONSTRUCTION WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED
BY PRESIDENT DE GAULLE AND THE WAY IN WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN POSED
WILL NOT FAIL TO CAUSE MUCH CONCERN TO THE CHANCELLERIES OF EUROPE
IN THE COMING MONTHS".

2. THE FOREIGN OFFICE IS DECLINING TO COMMENT PENDING DETAILED
ANALYSIS OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE.

3. THE BELGIAN PRESS TODAY DESCRIBES DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT
AS "EXPLOSIVE".

EVEN "LIBRE BELGIQUE" WHICH HAS TENDED TO BE PRO-DE GAULLE
ADMITS THAT IN FACT WHAT HE PROPOSES IS THE NEGOTIATION OF A NEW
TREATY AND THAT THE JUNE CRISIS NOW INVOLVES A GENERAL REVIEW OF
"THE EUROPE OF THE SIX".

IT SAYS DE GAULLE IS GUILTY OF MONUMENTAL ERRORS OF FACT AND
HAS INVOKED A THEORETICAL RISK TO ENDANGER A LIVING EUROPEAN
REALITY OF BENEFIT TO FRANCE.

IT POINTS OUT THAT THE DEADLOCK IS GRAVE AND THE THE "MUSCLES
OF THE COMMON MARKET MAY ATROPHY IF THE PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY IS
TOO LONG".

4. THE COMMISSION DECIDED LAST NIGHT THAT SINCE FUNDAMENTAL
ASPECTS OF THE TREATY HAD BEEN PLACED IN ISSUE IT SHOULD MAKE
"NO COMMENT".

REY IS SICK AND HERST IS AWAY BUT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HAS
JUST SEEN MANSCHOLT WHO REGARDS YESTERDAY'S STATEMENT AS MERELY
CONFIRMING WHAT THE COMMISSION HAS ALWAYS MAINTAINED I.E. THAT
DE GAULLE WISHES TO REPEAL THE TREATY OF ROME, NOT MERELY TO
OBTAIN A SATISFACTORY BARGAIN ON AGRICULTURE.

THE BROAD ATTITUDE OF THE COMMISSION IS THAT SO LONG AS THE
TREATY EXISTS IT IS THEIR DUTY TO APPLY IT AND FURTHER ITS
OBJECTIVES.

THE COMMISSION WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE WHAT INITIATIVES IT
CAN.

ITS REVISED PROPOSALS ON AGRICULTURAL FINANCING ARE BEFORE

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

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GOVERNMENTS.

IN ANY EVENT (EXCEPT IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF UNANIMITY TO THE CONTRARY) THE THIRD STAGE OF THE COMMUNITY WILL COME INTO FORCE 1 JANUARY AND CERTAINLY DECISIONS COULD THEN BE TAKEN BY THE FIVE BY MAJORITY VOTE.

5. KEY AMBASSADORS (AMERICAN, BRITISH, CANADIAN, AUSTRIAN AND DUTCH) AGREE ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

(A) DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT ON THE E.E.C. PARTICULARLY WHEN READ WITH HIS REMARKS ON NATO, AMOUNT TO A DECLARATION THAT FRANCE ACCEPTED THE COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY AND THE TREATY OF ROME IN A PERIOD OF WEAKNESS AND DOES NOT REGARD ITSELF AS UNDER AN OBLIGATION TO MAKE THEM EFFECTIVE UNLESS FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES ARE MADE.

(B) WHILE SOME FEATURES TO WHICH DE GAULLE HAS TAKEN EXCEPTION (E.G. THE REQUIREMENT THAT COMMISSION PROPOSALS WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THEIR ENTIRETY) COULD PERHAPS BE OVERCOME BY PROCEDURAL LEVIES OR A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT, HE IS UNLIKELY TO BE SATISFIED EXCEPT BY A FORMAL AGREEMENT MAKING UNANIMITY ESSENTIAL FOR IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

(C) UNTIL THE FIVE HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ADAPTED THEMSELVES TO THE NECESSITIES AS SEEN BY DE GAULLE THE FRENCH, WHILE PREPARED TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT RESUME ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS INVOLVING NEW DECISIONS.

(D) IT MAY BE MONTHS BEFORE THE FIVE CAN DEVELOP A POSITION. THERE WILL BE NO EFFECTIVE GERMAN GOVERNMENT UNTIL OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER.

THE ITALIAN AND LUXEMBOURG FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE MAKING STATE VISITS TO LATIN AMERICAN NOW AND SPAAK WILL ACCOMPANY THE KING IN OCTOBER.

(MANSHOLT ANTICIPATES HOWEVER THAT THE PRESENT UNCERTAIN STAGE MAY CONTINUE FOR MANY MONTHS.

WHILE NOT UNDULY PESSIMISTIC MANSHOLT WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF (UNLESS DE GAULLE RETIRES) IT TOOK A YEAR TO GET THE COMMUNITIES ON THE MARCH AGAIN.

...HARRY.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & I (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

11TH SEPTEMBER, 1965

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) AS(JIC) DL INT UN PACAM AMSP EAMEC E@ ICR PIO PFO

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109
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GSW

I.40115

FROM:

DATED: 9TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
1836

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
2014

2276 RESTRICTED.

DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

WITHOUT STUDYING THE FULL TEXT (MAIN POINTS OF WHICH WE SHALL CABLE TOMORROW) OUR IMPRESSION IS OF A VERY GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON WITH LITTLE THAT IS NEW.

ON KASHMIR HE REFERRED TO U. THANT'S MISSION WHICH HE HOPED WOULD LEAD TO A CEASE FIRE.

ON VIETNAM HE SAID THAT SPECULATION ABOUT FRENCH MEDIATION WAS BASELESS.

ON SOUTH EAST ASIA GENERALLY, WHILE ADMITTING THAT QUITE DIFFERENT POLICIES WERE NOW BEING PURSUED IN THE AREA, HE REPEATED HIS PROPOSALS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES LEADING TO NEUTRALIZATION BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE 5 MAJOR POWERS.

ON THE COMMON MARKET, HE SAID THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT THE ENTERPRISE SHOULD GET UNDER WAY AGAIN BUT THERE WOULD BE A DELAY WHILE THE POLICIES OF FRANCE'S PARTNERS WERE ADAPTED TO ACCEPT THE FULL ENTRY OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INTO THE MARKET AND THE TERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION'S EXCHANGE VIEW WITH ITS FIVE PARTNERS.

2. DE GAULLE SAID SIMPLY THAT IT WOULD BE KNOWN WITHIN TWO MONTHS WHETHER HE WOULD BE A CANDIDATE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M'S

10TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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SAJ.

I.40357.

FROM:

DATED: 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
1845

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
BONN.

REC'D: 13TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
0727

433. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 67, WASHINGTON 14,
SAVING PARIS 27, BRUSSELS 21, HAGUE 25, ROME 24, GENEVA 12.

WEST GERMANY: REACTIONS TO DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT.

PRESS IS TODAY, WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, UNIFORMLY PESSIMISTIC.
"DIE WELT" REMARKS THAT AT LEAST THE FIVE CAN NO LONGER SAY
THEY DO NOT KNOW WHAT IS IN DE GAULLE'S MIND.

GOVERNMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN HAS NATURALLY TRIED TO MINIMISE
PESSIMISM, BUT FOREIGN MINISTRY, IN PRIVATE, ADMITS TO ALMOST
UNRELIEVED PESSIMISM ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF IMPLICATIONS FOR
E.E.C. AND N.A.T.O.

2. MINISTERIAL DIREKTOR MEYER-LINDENBERG TOLD ME TODAY
FOREIGN MINISTRY SAW MAIN SIGNIFICANCE OF STATEMENT (APART
FROM CONFIRMATION OF DE GAULLE'S PREVIOUSLY KNOWN POLICIES)
IN:

- (A) ATTACK FOR THE FIRST TIME ON THE ROME TREATIES THEMSELVES
(AS DISTINCT FROM COMMISSION, SPECIFIC COMMISSION PROPOSALS,
ETC). AND ON MAJORITY VOTING PROCEDURE FROM JANUARY 1966.
- (B) INSERTION OF "AT LATEST" AFTER STATEMENT THAT PRESENT
FORM OF N.A.T.O. MUST BE ALTERED BY 1969.

3. CONCERNING E.E.C., MEYER-LINDENBERG SAID THERE WERE NO PRESENT
PLANS FOR A SPECIAL MEETING UNDER FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY NOR
ON PRESENT INDICATIONS DID HE SEE ANYTHING SUCH MEETING COULD
ACHIEVE WHICH COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED BY REGULAR BILATERAL
DISCUSSIONS.

INCIDENTALLY HE DEPLORED FORTHCOMING TRANSFER OF HIS
OPPOSITE NUMBER, LUCET, TO WASHINGTON AS AMBASSADOR.

HE INDICATED THAT HARKORT'S REVIEWS OF GERMANY POLICY IN
MY TELEGRAM 401 AND SAVINGRAM 18 WERE STILL VALID.

ONLY FAINTEST GLEAM OF HOPE WAS DE GAULLE'S LEAVING OPEN
POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS.

BLAKENEY.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
P.M'S

13TH SEPTEMBER, 1965

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.40357.

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AMSP EAMEC E PIO ICR ER PPO
WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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106

CONFIDENTIAL

SAJ.

I.40323

FROM:

DATED: 11TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
1100

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
THE HAGUE.

REC'D: 11TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
2055

266. UNCLASSIFIED.

DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE: DUTCH REACTION.

FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS FOREIGN MINISTER LUNS MADE IN
TELEVISION STATEMENT ON 10TH SEPTEMBER:

(A) HE COULD NOT ESCAPE IMPRESSION THAT PRESIDENT DE GAULLE
"NO LONGER REGARDS HIMSELF AS BOUND BY THE EUROPEAN
TREATIES", AT LEAST NOT WITH RESPECT TO INTRODUCTION OF
MAJORITY DECISIONS AND FUNCTION OF INDEPENDENT EXECUTIVE
BODIES.

(B) NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT REGARDED DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT
AS "DISAPPOINTING" BECAUSE IT CONTAINED NO CONSTRUCTIVE
ELEMENT REGARDING CONTINUATION OF EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC
CO-OPERATION AND BECAUSE DE GAULLE SHOULD KNOW IT WAS
IMPOSSIBLE TO BASE EFFICIENT DEFENCE ON PURELY NATIONAL
BASIS "WITHOUT PROFOUND JOINT PREPARATION BY THE ALLIES."

(C) IT WAS "REMARKABLE" THAT GENERAL DID NOT MENTION
ROLE U.S. CAN AND MUST PLAY IN SOLUTION OF GERMAN PROBLEM.

2. ASKED IF HE STILL FELT SAME MODERATE OPTIMISM FOR FUTURE OF
UNITED EUROPE THAT HE HAD SHOWN ON EARLIER OCCASIONS, LUNS SAID:
"THAT OPTIMISM HAS DIMINISHED TO A LARGE EXTENT".
CRISIS HAD BECOME "MUCH MORE ACUTE THROUGH WHAT HAPPENED
YESTERDAY".

3. FULL REPORT BY BAG.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

11TH SEPTEMBER, 1965

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) S&SEA PACAM AMSP
EAMEC E PIO ICR ER

INWARD CABLEGRAM

SCG:

I.40221

FROM:

Dated: 10th September, 1965
1845
Rec'd: 11th September, 1965
0614Australian Embassy,
ROME.

570.

SECRET.

Repeated Washington 7 (Canberra please pass) London
73 (Paris 35, Brussels 49, Bonn 19, The Hague 19, London please
pass).

First Italian Impressions of De Gaulle's Press Conference.

Director-General of Economic Affairs Ortona told me 10th
September that De Gaulle's comments were even worse than could have
been expected - even if you had been mentally prepared. Despite the
many difficulties in the past (it was not clear whether he was re-
ferring to E.E.C. or to NATO or both) there had always (Ø been) a
will to co-operate. He used "humiliating" and "disgusting" when
referring to De Gaulle's attitude to obligations incurred at a time
when France was less strong and his evident intentions to impose
French views on others. During his visit to Rome Fowler told Ortona
that De Gaulle had been extremely negative on his first visit to Paris.
Fowler saw Giscard Destaing on his second visit and this had been less
frigid.

Following is the gist of an official Italian comment on the
press conference:-

(A) reconfirms Italian willingness to seek a new and
equitable formula on agriculture to date from 1/7/65.

(B) reconfirms Italian willingness to take into consideration
in political discussions, at summit or other level, the political
difficulties in bringing the EEC toward a common agricultural market,
towards a common industrial market and towards all the developments,
including political, envisaged by signatories of Rome Treaty.

Italian diplomatic circles are quoted as describing the
conference as "arbitrary and lacunary". The Foreign Ministry is cited
as saying that the search for a solution of the EEC clearly presupposes
good will on the part of the signatories without the majority having to
give up their own opinions and accept as above discussion the wishes
of other single nations.

Stirling.

(Ø one word corrupt
"been"?)MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
MIN. & DEPT T. & I.(C)
P.M'S

11th September, 1965

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) AS(JIC) S&SEA DL INT UN PACAM AMSP EAMEC
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104

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JM

I.40321

DATED: 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
1840

FROM:

REC'D: 11TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
1940AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

2294 UNCLASSIFIED.

PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE.OUR FOLLOWING TELEGRAM CONTAINS TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT
ON E.E.C..

FOLLOWING ARE OTHER MAIN POLITICAL POINTS.

NATO.

"SO LONG AS WE CONSIDER NECESSARY THE SOLIDARITY OF THE WESTERN PEOPLES FOR THE POSSIBLE DEFENCE OF EUROPE WE SHALL REMAIN THE ALLY OF OUR ALLIES, BUT WITH THE EXPIRATION OF THE ENGAGEMENTS WE HAVE ENTERED INTO, THAT IS TO SAY AT THE LATEST IN 1969, THAT SUBORDINATION CALLED INTEGRATION WHICH NATO PROVIDES AND WHICH SUBMITS OUR DESTINY TO FOREIGN AUTHORITY WILL CLOSE SO FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED."

ASIA.

"WE BELIEVE THAT IN ASIA THE END OF THE FIGHTING UNDER WAY AND THE SATISFACTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEOPLES CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS, THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE REACHING OF A MODUS VIVENDI AMONGST THE POWERS WHO, SINCE THE WORLD WAR, HAVE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EVENTS OF THE SOUTH EAST OF THIS CONTINENT, NAMELY CHINA, FRANCE, AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND BRITAIN.

BUT WE ALSO BELIEVE MORE FIRMLY THAN EVER THAT THE ELEMENTARY CONDITION FOR SUCH A RAPPROCHEMENT OR PERHAPS FOR SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING WILL BE THE EFFECTIVE END OF ALL FORCING INTERVENTION AND CONSEQUENTLY THE COMPLETE AND CONTROLLED NEUTRALIZATION OF THE AREAS WHERE THERE IS FIGHTING."

VIETNAM.

"ALL THE SPECULATION ON FRENCH MEDIATION IS BASED ON AN ILLUSION.

AT PRESENT ALL THAT FRANCE CAN DO IS TO HOLD ITSELF IN RESERVE FOR THE FUTURE, AND IF THE MOMENT EVER COMES, FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING USEFUL IN PEKING, WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND LONDON IN REGARD TO THE CONTACTS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION, TO THE CONTROLS WHICH MAY BE NEEDED TO GUARANTEE IT AND LASTLY TO BRING AID TO THOSE UNHAPPY COUNTRIES WHOM FRANCE HAS CERTAINLY NOT FORGOTTEN".

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.40321

U.N.

"WHILST BEING, WITH FOUR OTHER POWERS, FOUNDERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION, AND WHILST DESIRING THAT IT REMAIN THE MEETING PLACE FOR DELEGATIONS FROM ALL PEOPLES AND THE FORUM FOR THEIR DEBATES WE DO NOT CONSIDER OURSELVES IN ANY WAY BOUND, EVEN FINANCIALLY, BY ACTS OF ARMED INTERVENTION WHICH ARE IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE CHARTER AND WHICH WE HAVE NEVER APPROVED."

EASTERN EUROPE.

"WE ARE MULTIPLYING CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE EAST, IN CONSIDERING AND TREATING EACH ACCORDING TO ITS NATIONAL PERSONALITY.
WE ATTACH A GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE NEW COURSE OF OUR RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA ETC..."

GERMANY.

"WITH GERMANY, DESPITE ALL THE INJURIES SUFFERED AND GRIEVANCES ACCUMULATED, WE HAVE CONCLUDED A TREATY WHICH IF IT HAS IN MANY FIELDS REMAINED ONE OF CORDIAL INTENTIONS BUT HAS NEVERTHELESS SET ON FOOT PERIODIC MEETINGS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND HAS BORN FRUIT IN CERTAIN FIELDS SUCH AS CULTURE AND YOUTH MEETINGS."

INITIAL COMMENT HAS CENTRED ON THE REFERENCE TO THE E.E.C., DESCRIBED BY MAURICE FAURE AS "THE FUNERAL ORATION OF THE COMMON MARKET" AND BY PAUL REYNAUD AS A POLICY OF "A STATIONARY FRANCE IN A WORLD ON THE MOVE".

PIERRE DROUIN IN "LE MONDE" SUGGESTS THAT THE TREATY OF ROME MAY NOW BE BURNT.

"COMBAT" SPEAKS OF "A PERFECT CONTEMPT FOR REALITIES".

"FIGAOR" COMMENTS THAT THE REFERENCE TO BRITISH ENTRY TO THE COMMON MARKET (FOR WHICH SUPRANATIONAL FORMULAE MUST BE RENOUNCED) MARKS A MAJOR STEP FROM THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY, 1963.

FULL FRENCH TEXT HAS BEEN SENT BY BAG.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

11TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) S&SEA M&I M DI INT UN PACAM
AMSP EA EAMEC E PIO INF MT ER PPO
BONN BRUSSELS GENEVA THE HAGUE LONDON MOSCOW NEW YORK(UN)
PHNOM PENH ROME SAIGON VIENTIANE WASHINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1

102

SAJ.

I.40320.

FROM:

DATED: 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
1019

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS.

REC'D: 11TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
1938

2295. UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

REPEATED BRUSSELS 20, LONDON 347, GENEVA 47.

DE GAULLE PRESS STATEMENT - E.E.C.

AS WE HAVE SEEN THE SUMMARIES AND COMMENT THAT MAJOR PRESS AGENCIES DESPATCHED FROM PARIS ON THAT PORTION OF DE GAULLE'S PRESS STATEMENT RELATING TO EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND AS THESE APPEAR TO US EITHER TO BE MISLEADING OR INCOMPLETE, WE THOUGHT IT WAS DESIRABLE FOR YOU TO HAVE THE TEXT OF WHAT WAS ACTUALLY SAID.

2. WHILST REMARKS ON COMMON MARKET NATURALLY NEED FINALLY TO BE RELATED TO OTHER RELEVANT PARTS OF THE TOTAL STATEMENT, WE THINK THAT THERE IS NO DANGER IN GIVING COMMENTS ON COMMON MARKET IN ISOLATION.

THESE FOLLOW:

WHAT HAPPENED IN BRUSSELS ON JUNE 30 REGARDING AN AGRICULTURAL FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT, BROUGHT TO LIGHT TWO THINGS.

FIRST, A PERSISTENT RETICENCE ON THE PART OF THE MAJORITY OF OUR PARTNERS TO INCLUDE AGRICULTURE IN THE COMMON MARKET OF THE SIX, AND THEN CERTAIN ERRORS OR AMBIGUITIES OF PRINCIPLES IN THE TREATIES RELEVANT TO THE ECONOMIC UNION OF THE SIX.

SOONER OR LATER THE CRISIS WAS INEVITABLE.

INDEED, THE THREE TREATIES WHICH RESPECTIVELY SET UP THE COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, EURATOM AND THE COMMON MARKET, WERE CONCLUDED BEFORE FRENCH RECOVERY IN 1958 AND THAT IS WHY THESE THREE TREATIES COVER, ABOVE ALL, EVERYTHING THE OTHER MEMBERS SOUGHT.

THE COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, INDEPENDENTLY FROM A FRANCO-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT, CONSISTED ESSENTIALLY IN RETURNING TO GERMANY CONTROL OVER ITS COAL AND STEEL AND IN GIVING TO ITALY, WHICH HAS NO NATURAL RESOURCES IN COAL OR IRON THE POSSIBILITY OF ACQUIRING THEM REASONABLY CHEAPLY TO CREATE, IN HER TURN, A POWERFUL STEEL INDUSTRY.

AS FOR EURATOM, THE INSTITUTION TENDED TO POOL EVERYTHING WHICH WAS TO BE DONE OR HAD BEEN DONE IN THE FIELD OF ATOMIC ENERGY, IN WHICH FRANCE, OWING TO THE LEASE SHE HAS TAKEN, WOULD PLAY THE LARGEST PART, BUT ALSO THE INSTITUTION TENDED TO CONTROL PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIALS WITH A VIEW TO PREVENTING THEIR MILITARY USE WHEREAS FRANCE ALONE WAS CAPABLE OF HAVING A NUCLEAR ARMAMENT.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SAJ.

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I.40320.

THE TREATY OF ROME CLEARLY FIXED THE CONDITIONS FOR THE INDUSTRIAL AREA WHICH WAS OF IMPORTANCE TO OUR NEIGHBOURS BUT DID NOT ESTABLISH THOSE FOR THE AGRICULTURAL AREA IN WHICH WE WERE MOST INTERESTED.

THE THREE TREATIES ESTABLISHED A "FIGURATION OF AN EXECUTIVE" IN THE FORM OF A COMMISSION INDEPENDENT FROM THE STATES ALTHOUGH MEMBERS MIGHT BE NAMED AND PAID BY THE STATES, AND A "FIGURATION OF LEGISLATURE" IN THE SHAPE OF A EUROPEAN ASSEMBLY DRAWN FROM MEMBERS OF THE DIFFERENT PARLIAMENTS, WITHOUT, HOWEVER, THE NATIONAL ELECTORS HAVING GIVEN THEM ANY MANDATE (IN SUCH AN ASSEMBLY).

THIS TECHNOCRACY, MAINLY FOREIGN, AND WHICH WAS DESTINED TO ENCROACH ON FRENCH DEMOCRACY IN SETTLING PROBLEMS UPON WHICH THE VERY EXISTENCE OF OUR COUNTRY DEPENDS EVIDENTLY DID NOT SUIT US FROM THE MOMENT WHEN WE RESOLVED TO TAKE OUR DESTINY INTO OUR OWN HANDS.

NO ONE CAN IGNORE THAT THE IDEA OF GROUPING THE STATES OF WESTERN EUROPE IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE (AND I ADD POLITICAL) HAS BEEN HELD BY US FOR A LONG TIME.

AS EVIDENCE, REFERENCE NEED ONLY BE MADE TO THE DECLARATIONS WHICH WERE MADE BY ME IN THE COURSE OF, AND AT THE END OF THE WORLD WAR WHEN NO ONE ELSE SPOKE OF IT, AND THEN ON MANY OTHER SOLEMN OCCASIONS:- FINALLY TO THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MY GOVERNMENT.

ON THE ECONOMIC ASPECT, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ORGANISED ADJUSTMENT OF THE RESPECTIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNTRIES SITUATED ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RHINE AND THE ALPS TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THAT THEY ARE CLOSE NEIGHBOURS, THAT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PRODUCTION THEY ARE AT THE SAME TIME BOTH AUXILIARY AND COMPLIMENTARY AND THAT IT CORRESPONDS TO THE CONDITIONS OF OUR TIMES TOWARDS LARGER GROUPINGS THAN ANY SINGLE EUROPEAN STATE.

BESIDES, FRANCE IN FULL DEVELOPMENT AND WHOSE CURRENCY IS NOW ONE OF THE STRONGEST IN THE WORLD, HAS EVERY REASON TO RENOUNCE ITS FORMER PROTECTIONISM AND OPEN UP PROGRESSIVELY TO COMPETITION.

THIS IS WHY FOR SEVEN YEARS WE HAVE VERY ACTIVELY WORKED IN BUILDING THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY - CREATED THEORETICALLY IN 1957 BUT WHICH UNTIL 1959 EXISTED ON PAPER ONLY BECAUSE THE CHRONIC DEFICIT IN THE FRENCH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PREVENTED THE ORGANISATION FROM GETTING UNDER WAY, EXCEPT IN SPEECHES.

BUT WHAT WE WANTED YESTERDAY AND WHAT WE WANT TODAY IS A COMMUNITY WHICH IS EQUITABLE AND REASONABLE.

BY EQUITABLE, WE MEAN THAT AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS SHOULD COME INTO THE COMMON MARKET AT THE SAME TIME AS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS BUT WITH THEIR OWN PARTICULAR CONDITIONS.

BY REASONABLE, WE MEAN THAT NOTHING THAT IS IMPORTANT, NOW IN ORGANISATION, LATER IN FUNCTIONING IN THE COMMON MARKET SHOULD BE DECIDED AND A FORTIORI IMPLEMENTED EXCEPT BY THE RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC POWERS IN THE SIX STATES, THAT IS TO SAY GOVERNMENTS CONTROLLED BY THEIR PARLIAMENTS.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

SAJ.

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I.40320.

WE KNOW THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENT CONCEPT OF A EUROPEAN FEDERATION IN WHICH THE MEMBER COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO THE DREAMS OF THOSE WHO ORIGINATED IT, WOULD LOSE THEIR NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND WHERE IN THE ABSENCE OF A FEDERATOR (SUCH AS CAESAR AND HIS SUCCESSORS, CHARLEMAGNE, OTHON, CHARLES THE FIFTH, NAPOLEON, HITLER AND IN THE EAST, STALIN, AS EACH OF THESE IN HIS OWN WAY TRIED TO BE) THE EUROPEAN FEDERATION WOULD BE RULED BY A TECHNO-CRATIC BODY, UTATELESS AND IRRESPONSIBLE.

TO THIS CONCEPT WHICH REALLY SEEMS UNREALISTIC, FRANCE OFFERS THE ALTERNATIVE OF ORGANISED CO-OPERATION BETWEEN STATES EVOLVING WITHOUT DOUBT (PRESS VERSIONS SUBSTITUTE "PROBABLY" FOR "WITHOUT DOUBT") TOWARDS A CONFEDERATION.

THIS IS THE PLAN WHICH ALONE SEEMS TO US BEST SUITED TO THE NATIONS OF OUR CONTINENT AS THEY ARE AT THE PRESENT TIME.

IT IS ALSO THE ONLY PLAN WHICH WOULD ONE DAY ALLOW OTHER COUNTRIES, LIKE ENGLAND AND SPAIN, TO JOIN, BECAUSE THESE COUNTRIES, JUST LIKE OURS, DO NOT WANT TO LOSE THEIR SOVEREIGNTY.

THIS PLAN ALONE WOULD ALLOW US TO CONCEIVE OF A FUTURE ENTENTE FOR THE WHOLE OF EUROPE.

NEVERTHELESS, WHATEVER THE AFTER THOUGHTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABOUT POLITICAL THEORIES, THE VERY LONG AND DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS IN BRUSSELS SEEMED TO BE NEARING FINALITY.

WE HAD THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY IN INDUCING OUR PARTNERS TO INCLUDE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE COMMUNITY.

FOR US, THIS IS A SINE QUA NON CONDITION BECAUSE UNLESS IT IS FULFILLED WE WOULD BEAR MORE THAN OUR NEIGHBOURS THE VERY HEAVY BURDEN OF SUPPORTING OUR AGRICULTURE.

WE WOULD BE THUS HANDICAPPED IN INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION.

THAT IS WHY IN 1962 WE ONLY AGREED TO PASS TO THE SECOND PHASE OF THE ROME TREATY (INVOLVING A CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION OF TARIFF BARRIERS) PROVIDED THE SIX UNDERTOOK FORMALLY TO SETTLE THE FINANCIAL ASPECT OF THE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM BY JUNE 30 OF THIS YEAR AT THE LATEST AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN EXPLICIT TIMETABLE.

WE SUCCEEDED (NOT WITHOUT DIFFICULTY) IN OBTAINING THE AGREEMENT OF OUR PARTNERS AND WE WERE ENTITLED TO BELIEVE THAT BY THE DUE DATE THEY WOULD FULFIL THEIR COMMITMENTS.

I MUST ALSO SAY THAT WHILST OBSERVING THAT THE LARGE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY BUILT AT GREAT EXPENSE AROUND THE COMMISSION OFTEN DUPLICATED THE EXPERT SERVICES OF THE SIX GOVERNMENTS, WE HAD IN THE COURSE OF OUR WORK (THERE) NOTED THE COMPETENCE OF THESE OFFICIALS OF THE COMMUNITY AND VERIFIED THAT THEY WERE ABSTAINING FROM EXCESSIVE ENCROACHMENT ON THE UNIQUE RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ARE PROPERLY THOSE OF STATES.

THAT WAS TOO GOOD TO LAST!

INDEED IN BRUSSELS ON JUNE 30 OUR DELEGATION RAN UP AGAINST A BLANK WALL AS REGARDS THE FINALIZATION OF THE FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT PREVIOUSLY PLEDGED.

JUST BEFORE (THAT DATE) THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION SUDDENLY SHED ITS POLITICAL RETICENCE AND LAID DOWN CONDITIONS REGARDING

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SAJ.

-4-

I.40320.

THE FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF GIVING TO IT, ALONE, A BUDGET WHICH MIGHT HAVE AMOUNTED TO FRANCS 20,000 MILLION (CONTRIBUTED BY THE STATES FROM LEVIES AND DUTIES) THUS MAKING IT (THE COMMISSION) A GREAT INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL POWER.

IT IS TRUE THAT ACCORDING TO THE ORIGINATORS OF THIS PROPOSAL THIS ENORMOUS BUDGET, THAT THE STATES WOULD FEED AT THE EXPENSE OF THEIR TAXPAYERS BUT WHICH THEY WOULD NOT CONTROL, WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE EUROPEAN ASSEMBLY FOR EXAMINATION.

BUT INTERVENTION BY THIS ASSEMBLY WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY CONSULTATIVE AND WHOSE MEMBERS HAVE NEVER BEEN ELECTED FOR THE PURPOSE WOULD ONLY AGGRAVATE THE URSUPATORY CHARACTER OF WHAT WAS PROPOSED.

LEAVING THAT ASIDE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHETHER PREMEDITATED OR NOT, OF THE SUPRA NATIONAL TENDENCIES OF THE BRUSSELS COMMISSION, OF THE SUPPORT THAT SEVERAL DELEGATIONS DECLARED THEMSELVES READY TO GIVE TO THEM, KINALLY OF THE FACT THAT CERTAIN OF OUR PARTNERS DREW BACK AT THE LAST MOMENT FROM WHAT THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED (THESE THINGS) FORCED US TO PUT AN END TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

IN THE LIGHT OF THESE EVENTS WE WERE ALSO ABLE TO SEE MORE CLEARLY WHAT FRANCE WOULD LET HERSELF IN FOR IN THE FUTURE IF SUCH AND SUCH PROVISION IN THE ROME TREATY WERE TO BE REALLY APPLIED.

FOR, ACCORDING TO THE TEXT, THE DECISIONS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE SIX WOULD BE TAKEN BY A MAJORITY VOTE FROM JANUARY 1ST NEXT.

THIS MEANS THAT FRANCE'S HAND COULD BE FORCED IN ALL ECONOMIC AND CONSEQUENTLY SOCIAL AND OFTEN EVEN POLITICAL MATTERS AND THAT IN PARTICULAR WHAT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED IN AGRICULTURE COULD BE JEOPARDISED AT ANY MOMENT WHETHER FRANCE LIKED IT OR NOT.

ADDITIONALLY, THE PROPOSALS OF THE COMMISSION WOULD FROM THE SAME DATE BE PRESENTED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR ADOPTION OR OTHERWISE AS THEY STOOD WITHOUT THE STATES BEING ABLE TO CHANGE ANYTHING UNLESS EXTRAORDINARILY THE SIX STATES WERE UNANIMOUS IN FORMULATING AN AMENDMENT.

IT IS KNOWN THAT MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION FORMERLY NOMINATED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS AND HENCEFORTH IN NO WAY RESPONSIBLE TO THEM AND THAT EVEN AT THE END OF THEIR MANDATE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO REPLACE THEM TO HAVE THE UNANIMITY OF THE SIX WHICH IN FACT MAKES THEM IMMOVABLE.

ONE CAN SEE WHERE SUCH SUBORDINATION COULD LEAD US IF WE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO RENOUNCE BOTH THE MANAGEMENT OF OUR OWN AFFAIRS AND OF OUR CONSTITUTION WHICH LAYS DOWN THAT FRENCH SOVEREIGNTY BELONGS TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE WHO EXERCISE IT THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AND THROUGH THE REFERENDUM - WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTION BEING FORESEEN.

THAT IS WHERE THINGS STAND.

NATURALLY IT IS CONCEIVABLE AND DESIRABLE THAT WORK BE RECOMMENCED ONE DAY ON THE GREAT ENTERPRISE OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

SAJ.

-5-

I.40320.

BUT BEFORE THAT HAPPENS THERE WILL BE A DELAY, THE LENGTH OF WHICH NO ONE CAN FORESEE.

WHO KNOWS IN EFFECT, IF, WHEN AND HOW THE POLICIES OF EACH OF OUR PARTNERS - TAKING INTO ACCOUNT MOREOVER CERTAIN ELECTORAL AND PARLIAMENTARY SITUATIONS - WILL BE ABLE TO ADAPT THEMSELVES DEFINITELY TO THE NECESSITIES SUCH AS THEY HAVE JUST BEEN DEMONSTRATED.

HOWEVER IT MAY TURN OUT, FRANCE FOR HER PART IS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH OTHER GOVERNMENTS MAY PROPOSE TO HER.

THE OCCASION ARISING (FRANCE) ENVISAGES RESUMING THE BRUSSELS NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS THE INCORPORATION OF AGRICULTURE INTO THE COMMON MARKET IS REALLY ACCEPTED AND AS SOON AS WE ARE FINISHED WITH THE PRETENCES AND ABUSIVE MYTHS WHICH OPPOSE GOOD SENSE AND REALITY. END OF QUOTE.

3. FOREGOING TRANSLATION MADE FROM TEXT SECURED FROM MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
FRENCH VERSION FULL TEXT FROM SAME SOURCE AIRMAILED TO TRADE.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

11TH SEPTEMBER, 1965

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) S&SEA SAMT PACAM AMSP
EAMEC E PIO ICR ER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

97

GSW

I.40115

FROM:

DATED: 9TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
1836

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 10TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.
2014

2276 RESTRICTED.

DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

WITHOUT STUDYING THE FULL TEXT (MAIN POINTS OF WHICH WE SHALL CABLE TOMORROW) OUR IMPRESSION IS OF A VERY GENERAL TOUR D'HORIZON WITH LITTLE THAT IS NEW.

ON KASHMIR HE REFERRED TO U. THANT'S MISSION WHICH HE HOPED WOULD LEAD TO A CEASE FIRE.

ON VIETNAM HE SAID THAT SPECULATION ABOUT FRENCH MEDIATION WAS BASELESS.

ON SOUTH EAST ASIA GENERALLY, WHILE ADMITTING THAT QUITE DIFFERENT POLICIES WERE NOW BEING PURSUED IN THE AREA, HE REPEATED HIS PROPOSALS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES LEADING TO NEUTRALIZATION BY AGREEMENT AMONG THE 5 MAJOR POWERS.

ON THE COMMON MARKET, HE SAID THAT IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT THE ENTERPRISE SHOULD GET UNDER WAY AGAIN BUT THERE WOULD BE A DELAY WHILE THE POLICIES OF FRANCE'S PARTNERS WERE ADAPTED TO ACCEPT THE FULL ENTRY OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS INTO THE MARKET AND THE TERMINATION OF THE COMMISSION'S EXCHANGE VIEW WITH ITS FIVE PARTNERS.

2. DE GAULLE SAID SIMPLY THAT IT WOULD BE KNOWN WITHIN TWO MONTHS WHETHER HE WOULD BE A CANDIDATE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
P.M'S

10TH SEPTEMBER, 1965.

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) S&SEA M&I M DL INT
UN PACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E PIO INF

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AUSTRALIAN TREASURY
PARIS

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25/1/1

File 206/1

9th September, 1965

Memo. no: 803

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
Canberra.

1966 Budget

We attach the report from Le Figaro of 9th September of the draft 1966 budget, announced after the Cabinet meeting of 8th September. The draft will be put to parliament on 17th September, and is expected to be voted by 19th November, i.e. before the Presidential campaign is at its height.

2. The draft budget is unspectacular and in general continues existing policies unchanged. It provides for a slight surplus, with receipts at Frs.106,192 million and expenditure at Frs.106,052 million. It envisages a continuing moderated economic growth, with an increase over the year ~~of~~ production by volume of 4.5 per cent, of production ~~by~~ value of 6.4 per cent and of general salaries 6.8 per cent.

3. The main increases of expenditure envisaged are for education (11 per cent), roads (27 per cent), research (27 per cent), and telecommunications (10 per cent). The increase in military expenditure is relatively low (5.63 per cent).

G. C. LEWIS

G. C. Lewis
First Secretary

E. C. Lewis
B.W.

(Orig. on 794/2/2/1)
Copies sent Tay. T.I., EPIC)

UPI-149

PARIS, SEPT. 9 (UPI)--PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE
FLATLY WARNED TODAY THAT FRANCE WILL NOT DROP HER COMMON
MARKET BOYCOTT UNLESS HER AGRICULTURAL DEMANDS ARE MET AND
PRA-NATIONAL FEATURES ELIMINATED FROM THE COMMUNITY.
AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE DE GAULLE CAUTIONED THAT THE COMMON
MARKET CRISIS WOULD BE LONG.

THE PRESIDENT SAID THE COMMUNITY MAY ONE DAY EVOLVE INTO
A CONFEDERATION. BUT AT PRESENT, HE SAID, THE CUSTOMS UNION
MUST REMAIN A GROUPING OF FREE, FULLY SOVEREIGN NATIONS SO AS
TO ALLOW FOR THE FUTURE PARTICIPATION OF SPAIN, BRITAIN AND
ALL OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS--PRESUMABLY ALSO EASTERN EUROPE.

DE GAULLE DID NOT OPENLY CALL FOR A FULL-SCALE REVISTION
OF THE 1956 ROME TREATY. BUT HE CHARGED THAT THE CURRENT
CRISIS HAS BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE THE +ERRORS AND AMBIGUITIES+
OF THE TREATY CONCLUDED BEFORE FRANCE'S +RECOVERY+ UPON
HIS 1958 RETURN TO POWER.

DE GAULLE CHARGED THAT THE COAL-STEEL POOL WAS PRIMARILY
DESIGNED TO RETURN TO WAR-PROSTRATE GERMANY THE CONTROL OVER
HER COAL AND STEEL INDUSTRIES. EURATOM, HE SAID, WAS TO POOL
ATOMIC KNOWLEDGE AND PREVENT ITS MILITARY EMPLOYMENT WHILE
FRANCE ALONE HAD THE CAPACITY TO ARM HERSELF WITH NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.

THE COMMON MARKET TREATY ITSELF, DE GAULLE SAID, SPELLED
OUT THE INDUSTRIAL NEEDS OF FRANCE'S PARTNERS WITHOUT TROUBLING
WITH AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS, FRANCE'S MAJOR INTEREST.

RR10024

Rome

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1

MH

I.39911

FROM:

DATED: 8TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
1740

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 9TH SEPTEMBER, 1965
2079

2267 RESTRICTED.

REPEATED LONDON 345, WASHINGTON 130

INDIA PAKISTAN.

SPOKESMAN AFTER TODAY'S CABINET MEETING STATED.-

FRANCE CAN ONLY DEPLORE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW THEATRE OF WAR IN ASIA, AND THAT TWO STATES WITH WHOM SHE HAS FRIENDLY RELATIONS SHOULD BE IN CONFLICT.

WE HOPE THAT REASON WILL PREVAIL BEFORE THE CONFLICT REACHES UNCONTROLLABLE PROPORTIONS. END OF QUOTE.

HE ADDED THAT A LETTER RECENTLY SENT BY MARSHALL AYUB KHAN TO GENERAL DE GAULLE HAD MERELY SET OUT THE PAKISTAN POSITION WITHOUT ANY REQUEST FOR MEDIATION.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH US, MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN AT THE SITUATION BUT HAVE GENERALLY TAKEN THE LINE THAT THIS A PROBLEM PRIMARILY FOR THE COMMONWEALTH.

(IF YOU WISH US TO PURSUE IN DETAIL WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR BRIEFING).

3. FRENCH PRESS REPORTING HAS SEEMED IN GENERAL OBJECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL, BUT SYMPATHY FOR PAKISTAN IS AT TIMES CLEAR.

JEAN WETZ, REPORTING FROM DELHI, FOR LE MONDE HAS DESCRIBED THE ENTHUSIASM FOR WAR BEING SHOWN BY THE INDIANS, WHOSE ACTIONS ARE CONTRASTED BY MOST EDITORIALS WITH THEIR REPUTED NON-VIOLENCE.

HUMANITE PLACES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CLASH ON BRITISH DECOLOURIZATION METHODS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
P.M'S

9TH SEPTEMBER, 1965

SEC FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) S&SEA M&I M DL SAMT
SA INT UN PACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E PIO INF MT CR

UPI-317

WITH KASHMIR
BY JOSEPH W. GRIGG

PARIS, SEPT. 8 (UPI)--THE IND-PAKISTANI CONFLICT IS
THE CRISIS AREA IN WHICH FRENCH PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE
IS UNLIKELY TO MEDDLE.

DE GAULLE OVER THE YEARS HAS BUILT UP QUITE A REPUTATION
FOR HIMSELF FOR PUTTING HIS FINGER INTO VARIOUS PIES THAT
DO NOT STRICTLY CONCERN FRANCE--VIET NAM, THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC.

BUT FRENCH OFFICIALS SAY THOUGH HE IS DEEPLY CONCERNED
BY THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
THERE IS NO QUESTION OF DE GAULLE OFFERING MILITARY, TECHNICAL
OR OTHER AID TO EITHER OF THE ADVERSARIES.

THERE WAS A MILD RIPPLE OF EXCITEMENT DIPLOMATIC
CIRCLES LAST WEEK WHEN IT BECAME KNOWN THAT PRESIDENT MOHAMMAD
AYUB KHAN OF PAKISTAN HAD WRITTEN A LONG PERSONAL LETTER TO
DE GAULLE.

PAKISTAN IS FRIENDLY WITH COMMUNIST CHINA. DE GAULLE HAS
BEEN TRYING TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS WITH PEKING.

SO SOME DIPLOMATS HASTILY PUT TWO AND TWO TOGETHER AND
ASSUMED AYUB HAD ASKED DE GAULLE FOR HELP AND THAT THE
FRENCH LEADER MIGHT BE INCLINED TO GIVE IT.

FRENCH OFFICIALS QUICKLY SQUELCHED THOSE RUMORS BY DENYING
AYUB LETTER ASKED FOR HELP OF ANY SORT. IT MERELY WAS
A RESUME OF THE PAKISTANI CASE ON KASHMIR, THEY SAID.

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C. W. ...

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25/1/1 92

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

I.38633

FROM:

DATED: 1ST SEPTEMBER, 1965
1840

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 2ND SEPTEMBER, 1965
0557

2206. UNCLASSIFIED.

REPEATED LONDON 335, WASHINGTON 126 (CBA PLS PASS)

FOLLOWING STATEMENT MADE AFTER TODAY'S CABINET MEETING.

2. GENERAL DE GAULLE MENTIONED THAT MR JOHNSON HAD ADDRESSED HIM A LETTER EXPRESSING THE WISH THAT MR BALL HAVE CONTACTS WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THAT, SHOULD HE BE RECEIVED, HE WOULD SPEAK IN HIS NAME.

THE GENERAL HAD RECEIVED MR BALL AND THEY DISCUSSED TOGETHER TWO QUESTIONS, VIETNAM AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

3. REGARDING VIETNAM IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THERE COULD NOT BE ANY QUESTION OF MEDIATION SINCE, AT THE PRESENT TIME, THERE IS NO MEDIATION CONCEIVABLE.

THE CONVERSATION ENABLED THE RESPECTIVE POINTS OF VIEW ON THE SUBJECT TO BE PUT FORWARD.

4. REGARDING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE MEETING NOTHING VERY NEW WAS SAID.

THE GENERAL DE GAULLE REPEATED THAT FRANCE WAS A MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE BUT THAT THE QUESTION OF ITS ORGANISATION WAS OPEN AND MUST BE PUT ONE DAY OR OTHER.

HE CONSIDERED THE CONVERSATIONS HAD BEEN USEFUL, FRIENDLY AND NORMAL, THAT THEY WERE IN NO WAY EXCEPTIONAL AND FORMED PART OF OVER-ALL FRANCE-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE
RT. HON. H.E. HOLT
MR. HEWITT
P.M'S

2ND SEPTEMBER, 1965

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25/1/1 91
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

I.38369

FROM.

DATED. 31ST AUGUST, 1965

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D. 1ST SEPTEMBER, 1965
0032

2191. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED GENEVA 46, BRUSSELS 18.

FROM CORKERY

FRANCE/EEC/KENNEDY ROUND.

1. ALTHOUGH WAHL ADMITTED "TECHNICAL" POSSIBILITY OF COMMISSION SUBMITTING TOKEN OFFERS ON SEPTEMBER 11, HE DID NOT THINK THEY WOULD DO THIS, EVEN THOUGH REY AND OTHERS MIGHT GIVE IMPRESSION THEY WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING IT.

THERE WAS, IN HIS VIEW, NO QUESTION OF OFFERS OF SUBSTANCE BEING MADE: APART FROM ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION (AND THERE WERE OTHERS) COMMITTEE 111 WOULD HAVE TO AUTHORISE THEM AND THAT COMMITTEE CERTAINLY COULD NOT MEET UNTIL AFTER SEPTEMBER 9.

2. WAHL SAID THAT NATURALLY HE DID NOT KNOW - ESPECIALLY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES - WHAT LINE DE GAULLE WOULD TAKE ON EEC ISSUE IN SEPTEMBER 9 STATEMENT.

IT SEEMED TO HIM AND OTHERS THAT THERE WERE TWO ASSUMPTIONS, NOT NECESSARILY EXCLUSIVE, THAT COULD BE MADE ABOUT IT.

(A) IF MAJOR OBJECTIVE WAS FOR REPLACEMENT OF HALLSTEIN, AND CURBING COMMISSION THEN DE GAULLE NEED NOT SAY MUCH AT THIS TIME.

(B) IF HOWEVER DE GAULLE HAD DEVELOPED IDEAS FOR A MORE MULTI-LATERAL TRADING EUROPE THAN IS INHERENT IN ROME TREATY (IDEAS WHICH FRANCE HAD CAUSED TO BE ABANDONED IN 1958) THEN STATEMENT WOULD NATURALLY BE MORE EXPANSIVE.

WHILST SPECULATION CAN BE UNREWARDING AND MISLEADING, THERE IS PERHAPS SIGNIFICANCE IN ABSENCE OF MENTION BY WAHL OF ANY ASSUMPTION THAT STATEMENT WOULD DEAL WITH FRENCH REQUIREMENTS IN THE COMMON MARKET, THUS OPENING WAY FOR TAKING UP PROCESS OF BARGAINING AND DEVELOPMENT WHICH HAD BEEN ABANDONED AT END OF JUNE.

IN CONVERSATION THERE WAS LITTLE TO SUGGEST THAT WORK AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IS PROCEEDING (OR IS FORESEEN) ON THE SO-CALLED TECHNICAL ISSUES (CAP FINANCING) WHICH MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO BE IN TRAIN OR IN PROSPECT IF IT WERE INTENDED TO GET THINGS MOVING WITHIN EEC, BUT ON FRENCH TERMS, IN THE EARLY AUTUMN.

WAHL IS LEAVING ON 1ST SEPTEMBER TO TAKE UP HIS APPOINTMENT IN LONDON.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

2.

I.38369

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C&E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M'S DEPT
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File No. 25/1/1

Published at LONDON.

Date 31-8-65

**GEN. DE GAULLE AS
'PEACE MAKER'****MR. BALL TO DELIVER
MESSAGE TODAY**

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

PARIS, AUG. 30

President de Gaulle, back with millions of his compatriots from the August holidays, will make his re-entry to-morrow—if he can ever be said to be off-stage—by receiving Mr. George Ball, the American Under-Secretary of State, who is expected to inform him of Washington's latest moves in the Vietnam conflict.

Ostensibly, Mr. Ball is seconding Mr. Henry Fowler, Secretary of the United States Treasury, in monetary talks in Paris and other European capitals, but he clearly has more than a watching brief. The Elysée interview has been arranged at American request, and Mr. Ball is understood to be carrying a message from President Johnson, perhaps of more purport than the habitual courtesies.

SALVE TO FRENCH

Mr. Ball's recent statement that the United States would rejoice at any contribution from General de Gaulle towards peace in Vietnam is seen in Paris not only as a salve to French feelings, but as the first official recognition from Washington that the General's ideas of a solution may be less Machiavellian than they were made to sound. If the positions of Washington and Paris are still found to be far apart, they seem ready to discuss Vietnam with far less sting.

The secret report brought back from Peking by M. Malraux, the French Minister of Culture, combined with the present visit to France of a Hanoi delegation as guests of the French Communist Party, prompts some observers to cast General de Gaulle in the role of mediator in the Vietnam war. This might sound premature, to say the least, but Mr. Ball will certainly be receptive to any move in Paris that could help to initiate a process of negotiation. It may be significant that his discussions with M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, with whom he has already talked informally, have been arranged for next Monday on his return from the other capitals—an unusual gesture to French diplomacy.

FINANCIAL MEETING

Mr. Fowler and Mr. Ball, accompanied by experts, had a session today with M. Giscard d'Estaing, the French Finance Minister, to open their soundings in Europe in the hope of finding enough common ground to go ahead with the American proposal for an international monetary conference. In the view of most commentators French suspicions of this move, for reasons already expounded by M. Giscard d'Estaing, are still too strong to give the two-day talks more than an exploratory character; they are regarded, indeed, as part of a continuing exercise.

Name of Paper *The Herald*File No. *25/1/1*Published at *Melbourne*Date *31-8-65*

GAULLE HAS PLANS FOR MARKET, NATO

From ROBERT KLEIMAN, member of the Editorial Board of the New York Times

NEW YORK, Mon. — Rarely has one of President de Gaulle's semi-annual Press conferences caused as much advance nervousness as that now scheduled for September 9 in Paris.

The French President has indicated clearly to a number of foreign visitors that he plans a major new assault against the whole imaginative structure of European and Atlantic institutions built painstakingly over the past two decades.

And it is certain that serious crises lie ahead both for the Common Market and NATO.

"NATO is the American military occupation of France," one of de Gaulle's most trusted Cabinet Ministers told a British leader recently.

The real problem in NATO is that American predominance has persisted long, long after Europe's revival. President Kennedy eloquently expressed the need three years ago to move towards an "equal" partnership.

But de Gaulle's Foreign Minister was able to reply to his critics in the French National Assembly by remarking that the Kennedy formula "has never since been repeated" by President Johnson.

LEAD LACKING

A clear, strong lead from Washington has been lacking in Europe since President Johnson's abrupt decision in December to shelve the project for a multilateral nuclear force.

There is fear now that the increasing American involvement in Vietnam may hamper a new initiative. And Europe's own political uncertainties impede a concerted response to the Gaullist challenge, for three critical elections now are pending.

The West German elections on September 19 are likely to return another weak Government. But there is an outside chance of a "big coalition" of the Socialists and Christian Democrats that would impress France. A NATO crisis might even produce a shotgun wedding.

Britain's election may be avoided by Labor for another year. A vigorous new bid at that time to enter the Common Market — possible if Wilson wins, but certain if Heath is the victor — would alter the entire political balance in Europe, whatever the French reaction.

RE-ELECTION?

Finally, General de Gaulle has yet to announce whether he will run for re-election in December.

But the expectation is that de Gaulle will run, be re-elected and proceed with his effort to remake the Common Market and NATO. His stated aim in 1956 was to achieve integration, re-emphasise nation-

the others will not follow. The General's objective now is to restore to France its freedom of action."

De Gaulle's chief target in NATO is the integrated command structure, and particularly SHAPE — the Supreme headquarters near Paris presided over in turn since 1951 by American Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, Gruenther, Norstad and now Lemnitzer.

The General feels SHAPE is suffocating us — destroying the independence of the French General Staff," said one of De Gaulle's Cabinet Ministers.

"We will make formal proposals in the course of next year to dissolve the integrated military structure of the alliance, particularly SHAPE, and to return to a normal alliance of national armies."

If the other allies disagree, he continued, they cannot expect SHAPE to remain on French soil. In the absence of an agreed military structure, France could denounce the North Atlantic treaty — as any member can, beginning in 1969.

LOOK AGAIN

In any event, existing Franco-American base agreements "must be renegotiated," the American air bases, supply dumps and lines of communication to Germany cannot continue "under American command."

It would be an error to suppose that de Gaulle is bluffing, or that he is unprepared to go the route.

But it would be an equal error to activate contingency plans and begin to re-locate SHAPE and American lines of communication in the Low Countries. Nothing would be more certain to assure French withdrawal from NATO.

What de Gaulle has been seeking in all his pressure moves against NATO since 1956 is a broad-gauged strategic negotiation with the United States.

By 1969 de Gaulle will have waited 11 years for that confrontation. Four years now have passed since the Presidents of the United States and France have even conferred.

The French President's closest associates believe "a compromise is possible." It might be wise for Washington to find out what it

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RE-ELECTION?

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"The General is now thinking of the situation after he is gone," said one of his closest associates. "In the Anglo-French-American triumvirate as proposed in 1958, De Gaulle could have spoken as an equal."

"When he is gone, France and Britain will be small countries compared to the United States. A European political-military union led by France? That is not possible at present;

the others will not follow. The General's objective now is to restore to France its freedom of action."

De Gaulle's chief target in NATO is the integrated command structure, and particularly SHAPE — the Supreme headquarters near Paris presided over in turn since 1951 by American Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, Gruenther, Norstad and now Lemnitzer.

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By 1969 de Gaulle will have waited 11 years for that confrontation. Four years now have passed since the Presidents of the United States and France have even conferred.

The French President's closest associates believe "a compromise is possible." It might be wise for Washington to find out what it might be, before deciding that it is unacceptable.

But a simple Johnson-de Gaulle meeting would not produce this result. The two presidents, surrounded by their advisers, would have to meet regularly and frequently with each other — and with their chief allies — over a considerable period of time.

If they do, they might even strengthen NATO, rather than rip it to shreds.

France's Real Aim in Brussels Dispute

From Our European Economic Correspondent—BRUSSELS

The Common Market rests uneasily becalmed. The crisis caused by the French boycott is entering a period of outward truce concealing close and intricate diplomacy in the capitals of the member states. It is possible to deduce what General de Gaulle wants. What now has to be explored—to use one of the favourite formulae of M. Couve de Murville's, the French Foreign Minister—is whether this is possible and then whether it is practical.

From the hints by which the French President's intentions filter out from the fly-see it is evident that he does not want the Common Market to break up. Everything suggests that, far from being a well thought out plan of action, French policy is being conducted on a short-term and opportunistic basis and that the initiative will be seized as and when the occasion offers.

First, France wants the financial arrangements of the agricultural policy to be settled on the lines she has laid down. This is a condition which it would be fairly easy to meet. The new memorandum of the Commission of the European Economic Community should satisfy French demands in this limited realm of farm policy.

EMOTIONAL FORCE

However, what the French Government really wants is to teach the Brussels Commission who is master in Europe. It must be disciplined, and disciplined severely. It must return to what is politely called a sense of reality. The force of emotion behind this feeling should not be under-estimated; it may well be the crucial element in the French attitude just because it goes beyond reason.

It is inconceivable to Gaullist minds that this distasteful collection of technicians in Brussels, tolerable at the best of times as a calculating machine, should have dared to set itself up to impose policy on national governments. And for what? To elevate a trivial Consultative Assembly in Strasbourg by giving it some control over the Common Market. One thing that Paris understands is the proper place of parliaments.

It is useless to protest that the Commission's proposals were legally justified, as Professor Hallstein, its president, has done; it is irrelevant to argue that the proposals were logical, conceived as a whole, extending the principle of paying in agricultural levies on farm imports to paying in customs duties on industrial imports, and hence raised the wider question of future Community income and expenditure—and that, finally, they had the support in principle of the majority of France's partners.

The legal arguments can be adduced on either side, and there are many people who believe that the Commission was misguided to push so far so fast. However, this is beside the point. The sin lay in supposing that France, for material interest, would be prepared to sacrifice a matter of principle—even worse, that she could not help being drawn into the integrationist Commission in Brussels by her co-tails. More naive, it now seems, was the supposition that General de Gaulle would be dissuaded from drastic action by this year's French elections.

PERSONAL DISLIKES

Industry in France is divided; the big companies want the Common Market to continue, the small ones would be happy to shelter behind such tariff protection as they can still find. The farmers may feel cheated but when it comes to casting their votes many will feel—according to one rural prefect—that General de Gaulle has fought for their interests and he is still their best hope. Above all, there is no effective opposition since the collapse of M. Defferre's candidacy.

How, then, is the Commission to be brought down? There seem to be two elements, the personal and the constitutional, and the Quai d'Orsay is still pondering how it is to proceed. The personal element is dislike for Professor Hallstein, who is considered to have overreached himself. The same seems to go for Dr. S. L. Mansholt, the Dutch Vice-President, and author of the common agricultural policy.

The mandate for the Commission comes up for renewal at the end of the

year in the proposed fusion of the executives. It would theoretically be possible for France to veto these two appointments but that, apart from being horribly clumsy, would hardly do the trick. And anyway—an ironic twist—both men might go on to high political office and confront the French not only as functionaries but as Ministers.

Dr. Mansholt might well return to high office in Holland. So, personal factors notwithstanding, what is required, from the French point of view, is nothing short of a renegotiation of the powers of the Commission. This is the crux of the problem.

COLLECTIVE ACTION

The Commission's main task is to initiate proposals for the governments—not the other way round. The governments examine and debate these proposals and changes are made, and the process is repeated. But it is always an essentially collective undertaking. The so-called supra-national element in the Common Market institutions is the life-spark and original element in the whole construction. The process whereby the Commission has initiated common proposals, not as an average of member states' interests but in the Community interest, has been vindicated by success. It is a new departure in political evolution.

The same can be said for the principle of qualified majority voting, which will cover a whole series of Common Market decisions from the beginning of next year. It means that a variety of decisions in the Council of Ministers can be taken if a given majority is in favour. The usual arrangement is 12 votes out of 17 (France, Germany, and Italy having four votes each, Belgium and Holland two each, and Luxembourg one).

Clearly General de Gaulle cannot be expected to like this arrangement. It has already worked against France on minor issues, for example in overriding her objections to the Euratom budget. It is equally certain, however, from experience of Community procedure that no country can ever be forced to act against its expressed wishes on an important issue. M. Couve de Murville and M. Pompidou, the French Prime Minister, have in the past underlined this. The effect of qualified majority voting is, paradoxically, to be a spur to agreement, to make it more, and not less, desirable to reach a unanimous decision.

Moreover, on all the big questions, such as amending the Rome treaty or admitting a new country to the Common Market, unanimous approval is required. It is therefore unlikely that General de Gaulle provoked the present crisis in order to break the majority voting procedure before next year.

OPPORTUNITY PRESENT

But while it may be possible to amend the treaty and subjugate the Commission, the question is whether this is practicable. A change in the treaty would require ratification by national parliaments. It is hard to imagine the Dutch Parliament—to mention no others—accepting a revision designed purely to gratify French nationalism. Still, the opportunity does present itself for reconsidering the whole basis of the European Community.

The three separate communities—the coal and steel pool, the Common Market, and Euratom—are to be fused into a single organization. Discussion on the form of the new community is a matter for Governments. A governmental conference—set in Paris?—might be the occasion for salving the pride and honour of all parties.

The trouble is the timing. The Six have allowed two years for this process. That is too long for General de Gaulle's purposes. Meanwhile, the present crisis cannot be settled until after the German elections in September, and it will take another month for the new Bonn Government to install itself. The French elections are in December, and at the end of the year the Common Market automatically enters its final stage.

France is a legally minded country which does not like to act beyond the law, as she would if she continued the boycott of the Common Market. The dilemma is how to resolve this situation with such an awkward time schedule.

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

I.33483

FROM:

DATED: 28TH JULY, 1965
1829AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.REC'D: 29TH JULY, 1965
18101930. UNCLASSIFIED.REPEATED LONDON 308 GENEVA 44 BRUSSELS 15 BONN 9 THE HAGUE 10
ROME 25.FRANCE - E.E.C.

1. FOR SOME REASON WHICH WAS NOT EXPLAINED POMPIDOU'S STATEMENT WHICH TOOK THE FORM OF AN INFORMAL TALKON TELEVISION WAS DELAYED FOR 24 HOURS AND MADE ON 27TH JULY.
2. THE PRIME MINISTER'S TALK COVERED A NUMBER OF ISSUES.
HIS REMARKS ON E.E.C. WERE CENTRED ON TWO ASPECTS:
A) IF THERE IS TO BE A COMMON MARKET AGRICULTURE HAD TO BE A PART OF IT AND
B) THE UNACCEPTABILITY TO FRANCE OF OUTSIDE DIRECTION OF THE ECONOMY.
3. ON E.E.C. HE STARTED BY EMPHASISING THAT THE COMMON MARKET WAS "BEARABLE" FOR FRANCE ONLY IF AGRICULTURAL OPENINGS COMPENSATED FOR HAVING TO FACE INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION, PARTICULARLY THAT FROM GERMANY.
HIS THEME WAS THAT THE AGRICULTURAL COMMON MARKET HAD TO RELIEVE FRANCE IN LARGE MEASURE OF THE NECESSITY OF SUBSIDISING ITS AGRICULTURE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THIS WAS THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT IN WHICH THE BURDEN OF EXPORTING SURPLUSES AT PRICES BELOW THOSE PAID TO PRODUCERS WOULD BE SHARED.
FRANCE HAD RECEIVED IN JANUARY, 1962 (BEFORE MOVING TO THE SECOND STAGE) A PROMISE THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE MADE: THIS WAS CONFIRMED IN DECEMBER, 1964.
POMPIDOU THEN COMMENTED THAT "IN SPITE OF MANY CONCESSIONS ON OUR PART OUR PARTNERS WENT BACK ON ENGAGEMENTS THEY HAD MADE AND REAFFIRMED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.
WORSE YET, NUMEROUS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS WHICH WERE BOTH NEW AND UNTIMELY WERE BROUGHT UP.
EVERYTHING HAD TO BE EXAMINED AGAIN FROM THE START."
4. HE CONCLUDED IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS "FOR THE FUTURE WE WILL SEE: THERE IS A SOLUTION TO EVERYTHING AND FUTURE MONTHS WILL ALLOW US TO SEE WHERE WE CAN GO.
BUT IT IS CERTAIN THAT THE COMMON MARKET CAN ONLY TAKE PLACE IF THERE IS A COMMON AGRICULTURAL MARKET AND FAIR FINANCIAL REGULATIONS
WHAT IS ALSO CERTAIN IS THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT DIRECTION OF THE FRENCH ECONOMY FROM OUTSIDE EXCLUDING THE RIGHT OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO KEEP ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS THE FRENCH PEOPLE."

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

2.

I.33483

GOOD SENSE WARNS AND EXPERIENCE PROVES THAT WE CANNOT LEAVE DECISIONS ABOUT THE FRENCH STANDARD OF LIVING AND THE FATE OF OUR AGRICULTURE AND OUR INDUSTRY TO A COMMISSION WHICH HAS NO POLITICAL CALLING.


WE CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT TO PREVENT THE MAKING OF EUROPE.
I THINK WE HAVE EVEN "PUSHED" HARDER THAN ANYONE ELSE TOWARDS ITS ACHIEVEMENT, BUT IT CAN ONLY BE DONE WITH THE DETERMINED CO-OPERATION OF THE COUNTRIES ENGAGED IN ITS MAKING.
THIS IS OUR POSITION AND WE WILL KEEP IT."

5. FULL TEXT SENT EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE AND INDUSTRY.
6. PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE HAS NOW BEEN SCHEDULED FOR 9TH SEPTEMBER.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
TREASURER & TREASURY
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

29TH JULY, 1965

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E PIO ICR ER



82
AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

Memo No. 648
File No. 211/1

22nd July, 1965

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Gaullism and Europe

....

We attach an article by Raymond Aron from Le Figaro of 22nd July which comments on a pamphlet on European unity written by Michel Debré in 1949.

G. C. Lewis

(G. C. Lewis)
First Secretary

Mr Woodberry
for
30/7

SECRET
11
see
in

« JEAN-FOUTRE » IGNORÉ

par Raymond ARON

J e rangeais ma bibliothèque : une mince plaquette m'est venue entre les mains. Le titre *Projet de pacte pour une Union d'Etats européens* me rappela de vieux souvenirs et je relus ce texte oublié, écrit en 1949, publié en 1950.

Sur la première page, cette dédicace : « A tous ceux qui pensent que la politique a un idéal et que le nom de cet idéal est liberté... A tous ceux qui pensent que la neutralité, comme hier la collaboration, est aujourd'hui un renoncement et sera demain l'esclavage. » L'auteur, manifestement, était un fanatique du parti européen : « Quittons notre province », s'écriait-il, « je veux dire, notre nation. » Et, un peu plus loin : « Et nous, que faisons-nous dans nos superbes mais petites nations ? » Cet Européen qui ne se résignait pas à sa province, était impatient : « Churchill a dit, paraît-il, récemment : l'Europe doit se faire pas à pas. Si ce grand homme d'Etat s'est ainsi exprimé, cette fois il a tort, mille fois tort. C'est avec des bottes de sept lieues qu'il faut faire l'Europe, car elle n'est qu'une étape sur un chemin où nous avons déjà pris du retard. »

Cet Européen impatient était aussi fidèle à l'idée atlantique : « L'Europe est commandée par l'existence de problèmes européens, mais l'Europe, en tant que société isolée, est folle. Notre époque est celle d'une communauté plus vaste, déjà dessinée sur la carte : la communauté que forment les nations qui entourent l'Atlantique et quelques autres attirées par ce noyau. »

L'auteur s'opposait vigoureusement à certaines théories aujourd'hui à la mode. Il écartait avec mépris les fausses symétries. « Certains esprits, écrivait-il, qui se disent plus européens que tout autre... affirment sur le même ton que l'Europe doit s'écarter de l'Atlantique autant que de l'Oural et qu'elle ne peut subsister qu'en tenant la balance égale entre les deux blocs, l'anglo-saxon et le russe. » A cette « curieuse conception » l'auteur adressait deux objections principales. Si les Russes et les Américains, aujourd'hui, sont en conflit, c'est, pour une bonne part, à cause de l'Europe. Les Européens sont un peu « dans la position de Lorrains qui se seraient écriés : « La querelle entre Berlin et Paris ne nous intéresse pas », sans se rendre

compte que cette querelle était largement provoquée par et pour la possession de la Lorraine ». De plus, « on parle d'un conflit entre deux impérialismes. Il s'agit plutôt d'une querelle entre deux civilisations et l'Europe n'a pas de choix à faire... L'Europe est dans l'Occident et ne peut se séparer son sort de l'Occident... L'Europe atlantique est la seule conception réelle, la seule concevable. »

Cet avocat passionné de l'Europe atlantique mettait déjà les techniciens à une place qui ne peut pas être la première. Aussi avait-il pour ambition de créer « un pouvoir », moins qu'une fédération, pleine et entière, mais plus qu'une confédération. L'Union des Etats européens aurait à sa tête un arbitre, élu pour cinq ans au suffrage universel direct par tous les citoyens membres de n'importe quel Etat européen avant adhésion à l'Union. Cette Union européenne aurait pour objectif « la défense des membres de l'Union, l'amélioration des conditions de vie des peuples, le développement de la production, l'unification des grandes règles administratives et institutions juridiques. » Quant à la politique extérieure des membres de l'Union, « elle sera unifiée par une coordination qui entrera également dans la compétence et le pouvoir de l'Union. »

Avec une quinzaine d'années d'avance sur J.F. Kennedy, cet Européen d'inspiration atlantique recommandait l'association, le « partnership », entre les deux fragments de l'alliance atlantique. « Que les nations d'Europe occidentale qui partagent l'idéal libéral se regroupent et permettent l'association politique du vieux et du nouveau monde : le clan de la liberté devient le plus fort, en même temps mieux équilibré, il cesse de prendre la figure d'un seul impérialisme. »

Quiconque tiendrait de tels propos aujourd'hui passerait immédiatement pour « un agent des Etats-Unis » ou, selon un mot fameux, pour un « Jean-foutre ». Thurling, féroces de la V^e République, humoristes ou polémistes, le traiteraient de la belle manière. Pourtant, l'auteur de cette brochure est M. Michel Debré.

Raymond ARON.

(Suite en dern. page, col. 1 et 2.)

UN « JEAN-FOUTRE » IGNORÉ

Suite de la première page

L'ancien premier ministre me répondra, et à bon droit, que mon choix de citations est partial, que les circonstances ont changé, que l'Europe a perdu ses positions extérieures, positions qu'une union réalisée il y a quinze ans lui aurait peut-être permis de conserver. Il ne manquerait pas d'autres arguments : la menace soviétique a disparu, les Etats-Unis ne sont plus, comme il l'écrivait alors, « par sa jeunesse même une des nations qui a le moins de reproches à se faire ». Les Etats-Unis, en refusant de se solidariser avec le combat que la France a mené en Extrême-Orient, puis en Algérie, en voulant se réserver le mono-

pole des armes atomiques, n'ont-ils pas rendu impossible la Communauté atlantique, vaine une Union européenne à laquelle les moyens de défense seraient refusés ? Enfin, rien n'est plus facile que de mettre un homme d'Etat en contradiction avec lui-même : dans l'opposition, il rêve ; au pouvoir, il agit. Seuls les professeurs prennent au sérieux les rêves des hommes d'Etat, je veux dire : les livres auxquels ces derniers consacrent leurs loisirs.

Ces réserves faites, les « Européens » ont bien le droit, eux aussi, d'occuper leurs loisirs en relisant de vieux livres. Que M. Michel Debré ait été, en d'autres temps, favorable à une Europe atlantique et à un pouvoir européen élu au suffrage universel direct ne prouve rien, ni pour ni contre l'actuelle politique du gouvernement. Le fait nous sert du moins de caution : partisan d'une Europe atlantique, M. Debré n'avait pas cessé pour autant d'être un bon Français. L'Europe, à ses yeux, était en 1950 « une exigence de la raison ». Mais elle risquait de devenir, selon le mot de Bismarck, « un mot employé par les puissances qui exigent des autres ce qu'elles n'osent pas réclamer en leur nom ».

Le général de Gaulle, s'il l'avait voulu, aurait été le premier « arbitre » de l'Union des Etats européens. Il en a décidé autrement. Ceux des gaullistes qui doivent leur formation à Maurras ou à Bainville s'en réjouissent, mais combien d'autres, au fond d'eux-mêmes, gardent la nostalgie du pacte européen, rêvé par un sénateur d'Indre-et-Loire ?

Raymond ARON.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

80

Memo No. 648
File No. 211/1

22nd July, 1965

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
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(G. C. Lewis)
First Secretary

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1 79

CM.

I.33064

FROM:

DATED: 26TH JULY, 1965.
1745

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS.

REC'D: 27TH JULY, 1965.
0709

1905. UNCLASSIFIED.

REPEATED LONDON 305, GENEVA 43, BRUSSELS 14, BONN 8,
THE HAGUE 9.

FRANCE - E.E.C. - KENNEDY ROUND.

1. NO FIRM DATE HAS YET BEEN ANNOUNCED FOR DE GAULLE'S (SUMMER)
PRESS CONFERENCE BUT IT HAS BEEN INDICATED THAT THIS WILL BE HELD
DURING FIRST TWO WEEKS IN SEPTEMBER.
POMPIDOU IS EXPECTED TO MAKE GENERAL STATEMENT THIS EVENING
AND DATE FOR DE GAULLE'S PRESS CONFERENCE IS EXPECTED TO BE
ESTABLISHED THIS WEEK.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
MIN. & DEPT CUSTOMS & EXCISE
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

27TH JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) UN PACAM AMSP EAMEC
E ICR ER PIO PPO

UPI-2

UPI-2

UPI-2

ADD MARKET BRUSSELS (YESTERDAY'S UPI-290)XXX EUROPE.
FRANCE EVIDENTLY IS PREPARED TO MAINTAIN THIS ATTITUDE UNTIL
THE QUARREL ENDS DESPITE THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES WHICH MAY BE
HARDER ON HER THAN ON THE OTHER FIVE.

THE STANDSTILL OF THE COMMUNITY IS HAVING FAR-FLUNG EFFECTS
ON THE "KENNEDY ROUND" AT WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER
WESTERN NATIONS HOPE TO LOWER TARIFF AND OTHER TRADE BARRIERS
ARE GROUNDED. THE COMMUNITY NEGOTIATES AS A UNIT AT THESE TALKS,
BUT AS LONG AS THE INTERNAL QUARREL LASTS NO PROGRESS CAN BE MADE.
NIGERIA HAS CONCLUDED A TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMUNITY
BUT IT CANNOT BE RATIFIED. TUNISIA, MOROCCO AND ALGERIA AND
AUSTRIA ARE DEEP IN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH CAN ALSO BE CARRIED ON
BUT CANNOT BECOME EFFECTIVE.

THE CRISIS BLEW UP IN THE EARLY HOURS OF JULY ONE WHEN FRANCE
STORMED OUT OF A MEETING OF COMMUNITY FOREIGN MINISTERS CLAIMING
HER PARTNERS HAD NOT MET THEIR COMMITMENTS REGARDING THE FINANCING
OF A COMMUNITY AGRICULTURAL POLICY.

BUT THE SEEDS OF THE QUARREL WERE SEWN ALREADY LAST DECEMBER.
(MORE)

DU12:12A

UPI-3

THIRD MARKET BRUSSELS XXX DECEMBER.

AT THAT TIME THE MINISTERS ASKED THE COMMUNITY'S EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION TO PREPARE AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS TO REPLACE AND
EXTEND THE EXISTING RULES WHICH EXPIRED JUNE 30, 1965.

IN MID-MARCH THE COMMISSION PUBLISHED THE DRAFT PROPOSALS BUT
MADE THEM CONDITIONAL ON CERTAIN POLITICAL TIES. THESE INCLUDED
AGREEMENT TO GIVE THE COMMISSION A FEDERAL-TYPE BUDGET MAKING IT
INDEPENDENT OF NATIONAL TREASURIES AND THEREBY NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS.

IN ADDITION THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDED THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT BE INCREASED FROM ITS PURELY CONSULTATIVE LEVEL TO
ENABLE IT BECOME A REAL LEGISLATIVE BODY. THE COMMISSION'S
MOTIVATION FOR THIS WAS ITS NINE MEMBERS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE
FOR 4.5 BILLION DOLLARS BUDGET EVERY YEAR AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL
SHOULD BE EXERCISED BY THE SUPRANATIONAL PARLIAMENT.

BOTH THE BUDGET AND PARLIAMENTARY RECOMMENDATION WERE UNPALATABLE
TO FRANCE WHOSE GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY REJECTED THE IDEA OF
A CLOSE-KNIT SUPRANATIONAL COMMUNITY IN FAVOR OF A LOOSE
FEDERATION OF SOVEREIGN NATIONS.

FRANCE FELT THE SUPRANATIONALISTS SUCH AS HOLLAND'S FOREIGN
MINISTER JOSEPH LUNS WERE TRYING TO SLIP ONE OVER HER. COUVE
DE MURVILLE SAID FRANCE WAS WILLING ONLY TO DISCUSS THE
AGRICULTURAL END OF THE COMMISSION PACKET AND SAID HER PARTNERS
HAD AGREED JUNE 30 WAS THE DEADLINE.

MORE

DU12:13A

UPI-4

FOURTH MARKET BRUSSELS X X X DEADLINE.

THE FIVE PARTNERS AND THE COMMISSION REPLIED THAT
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE COMMISSION IN DECEMBER WERE NOT
LIMITED TO DRAFTING AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS.

THEY FURTHER ARGUED THAT THE COMMUNITY HAD FREQUENTLY
EXTENDED DEADLINES AT THE REQUEST OF FRANCE AND SUGGESTED THE JUNE
30 DEADLINE COULD SIMILARLY BE OVERLOOKED.

COUVE DE MURVILLE REFUSED ANY EXTENSION AND THE MEETING
BROKE UP EARLY JULY 1, PRECIPITATING THE COMMUNITY INTO
CRISIS.

AS AGRICULTURE IS FRANCE'S MAIN INDUSTRY, SHE BADLY WANTS
THE FARM REGULATIONS TO OPEN UP NEW MARKETS FOR HER FARMERS
AND GET OTHER MEMBER COUNTRIES TO HELP PAY THEIR SUBSIDIES FOR
MODERNIZATION, EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND PRICE SUPPORTS.

FOURTH MARKET BRUSSELS X X X DEADLINE.
THE FIVE PARTNERS AND THE COMMISSION REPLIED THAT
THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO THE COMMISSION IN DECEMBER WERE NOT
LIMITED TO DRAFTING AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS.
THEY FURTHER ARGUED THAT THE COMMUNITY HAD FREQUENTLY
EXTENDED DEADLINES AT THE REQUEST OF FRANCE AND SUGGESTED THE JUNE
30 DEADLINE COULD SIMILARLY BE OVERLOOKED.
COUVE DE MURVILLE REFUSED ANY EXTENSION AND THE MEETING
BROKE UP EARLY JULY 1, PRECIPITATING THE COMMUNITY INTO
CRISIS.

AS AGRICULTURE IS FRANCE'S MAIN INDUSTRY, SHE BADLY WANTS
THE FARM REGULATIONS TO OPEN UP NEW MARKETS FOR HER FARMERS
AND GET OTHER MEMBER COUNTRIES TO HELP PAY OUTLY SUBSIDIES FOR
NOBLESSE OF THE FARM.

BUT THE FIVE PARTNERS ARE SUSPICIOUS THAT FRANCE IS JUST
INTERESTED IN GETTING THE FARM END OF THE DEAL WITHOUT
CEDING ANYTHING ON THE POLITICAL FRONT TO THOSE WHO ENVISAGE
THE COMMUNITY AS A STEP TOWARD A UNITED EUROPE.

THEY ALSO RESENT FRANCE'S LEADERSHIP BY THREAT+ POLICY
IN WHICH SHE THREATENS TO KICK OVER THE PROSPEROUS COMMUNITY. IF
SHE DOES NOT GET HER WAY. THIS TECHNIQUE WAS USED BY FRANCE TO
VETO BRITISH MEMBERSHIP IN JANUARY 1963.

DU12:20A

UPI-5

FIFTH MARKET BRUSSELS X X X JANUARY 1963.

THIS POLICY MAY HAVE TO END IN JANUARY 1966 WHEN THE
COMMUNITY IS SCHEDULED TO GO OVER FROM UNANIMOUS TO MAJORITY
VOTING. FRANCE MAY CHALLENGE THE ACTUAL DATE
HOWEVER.

FRANCE, TOO, IS ACCUSING THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF
OVERSTEPPING ITS ROLE BY TRYING IN POLITICAL DEMANDS WITH PURELY
TECHNICAL AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS.

IT IS BELIEVED THAT GENERAL DE GAULLE WOULD LIKE TO
SEE THE COMMISSION WHICH IS PRESIDED OVER BY WALTER HALLSTEIN
REDUCED TO THE ROLE OF A PURELY DRAFTING BUREAUCRACY.

HALLSTEIN SEES HIS COMMISSION'S ROLE, HOWEVER, AS
THE GUARDIAN OF THE COMMON MARKET TREATY AND ARBITER OF THE NATIONAL
DEMANDS. HE CONSIDERS THE COMMUNITY GREATER THAN THE SUM OF ITS
PARTS. HE IS GENERALLY BACKED BY ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES BUT FRANCE IN
THIS ROLE.

SPAAK, HOWEVER, EXPRESSED DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF
INCREASING THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AS CURRENTLY IT IS
NOT AN ELECTED BODY. ITS MEMBERS ARE NOMINATED FROM NATIONAL
LEGISLATURES.

TO REDUCE THE COMMISSION TO POLITICAL IMPOTENCY IT WOULD
PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO MODIFY THE COMMON MARKET TREATY.
FRANCE MAY SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY WHEN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY OR COMMON MARKET MERGES WITH THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMUNITY AND EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY AROUND 1963.

MEANWHILE, THERE ARE DOUBTS THAT THE MERGER OF THE THREE
EXECUTIVE COMMISSIONS OF THE THREE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WILL GO
THROUGH AS PLANNED AT THE BEGINNING OF NEXT YEAR. THIS MOVE
WOULD STRENGTHEN, NOT WEAKEN, THE ROLE OF THE HALLSTEIN COMMISSION.
IT MAY BE OPPOSED BY FRANCE ALTHOUGH THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT HAS
RATIFIED THE MOVE.

THE COMMISSION MERGER ON THE OTHER HAND MIGHT, HOWEVER,
GIVE FRANCE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REPLACE HALLSTEIN WITH A
PRESIDENT MORE WILLING TO INTERPRET HIS ROLE ACCORDING TO FRENCH
LIGHTS.

ALL THESE ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS ARE EXPECTED TO
BE RAISED AT NEXT WEEK'S MEETING BETWEEN SPAAK AND COUVE AND THEY ARE
THE REASON WHY SPAAK HAS NO READY-MADE SOLUTION AVAILABLE
AND WHY THE CRISIS MAY LAST A LONG TIME.

DU12:27A

XUPI-3

72

DUESSELDORF, GERMANY, JULY 9 (UPI)--ITALIAN PRESIDENT GIUSEPPE SARAGAT TODAY CALLED FOR +PERSEVERANCE+, COOL-HEADEDNESS AND HEALTHY COMMON SENSE+ IN MOVES TO SETTLE THE CURRENT COMMON MARKET CRISIS.

SARAGAT SPOKE TO THE TRADE AND INDUSTRY CHAMBER HERE BEFORE HE AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER, AMINTORE FANFANI, MET WITH COMMON MARKET HIGH COMMISSION PRESIDENT HALLSTEIN TO CONSIDER THE NEXT MOVES IN THE ROW WITH FRANCE.

HALLSTEIN, OSTENSIBLY HERE TO DELIVER A SPEECH LAST NIGHT TO A PRE-ELECTION MEETING OF INDUSTRIALISTS WHO SUPPORT CHANCELLOR LUDWIG ERHARD'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION, ALSO SCHEDULED A CONFERENCE WITH THE GERMAN CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT.

THE ITALIANS ARE KEY FIGURES IN THE PRESENT CRISIS AS FANFANI BECAME CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMON MARKET COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON JULY 1, AND SARAGAT IS EXPECTED TO MEET FRENCH PRESIDENT DE GAULLE JULY 16 WHEN THE TWO HEADS OF STATE OPEN THE MONT BLANC TUNNEL.

SARAGAT SAID THE APPEARANCE OF PROBLEMS IN THE COMMON MARKET MERELY PROVES THAT IT IS ALIVE.

HE ADDED:

+AT THE MOMENT, THE MOST IMPORTANT DUTY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IS TO GIVE ITS NATURAL DYNAMISM A POSITIVE MEANING. IT MUST PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE OF PERSEVERANCE, COLD-BLOODEDNESS AND HEALTHY COMMON SENSE, AN EXAMPLE WHICH WOULD BE ABLE TO SHOW DETERMINATION AND CONFIDENCE TO ALL WHO MIGHT STILL BE UNCERTAIN OF THE FUTURE.+

HALLSTEIN WARNED LAST NIGHT THAT A COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON MARKET EIGHT YEARS AFTER ITS FOUNDATION WOULD BE +THE GREATEST ACT OF DESTRUCTION SINCE HITLER'S DAY.@

IR1232A

W. J. ...

UPI-340

1ST LEAD COMMON MARKET (UPI-159)

BY WILLIAM ANDERSON

73

BRUSSELS, JULY 9 (UPI)—BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PAUL-HENRI SPAAK HELD INFORMAL TALKS WITH LUXENBOURG PREMIER PIERRE WERNER TODAY IN HIS ROLE AS "HONEST BROKER" BIDDING TO CLOSE THE RIFT BETWEEN FRANCE AND HER COMMON MARKET PARTNERS.

THE TWO STATESMEN CONSULTED OVER LUNCH IN A PRIVATE RESTAURANT ON WHAT STEPS COULD BE TAKEN TO END THE DISPUTE NOW IN ITS NINTH DAY.

SPAAK IS SCHEDULED TO MEET FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE IN PARIS NEXT TUESDAY, 24 HOURS AFTER COUVE MEETS WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOSEPH LUNS.

SPAAK ALREADY HAS CONSULTED WITH THE COMMON MARKET'S EXECUTIVE COMMISSION PRESIDENT WALTER HALLSTEIN, WHO IN DUESSELDORF YESTERDAY SAID A BREAKDOWN IN THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE THE "GREATEST ACT OF DESTRUCTION IN EUROPE" SINCE HITLER.

HALLSTEIN IS PREPARING NEW PROPOSALS BUT WILL NOT SUBMIT THEM UNTIL ASSURED THAT THEY STAND SOME CHANCE OF BEING EXAMINED BY FRANCE.

LUNS ALSO PAID A FLYING VISIT TO BRUSSELS YESTERDAY TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH SPAAK.

THE BELGIAN STATESMAN WILL CARRY THE PARTNERS VIEWS ON THE CRISIS TO PARIS AND WILL SIMULTANEOUSLY SOUND OUT FRENCH DIPLOMATS ON WHAT CONDITIONS THE PARIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS MUST BE FULFILLED BEFORE REVERSING ITS POLICY OF FREEZING COMMUNITY PROGRESS AND RESTARTING NEGOTIATIONS ON FARM FINANCING.

REPORTS FROM PARIS ALSO INDICATE THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MAY WANT TO STRIP THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION OF SOME OF ITS POWER AND TURN IT INTO A MERE BUREAUCRACY FOR DRAFTING PROPOSALS.

THE NINE-MAN COMMISSION LED BY HALLSTEIN AND WHICH INCLUDES TWO FRENCHMEN, HOWEVER, REGARDS ITSELF AS THE GUARDINA OF THE TREATY OF ROME AND NEUTRAL ARBITER OF NATIONAL DEMANDS BY MEMBER GOVERNMENTS.

IT JEALOUSLY GUARDS ITS PERORGATIVES, BACKED SO FAR BY MEMBER GOVERNMENTS.

NG1124P

European

UPI-236

BRUSSELS, JULY 9 (UPI)--THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND EURATOM ANNOUNCED THRSDAY THEY APPROVED THE APPOINTMENT OF FEREDOUN DIBA AS NEW IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE COMMUNITIES. DIBA SUCCEEDS KHORSROW HEDAYAT, WHO WAS APPOINTED TO ANOTHER POST.

MG430P

Europe

UPI-167

BRUSSELS, JULY 10 (UPI)-- EFFORTS TO FORM A NEW BELGIAN GOVERNMENT HIT A NEW SNAG TODAY WHEN THE SOCIALIST PARTY BUREAU SHOWED ITSELF RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS FOR A COALITION WITH THE SOCIAL CHRISTIANS.

BELGIUM HAS ONLY A CARETAKER GOVERNMENT SINCE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS MAY 23 PUT AN END TO THE FOUR-YEAR OLD SOCIAL CHRISTIAN-SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT OF PREMIER THEO LEFEVRE.

AFTER PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS KING BAUDOUIN LAST MONTH ASKED SOCIAL CHRISTIAN LEADER PIERRE HARMEL 54, TO TRY TO FORM A NEW GOVERNMENT.

THE SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY BUREAU TODAY STATED ITS CONFIDENCE IN HARMEL AND TERMED HIS PROPOSALS A +VALUABLE BASIS FOR A GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS.+ BUT AFTER THE SOCIALIST BUREAU MEETING SOCIALIST CHAIRMAN LEO COLLARD SAID THE BUREAU FELT THE PROGRAM HAD NOT BEEN APPROVED WITH A SUFFICIENT MAJORITY TO JUSTIFY CONVENING A PARTY CONGRESS.

MG1038A

75

[Signature]

UPI-164

NEW YORK, SUNDAY, JULY 11 (UPI)-- THE NEW YORK TIMES, IN AN EDITORIAL ON TROUBLES IN THE COMMON MARKET, SAID TODAY THAT, "IN FAIRNESS TO FRANCE, IT HAS TO BE RECOGNIZED SHE HAS A GRIEVANCE."

THE EDITORIAL SAID:
"THE WORST FOREBODINGS ABOUT THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, OR COMMON MARKET, HAVE NOW MATERIALIZED. AT BEST, THE SIX-NATION ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN PUT ON ICE FOR SOME MONTHS. AT WORST, THE COMMUNITY WILL DISINTEGRATE WITH REPERCUSSIONS THAT WILL AFFECT THE WHOLE INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE OF TRADE, INCLUDING AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NEGOTIATIONS ON THE KENNEDY ROUND OF TARIFF REDUCTIONS. THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, WHICH FRANCE IS ALSO BOYCOTTING, THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK ARE ALL IN JEOPARDY."

"IN FAIRNESS TO FRANCE IT HAS TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT SHE HAS A GRIEVANCE. FRANCE'S GREATEST INTEREST IN THE COMMON MARKET IS AGRICULTURAL. SHE AGREED TO THE INDUSTRIAL MEASURES, WHICH ESPECIALLY FAVORED WEST GERMANY, ON THE UNDERSTANDING, REACHED IN JANUARY 1962, THAT THE AGRICULTURAL FEATURES WOULD BE SETTLED BY JUNE 30 OF THIS YEAR. THEY WERE NOT, AND NEW PROPOSALS THAT WERE PUT FORWARD WOULD HAVE CARRIED THE E.E.C. DEEPLY INTO A ZONE OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION."

"THE COMBINATION WAS MORE THAN PRESIDENT DE GAULLE WOULD ACCEPT. ANYTHING SUPRANATIONAL IS ANATHEMA TO HIM...THE MOST NATIONALISTIC OF EUROPEAN LEADERS, BACKED BY A FLOURISHING ECONOMY, WAS GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO STRIKE A BLOW AGAINST EUROPEAN UNITY--AND HE STRUCK HARD...THE FRENCH STATESMAN SULLY HAD A GRAND DESIGN TO UNITE EUROPE--CHARLES DE GAULLE SEEMS TO HAVE ONE TO DISRUPT IT."

MG1023A

UPI-123

CALAIS, FRANCE, JULY 10 (UPI)--FRANCE'S GAULLIST REGIME, LARGELY ISOLATED BY ITS POLICIES WITHIN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET TODAY MADE A BID FOR CLOSER LINKS WITH BRITAIN.

THE CAMPAIGN WAS MARKED BY EFFUSIVE PRO-BRITISH SPEECHES BY OFFICIALS IN THE FRENCH CHANNEL PORTS OF CALAIS AND DIEPPE.

IN CALAIS, THE SPEAKER WAS ALAIN PEYREFITTE, INFORMATION MINISTER AND OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE. HIS SPEECH ECHOED TERMS USED BY DE GAULLE HIMSELF AND CLEARLY HAD THE PRESIDENTIAL CLEARANCE.

FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS HAVE BEEN COOL EVER SINCE DE GAULLE SLAMMED THE DOOR ON BRITAIN'S ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE SIX-NATION EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET JAN. 14, 1963. PEYREFITTE MADE NO SUGGESTION THAT DE GAULLE WAS THINKING OF WITHDRAWING HIS COMMON MARKET BLACKBALL.

BUT HE SAID: "FRANCE AND BRITAIN, THE TWO GREAT EUROPEAN NATIONS, PUSHED BY REASON AND SENTIMENT TO DEVELOP WHAT UNITES RATHER THAN WHAT SEPARATES THEM, ARE GRADUALLY MOVING CLOSER TO ONE ANOTHER AND ARE BUILDING A FUTURE OF EXCHANGES, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION."

THE GAULLIST INFORMATION MINISTER SPOKE AT THE OPENING OF AN EXHIBITION IN CALAIS, A CITY WHICH FOR CENTURIES WAS A SYMBOL OF ANGLO-FRENCH CONFLICT. KING EDWARD III SEIZED CALAIS FOR ENGLAND IN 1347, DURING THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR AND THE FRENCH DID NOT RECAPTURE IT UNTIL 1558.

AS HE SPOKE IN CALAIS, STATE SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE YVON BOURGES WAS OPENING A BRITISH-FRENCH FAIR ORGANIZED BY THE CHANNEL REGIONS OF SUSSEX AND NORMANDY IN NEARBY DIEPPE.

HE HEARD PRESIDENT OF THE DIEPPE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE LOUIS DELAPORTE TELL AN AUDIENCE WHICH INCLUDED MAYORS OF THE BRITISH CHANNEL TOWNS OF BRIGHTON, NEWHAVEN, EASTBOURNE AND HASTINGS:

"IT IS CLEAR THAT WHATEVER MAINTAINS, CONFIRMS AND STRENGTHENS THE TRADITIONAL AND VITALLY NECESSARY TIES BETWEEN FRANCE AND BRITAIN MUST BE ENCOURAGED. WE HOPE THAT THE EUROPE OF TOMORROW WILL NOT TURN ITS BACK ON BRITAIN, BECAUSE BRITAIN HAS A NATURAL PLACE IN EUROPE."

BU7:1A

UPI-290

25/1/11
BY WILLIAM ANDERSON

BRUSSELS, JULY 10 (UPI)--HOPES ROSE IN THE CRISIS-RIDDEN EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET TODAY THAT THE COMING WEEK MAY PRODUCE THE BEGINNING OF A SOLUTION TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FRANCE AND HER COMMUNITY PARTNERS.

THE HOPES ARE BASED ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE IS TO MEET WITH HIS BELGIAN COUNTERPART PAUL-HENRI SPAAK ON TUESDAY.

FURTHER CONTACT MAY OCCUR WHEN PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE AND ITALIAN PRESIDENT GIUSEPPE SARAGAT MEET AT THE OPENING OF THE MONT BLANC ROAD TUNNEL A FEW DAYS LATER.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE MEETINGS MAY SERVE ONLY TO FURTHER UNDERLINE THE GULF THAT HAS ARISEN BETWEEN FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY, ITALY, HOLLAND, BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG.

SPAAK HAS NO RECONCILIATION PLAN AVAILABLE AND EVEN DENIES HE IS ACTING AS A MEDIATOR. BUT HIS ROLE OF "HONEST BROKER" SPRINGS FROM THE FACT THAT HE SIDES WITH FRANCE IN SOME ASPECTS OF HER QUARREL WITH HER PARTNERS. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS AN ARCHITECT OF THE COMMON MARKET TREATY AND LONG-TIME EXPONENT OF A UNITED EUROPE, HE IS ACCEPTABLE TO FRANCE'S OPPONENTS IN THE QUARREL NOW IN ITS SECOND WEEK.

SINCE FRANCE REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY COMMON MARKET MEETINGS AND A UNANIMOUS VOTE IS NECESSARY FOR MOST DECISIONS, PARIS HAS EFFECTIVELY FROZEN PROGRESS IN THE SEVEN-YEAR-OLD COMMUNITY WHICH HAS HELPED BRING PROSPERITY TO EUROPE.

G MGL146P

MORE

Hubert

UP20U

BY WILLIAM ANDERSON

BRUSSELS, JULY 26 (UPI)--FRANCE TODAY BOYCOTTED A COMMON MARKET +END-THE-CRISIS+ MEETING AND THEREBY FROZE ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN THE PROSPEROUS COMMUNITY AT LEAST UNTIL THE MTNMM VLGGBBBG MGBSEBEMRTMG DELEGATIONS AND HIGLBNUMUABD SEVERAL MINISTERS, BUT THIS ONLY UNDERLINED THE SPLIT IN THE COMMUNITY.

AFTER OFFICIALLY NOTING FRANCE'S ABSENCE, THE OTHER FIVE WENT INTO A SECRET CONCLAVE TO WORK OUT MEANS OF GETTING FRANCE BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THE MEETING WAS PRESIDED OVER BY ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AMINTORE FANFANI.

THE EMPTY CHAIRS MARKED +DELEGATION FRANCAISE+ IN THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ROOM AT THE BRUSSELS PALAIS DES CONGRES, HOWEVER, PREVENTED ANY DECISIONS BEING TAKEN ON DOZENS OF PENDING PROPOSALS FOR ADVANCING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF THE 170 MILLION INHABITANTS OF MEMBER NATIONS. A UNANIMOUS SIX-NATION VOTE IS REQUIRED FOR ALL MAJOR LEGISLATION.

AS THE MINISTERS ARE NOT SCHEDULED TO MEET AGAIN UNTIL LATE SEPTEMBER, THE CREEPING PARALYSIS CAUSED BY FRANCE'S ABSENCE WILL CONTINUE. THERE STILL IS NO GUARANTEE PARIS WILL EVEN THEN RESPOND TO OVERTURES FROM HER PARTNERS AND RETURN TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE WHICH SHE LEFT JULY 1 AFTER DISAGREEING ON HOW COMMUNITY FARM POLICY SHOULD BE FINANCED.

THE DATE OF SEPT. 27-28 SET FOR THE NEXT MINISTERS MEETING, HOWEVER, GIVES THE SIX TWO MONTHS FOR THOROUGHLY STUDYING THE COMMISSION PROPOSALS WHILE WEST GERMAN LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS WILL ALSO BE OVER BY THEN. THEY ARE SCHEDULED FOR SEPT. 19.

SQUATER HOW

LATER, HOWEVER, DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOSEPH LUNS SAID THE NEW PROPOSALS WILL BE DISCUSSED BY THE MINISTERS AGAIN ONLY EARLY IN OCTOBER.

(MORE)

DU5:53A

UPI-98

ADD COMMON MARKET BRUSSELS XXX OCTOBER.

ON THE TABLE AT THE SECRET MEETING, SOURCES SAID WAS A MODIFIED DRAFT OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH FRANCE REJECTED. THIS DRAFT WAS DRAWN UP BY THE COMMUNITY'S EXECUTIVE COMMISSION UNDER PRESIDENT WALTER HALLSTEIN IN SEVEN SESSIONS HELD SINCE JULY 1.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT RECEIVED A COPY LAST WEEK BUT DID NOT REACT.

SOURCES SAID THE COMMISSION'S NEW PROPOSALS ARE MUCH CLOSER TO FRENCH VIEWS THAN THE PREVIOUS DRAFT.

A FULL CUSTOMS UNION AND COMMON MARKETING RULES FOR AGRICULTURE WOULD BE INTRODUCED BY MID-1967.

A MOVE TO GIVE THE COMMUNITY ITS OWN FINANCIAL RESOURCES BY MEANS OF A FEDERAL-TYPE BUDGET IS PUT OFF UNTIL 1970 AT LEAST. THIS WOULD HAVE MADE THE COMMISSION INDEPENDENT OF NATIONAL TREASURIES FOR ITS FUNDS, AND THEREFORE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS. SO IS A PROPOSAL TO INCREASE THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT. THESE SUPRANATIONAL OBJECTIVES WERE THE MAIN REASON FRANCE REJECTED THE PREVIOUS DRAFT.

THE FINANCING OF AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS WHICH FRANCE WANTS IMPLEMENTED TO BIND HER PARTNERS INTO AIDING FRENCH AGRICULTURE HAVE ALSO BEEN MODIFIED. THEY ENABLE WEST GERMANY AND ITALY TO CUT BACK THE AMOUNT THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY FOR COMMUNITY-TYPE AGRICULTURE. THEY ALSO ENABLE FRANCE'S PARTNERS TO WORK OUT MORE ACCURATELY HOW MUCH THEY WILL HAVE TO PAY INTO THE COMMON FARM FUND OF WHICH FRANCE WILL BE THE MAIN BENEFICIARY.

PREVIOUS PROPOSALS WERE MUCH MORE VAGUE ON THIS POINT, RAISING FEARS THAT ITALY, WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY AN AGRICULTURAL NATION, WOULD BE PAYING IN MORE THAN SHE COULD TAKE OUT OF THE FUND.

DU5:58A

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

RESTRICTED

25/1/1

1.30098

FROM Australian Embassy
PARIS.

Dated: 8th July, 1965
Rec'd: 19th July, 1965.
1545.

Savingram to CANBERRA 19

RESTRICTED.

Repeated to:
Bonn 8: Brussels 7: Cairo 9: Dublin 6: Geneva 13:
The Hague 9: London 14: Moscow 6: Rome 15:
Stockholm 6: Washington 16.

France: Monthly Political Summary for June 1965

Germany

General de Gaulle went to Bonn on 11th June for discussions under the auspices of the Treaty of Co-operation. The visit was marked more by the incidents which preceded and followed it than by the results of the talks themselves.

2. On 10th June General de Gaulle gave a Garden Party for Parliamentarians at which he castigated advocates of supranationalism as "Jean-foutres". Le Monde described this as a "curious preparation" for discussions with "men who are convinced ... that the salvation of Europe passes by a supranational channel".

3. Just before the discussions ended the German spokesman reported that agreement had been reached for a summit meeting of the Six. This statement was soon corrected by M. Pompidou who said that a summit meeting "was not to be ruled out". This misunderstanding raised pessimistic forecasts for the future of Franco-German relations in the press.

4. Although progress was reported in the discussions between some of the accompanying ministers, the feeling gained in Paris was that the Treaty "resembles a well-oiled machine whose cogs turn to no purpose". (Le Monde).

United States

5. The local American press hailed a "New Era in Franco-U.S. Relations" (New York Times) during the month. The distinction made by General de Gaulle between the two hegemonies which wish to "control the world" was appreciated - while one "imposed a totalitarian régime" the other used different means which were "certainly less unpleasant, less harsh". Reference was also made to the address given by M. Couve de Murville to the National Assembly, when he was at pains to explain that France was not just being "inexplicably offensive" to the United States but had valid reasons for its disagreement with U.S. policy, and to M. Giscard d'Estaing's "olive branch" in making an advance repayment of part of France's postwar debt.

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INWARD SAVINGRAM

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6. The welcome extended to Vice-President Humphrey and the cosmonauts White and McDivitt when they visited the Paris Air Show at very short notice was remarked on by nearly all the press. Most papers thought that the move "constituted a political gesture" (*Le Monde*) as well as a publicity initiative and that General de Gaulle's interview with Mr. Humphrey was a "goodwill gesture" (*France-Soir*). Most commentators have thought that the reasons behind this change were that General de Gaulle thought that bilateral relations had deteriorated to a dangerous extent.

N.A.T.O.

7. It was reported that a French regiment equipped with Hawk missiles was to take up duty near Munich as part of the N.A.T.O. anti-aircraft air defence network.

Vietnam

8. The French Government received the news of General Ky's decision to break off diplomatic relations calmly. ("Qui est Ky?" asked de Gaulle). Commentators pointed out that French cultural and economic interests were not affected.

Visitors

9. The King of Afghanistan paid a state visit to Paris from 1st to 3rd June.

10. African Heads of State and Heads of Government who called on General de Gaulle after the O.C.A.M. Conference or on their way to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference included: President Grunitzky of Togo, President M'ba of Gabon, President Nyerere of Tanzania, President Dacko of the Central African Republic, Prime Minister Banda of Malawi. Mr. Tshombe of the Congo (Léopoldville) also visited Paris to continue discussions on Franco-Congolese co-operation.

InternalOpposition Campaign

11. The main feature of the internal scene was the failure of M. Defferre's project to establish a Democratic Socialist Federation. After surviving, but not unscathed, the S.F.I.O. Congress, the project was discussed by party leaders and representatives from the political clubs in an attempt to evolve a mutually acceptable programme and policy. After a nine hour meeting on 17th June M. Defferre had to announce failure. The principal stumbling blocks were: relations with the Communist Party, secularism and socialism.

12. The political party leaders have received considerable criticism for their role in this failure, although the divergences between their positions were often on fundamental questions. M. Defferre on the other hand has emerged with enhanced personal prestige. Despite a public statement that

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INWARD SAVINGRAM

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he has withdrawn his candidature for the presidential elections he has not disappeared from the political scene, and it is possible that he could be called upon to be the candidate for a new Opposition grouping.

13. For the moment the parties and clubs are examining the situation. Optimistic communiqués about a new association have been published, but no organized move has yet been made. M. Antoine Pinay has attracted attention with a series of statements that he has no ambitions towards the Elysée.

General de Gaulle's "Tour de France"

14. General de Gaulle completed his programme of visiting all the French administrative départements during his septennate. The speeches during his tour of the Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne and Eure-et-Loire were mainly on the themes of national independence, national unity and internal progress. Possible references to the presidential campaign were again found, and efforts to appeal to the crowd were noted. It was reported later that General de Gaulle will undergo a medical examination in the autumn to determine his fitness for another seven year period, and after which he will decide on his intentions for December.

Baccalauréat

15. For the second consecutive year examination papers for the baccalauréat were stolen, and were printed in an Opposition newspaper. Combined with a series of misprints in the examination papers this new "scandal" proved embarrassing to the Government.

Air Show

16. The International Air and Space Show held at Le Bourget during the month was a propaganda success for the Russians. After attracting extensive publicity for the V-10 helicopter the surprise arrival of the Antonov-22 dominated press coverage of the Show, almost eclipsing the extremely large United States exhibit, unhappily marred by the tragic crash of a B-58 "Hustler". The visit of the cosmonauts White and McDivitt helped to redress the balance, but was regarded by many press commentators as a "face-saving move".

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

20th July, 1965.

SEC	DS	FAS(1,2,3,4)	SAS(MS)	AS(JIC)	S&SEA	M&I
M	DL	INT UN PACAM	AMSP	EA	EAMEC	EO PIO
ICR	MT	PPO				

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

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LES

I.30039

FROM:

DATED: 17TH JULY, 1965.

0720

REC'D: 19TH JULY, 1965.

0830

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

SAV.851 CONFIDENTIAL.

COPIES LONDON, BRUSSELS, BONN, ROME, THE HAGUE.

DE GAULLE AND THE COMMON MARKET.

WE DISCUSSED PARIS TELEGRAM 109 WITH DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WEST
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS (MCKILLOP) AND FRENCH DESK OFFICER (BARBOUR) TODAY.
POINTS ARISING THEREFROM ARE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS THE UNITED STATES IS NOT GOING
TO MAKE ANY OFFICIAL COMMENT ON THE BREAKDOWN OF THE E. E. C. NEGOTIA-
TIONS IN BRUSSELS.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AT SOME LATER DATE A STATEMENT COULD BE
ISSUED SIGNIFYING UNITED STATES CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE KENNEDY
ROUND AND EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION.

THE DECISION TO MAKE NO COMMENT, MCKILLOP SAID, HAD BEEN WELCOMED
IN EUROPEAN CIRCLES.

BY MAKING NO COMMENT, THE U.S. WOULD AVOID PROVOKING DE GAULLE.

(B) EXACT MOTIVES FOR FRENCH ACTIONS WERE NOT CLEAR.

MCKILLOP, HOWEVER, DID NOT FEEL THAT FAILURE OF THE 5 TO AGREE
TO FRENCH PROPOSALS FOR AGRICULTURAL FINANCING WAS THE REAL CAUSE.

THE VIEWS OF THE VARIOUS PARTIES WERE NOT ENTIRELY IRRECON-
CILEABLE ON THIS QUESTION AND INDEED A BASIS FOR COMPROMISE HAD BEEN
ESTABLISHED BEFORE MIDNIGHT ON 30TH JUNE.

THIS HAD ALSO BEEN TRUE ON THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS.

"STOP THE CLOCK" PROCEDURE COULD HAVE BEEN ADOPTED HAD COUVE
BEEN WILLING TO EXPLORE COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS.

(C) UNDOUBTEDLY THE COMMISSION HAD BEEN IMPOLITIC IN BRINGING
FORWARD THEIR PROPOSALS AT THIS TIME.

IF THE COMMISSION HAD FELT DE GAULLE MIGHT HAVE ACCEPTED ITS
PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO WIN AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURAL FINANCING,
SO KEENLY SOUGHT BY THE FRENCH FARMERS, THEN IT HAD MISCALCULATED
BADLY.

(D) BY FREEZING THE COMMON MARKET DE GAULLE MAY HOPE TO HAVE
STRENGTHENED HIS HAND SO AS TO FORCE THE 5 TO ACCEPT HIS VIEWS ON
THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSION AND MAJORITY VOTING AS WELL AS
AGRICULTURE.

SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION PRESUPPOSED THAT DE GAULLE DOES NOT WISH
TO WRECK THE COMMON MARKET.

ONE, HOWEVER, COULD NOT EVEN BE CERTAIN OF THIS.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM

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MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
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MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

19TH JULY, 1965.

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SEC DS FAS(1 2 3 4) UN PACAM AMSP EAMEC E PIO ICR ER PPO

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

25/1/1

64

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GSW

I.29670

FROM:

DATED: 14TH JULY, 1965.
1630

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 15TH JULY, 1965.
0556

1817 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 289, BRUSSELS 13, THE HAGUE 8, ROME 22 (LONDON
PLEASE PASS) BONN 7, GENEVA 40.

FROM WALKER.

COMMON MARKET.

JUDGING FROM PRESS REPORTS THE BI-LATERAL CONVERSATIONS IN PARIS
WITH LUNS, SPAAK AND FANFANI HAVE NOT YIELDED ANYTHING.

THE BELGIAN AMBASSADOR, WHOM I HAVE SEEN TWICE IN THE PAST 24
HOURS WAS MOST RETICENT.

THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TOLD ME TODAY THAT COUVE DE MURVILLE
CONFIRMED TO HIM THAT NO SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IS LIKELY BEFORE
THE GERMAN ELECTIONS.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES.
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

15TH JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR PIO ER
PPO

25/1/1 63

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

RAD

I.27882

FROM:

DATED: 1ST JULY, 1965.
1935

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 2ND JULY, 1965.
0606

1691 UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

FOR TRADE
REPEATED BRUSSELS FOR GORTER 9.

FOLLOWING TODAY'S MEETING OF THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MR PEYREFITTE, MINISTER FOR INFORMATION, ISSUED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS AT BRUSSELS.

FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THIS STATEMENT.

"THE COUNCIL DEPLORES THE FACT THAT AN ENGAGEMENT UNDERTAKEN 3 1/2 YEARS AGO, TO COMPLETE THE EEC FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT BY 30TH JUNE 1965, HAS NOT BEEN FULFILLED.

THE CRISIS IS STILL MORE SERIOUS BECAUSE FIRSTLY, FRANCE AGREED IN JANUARY 1962, TO PASS TO THE SECOND STAGE OF THE TREATY OF ROME, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE REACHED AND SECONDLY THE DECISIONS OF 15TH DECEMBER 1964 ON COMMON CEREAL PRICES, HAD BEEN REACHED THROUGH FORMAL AND REPEATED ASSURANCES THAT THE FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE COMPLETE, AS AGREED, BY 30TH JUNE 1965.

THE COUNCIL ALSO VOTED ITS GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE FRENCH DELEGATIONS PROPOSED TIMETABLE WHICH ANTICIPATES COMPLETION OF AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS (STILL IN ABEYANCE) AND THE FIXING OF COMMON PRICES.

THIS CALENDAR PROVIDES FOR FREE CIRCULATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY BY 1ST JULY 1967, UNIFORM PRICES, AND COMMON PROTECTION THROUGH LEVIES.

THE COUNCIL NOTED THAT, WHILE FRANCE'S PARTNERS IN THE COMMON MARKET WERE SUPPORTING THIS CALENDAR, OTHER MEMBERS, BECAUSE OF NEW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PROVOKED BY THIS ULTIMATE NEGOTIATION, HAD PREVENTED AGREEMENT ON COMMON FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS CRISIS IS STILL LESS JUSTIFIABLE IN THAT THE FRENCH DELEGATION HAD MADE PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT HAVE LED TO FRANCE'S ASSUMING A PROPORTION OF THE FINANCIAL BURDENS JUDGED EXCESSIVE BY SOME OF HER PARTNERS, AND HAD, MOREOVER, AGREED TO THE FINALIZING OF CUSTOMS UNION FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS BY 1ST JULY 1967.

IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED, AS

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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FAR AS IT ITSELF IS CONCERNED, TO DRAW THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND JUDICIAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS THUS JUST BEEN CREATED.

END OF STATEMENT."

FOLLOWING THIS STATEMENT, THE MINISTER WAS ASKED IF HE COULD INDICATE THE NATURE OF CONCLUSIONS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MIGHT REACH.

HE REPLIED THAT THESE CONCLUSIONS WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN DUE COURSE.

WHEN ASKED IF ANYTHING HAD BEEN CHANGED, ~~HE~~ REPLIED - "YES BECAUSE EVERYTHING IS NOW AT A DEADLOCK".

WHEN ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT NO MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED FOR JULY, MR PEYREFITTE REPLIED, "INDEED, FOR THE MOMENT, NO NEW MEETING IS PLANNED FOR JULY".

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

2ND JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1, 2, 3, 4) AMSP PACAM EAMEC E ER ICR PIO

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GCL.

I.28899

FROM:

DATED: 9TH JULY, 1965.

1934.

REC'D: 9TH JULY, 1965.

2350.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON.

2302.

UNCLASSIFIED.

REPEAT GENEVA MISC 240 BRUSSELS MISC 241

E.E.C.

THE NEW YORK TIMES THIS MORNING CARRIES AN ARTICLE ON THE UNITED STATES VIEW OF DE GAULLE IN WHICH IT SAYS THAT THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION IS WATCHING THE LATEST ASSAULT ON EUROPEAN UNION AND ALLIED INTEGRATION "WITH FASCINATION, SORROW AND DISCIPLINED SILENCE".

THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO SAY: "THE FASCINATION IS WITH THE FRENCH LEADER'S CANDOR AND TECHNIQUE, WITH HIS WELL-ORCHESTRATED THREATS TO FRUSTRATE OR DESTROY THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION, AND WITH HIS APPARENT ASSUMPTION THAT LESSER MEN ELSEWHERE WILL CRUMBLE UNDER SUCH PRESSURE.

THE SORROW COMES FROM BEING REMINDED SO AMPLY THAT, AS LONG AS HE RULES, FRANCE WILL NOT JOIN IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EUROPEAN OR ATLANTIC INSTITUTIONS THAT COULD GIVE POLITICAL EXPRESSION TO THE SUPRANATIONAL INTERESTS THAT THE WESTERN COUNTRIES SHARE.

THE SILENCE IS TACTICAL.

IT REFLECTS THE CALCULATION OF PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS THAT THEY OUGHT NOT TO FUSS AND FUME AND QUAKE AND TREAT GENERAL DE GAULLE AS IF HE COULD ACTUALLY ACHIEVE HIS STATED GOALS.

INSTEAD, THE INTENTION OF THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS HERE IS TO WAIT HIM OUT AND STARE HIM DOWN, CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN BE SURROUNDED AND RESISTED AND SO PERSUADED TO LIMIT HIS AIMS".

THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT WASHINGTON DOUBTS THAT DE GAULLE REALLY WANTS TO WRECK THE COMMON MARKET AND THINKS HE ABHORS THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF COLLAPSE AS MUCH AS THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF INTEGRATION, AND CONTINUES: "THUS FAVORING A STANDSTILL HE IS EXPECTED TO WIN SOME BUT NOT ALL OF HIS OBJECTIVES OF THE MOMENT, LEAVING THE COMMON MARKET IN ITS PRESENT STATE OF CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC BUT ONLY FEEBLE POLITICAL COHESION".

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

GCL.

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I.28899

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
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MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'s DEPT
P.M.'s

10TH JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) UN PACAM AMSP EAMEC E PIO ICR ER@
PPO

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

1.29084

JW

FROM:

DATED: 10TH JULY, 1965
1210

AUSTRALIAN HIGH COMMISSION,
LONDON.

REC'D: 10TH JULY, 1965
2250

1796. CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 285, BRUSSELS 12, BONN 6, ROME 21
(LONDON PLEASE PASS), THE HAGUE 7, WASHINGTON 109.

FROM WALKER.

GENERAL DE GAULLE AND THE COMMON MARKET.

I HAVE WITHHELD COMMENT UNTIL NOW IN THE HOPE THAT THE
SITUATION WOULD BE CLEARER AFTER THE DUST HAD SETTLED.
BUT THE FUTURE OUTLOOK REMAINS UNCERTAIN AND IS PREGNANT WITH
POSSIBILITIES.

2. PRESIDENT DE GAULLE'S OWN FUTURE IS DIRECTLY INVOLVED INASMUCH
AS THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS OVER THE NEXT FEW MONTHS COULD BE
INFLUENCED BY (AND IN TURN HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON) HIS ATTITUDE
TOWARDS STANDING FOR RE-ELECTION IN DECEMBER.

THE DECISION TO BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE AGRICULTURAL
FINANCIAL REGULATIONS IN THE NIGHT OF 30TH JUNE WAS TAKEN BY COUVE
DE MURVILLE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL'S OWN POSITION,
WHICH (ACCORDING TO BRUNET, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AT
THE FOREIGN MINISTRY) HAD BEEN PUT VERY BLUNTLY TO CHANCELLOR
ERHARD BY DE GAULLE WHEN HE VISITED BONN EARLIER IN JUNE.

THE SUBSEQUENT DECISION OF THE FRENCH CABINET TO SUSPEND ALL
PARTICIPATION IN FURTHER STEPS TO DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT THE COMMON
MARKET CLEARLY REFLECTED DE GAULLE'S OWN WILL.

THE PRESS COMMUNIQUE WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN DRAFTED BY HIM,
AND SOME OF THE LANGUAGE USED WAS UNDISPUTABLY GAULLIAN.

WATCHING PEYREFITTE (MINISTER FOR INFORMATION) READING THE
COMMUNIQUE ON TELEVISION I WAS STRUCK BY HIS UNUSUAL VEHEMENCE
AND AUTHORITARIAN GESTURES, WHICH WERE EVIDENTLY AN ECHO OF THE
PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE IN CABINET.

3. MANY COMMENTATORS ATTRIBUTE THE DECISION TO (A) DE GAULLE'S
OPPOSITION TO SUPRA-NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS REFLECTED IN THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMISSION'S LATEST PROPOSALS SUBJECTING THE
DISPOSAL OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE COMMON MARKET'S CUSTOMS DUTIES
AND AGRICULTURAL LEVIES TO THE CONTROL OF THE PARLIAMENTARY
ASSEMBLY AT STRASBOURG, AND (B) HIS RELUCTANCE TO ENVISAGE THE
COMMON MARKET PROGRESSING TO THE STAGE AT WHICH DECISIONS BY THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WILL NO LONGER REQUIRE UNANIMITY BUT CAN BE
TAKEN BY A QUALIFIED MAJORITY WITH WEIGHTED VOTING.

BUT THE BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS IN BRUSSELS DID NOT
ARISE FROM A HEADLONG COLLISION BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE OTHERS ON
EITHER OF THESE ISSUES.

THE FRENCH CLAIM THAT NONE OF THE FIVE WAS PREPARED
TO ACCEPT THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS IN FULL, AND THAT THE
NEGOTIATIONS BROKE DOWN SIMPLY BECAUSE THE SIX WERE NOT ABLE TO
AGREE ON ANY FINANCIAL REGULATIONS FOR THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL
POLICY FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

JW

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THE SECOND ISSUE, THAT IS, THE ULTIMATE ADOPTION OF THE QUALIFIED MAJORITY PROCEDURE, WAS NOT UNDER DISCUSSION AT ALL, AND ACCORDING TO BRUNET NONE OF THE SIX WOULD EVER ACCEPT DECISIONS ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS THAT WERE IMPOSED BY THE MAJORITY AGAINST THE OPPOSITION OF A MEMBER STATE.

(HE QUOTED COUVE DE MURVILLE AS HAVING SAID THAT IN PRACTICE SUCH MAJORITY DECISIONS WOULD NEVER BE TAKEN ON IMPORTANT QUESTIONS)

4. WITHOUT GOING INTO THE DETAILS, OR FIGURES THE FRENCH POSITION MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS.

THE COMMON MARKET MUST INCLUDE AGRICULTURE AS WELL AS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS.

(IT WAS ONLY ON THIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FRENCH PARLIAMENT RATIFIED THE TREATY OF ROME.)

THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY WHICH HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN PRINCIPLE, AND IS TO BE ACHIEVED BY STAGES, WILL PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM DOMESTIC PRICES, FOR LEVIES ON LOWER PRICED IMPORTS FROM OUTSIDE THE COMMON MARKET, AND THE USE OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE LEVIES TO SUBSIDISE THE DISPOSAL OF SURPLUSES (AS WELL AS FINANCING CERTAIN OTHER OPERATIONS OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY).

THE FINANCIAL REGULATIONS ARE CRUCIAL TO THIS SYSTEM.

IN JANUARY 1962 THE SIX ADOPTED PROVISIONAL REGULATIONS FOR THREE YEARS ONLY AND UNDERTOOK TO AGREE BY JUNE 1965 ON REGULATIONS FOR THE FOLLOWING TWO YEARS.

ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH, THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE AS THEY STOOD TO ANY OF THE SIX:

FRANCE HAD MADE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS THAT SHE CONSIDERED REASONABLE:

NOBODY CAME FORWARD WITH ANY OTHER PROPOSALS:

AND THE COMMISSION, INSTEAD OF PLAYING ITS PROPER ROLE AS MEDIATOR AND SEEKING SOME COMPROMISE, STOOD FIRM ON ITS OWN PROPOSALS

THE SIX FOUND THEMSELVES UNABLE TO AGREE ON ANY REGULATIONS FOR THE ENSUING TWO YEARS AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT DECIDED IT WOULD NOT IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS LOOKING TO FURTHER ELABORATION OF THE COMMON MARKET.

5. THIS ANALYSIS BEING PROBABLY TOO COMPLEX, MOST PEOPLE WILL CONSIDER THE DECISION (LIKE THE EXCLUSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM) TO BE AN EXPRESSION OF DE GAULLE'S PERSONAL POLICIES IN RELATION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION.

CONSEQUENTLY, AS THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE STANDSTILL BEGIN TO EMERGE, THERE WILL BE A STRONG TENDENCY TO CONSIDER DE GAULLE AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM.

THIS IS WHERE THE FUTURE OF THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS BECOMES INVOLVED WITH DE GAULLE'S OWN POLITICAL FUTURE.

6. WHAT ARE THE IMMEDIATE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION?

NOT, OF COURSE, ANY DISMANTLING OF THE COMMON MARKET AS IT AT PRESENT EXISTS (IN INCOMPLETE FORM), BUT THE REFUSAL OF FRANCE FOR THE PRESENT TO TAKE PART IN NEGOTIATIONS ON FURTHER DEVELOPMENT.

THIS AFFECTS NOT ONLY MATTERS INTERNAL TO THE COMMON MARKET BUT ALSO NEGOTIATIONS ON EXTERNAL COMMERCIAL POLICY.

FRANCE HAS INFORMED THE COMMISSION WHICH IS REPRESENTING THE COMMON MARKET IN THE KENNEDY ROUND THAT FRENCH ADVISERS WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PRESENT.

THUS DE GAULLE BECOMES THE MAIN OBSTACLE IN THE WAY OF THE KENNEDY ROUND.

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INWARD CABLEGRAM

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ALTHOUGH THIS MAY HAVE LITTLE DOMESTIC SIGNIFICANCE IN FRANCE, IT WILL EMBITTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES THAT PLACE HOPES IN THE KENNEDY ROUND.

7. MORE IMPORTANT DOMESTICALLY IS THE FACT THAT FRENCH FARMERS HAVE BEEN LED TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR FUTURE LIES IN THE SUCCESS OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, WHICH PROMISED THEM HIGHER PRICES FOR A LARGER PRODUCTION.

THERE WILL BE GREAT PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT (AND DE GAULLE) TO GIVE FARMERS ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL NOT SUFFER, AND THIS WOULD IMPLY ADDITIONAL BURDENS ON THE REST OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE.

AGRICULTURAL POLICY NOW BECOMES A MAJOR ISSUE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

8. HOW LONG WILL THE STANDSTILL LAST?

"SEVERAL WEEKS", SAY FRENCH OFFICIALS.

"AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE GERMAN ELECTIONS IN SEPTEMBER"

SAY SOME DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES.

THERE ARE TO BE BILATERAL TALKS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS.

M. SPAAK AND MR. LUNS COME TO PARIS NEXT WEEK AND DE GAULLE WILL MEET THE PRESIDENT OF ITALY AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE MONT BLANC TUNNEL BUT THEN FOLLOWS THE HOLIDAY PERIOD.

BY OCTOBER THE FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WILL BE VERY CLOSE, AND NEW DECISIONS WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEIR POSSIBLE INFLUENCE ON THE CAMPAIGN, WHETHER OR NOT DE GAULLE IS A CANDIDATE.

9. THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS, THOUGH NOT ORIGINALLY RELATED TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, NEVERTHELESS OFFERS DE GAULLE THE SORT OF DRAMATIC SITUATION THAT HE CAN EXPLOIT IF HE STANDS FOR RE-ELECTION.

IN THE EVENT OF THE OTHER PARTNERS IN THE COMMON MARKET AGREEING TO SOME COMPROMISE BASED ON FRANCE'S PROPOSALS OR ACCEPTABLE TO FRANCE, DE GAULLE WILL BE ABLE TO CLAIM THAT HIS FIRMNESS HAS SAVED FRENCH AGRICULTURE, AND THAT HIS RE-ELECTION GIVES HIM A MANDATE TO RESIST FURTHER MOVES TOWARDS SUPRA-NATIONALISM THAT COULD IMPERIL FRANCE'S ECONOMY AND INDEPENDENCE.

IF, FOR HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, HE DECIDED NOT TO RUN (I AM TOLD THAT ONE OF HIS MINISTERS HAS ALREADY CONTACTED BUSINESSMEN ABOUT ESTABLISHING A MEMORIAL MUSEUM, WHICH IS INTERPRETED AS AN INDICATION THAT HE WILL SOON GIVE UP OFFICE) SUCH A COMPROMISE WOULD TERMINATE HIS OFFICIAL CAREER WITH A FINAL TRIUMPH.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IN THE EVENT OF FRANCE MAKING NO PROGRESS WITH THE COMMON MARKET BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, HE CAN SEEK A MANDATE TO PERSEVERE WITH THE STRUGGLE ON BEHALF OF FRENCH AGRICULTURE.

ALTERNATIVELY, IF HE DECIDES NOT TO RUN, HE LEAVES HIS SUCCESSOR WITH "FREE HANDS" - AFTER HAVING SAVED FRANCE FROM A "FOOLS BARGAIN" (AS THE COMMON MARKET WITHOUT SUITABLE AGRICULTURAL REGULATIONS HAS BEEN CALLED).

AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND THE FRENCH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS IS LIKELY TO BE VERY FIRM INDEED.

10. A POSSIBLE QUALIFICATION TO THE ABOVE IS THAT THE STANDSTILL WILL ALSO BE BAD FOR FRENCH BUSINESS.

MANY INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN EUROPE IN ANTICIPATION OF THE WIDER MARKETS AVAILABLE WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET, AND AS THESE EXPECTATIONS ARE REPLACED BY UNCERTAINTY, INVESTMENT IN EUROPE IS LIKELY TO DECLINE IN THE MONTHS PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS.

BUT THIS WILL GENERATE PRESSURES ON ALL THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE COMMON MARKET TO SEEK A COMPROMISE, AND NOT ON DE GAULLE ALONE.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.29084

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT P.I.
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & TERRITORIES
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

11TH JULY, 1965

CONFIDENTIAL

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SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) DL S&SEA INT UN
PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR PIO SAMT ER

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25/1/1

UPI-34

PARIS, JULY 3 (UPI)--FRANCE'S GAULLIST GOVERNMENT HAS AGREED TO TALK OVER THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET CRISIS WITH THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, IT WAS ANNOUNCED TODAY.

AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT SAID FOREIGN MINISTER MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE HAS AGREED TO MEET SEPARATELY WITH DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER JOSEPH M. LUNS AND BELGIUM'S PAUL-HENRI SPAAK.

DE MURVILLE WILL MEET WITH LUNS AT 5 P.M. (1600 GMT) MONDAY AND WITH SPAAK AT 5:45 P.M. (1645 GMT) TUESDAY.

BOTH LUNS AND SPAAK WERE COMING TO PARIS FOR TUESDAY'S SPECIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) COUNCIL WHICH WILL REVIEW THE SITUATION IN VIET NAM.

U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE W. BALL IS TO ATTEND THE TUESDAY NATO MEETING AND OTHER MAJOR COUNTRIES ARE SENDING THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS. BUT PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE, WHO DISAPPROVES OF THE UNITED STATES VIET NAM POLICY, IS SENDING ONLY FRANCE'S PERMANENT AMBASSADOR TO NATO.

DE MURVILLE'S READY ACCEPTANCE OF THE DUTCH AND BELGIAN APPROACH FOR TOP-LEVEL DISCUSSION OF THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS RAISED SOME HOPES THAT FRANCE MAY BE WILLING TO MAKE SOME CONCESSIONS TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK.

HIS MEETING WITH LUNS AND SPAAK WILL BE THE FIRST SINCE THE EARLY HOURS OF THURSDAY WHEN COUVE DE MURVILLE, AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMON MARKET FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE IN BRUSSELS, ABRUPTLY ENDED THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE FRENCH CLAIMED THEIR FIVE COMMON MARKET PARTNERS WERE RENEGGING ON EARLIER COMMITMENTS ON LONG-TERM FINANCING OF COMMON MARKET AGRICULTURE.

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25/1/1

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UPI-313

(SEE UPI-125)

1ST LEAD KOMMON MARKET

BRUSSELS, JULY 8 (UPI)--FRANCE SAT OUT TODAY WHILE HER COMMON MARKET PARTNERS WORKED ON ROUTINE PROBLEMS AND PONDERED HOW TO STOP THE PRESENT COMMUNITY CRISIS FROM DRAGGING ON FOR MONTHS.

ALTHOUGH THE CRISIS TEMMED FROM FARM REGULATIONS, OBSERVERS AGREED THAT THE BASIS OF THE BLOW-UP WAS THE DISCORD ABOUT THE SHAPING OF A SUPRA-NATIONAL COMMUNITY.

FRANCE HAS BLAMED HER PARTNERS FOR NOT KEEPING THEIR COMMITMENTS TO SETTLE THE COMMUNITY'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY, INCLUDING MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR FINANCIAL REGULATIONS.

BUT OTHER MEMBER COUNTRIES FELT FRANCE WAS BLOCKING PROGRESS TOWARDS SUPRA-NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL UNITY. FRANCE FIRMLY TURNED DOWN ANY WIDER POWERS FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TO CONTROL THE CENTRAL COMMUNITY FUND PROJECTED TO FINANCE FARM SUBSIDIES, MODERNIZATION AND EXPORT REBATES.

FRANCE'S PARTNERS WERE NOW TRYING TO GAUGE HER INTENTIONS AND TO OUTLINE THEIR OWN FUTURE APPROACH TO THE CRISIS.

WITH SUMMER HOLIDAYS STARTING NEXT MONTH, FOLLOWED BY ELECTIONS IN WEST GERMANY AND FRANCE, IT WAS FEARED IF NO QUICK SETTLEMENT WERE FOUND THE CRISIS MIGHT DRAG ON UNTIL THE END OF THE YEAR.

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8/1/81 25/1/1

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25/1/1 53

UPI-165

25/1/1

PART 6, JULY 7 (1971) - PRESIDENT CHARLES DE GAULLE DECIDED AT HIS REGULAR WEEKLY CABINET MEETING TODAY TO CONTINUE FRANCE'S BOYCOTT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET.

INFORMATION MINISTER ALAIN PEYREFITTE SAID THE CABINET EXAMINED THE SITUATION, BUT HE GAVE NO HINT AS TO WHAT NEW MEASURES FRANCE MIGHT TAKE.

FRANCE YESTERDAY BLOCKED ALL FURTHER ACTION BY THE SIX MARKET NATIONS BY WITHDRAWING JEAN-MARC BOEGNER, AMBASSADOR TO THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY'S HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS. BOEGNER'S STAFF REMAINED BRUSSELS BUT IT WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO ATTEND ANY COMMON MARKET MEETINGS.

IN BRUSSELS, THE POWERFUL UNION OF COMMON MARKET INDUSTRIES (UNICE) TODAY URGED ITS MEMBERS--FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, HOLLAND, BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG--TO SOLVE THE CRISIS +IN THE HIGHER INTEREST OF THE COMMUNITY+.

+THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF EUROPE IS A DYNAMIC PHENOMENON,+ UNICE SAID. +HENCE ANY HALTING OF ITS DEVELOPMENT WOULD IRREVOCABLY JEOPARDIZE RESULTS REACHED SO FAR AS WELL AS THE FUTURE OF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY+.

FRANCE'S BOYCOTT WAS INSTITUTED ONE WEEK AFTER ITS MARKET PARTNERS REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH DEMANDS ON FINANCING THE COMMUNITY'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY.

FRANCE ALSO BALKED AT ANY INCREASE IN THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WHICH THE COMMUNITY'S EXECUTIVE COMMISSION SAID WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HANDLE AGRICULTURAL FUNDS.

FRENCH DELEGATES WERE CONSPICUOUSLY ABSENT FROM NEGOTIATIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION YESTERDAY WITH NIGERIA AND TUNISIA AND FROM MONDAY MEETING OF COMMUNITY AGRICULTURAL EXPERTS.

THE CHIEFS OF THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS OF THE FIVE REMAINING MARKET PARTNERS MET TODAY, BUT UNDER COMMON MARKET RULES, THEY CAN TAKE NO ACTION WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF ALL THE MEMBERS.

MG959A

AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION
22 Bougainville Street, MELBURN, CANBERRA

October 29, 1963

SPEECH DELIVERED BY M. MAURICE DE MURVILLE
FRENCH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BEFORE THE FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
ON OCTOBER 29, 1963.

I am gratified that, with the full approval and even on the proposal of the Government, your Assembly has decided to organize, as it did last year, a broad debate on French foreign policy on the occasion of the discussion of the Foreign Ministry budget. I am even more gratified that the development of the international situation since the beginning of this summer and a number of recent events undoubtedly make it necessary that the Government's position and the reasons for its attitude be explained to you and clarified. It is on this position and these reasons that I am going to speak now, keeping for a future statement the answers that I owe the Assembly with regard to the questions put to me on my department's budget. This, moreover, is the procedure that had been followed previously and it seems to have given everyone satisfaction.

When the international situation is discussed at present, it is obvious that we think first of all of the relations of the Western countries with the Soviets, following the signature of the Moscow Agreement. I said "following" and not "in terms of", for the development we are witnessing in what we have come to call East-West relations, and which we must hope will lead to a true détente, is not in any way linked, of necessity, with a treaty on the partial halting of nuclear tests like that signed in July.

This treaty came about between three major countries who happen to have, particularly two of them, a nuclear arsenal that is already enormously overabundant in relation to any foreseeable conflict between them or with other countries. They thought, therefore, that they no longer needed to go ahead in the future, at least for a while, with atmospheric testing and agreed to give it up, for the time being. In this arrangement, which quite naturally satisfied both their own public opinion and world opinion, they invited all the other countries of the world to participate. The majority of these, who had never had the intention, or perhaps the means to carry out any test, have, quite naturally also, responded to this appeal.

But, there was, however, at least one country -- our own -- that happened to be in a different situation. Although France is already, from the military standpoint, a nuclear power, she is, in contrast to the United States, Russia and Great Britain, far from having completed her program and from already

having at her disposal the weapons she proposes to manufacture. This, for the simple reason that we were not able, owing to the war and its consequences, to begin until much later than the others. If therefore France had attached her signature to the Moscow Agreement, she would have found herself the only country adhering to it for whom this adhesion would have had consequences.

Whereas for all the others, whether they fall in the category of the have's or the have-not's, adhesion constituted a purely platonic gesture, our country would have had to stop going ahead with the implementation of its nuclear program, in so doing sacrificing a basic element of its defence, that is, an essential national interest.

This isolated sacrifice did not seem possible to us, since once again it was not a matter for the others -- and this is in no way criticism -- of agreeing to a symbolic gesture. Things would be quite different -- we have said this repeatedly -- the day when it would be possible to move on from symbolism to reality, that is, the day when disarmament would be feasible. Then France would be the first to request that, for the sake of world peace, all the existing atomic weapons be sacrificed, including her own, and also all the manufacture programs, including her own. In order to clearly indicate that this is and remains her policy, France has once again put forth the project which she already suggested under similar circumstances of East-West negotiations, of the destruction and banning of manufacture of vehicles for the nuclear weapon, subject to adequate control. When the time comes, we will propose to our atomic partners a resumption of the discussion, for this seems to us the best possible approach to this nuclear disarmament which we continue to believe is in the long run the very condition of human survival.

I say nuclear disarmament, that is the disappearance of the weapon and not halting its spread, which people tend more and more to present as the essential requirement. It is unhealthy, and even deadly, that the nuclear weapon exists, and it may be considered deplorable that it spreads because it exists. The chief problem is thus the very existence of the atomic weapon, its possession, if only by a single State, however peaceful and reasonable it may be. That is the real menace which hangs over the world, and from which, once again, we will be freed only by disarmament, that disarmament which we, for our part, place at the head of the program. Our abstention in face of the Moscow Agreement in no way contradicts this position, quite the contrary, since this agreement, by the very admission of its authors, is not a disarmament agreement.

No more is it the condition of the détente, even if it is capable of facilitating it, for which we on our part could only feel gratification. Just as she ardently and profoundly desires disarmament, France also hopes for the end of the cold war, for a general improvement in the West's relations with the Communist world, which would make it possible to discuss a settlement of the major problems still pending. Everyone knows that the French people are peaceful and that they are not lacking in good will.

But the problem is for the responsible leaders to find where to apply this peaceful spirit and this good will. Now, détente happens to be a magic word for the Western peoples. Voicing it is enough for the immediate awakening of hopes and for the immediate display of eager intentions to negotiate.

We had this experience between the autumn 1959 and the spring 1960. A rumor was then being spread that everything was going to change, that an irresistible movement had been started which could lead to peace. A summit conference of the four major world powers was announced. And suddenly, on May 16, 1960, the world, astounded, learned that the hope was only an illusion and that the long-awaited détente had vanished even before it had appeared.

What had happened? Just that Russia said "No". Today's world is so made that the Soviet Union commands the situation. She is responsible for the cold war. She is also capable, and she alone is capable, of putting an end to it. Should she show the least sign in favor of detente, the entire world trembles with hope and declares itself eager to talk.

This is exactly what occurred when, after four and a half years of fruitless and endless negotiations on a nuclear test ban, Mr. Khrushchev showed himself prepared to sign the symbolic Moscow Treaty.

And at the same time each is seeking reasons for such an obvious deviation in Soviet policy. And everyone, or almost everyone, is agreed on an analysis which questions both the relations of the United States and of Russia and the Soviet Union's own position.

There was first the great nuclear fear felt by the two atomic superpowers in the autumn of 1962, at the time of the Cuban crisis. The trial of strength that followed -- Europe, neither then nor now, is fully aware of it -- left the protagonists with a deeprooted impression of fear and even of horror of the consequences of a nuclear war. The impression was naturally even stronger in Russia as the nuclear superiority of the United States in this domain seemed to be considerable.

There was, in the second place, the Soviet Union's own difficulties. I mean by this, the grave economic problems which she has to face, particularly in the field of food supply. I mean also the now open conflict with China which is bringing about a radical change in the balance of forces in the Communist world and throughout the world.

On an analysis of this kind, everyone, as I have said, is agreed and the French Government the very first. We do not, however, draw from this conclusion -- and it is here that the vital difference emerges -- that we must automatically and on every subject open the talks that may be suggested to us. For the dialogue to become not only possible, but also useful, we think that a real transformation is needed in the Soviet Union and in its policy. Let this transformation appear, then all doors will be opened. Let for example, there be a definite end to the threats over Berlin, let there be, for a number of months, not a single incident in our communications with the former capital, then the detente will undoubtedly begin to appear of its own accord, and the real problems can be approached and then dealt with.

We feel ourselves strengthened in this position when we consider the subjects offered for the East-West discussion. With a single exception, that of halting the spread of atomic weapons, these subjects are proposed by the Soviets: concluding of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact organization, setting up of control points against surprise land attacks, reduction in the allied forces stationed in Germany, demilitarization of Central Europe. All, in reality, under the cover of formal disarmament, have as their subject Germany, its status and its future. All tend either to crystallize the present situation, that is, to recognize the Communist State of East Germany, or to prepare the neutralization of Germany, that is, its detachment from the West. It is not in this way -- I mean in seeking to rupture the precarious balance which, for 15 years, attempts have been made to build between a Communist Eastern Europe and a Western Europe united in freedom -- that we will be able to prepare a real peace.

Nothing illustrates this better than this simple remark. Legalizing the status quo in Germany is clearly Russia's goal, but with one exception, a vital exception, and that is Berlin. In this regard, quite the contrary, nothing must be done in Russia's eyes to consolidate what exists, in other words, the Western presence. The Americans are denied all talks and periodically there are incidents whose only result is to recall the still preca-

rious nature of our position. The most recent of these incidents, whatever may have been their reasons -- that does not enter into consideration-- came just at the right time to underscore this persistent precariousness. In the same way, with regard to Germany as a whole, the repeated declarations of the highest Soviet authorities, even during the past few days, always remind us that nothing has changed in the will of the Soviets to make us permanently accept the program they propose.

But, I will be told, our allies who negotiate are perfectly aware of these factors of the problem, and no indication gives us reason to think that, in the discussions they are conducting on their own behalf, they are likely to compromise what we -- and they with us -- consider to be the West's vital interests. I fully agree with this, and the talks which I recently had the occasion to hold with my American and British colleagues have confirmed me in this conviction. Didn't the American Secretary of State just deliver a speech on this subject, in which he warned against illusions in unequivocal terms?

And then there are the facts. During the three months that talks have been held, nothing has been concluded, no basis for agreement has emerged. I would not be risking too much in saying that, for the time being, no basis for agreement seems likely to emerge.

In reality we find ourselves, among the Western peoples, in a situation very comparable to the one we were in during the autumn of 1961, when the question of knowing if it was suitable or not to open talks with the Russians on the subject of Berlin was being heatedly discussed. We had, on both sides, taken stands comparable to those we are taking today, and for the same reasons. The Americans, without our being associated in it, but also without our objecting to it, made the contacts with Moscow which they then judged necessary. Nothing came of it, either for better or for worse, and it was then that there was a real desire to recognize that, as we had been suggesting for a long time, the Berlin crisis, such as it had been opened in November 1958, was in reality over, since in August 1961 the Russians had, without firing a shot, built the wall which divided the city.

In the same way today, without objecting to the Anglo-American-Russian talks which have been opened, and which perhaps may be continued, we do not intend to participate in them. As I have already indicated, the subjects under discussion are unfortunate, and the first talks have immediately revealed that they raised all the problems relative to Germany, on which the respective stands remain the same, with the only consequence that they create a state of trouble and alarm in the Federal Republic, a state of trouble and alarm in which we really do not see any advantage.

This is not immobilism, it is plain common sense. In any case, as has already happened in the past, the future will decide between us.

But then we are told, we are no longer following you. Perhaps you are right, but since you have not been able to convince our allies, you are wrong to persist; your duty is to fall into line, otherwise you are isolating yourself.

There, the big word has come out, the major criticism has been formulated. Doubtless it is worthwhile to dwell on this a moment.

When people talk about the isolation of France, they mean within the Atlantic world, where our principal friends are, and where the Western defense is organized, and they mean first of all that we find ourselves in disagreement with the United States of America.

It is indeed a fact that France holds a special position in the camp of freedom.

Firstly, and in relation to her major partners, the Americans and the

British, she is part of continental Europe. That is to say, she is bound by her very nature to consider the major problems from the standpoint of Europe and of Europe's future; she is doing so more than ever in the present international situation.

Furthermore, France, as a European country, is in a position to speak with undisputed authority.

Obviously because, on major occasions, it is General de Gaulle who speaks in her name. Also because, after having re-established her domestic situation on solid foundations from the political and economic viewpoint, she has been able to solve, doubtless alone among the countries of the Continent, the major national problems which were in her case the problems of decolonization.

France, has, by the same token, found again the sense of her responsibilities, and firstly with regard to defense.

The United States has been complaining for years now that the Europe of today, risen again from the ruins of the war, is not making a big enough effort for its own defense, leaving the United States with all the main part of the burden, as in the distant days of 1950 when it alone possessed the necessary resources. And in fact, most of its European allies find quite convenient a situation in which they can thus, without other preoccupations, attend to their own affairs.

This is, as I recently tried to explain in Washington, a situation which will not be modified without a profound psychological and political change. Indeed, no country will ever accept financial liabilities unless feels that these derive from its own responsibilities.

France, for her part, is determined to play her own role in defense. That is why she wanted to have control of her own forces, whether of the army, navy or air force. This is the reason why she has decided upon a military atomic program of her own. In doing this she may have upset some of the ideas acquired in the Atlantic Organization. But she showed herself as having a national will and consequently as being a worthwhile ally. The day when, *mutatis mutandis*, the other European members of the Alliance show the same will, then a reorganization on a lasting basis of the Atlantic Organization will become possible. Then we can satisfy America's justified request for a different distribution of duties, because there will be a different distribution of responsibilities. Then we will assure the maintenance of this Alliance and in consequence the participation of the United States in the defense of Europe. In wishing to prolong the present situation unlimitedly, a situation that has become, in everyone's opinion, an anachronism, we are simply provoking one day, perhaps sooner than later, the agonizing reappraisals of which there is a growing fear everywhere and which the firm and responsible policy of France is alone in a position to avoid.

Is this isolation on our country's part, and since when in this world have we come to confuse conformism and solidarity? Systematic alignment is not a policy. Nor is it, in an alliance, a guarantee of commitments made. France is perhaps a difficult ally. She is above all a loyal and sure ally in the event of a serious crisis, and everyone can testify to this.

If, moreover, some good souls are anxious to be reassured, let them go abroad and see what international public opinion is today. French policy, founded on national independence, on firmness in the defense of the vital interests of the West, on enlightened cooperation with the less-favored peoples, is arousing enormous interest throughout the world. I only need as a proof the elections that took place during the present session of the United Nations and in which, despite absences that some have criticized us for, France, each time she was a candidate, received more votes than any other country, no matter what its power or its popularity. I think that each one of you in this Assembly may feel gratified at this.

So much for the international situation in general. There is another vital

aspect of our foreign policy that I would like to deal with now, for it also involves our future; it is the question of European policy.

During our previous debate in this Assembly, last January, we happened to be in the thick of the crisis, after the breaking off of the negotiations for the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market. There were then, and quite naturally, violent reactions. After a lapse of ten months, a more objective outlook is possible and has in fact prevailed. The problem of the relations between the European Community and Great Britain is still pending without its being possible to say how, when the time comes, it will be solved. But relations that have more or less returned to normal have been established through the Western European Union. A meeting of this organization has just been held in The Hague, which took place under satisfactory conditions and at which I was able to have an initial and extremely cordial meeting with my new British colleague, Mr. Butler.

In addition, the Common Market is in motion again, I mean it is moving forward. After the further reduction in intra-Community tariff barriers and the further alignment of the common external tariff on July 12, activity is now concentrated on the completion of the common agricultural policy. It was agreed between the Six that, for the most part, the definition of this policy should be completed by December 31, so that the new regulations may come into force on April 1, 1964. The work to be done to reach this goal is of course still considerable. It is in progress and, on the French side, the Minister of Agriculture is devoting himself to it with all his ability and authority.

I shall not conceal from the Assembly the fact that the difficulties are great and will remain so until the end. They are both internal and external.

Inside the Community the tendencies and interests are of course varied and sometimes in opposition. But, by the very nature of things, Germany has a special position, notably with regard to the inevitable alignment of the prices of the principal food products. The recent statements by its representatives underline this very clearly and are, moreover, a source of some concern to us. We believe, however, that with mutual goodwill the obstacles can be surmounted and a permanent agreement come about. It is in fact a question of the substance, that is to say, of the very future of the Common Market.

Outside the Community, as the single European market is formed, reactions appear, because it necessarily brings about changes in the traditional trade channels, otherwise the Common Market would have no meaning. Such changes are felt even more in the particularly sensitive sector of agricultural commodities. Everyone knows in this respect in particular the positions taken by our American friends. The problem is that the changes must not become upheavals, that is, that a fair share is given to the legitimate interests of nonmember countries. Quite naturally, this problem will come up for discussion next year when, after completion of our common agricultural policy, we will begin in GATT the major international trade negotiations, the initiative for which was taken by the United States of America.

Another important task will also soon come up for discussion. It concerns the merging of the European Communities. This Assembly will doubtless recall that this question was presented in the past in the limited form of the merger of the Communities' Councils and Commissions, in other words, the institutions. The Government had reservations about this for a long time, because it considered that such a partial reform risked being considered an end in itself, that is impeding the real reform, which was in its opinion the merging of the Communities themselves. The ideas gained ground and little by little the viewpoints drew closer. We are now in agreement with most of our partners on a process which would bring about the merging of the institutions, spontaneously entailing to a certain degree the merging

of the administrations, a first step toward an effective merger of the Communities. This process, of course, would take place over quite a long period of time. It would call for treaties which would, when the time came, be submitted to the approval of Parliament. But we sincerely hope that it will be effectively begun in the near future, and we see in it the hope for a reform of great scope. The effectiveness and output of the single European Community will be incomparably more satisfactory than those of the three existing Communities: to appreciate this it is enough to mention the eternally discussed and never solved problem of the common energy policy. Do I need to add that, from the political viewpoint even more, the merger, by giving new impetus to economic cooperation, cannot fail to have fruitful consequences for what continues to be our goal, I mean the political union of Europe. No doubt the time will come when, with our partners, this essential problem will be the subject of new initiatives.

European policy, relations with the United States in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, relations with the Soviet Union as regards prospects for peace -- these are the focal points of France's foreign policy. Naturally added to this is the all-important issue of our relations with the nonaligned countries, relations based on that policy of cooperation which followed a colonial policy of which we are in no way ashamed, but to which the evolution of the world necessarily put an end. All our action, moreover, will revolve around our own idea of what the role of France, and the role of Europe should be in the world, now these roles are no longer separable. An independent role, for without independence one loses one's character, if not one's *raison d'être*. An active role inside the free world and for the defense of freedom. A role, finally, in the service of man, of his dignity and his development, for there is no more noble or fruitful task in the world.

25/1/1 45
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JM

I.28646

FROM:

DATED: 7TH JULY, 1965.
1802

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 8TH JULY, 1965.
0437

1770 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 280 BRUSSELS 11 GENEVA 37.

FRANCE - E.E.C.

1. IN READING OVER OUR 1743 FEEL WE SHOULD DRAW ATTENTION THAT WAHL STATED POSITION TAKEN BY DE GAULLE WAS THAT AN UNDERTAKING HAD BEEN GIVEN ON CAP FINANCING FOR WHICH FRANCE HAD ALREADY PAID IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND THAT NOW THIS UNDERTAKING WAS NOT BEING TRANSLATED INTO FACT AND THAT COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS BROUGHT IN ADDITIONAL MATTERS (AS A CONDITION OF ADOPTION) WHICH FORMED NO PART OF THE ORIGINAL BARGAIN.

2. THIS CENTRAL ASPECT EMPHASISED BECAUSE PRESS E.G. TODAY'S "LONDON TIMES" SAYS QUITE WRONGLY (AS WE HAVE IT) THAT WHAT FRANCE WANTS "ESSENTIALLY IS TO HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF THE AGRICULTURAL COMMON MARKET WITHOUT THE REST OF THE PACKAGE" - WHEREAS FRENCH CONTENTION AND BASIS FOR ACTION IS THE OPPOSITE.

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY(C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

8TH JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1, 2, 3, 4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) LA S&SEA INT UN
PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ER@ CR ICR PIO PPO C
BANGKOK THE HAGUE ROME STOCKHOLM WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

25/1/1

44

INWARD CABLEGRAM

GCL.

I.28608

FROM:

DATED: 7TH JULY, 1965.

1616.

REC'D: 8TH JULY, 1965.

0222.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.

199.

CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 73, PARIS 49, BONN 35, GENEVA 38.
LONDON PLEASE PASS SAVING : HAGUE 11, ROME 11.

E.E.C. CRISIS:

HERBST (SECRETARY-GENERAL, EXTERNAL RELATIONS, EEC) TOLD ME LAST NIGHT THE COMMISSION REGARDED THE CRISIS AS SERIOUS, THOUGH IT HAD BEEN ARTIFICIALLY CREATED.

HE PERSONALLY WAS SURPRISED THE FRENCH HAD NOT TAKEN A STAND EARLIER AGAINST THE TREND TOWARDS SUPRA-NATIONALISATION. EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE TO CONTINUE NORMAL ACTIVITIES BUT FRENCH HAD REFUSED TO ATTEND NOT ONLY MEETINGS BUT EVEN A LUNCHEON IN CONNECTION WITH THE TUNISIAN TALKS.

THERE WERE RUMOURS THAT FRENCH OFFICIALS SECONDED TO THE COMMISSION MIGHT SHORTLY BE REQUIRED TO MAKE THE DIFFICULT CHOICE BETWEEN RETURNING TO PARIS OR REMAINING IN BRUSSELS, AND SEVERING CONNECTIONS WITH THE FRENCH SERVICE.

(SEE KOJEVE'S HINT THAT 'COMMISSIONERS' MIGHT HAVE TO BE REPLACED - PARIS CABLE 1743.)

THIS WAS BAD FOR MORALE GENERALLY.

2. VAN BELLINGHEN (DIRECTOR-GENERAL, ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY) SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE IN GENEVA TO CONTINUE ATTENDING MEETINGS BUT TO TRY TO AVOID ACTION BEING TAKEN WHICH WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR FRANCE TO RESUME ACTIVITY LATER.

THIS LINE HAD BEEN APPROVED BY M. SPAAK, WHO IS DECLINING TO MAKE ANY PUBLIC COMMENT.

3. FRANCE HAS REQUESTED CANCELLATION OF THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF ECSC ARRANGED FOR 13TH JULY.

THE ONLY CONTINUING FRENCH ACTIVITY IS ATTENDANCE TO 'ADMINISTRATIVE' MATTERS AT MEETINGS IN CONNECTION WITH THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND INVOLVING GRANTS TO MALI, MAURITANIA, THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND MADAGASCAR.

4. MEANWHILE THE COMMISSION IS WORKING ON REVISED PROPOSALS. THE FORM OF WHICH IS APPARENTLY NOT YET DECIDED.

COMMISSIONERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE RETICENT AS TO PROBABLE CONTENTS, BUT OUR ESTIMATE BASED ON DISCUSSION WITH OFFICIALS AND COLLEAGUES IS THAT THEY WILL NOT AMOUNT TO A RADICAL CHANGGE OF ATTITUDE BY HALLSTEIN AND MANSHOLT BUT MAY SEEK TO BUILD ON THE AGREEMENT TENTATIVELY REACHED BY THE AGRICULTURE MINISTERS ON 29TH JUNE.

..f2

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

GCL.

- 2 -

I.28608

PROPOSALS WOULD BE LIKELY TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS :-

- (A) A TIMETABLE FOR COMPLETION OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY.
- (B) EXTENDING THE FINANCIAL REGULATIONS UNTIL 1970 BUT WITH A CHECK POINT ON 1ST JULY 1967 TO ENSURE THAT BY THAT TIME THE HARMONIZATION OF PRICES, THE RESULTS OF THE KENNEDY ROUND AND OTHER FACTORS WERE PRODUCING AN EQUITABLE RESULT.
- (C) RECOGNITION OF THE NEED FOR REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.
(THIS WOULD BE IN LINE WITH THE GERMAN APPROACH SUMMARIZED IN BONN'S 348).

5. THE GENERAL EXPECTATION IS THAT THE COMMISSION WILL NOT PUT ANYTHING FORWARD FORMALLY FOR THE TIME BEING, PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT ITALIAN-GERMAN TALKS DURING SARAGAT'S VISIT TO BONN, AND VISITS BY LUNS AND HALLSTEIN TO GERMANY.

SPAAK IS UNLIKELY TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE, THOUGH HE COULD BE EXPECTED TO FAVOUR A COMPROMISE IN DUE COURSE.

6. TUTHILL, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO EEC, (PLEASE PROTECT) TELLS ME THAT AT HIS SUGGESTION LEDDIE HAS TWICE CABLED ALL U.S. REPRESENTATIVES INSTRUCTING THEM TO AVOID ALL COMMENT, IN SPITE OF ALLEGATIONS IN FRENCH PRESS THAT THE GERMAN FIRMNESS IN BRUSSELS WAS DUE TO U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT.

TUTHILL BELIEVES ANY U.S. INITIATIVE AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

HARRY

MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'s DEPT
P.M.'s

8TH JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) AS(JIC) LA UN PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ER@
PIO ICR PPO

CONFIDENTIAL

25/1/1 42

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JM

I.28478

FROM:

DATED: 6TH JULY, 1965.
1925

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 7TH JULY, 1965.
0710

1743 CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

REPEATED LONDON 277, BRUSSELS 10, GENEVA 35.

FRANCE - E.E.C. - KENNEDY ROUND.

IN AN EFFORT TO ASSESS IMPLICATIONS OF BRUSSELS BREAKDOWN (AND SUBSEQUENT FRENCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS) FOR FRENCH TRADE POLICY IN E.E.C. ITSELF AND KENNEDY ROUND CORKERY SAW WAHL TODAY.

HE OPENED WITH WAHL BY ASKING FIRSTLY "WHAT HAD HAPPENED?" AND SECONDLY "WHAT NOW?"

WAHL SAID IT WAS RELATIVELY EASY TO ANSWER THE FIRST BUT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT ON THE SECOND.

HIS ACCOUNT OF BRUSSELS DEADLOCK WAS THAT IT WAS DUE TO A SET OF UNFORTUNATE AND EVEN STUPID CIRCUMSTANCES BUT REMARKED THAT THE DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS HAD NEVER BEEN DIRECTED TO ANYTHING BUT TECHNICAL ISSUES.

HE SAID:

(A) CONFLICTING ADVICE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO DE GAULLE PRIOR TO BRUSSELS REGARDING DATE OF 30TH JUNE AS A DEADLINE, IN THE EVENT INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN FOR THE FRENCH DELEGATION TO REGARD IT AS SUCH FOR SECURING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT IN PRINCIPLE.

(B) FANFANI HAD BEEN PLAYING TO A DOMESTIC AUDIENCE IN ASSERTING THAT ITALY'S SHARE OF FINANCIAL BURDEN WAS TOO HIGH.

HE HAD WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE COULD SECURE A BETTER DEAL FOR ITALY IN THIS FIELD THAN COLOMBO HAD OVER TWO YEARS AGO.

FRENCH HAD AGREED PRIVATELY AND IN ADVANCE WITH ITALY'S CLAIM BUT THIS HAD ONLY RESULTED IN FANFANI PUTTING A STRONGER AND MORE EMOTIONAL CASE.

(C) DUTCH WERE BOUND BY PARLIAMENTARY INSTRUCTION ON POWERS FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BUT WITH WHICH LUNS PRIVATELY DISAGREED.

(D) GERMANS HAD BEEN ANTI-FRENCH MOOD DUE TO SCHROEDER AND HAD SPOKEN AT VARIANCE WITH ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT BETWEEN GERMAN AND FRENCH OFFICIALS IN THE PREVIOUS WEEK.

(E) FRENCH GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS HAD BEEN CONCERNED TO SHOW THAT NO OTHER COUNTRY WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT PROPOSALS AS THEY STOOD - FRANCE WAS NOT ALONE IN WANTING MODIFICATIONS. (WAHL COMMENTED THAT GERMANS WERE AS MUCH CONCERNED (AS FRENCH) ABOUT POWERS TO BE GIVEN TO EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THAT DUTCH ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS ALONE WERE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS RELATING TO CUSTOMS REVENUE).

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.28478

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(F) HALLSTEIN HAD MADE MATTERS WORSE AND INDEED PRECIPITATED CRISIS BY SAYING THAT THERE WAS REALLY NO NEED TO AGREE THE ISSUE OF FINANCING THE CAP BY THE DEADLINE.

THIS, WAHL CLAIMED, LEFT FRENCH WITHOUT ANY ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND WHEN DEADLOCK WAS REPORTED IN PARIS IT HARDENED DE GAULLE'S ATTITUDE WHICH IS REGARDED BY WAHL AS BEING, IN ANY EVENT, "TOO HEAVY".

2. AS BACKGROUND, WAHL SAID THAT WHILST NO-ONE WAS WITHOUT BLAME IN BRUSSELS THE COMMISSION HAD MADE A FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE IN PUTTING FORWARD PROPOSALS WITHOUT PRIOR CONSULTATION. RESULT WAS THAT SOMETHING WAS ON THE TABLE THAT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO NO-ONE BUT THERE HAD BEEN PRIOR AGREEMENT ABOUT FINALISATION BY JUNE 30TH.

DE GAULLE'S ATTITUDE WAS THAT FRANCE HAD LIVED UP FULLY TO CUSTOMS UNION PROVISIONS AND DECISIONS ON INDUSTRIAL SIDE AND THAT OTHERS MUST ABIDE BY THE AGREEMENT TO ESTABLISH THE FINANCING OF THE CAP.

PRESENT POSITION WAS THEREFORE THAT FRANCE WAS CALLING A HALT AND AS YOU MAY HAVE ALREADY SEEN FROM PRESS FRENCH ARE NOT ATTENDING ANY E.E.C. MEETINGS (INCLUDING THOSE OF CO-ORDINATION IN GENEVA), AND PRESENT INTENTION IS ALSO NOT TO ATTEND BRUSSELS MINISTERIAL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR LATER THIS MONTH.

FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO E.E.C. WAS EITHER TO BE RECALLED OR TO GO ON VACATION - PROBABLY THE LATTER.

3. AS TO IMMEDIATE FUTURE, WAHL SAID HE COULD NOT PREDICT, IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF EVENTS COMMISSION SHOULD PREPARE NEW PROPOSALS AND CONSULT CONFIDENTIALLY AND INDEPENDENTLY WITH MEMBER COUNTRIES. THIS PROCESS COULD GO THROUGH SEVERAL STAGES AND IF TAKEN IT WOULD BE OCTOBER/NOVEMBER BEFORE A NEW DRAFT CAME BEFORE MINISTERS.

HE GAVE IT AS HIS OPINION THAT THIS WOULD BE THE SENSIBLE COURSE BUT IT APPEARED THAT COMMISSION WERE WORKING ON NEW PROPOSALS AND NOT CONSULTING ANYONE.

IF SUCH A DRAFT WERE FORMALLY PRESENTED HE FELT IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE AND ONLY AGGRAVATE SITUATION.

WAHL IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION AGREED THAT EVENTS WERE SNOW-BALLING AND THAT DECISIONS WERE TAKEN (AND BEING TAKEN) DIRECTLY BY DE GAULLE.

HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT WHILST THIS WAS OBVIOUSLY A MAJOR CRISIS WE SHOULD NOT READ INTO IT, AT THIS STAGE, FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM E.E.C. BUT AS A STANDSTILL.

HOW LONG IT WOULD CONTINUE HE WOULD NOT HASARD BUT SPOKE OF POSSIBILITY OF RETURN TO MORE NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER PRESSURE AND INITIATIVES FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SIX AND AMERICANS.

4. WHEN WE SAID THAT IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT FRANCE DID NOT RELISH DATE OF 1ST JANUARY, 1966 WHEN QUALIFIED MAJORITY WAS POSSIBLE AND THAT SUPRA-NATIONAL ELEMENT OF COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL WAS ALSO OBVIOUSLY NOT LIKED WAHL EMPHASISED AGAIN THAT DISCUSSION IN BRUSSELS HAD NEVER PROGRESSED BEYOND TECHNICAL ISSUES AND THAT GERMANS WERE OF IDENTICAL VIEW WITH FRENCH ON THE SUPRA-NATIONAL POINT

.../3...

INWARD CABLEGRAM

JM

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I. 28478

ON VOTING HE SAID THAT FRANCE AND GERMANY HAD ALREADY REACHED DE FACTO AGREEMENT AT QUALIFIED MAJORITY WOULD NEVER BE USED EXCEPT ON MINOR ISSUES - HE INSTANCED THINGS LIKE TARIFF QUOTAS.

HE WAS EMPHATIC THAT THESE TWO ISSUES HAD BEEN OVER-EMPHASISED IN PRESS AND ADDED CATEGORICALLY THAT IF "A GOOD SOLUTION" WITHIN THE PREVIOUSLY AGREED (AND PAID FOR BY FRANCE) TIME LIMIT HAD BEEN SECURED DE GAULLE WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY HAPPY TO ACCEPT IT.

WHILST ALL THIS MAY SOUND CONVINCING ENOUGH IT RATHER BEGS THE QUESTION OF WHY FRANCE DID NOT SHOW MORE PATIENCE IN BRUSSELS.

WAHLS ANSWER ON THIS IS THAT WHOLE EXERCISE WAS A SERIES OF ERRORS AND WAS PRODUCED BY THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING.

IN OTHER WORDS WAHL IS SAYING THAT FRENCH DID NOT SET OUT TO PROVOKE A CRISIS BUT TO GET AGREEMENT BUT THIS PROVED IMPOSSIBLE.

5. FOR THE KENNEDY ROUND HE SAID THAT IT HAD BEEN APPARENT THAT IF THE FINANCIAL PROVISIONS COULD NOT BE FINALISED THEN SO FAR AS AGRICULTURE WAS CONCERNED SEPTEMBER 16TH DATE COULD NOT BE KEPT.

IN NEW CIRCUMSTANCES HE FELT THAT WHOLE AREA OF NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE HELD IN ABEYANCE FOR FRANCE AND E.E.C.

WHEN ASKED IF THE COMMISSION COULD NOT CONTINUE IN GENEVA AND CLAIM TO BE WORKING WITHIN ITS EXISTING MANDATE HE SAID IT WAS ALWAYS POSSIBLE FOR THE COMMISSION TO TAKE THAT VIEW BUT THAT IT DID NOT SEEM VERY REALISTIC.

IN ANY EVENT, FRENCH DELEGATIONS WOULD NOT BE PARTICIPATING IN E.E.C. CO-ORDINATING (OR OTHER) MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS OR GENEVA.

6. THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION WAHL WAS OBVIOUSLY UNHAPPY IN DISCUSSING FUTURE PROSPECTS, FOR AS YOU ARE AWARE HE HAS A POSITIVE APPROACH TO MATTERS.

HE MADE CLEAR MANY TIMES THAT FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS COULD NOT BE FORESEEN BUT CONCLUDED ON NOTE THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE TOO PESSIMISTIC.

HE THOUGHT (PERHAPS IT WAS MORE OF A HOPE) THAT AFTER AN INTERVAL THINGS WOULD SORT THEMSELVES OUT AND THAT MATTERS BOTH WITHIN E.E.C. AND KENNEDY ROUND COULD PROGRESS BUT THIS WOULD TAKE TIME.

7. IN A SUBSEQUENT AND SEPARATE CONVERSATION KOJEVE EXPANDED ON THE REFERENCE BY WAHL TO COMMISSION'S MISHANDLING.

HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE FUTURE OF E.E.C. WAS IN DOUBT AND THOUGHT THAT PRESENT WAS SOMETHING OF A "VACATION CRISIS", SOME THINGS WOULD HAVE TO CHANGE AND HE MENTIONED POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT OF SOME COMMISSIONERS AND PRUNING OF COMMISSION'S POWERS.

LEAVING ASIDE PRESENT CRISIS, HE IS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT KENNEDY ROUND AND FEELS IT WILL HAVE TO BE REDUCED IN SCALE AND MORE OR LESS CONFINED TO INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS.

HE CONTINUES TO ADVOCATE CEREALS ARRANGEMENT BECAUSE IT MAKES SENSE AND ADDS THAT AS KENNEDY ROUND PRECEPTS JUST DO NOT APPLY IN AGRICULTURE IT WOULD BE EASIER AND MORE PRACTICAL TO CONSIDER SELECTED PRODUCTS FOR NEGOTIATION AT A FUTURE DATE E.G., CEREALS.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

JM

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I. 28478

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

7TH JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1, 2, 3, 4) UN PACAM AMSP EAMEC E PIO ICR
ER@ PPO

CONFIDENTIAL

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25/1/1 38

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

SAJ.

I. 28629

FROM:

DATED: 7TH JULY, 1965
1802

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS.

REC'D: 8TH JULY, 1965
0315

1772. UNCLASSIFIED.

COMMON MARKET.

INFORMATION MINISTER PEYREFITTE SAID AFTER TODAY'S CABINET MEETING THAT THERE WAS NOTHING TO ADD TO LAST WEEK'S COMMUNIQUE, NO NEW EVENTS HAVING TAKEN PLACE SINCE THEN.

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT PRIMARY INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C&E
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

8TH JULY, 1965

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) AS(JIC) LA UN PACAM AMSP EAMEC
E ER@ ICR PIO PPO
BONN BRUSSELS GENEVA THE HAGUE OTTAWA PARIS ROME
STOCKHOLM WASHINGTON WELLINGTON

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

37

25/1/1

GCL.

I.28466

FROM:

DATED: 6TH JULY, 1965.

1736.

REC'D: 7TH JULY, 1965.

0620.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.

196. RESTRICTED.

REPEATED LONDON 72, PARIS 48, GENEVA 37, BONN 34
LONDON PLEASE PASS SAVING : HAGUE 10, ROME 10

EEC CRISIS

MEETING OF AGRICULTURAL MINISTERS SCHEDULED FOR 12TH JULY
WAS CANCELLED IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE BREAKDOWN.

FRENCH EXPERTS HAVE ALSO WITHDRAWN FROM WORKING GROUPS
(VEGETABLES, NIGERIAN AND MAGHREB NEGOTIATIONS).

FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE BOEGNER HAS NOW BEEN RECALLED TO PARIS
FOR CONSULTATION AND HIS DEPUTY IS NOT AUTHORISED TO
ATTEND COUNCIL MEETING 26TH JULY.

2. COMMISSION OFFICIALS WHO HAVE BEEN WORKING ON PROPOSALS
DESIGNED TO FACILITATE A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, HAVE EXPRESSED
CONCERN TO US AT THESE DEVELOPMENTS.

THEY POINT OUT THAT EEC OFFERS IN THE KENNEDY ROUND REQUIRE A
FURTHER DECISION BY THE COUNCIL BEFORE THEY ARE TABLED IN GENEVA,
AND THAT UNLESS THE MINISTERS RESUME ON 26TH JULY THE DEADLINE OF
16TH SEPTEMBER WILL HAVE TO BE EXTENDED.

APPARENTLY THERE WILL BE NO BUSINESS IN AUGUST AS
USUAL.

HARRY

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'s DEPT
P.M.'s

7TH JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) LA INT UN PACAM AMSP
EAMEC E ICR PIO PPO ER@ CR
OTTAWA STOCKHOLD WASHINGTON WELLINGTON



INWARD CABLEGRAM

GSW

I.28187

FROM:

DATED: 2ND JULY, 1965.
1853.

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 5TH JULY, 1965.
1800

1712 UNCLASSIFIED.

FRENCH PRESS COMMENTARY ON BREAKDOWN OF BRUSSELS NEGOTIATIONS HAS EMPHASIZED CONNECTION BETWEEN ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS AND POLITICAL AIMS.

2. ROGER MASSIP IN LE FIGARO TODAY SAID THAT BREAKDOWN SHOWED THAT IT IS USELESS "TO WISH TO CONSTRUCT AN ECONOMIC EUROPE WHILE PRETENDING TO DRAW THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF UNIFICATION".

HE RECALLED HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL REGULATION PROPOSALS AND SAID THAT FRENCH PROPOSAL OF 15TH JUNE WAS "LOGICAL"

HOWEVER THE "FRENCH ATTITUDE ON 15TH JUNE HAD HELPED DEFLECT SOME OF OUR PARTNERS".

IT ALSO CONVINCED THEM THAT GENERAL DE GAULLE WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN COOPERATION TOWARDS THE COMMUNITY FORMULAE THAT THEY WANTED.

THIS CREATED A BAD ATMOSPHERE IN BRUSSELS WHICH COMPROMISED THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE DECLARATION READ YESTERDAY, WHICH (SAID MASSIP) HAD BEEN DRAWN UP BY GENERAL DE GAULLE HIMSELF, SHOWED THAT THE COMMON MARKET WAS NOW UNDERGOING A VERY SERIOUS CRISIS.

IT WAS BECAUSE THE BELIEVERS IN A COMMUNITY OF EUROPE HAD LOST HOPE OF BRINGING THE FRENCH ROUND TO THEIR VIEW THAT THEY WERE INTRANSIGENT TO THE POINT OF TURNING DOWN THE FRENCH SUGGESTIONS.

M COUVE DE MRVILLE HASTENED EVENTS BY CLOSING DISCUSSIONS ONLY TWO HOURS AFTER THE FIXED TIME.

THE LACK OF GOOD WILL AND COMMUNITY SPIRIT WAS ONE OF THE MOST DISCOURAGING CONCLUSIONS FROM THE RUPTURE.

3. PIERRE DROUIN OF LE MONDE REFERRED TO "A HIBERNATION OF EUROPE".

HE THOUGHT THAT THE PARTICIPANTS AT BRUSSELS HAD "UNINTENTIONALLY RELEASED POLITICAL FORCES AND ECONOMIC APPETITES THAT THEY WERE THEN UNABLE TO CONTROL".

HE QUOTED THE EXAMPLE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FINANCING OF THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.

THE TANDEM TEAM OF FRANCE AND THE COMMISSION WHICH HAD BEEN LEADING AGRICULTURAL EUROPE HAD STRUCK A POLITICAL OBSTACLE OF SUPRANATIONALITY.

4. DROUIN MENTIONED THE FOLLOWING CONSEQUENCES:

(1) ECONOMIC: FRANCE NOW FEELS IT HAD BEEN TRICKED IN ACCEPTING RISING CEREAL PRICES WITHOUT COMPENSATION BY COMMUNITY DISPOSED OF SURPLUSES.

IT WOULD TRY TO PROTECT ITS REAR BY LEAVING INDUSTRIAL TARIFS AS THE STAND OR EVEN RAISING THEM.

(2) POLITICAL: FRANCE NEEDED EUROPE, BUT WOULD IT GO AHEAD TO A SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT SUCH A TIME, ALTHOUGH THIS WAS NOW NEEDED TO SOLVE THE CRISIS?

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GSW

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

1.28187

(3) JURIDICIAL: BREAKDOWN MEANT IN EFFECT RETURN TO THE FIRST STAGE OF THE COMMON MARKET AS REGARDS AGRICULTURE. ALTHOUGH OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS WOULD NOT BE ABOLISHED IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE NOW TO GO INTO THIRD STAGE ON 1ST JANUARY 1966.

5. EUROPE WAS BOUND TO EXPERIENCE CRISES.
IF THE PRESENT CRISIS IS OVERCOME CONDITIONS WILL BE READY TO TAKE UP OTHER SUBJECTS THAN FRUIT AND VEGETABLES.

MIN. & DEPT T. & I. (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M'S DEPT
P.M'S

5TH JUNE, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1,2,3,4) AS(JIC) LA PACAM AMSP EAMEC E
ICR ER@ PIO PPO

25/1/1
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

1.27993

LES

FROM:

DATED: 2ND JULY, 1965.

1455
REC'D: 3RD JULY, 1965.
0215

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.

193 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 68, PARIS 45.
LONDON PLEASE PASS SAVING HAGUE 7, ROME 7, BONN7.

E.E.C. CRISIS.

REACTIONS IN BRUSSELS TO THE COUNCIL DEADLOCK AND TO
PEYREFITTE'S STATEMENT (PARIS TELEGRAM 1691) HAVE BEEN VARIED.

2. ALTHOUGH MANSCHOLT DEFERRED HIS DEPARTURE FOR TALKS IN ATHENS
BECAUSE OF THE CRISIS THE OFFICIAL E.E.C. LINE HAS BEEN TO PLAY DOWN
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION.

HALLSTEIN IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE CLAIMED THAT A SETTLEMENT
COULD STILL BE REACHED.

HE SAID THAT THE SIX HAD ALREADY BEEN HALF WAY TO FULL
AGREEMENT AND THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT NEGOTIATING MARGIN TO
COMPLETE IT.

HE URGED THAT THE SITUATION BE NOT DRAMATISED AND CALLED FOR
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS BY THE SIX BY 'STOPPING THE CLOCK'.

HE SAID THE COMMISSION WOULD RE-EXAMINE ITS PROPOSALS FOR
FINANCING THE COMMUNITY.

3. OTHER E.E.C. OFFICIALS HAVE ADMITTED PRIVATELY THAT THE
COMMISSION OVERREACHED ITSELF IN ITS PROPOSALS AND THAT A PERIOD OF
DIGESTION WILL NOW BE REQUIRED BEFORE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE
AT A NEW COMPROMISE BASED ON A REAL BALANCE OF INTERESTS.

THEY CONSIDER THAT THE FRENCH STATEMENT WHILE NOT SHUTTING THE
DOOR TO NEGOTIATIONS MAY DELAY A SETTLEMENT UNTIL THE END OF THE
YEAR.

4. I HAVE FOUND LITTLE REFLECTION IN THE COMMISSION OR AMONG THE
PERMANENT DELEGATIONS OF THE THESIS PUT FORWARD BY THE LONDON
TIMES CORRESPONDENT THAT THIS IS A VICTORY FOR THE FIVE WHO HAVE AT
LAST CALLED FRANCE'S BLUFF.

OFFICIALS PRESENT DURING THE MEETING HAVE HOWEVER EXPRESSED
SURPRISE AT THE TOUGHNESS OF THE DUTCH, GERMANS AND EVEN
ITALIANS WHO WOULD ON PAST FORM HAVE BEEN INCLINED TO COMPROMISE.

5. LUNS APPARENTLY HAD LITTLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE BECAUSE OF HIS
PARLIAMENT'S INSISTENCE ON GREATER CONTROL BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
(HAGUE MEMORANDUM 360), WHICH LUNS HAD ORIGINALLY RAISED ONLY AS AN
ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF DELAY.

THE FIRM POSITION TAKEN BY THE BUNDESTAG ALSO TIED THE HANDS
OF THE GERMANS.

WE UNDERSTAND THAT ITALIANS MADE EFFORTS TO SECURE A SETTLEMENT
ON THE BASIS OF A DECISION CONFINED TO A LIMITED PERIOD BUT WERE NOT
PREPARED TO ACCEPT A TIMETABLE EXTENDING TO 1970 AS THE FRENCH
ORIGINALLY WANTED.

EVEN SPAAK DID NOT GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO FRANCE ON THIS POINT,
THOUGH HE AGREED WITH THE FRENCH ARGUMENT THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO
DECIDE ON WIDER POWERS FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

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I.27993

6. THERE IS OF COURSE MUCH SPECULATION AS TO WHETHER THE STATEMENT DE GAULLE IS TO MAKE WILL FURTHER HARDEN THE POSITION OR WHETHER HE WILL, AS IS HOPED, LEAVE SCOPE FOR NEGOTIATION. PEYREFITTE'S STATEMENT THAT PROPOSALS WERE MADE BY THE FRENCH DELEGATION 'WHICH MIGHT HAVE LED TO FRANCE'S ASSUMING A PROPORTION OF THE FINANCIAL BURDENS JUDGED EXCESSIVE BY SOME OF HER PARTNERS' PRESUMABLY REFERS TO A FRENCH OFFER TO ACCEPT A LOWER CONTRIBUTION BY ITALY.

THE BEST DESCRIPTION WE HAVE OF THE FRENCH POSITION IS CONTAINED IN OUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

IT IS POSSIBLE THAT FRANCE MAY RENEW THIS OFFER WHICH WAS NOT SPELT OUT IN DETAIL AS FAR AS WE CAN LEARN.

7. OUR SOURCES HERE INDICATE HOWEVER THAT COUVE DE MURVILLE WAS IN AN ANGRY MOOD WHEN HE LEFT BRUSSELS, CLAIMING THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO PROCEED IF OTHERS WOULD NOT STICK TO THEIR AGREEMENTS.

HE WAS APPARENTLY REFERRING NOT ONLY TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE COUNCIL THAT A FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE COMPLETE BY 30TH JUNE 1965, BUT ALSO TO THE GERMAN AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT FRANCE ON FINANCING IN RETURN FOR FRENCH AGREEMENT TO THE FULL INDUSTRIALL COMMON MARKET ON 1ST JULY 1965.

8. ON BALANCE THE VIEW IS THAT EVEN IF THE CRISIS IS NOT SHARPENED THERE WILL BE FURTHER AND PERHAPS PROLONGED DELAY IN E.E.C. OFFERS ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS WITH INEVITABLE REPERCUSSIONS ON THE WHOLE KENNEDY ROUND.

HARRY.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

3RD JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1 2 3 4) PACAM AMSP EAMEC E ICR PIO ER

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25/1/1 22
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

LES

I.28005

FROM:

DATED: 2ND JULY, 1965.

1604

REC'D: 3RD JULY, 1965.

0305

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
BRUSSELS.

194 UNCLASSIFIED.

ADDRESSED CANBERRA 194, REPEATED LONDON 69, PARIS 46,
LONDON PLEASE PASS SAVING HAGUE 8, ROME 8, BONN 8.

FOLLOWING IS THE FRENCH PROPOSAL AS REPORTED BY 'L'EUROPE' :-

'WHEREAS THE TREATY HAS PROVIDED FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING MEMBER STATES' FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS WITH RESOURCES OF THE COMMUNITY ITSELF, NOTABLY THROUGH INCOME ARISING OUT OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF, WHEREAS THIS REPLACEMENT COULD NOT BE EFFECTED UNTIL WARRANTED BY THE LEVEL OF COMMUNITY EXPENDITURE, WHEREAS WITH EFFECT FROM THE MOMENT AT WHICH CUSTOMS DUTIES ARE ABOLISHED IN TRADE BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES AND THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF SET UP, THE PLACE AT WHICH IMPORTS ARE TAXED AND THE PLACE AT WHICH THEY ARE CONSUMED NO LONGER NECESSARILY CORRESPOND, AND THAT IT IS RIGHT AND PROPER AS A RESULT, TO EFFECT AN EQUALISATION OF CUSTOMS DUTIES BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES, THE COUNCIL HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS :-

- (1) WHEN THE DAY-TO-DAY EXPENSES OF THE COMMUNITY EXCEED THE TOTAL OF RECEIPTS ACCRUING ON THE ONE HAND, FROM THE APPLICATION OF THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF, AND TAXES ON CERTAIN GOODS RESULTING FROM THE PROCESSING OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS CUSTOMS DUTIES, AND ON THE OTHER HAND RECEIPTS ACCRUING FROM LEVIES AND OTHER CHARGES INSTITUTED AS PART OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, THE COUNCIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 201, WILL MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS TO ALLOCATE TO THE COMMUNITY CUSTOMS DUTIES AS ITS OWN RESOURCES.
- (11) AS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF IS APPLIED, AND UP TO THE TIME AT WHICH CUSTOMS DUTIES ARE ALLOCATED TO THE COMMUNITY BUDGET, CUSTOMS DUTIES SHALL BE EQUALISE BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

3RD JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(2 4) UN PACAM AMSF EAMEC E ICR PIO ER

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

25/1/1 31

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I.27882

FROM:

DATED: 1ST JULY, 1965.
1935

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 2ND JULY, 1965.
0606

1691 UNCLASSIFIED. PRIORITY.

FOR TRADE
REPEATED BRUSSELS FOR GORTER 9.

FOLLOWING TODAY'S MEETING OF THE FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MR PEYREFITTE, MINISTER FOR INFORMATION, ISSUED A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS AT BRUSSELS.

FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THIS STATEMENT.

"THE COUNCIL DEPLORES THE FACT THAT AN ENGAGEMENT UNDERTAKEN 3 1/2 YEARS AGO, TO COMPLETE THE EEC FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT BY 30TH JUNE 1965, HAS NOT BEEN FULFILLED.

THE CRISIS IS STILL MORE SERIOUS BECAUSE FIRSTLY, FRANCE AGREED IN JANUARY 1962, TO PASS TO THE SECOND STAGE OF THE TREATY OF ROME, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE REACHED AND SECONDLY THE DECISIONS OF 15TH DECEMBER 1964 ON COMMON CEREAL PRICES, HAD BEEN REACHED THROUGH FORMAL AND REPEATED ASSURANCES THAT THE FINANCIAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE COMPLETE, AS AGREED, BY 30TH JUNE 1965.

THE COUNCIL ALSO VOTED ITS GENERAL SUPPORT OF THE FRENCH DELEGATIONS PROPOSED TIMETABLE WHICH ANTICIPATES COMPLETION OF AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS (STILL IN ABEYANCE) AND THE FIXING OF COMMON PRICES.

THIS CALENDAR PROVIDES FOR FREE CIRCULATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY BY 1ST JULY 1967, UNIFORM PRICES, AND COMMON PROTECTION THROUGH LEVIES.

THE COUNCIL NOTED THAT, WHILE FRANCE'S PARTNERS IN THE COMMON MARKET WERE SUPPORTING THIS CALENDAR, OTHER MEMBERS, BECAUSE OF NEW POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PROVOKED BY THIS ULTIMATE NEGOTIATION, HAD PREVENTED AGREEMENT ON COMMON FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIS CRISIS IS STILL LESS JUSTIFIABLE IN THAT THE FRENCH DELEGATION HAD MADE PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT HAVE LED TO FRANCE'S ASSUMING A PROPORTION OF THE FINANCIAL BURDENS JUDGED EXCESSIVE BY SOME OF HER PARTNERS, AND HAD, MOREOVER, AGREED TO THE FINALIZING OF CUSTOMS UNION FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS BY 1ST JULY 1967.

IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE GOVERNMENT HAS DECIDED, AS

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD CABLEGRAM

RAD

- 2 -

I.27882

FAR AS IT ITSELF IS CONCERNED, TO DRAW THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND JUDICIAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE SITUATION WHICH HAS THUS JUST BEEN CREATED.

END OF STATEMENT."

FOLLOWING THIS STATEMENT, THE MINISTER WAS ASKED IF HE COULD INDICATE THE NATURE OF CONCLUSIONS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT MIGHT REACH.

HE REPLIED THAT THESE CONCLUSIONS WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN DUE COURSE.

WHEN ASKED IF ANYTHING HAD BEEN CHANGED, HE REPLIED - "YES BECAUSE EVERYTHING IS NOW AT A DEADLOCK".

WHEN ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT NO MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED FOR JULY, MR PEYREFITTE REPLIED, "INDEED, FOR THE MOMENT, NO NEW MEETING IS PLANNED FOR JULY".

MIN. & DEPT TRADE & INDUSTRY (C)
MIN. & DEPT P.I. (C)
TREASURER & TREASURY
MIN. & DEPT N.D.
MIN. & DEPT C. & E.
A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'S DEPT
P.M.'S

2ND JULY, 1965.

SEC DS FAS(1, 2, 3, 4) AMSP PACAM EAMEC E ER ICR PIO

25/1/1

Memo No. 550
File No. 201/1

25th June, 1965

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

General de Gaulle's "Tour de France"

General de Gaulle completed his tour of the French Departments by visiting the Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne, and Eure-et-Loire from 16th to 20th June. The visit followed what has by now become a ritual with speeches at the major stops, and "a few words to the people" at shorter halts.

2. The themes of the speeches were the same as those on his previous tour. The "two hegemonies" were again criticized, although this time a distinction, appreciated by the New York Times and New York Herald Tribune, was made between them. While one "imposed on its satellites a totalitarian régime, the other (extended its hegemony) by other means, certainly less unpleasant, less harsh, which consisted of offering its protection and its aid, and in intervening, if necessary, with military forces as we see in Vietnam, Laos and Santo Domingo".

3. France's role in the world was again evoked. At Chartres he referred to "its permanent mission, peace, equilibrium, liberty, dignity". In order to be able to play this role, and to complete its internal reform, General de Gaulle said France needed national unity and solidarity. "France needs a collective effort" and "to complete the transformation of France a collective effort is needed, not dispersed efforts." The present government was contrasted unfavourably with the Fourth Republic. "We must not return to a régime of permanent division, of ministers who fall one after the other."

4. Possible references to the presidential campaign were, as usual, looked for. Statements which were seized upon included: "I am touched by this evidence you give me. I will take it as an element of resolution for the future", and a call for assistance to all French people to help in his task of "representing the national sovereignty".

5. Several recent statements by General de Gaulle have been interpreted as an effort to appeal to popular sentiment. Following on the description of European supranationalists as "Jean-foutres" at an Elysée Garden Party, the General, when calling for a national effort, said; "Il ne faut pas se mettre à côté, à pisser du vinaigre dans son coin." A press commentator has pointed out that General de Gaulle finds it difficult to adapt himself to the level of the crowd

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he is addressing, and so has to rely on this "barrack-room slang". A statement during another speech on France's role in the world, that he felt he heard from other nations an approving "Allez la France" (a chant often used by French supporters at international sporting fixtures) is open to the same interpretation.

6. General de Gaulle also answered critics who have been saying that he is not sufficiently interested in internal administrative matters. On several occasions he referred to problems of economic development, and at least once specifically said that the "intendance" was his personal concern.

7. Special references were made to M. Pompidou. At Versailles General de Gaulle said that "those who help me carry this charge, in the first place the Prime Minister, M. Georges Pompidou, who is beside me, think as I think ...". Most commentators are of the opinion that General de Gaulle will be a candidate in December, but one writer has wondered whether, in the face of a divided opposition, General de Gaulle might not put M. Pompidou in as a presidential candidate at the last minute, and then use all his influence to ensure his (Pompidou's) election.

8. Le Monde's estimation of the crowds during the tour is that they were noticeably thin and unenthusiastic on the first day, when it was raining and the cortège was passing through dormitory suburbs, but became denser and more appreciative later on. The avoidance of the more heavily industrialized areas around Paris was remarked on. An instruction from the Minister of Education that teachers were to take school children to line the route aroused much criticism from opposition elements. Judging by press reports the measure was counter-productive, as it seemed to lead to bad publicity but no increase in the crowds, as many teachers found ways of avoiding the instruction.

C.A. EDWARDS

(C. A. Edwards)
Third Secretary

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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS

File 25/1/1
(answ 25/2)

27

Memo No. 530
File No. 202/3

22nd June, 1965

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

Internal Politics

Following the Congresses of the S.F.I.O. and the P.S.U. representatives of the parties and political club favourable to M. Gaston Defferre's proposal for the creation of a Democratic Socialist Federation held meetings to attempt to evolve a mutually acceptable programme and policy for the federation. The differences in attitude noted during these congresses, and the M.R.P. Congress, were revealed again with greater force, and after a nine hour meeting on the night of 17th June M. Defferre had to announce the failure of his efforts. "The representatives of the political parties have had to note that they were not able to reach a wide enough agreement to set up a unitary political formation."

2. Press accounts of the meeting have stated that agreement was reached on all sections of the proposal connected with foreign policy: a politically united Europe, creation of a federal system with a parliament and government, East-West détente, industrial co-operation with East Europe, reinforcement of the Atlantic Alliance, international solidarity pact with the developing countries. On some points of domestic policy agreement was reached: democratic application of the 1958 Constitution, priority to education instead of nuclear armament, municipal ownership of building sites. On other points of domestic policy, however, differences were too great.

3. The first of these points raised was the Federation's attitude to the presidential elections. Some felt that it would lose prestige if it appeared to be simply a cartel for the elections, while others said that it could not be effective in the legislative elections in 1967 if it had not already acted in 1965. The question was reserved.

4. Relations with the Communist Party were another stumbling block. The M.R.P. were hostile to any moves towards the P.C.F., while a club representative felt that such electoral matters should be excluded from the Federation's charter. The question was reserved.

5. Another question on which no decision was taken was the question of secularity. State aid to schools was discussed at length without any agreement being reached.

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6. The final break occurred over the question of the title of the Federation, i.e. whether or not it was to be "socialist". The M.R.P. and S.F.I.O. took opposing positions and various alternative suggestions such as "fédération travailliste" were not accepted.

7. Most commentators have blamed the political parties for the failure - the fact that the final communiqué made no mention of the club is significant. Combat was the most outspoken in its criticism of the parties when it said "the stupidity, the vanity and the hypocrisy of the leaders of the political parties engaged in the elaboration of the Federation have caused the failure the other night of the only positive enterprise which has been made for seven years against Gaullist personal power". Working out the share of the blame to be attached to each would be a difficult and unrewarding task, but it is interesting to note that L'Express, whose Director-General represented the Horizon 80 Club at the final meeting, was especially critical of the M.R.P. leaders, for whom "France was only an electoral problem". It pointed out that they said that their followers would not be elected on a "ticket" containing the word "socialist", and envisaging relations with the Communist Party.

8. The analysis of the reasons for the break made by Le Populaire is however probably nearer to the point. It said that while agreement was possible on many questions, there are "reasons which prevent" the parties taking common action "up to the federal level. They are of two sorts. One sort concerns the programme and tactics, the other the whole significance of the projected federation." It cited as an example of the economic questions on which "serious divergences exist" the question of the nationalisation of banks. The divergences between the doctrines of the parties concerned on such fundamental positions as their attitude towards socialism were too great to be settled by round table discussions, if they could be settled at all.

9. M. Defferre's own tactics now seem to have contributed to this failure. The emphasis on the "dynamism" of his group aroused considerable public interest and won the support of the young sections of the parties, but did not appeal to the old party leaders. "We do not have a taste for 'adventurism'" said Guy Mollet. Maurice Duverger in Le Monde said that M. Defferre overestimated the importance of the congresses in the decision-making processes of the parties. The decisions were made by the party leaders, and their positions had not evolved.

10. The opposition movement for a common association has thus come to a halt, but this could be only temporary.

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The clubs and political associations, including members of some of the parties, are presently holding meetings to examine the situation, and communiqués published to date have been optimistic, and called for a new effort outside the realm of the parties. The Committee of Democrats (mainly the M.R.P. and Rassemblement Démocratique) said that "to assure the future of democracy, the local elected members decide to create, beyond the old formations, a new political force, excluding the double danger of a return to the outdated struggles and the abandon to personal power". A meeting of members of six of the clubs resulted in a communiqué which "affirmed their desire to continue and deepen their action".

11. While it seems most likely that any future movement will take place outside the strict party context, i.e. will not be a grouping of the parties as such, M. Defferre's own position is not yet clear. Despite comments on his errors of judgement he has probably gained in prestige over recent weeks. Commentators in Le Monde and Le Figaro have over the past few months predicted that he would withdraw his candidacy for the presidential elections if the Federation failed. These predictions, however, were not based on any declaration by M. Defferre and it is still possible that he will initiate a new movement and remain in the campaign. For many commentators he is still the "only worthwhile candidate against General de Gaulle".
(Combat)

C.A. EDWARDS

(C. A. Edwards)
Third Secretary



AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

Memo No. 520
File No. 211/1

18th June, 1965

The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.

French Foreign Policy

.... We attach a copy of extracts from the speech given by M. Couve de Murville during the National Assembly debate on foreign policy, as printed in Le Monde. M. Couve made the following points:-

European Communities

2. The treaty for the fusion of the three European Communities was a "measure for good administration". M. Couve said that by the end of 1967 or 1968 the new economic community would appear as the Common Market took "its final form". The questions of internal tariffs, common external tariffs and common agricultural prices would be settled. This presupposed that before then "all the indispensable decisions", including the financing of the agricultural policy, would have been taken.

Common Agricultural Policy

3. In December the French Government helped reach the agreement on cereal prices, believing that this would soon be completed by a common financial policy, as agreed on 14th January, 1962. The French Government believed that financial policy should now be completed, without raising such questions as distribution of charges and proceeds connected with imposition of common external tariffs. The Six should be reaching agreement on the taking up of these charges by the Agricultural Fund, on the lines laid down by the January 1962 meeting.

Strasbourg Parliament

4. For the transitory period, as long as governments have not given up irrevocably any receipts, there is no reason to claim powers from the Assembly at Strasbourg. Proceeds from duties on industrial goods could one day be allocated to Community expenses, but a decision to allocate receipts now far exceeding its annual expenses would only lead to waste. Once the external tariff was set up, some measure to equalize receipts would be reached. On the real problem for the Six is to decide on how to use receipts from customs duties.

Brussels Negotiations

5. M. Couve explained recent negotiations at Brussels.

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Wls ER
sent 24/6
M. J. Dunn
M. Murphy

MR
A.R. Moorhead



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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

- 2 -

He said that the Commission had proposed the date of 1st July, 1967 for commencement of the "single market" in order to justify the allocation of customs duties to the Community. This would have entailed a large intervention by the Strasbourg Assembly, but this was considered "imprudent" by all the Six and therefore rejected. This will not delay the concluding of the agricultural policy or the determining of common prices.

6. M. Couve returned to this subject later to deny that France had changed her policy at Brussels.

Supranationality

7. "The European Communities remain the basis of our European policy." But national controls are also necessary to assure prosperity. The very size of the Common Market implies that the major decisions are political as well as economic, and that explains why the E.E.C. members wish to prolong their national control. "No one any longer talks seriously ... about an illusory supranationalism." In practice it is cooperation between governments that is needed; problems of foreign and defence policy are not settled by majority votes. It was by the way of an independent "European Europe" that all national European problems would be settled.

Europe

8. France was ready to discuss with other Europeans the questions of a European policy, but it would take a lot of time to define its essential elements, and in the meanwhile "life continues and French policy must provide for it".

9. A European settlement, as much as a German settlement, signifies an East-West agreement. It has never been a question of excluding the United States from this. A transformation of relations between all European countries is necessary. This calls for internal changes in the East European countries, and this seems to have begun. France has established more normal contacts with these countries. The economic and political union of Western Europe would be a major element of equilibrium in this new European situation.

United States

10. French policies have raised many apprehensions, but to pretend that "our country and its Government has as its only objective to be inexplicably disagreeable to a great friendly nation is simply ridiculous". In Vietnam it is a question of the relations between whites and coloured, of the peace of the world. "In all these great problems isn't a country like ours vitally interested?"

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


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AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY
PARIS

- 3 -

In the Dominican Republic France could not approve of military intervention. The fact that France cannot speak for all of Europe, and does not have the power to destroy the world does not mean that she cannot talk of liberty, independence and peace. The sooner Europe engages in a revision of relations with the United States the easier the evolution will be, and the easier it will be to maintain the indispensable relations of alliance and friendship.

11. A copy of this memorandum has been sent to Washington.


(G. A. Edwards)
Third Secretary

- 2-3. — Le défilé de politique étrangère à l'occasion de la fête de l'Armée.
4. — L'affaire vietnamienne, A. Clement, A. Jacob.
5. — La crise dominicaine, Ph. Ben.
6. — L'annuaire du mouvement de Ber-
7. — L'annuaire du mouvement de Ber-
8. — L'annuaire du mouvement de Ber-
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Tarif des abonnements en page 2

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LA CONFÉRENCE DU COMMONWEALTH

Augmentée de trois nouveaux adhérents depuis l'année dernière, la section de la région de Lille — Malle, la Zambie et la Gambie — a organisé, le 12 novembre, la conférence des premiers ministres du Commonwealth se réunissant à partir de jeudi à Londres. Elle tire son intérêt du fait que pour la première fois depuis quarante ans, le siège du Royaume-Uni est occupé par un premier ministre travailliste et que les membres du Commonwealth se trouvent aux prises avec des problèmes bien brûlants qu'à aucun moment depuis l'affaire de Suez.

[illegible]

La question reste complexe. Le fait d'avoir su une telle affaire, le communisme peut être défini. Une telle affaire se sépare en effet un pays. Les tentatives d'extrême droite, comme l'Allemagne, dont les forces armées sont des forces armées au Vietnam, de la Tanzanie ou du Ghana, ont permis l'accueil favorable de la Grande-Bretagne et aux États-Unis à la déclaration commune des dix-sept pays non alignés, parmi lesquels figurent également le Pakistan, le Bangladesh, le Kenya, le Ghana, le Nigeria, l'Égypte, l'Ouganda et Zaire, mais pas le Canada, d'autant plus infé-

Les Etats-Unis vont porter à 70000 hommes leurs effectifs au Vietnam

mercredi, quelques heures avant que les Etats-Unis jettent anoir que leurs appétits assaient ébahi dans les Mayas, et l'annonce d'un bombardement au sud-ouest de Hanoi. M. McNamara a annoncé à Washington ce que chacun attendait : l'envoi de renforts, les troupes américaines au Vietnam du Sud. Les renforts, dont certains sont déjà en route, consistent en six bataillons de combat, ce qui représente environ vingt mille hommes. Dans « quelques semaines », lorsque ces troupes d'appont seront toutes arrivées au Vietnam, les militaires américains seront de soixante-dix à soixante-quinze mille hommes. Ils sembleront aujourd'hui à cinquante-cinq mille hommes.

Le secrétaire à la défense, qui a justifié cette nouvelle mesure par la nécessité d'opposer au moins cinq combattants réguliers à un combattant du Vietcong, a précisé qu'aucun changement n'aurait lieu au niveau du commandement. Les unités américaines et vietnamiennes restèrent sous leurs commandements respectifs. Il n'y eut aucune modification prévisible pour une date ultérieure. La seule nouveauté du commandement fut la mise au point d'un commandement unifié. Se félicitant de l'efficacité des bombardements du Vietnam du Nord, le Vietcong y contribua à isoler les unités américaines. Cependant, affirmant que le Vietnam du Nord avait probablement réussi à « éliminer » le centre du Vietnam du Sud. Jusé, plusieurs autorités américaines navales, les autorités américaines du Vietnam du Nord, ont déclaré que la mesure de l'intégration d'un seul commandement à la défense avait annoncé la fin de la division séparée d'une nouvelle division aérienne. Forte d'un million de soldats, elle disposa de seize mille hommes, elle disposa de ses propres avions et hélicoptères. Elle était dirigée par Benning, qui fut rapidement et

M. Couve de Murville
a explicité la notion
d'Europe « européenne »

[illegible]

Provins, 17 juin. — Un temps beaucoup plus élément, un accueil sympathique et plus chaleureux de populations un peu plus ombreuses que la veille, ont marqué la matinée de jeudi.

A Chelles, première étape après le château de Champs, MM. Peyssitte, ministre de l'information, et Jacques, ministre des travaux publics, ont été reçus par la directrice de la prison, M^{lle} Gaudin.

A MEAUX : aidez-moi !

Le cortège présidentiel arrive à Meaux et s'arrête près de la cathédrale qu'illustre Bossuet. Sur la place, devant l'hôtel de ville, il y a assez peu de monde, mais l'atmosphère est jeune et triomphale. On croit en France que tout va bien. Les communistes ont disparu, les socialistes ont pris le pouvoir, les catholiques se réconfortent. On se sent à l'aise. On se sent en France.

Le voyage présidentiel en Ile-de-France

LA SEINE-ET-MARNE
réserve au chef de l'État
un accueil sympathique
et parfois chaleureux

Pour gagner la Seine-et-Marne, à laquelle le maréchal se joint, la seconde journée de son voyage, en 1142-d'France, le général de Gaulle, qui avait passé la nuit à la préfecture de Versailles, a emporté dans la voiture des troupes, Parti du camp de Satory en hélicoptère, il a rejoint, à Commeny, Paris et atterri au cimetière de Champs, d'où le cortège s'est dirigé vers Meaux, Coulommiers et Provins, principales étapes de la campagne.

Laqueux de la Seine-et-Marne, malgré un temps toujours incertain, chaud et frais, a été plus cordial que celui qu'avait réservé la veille, pour les troupes d'armes d'armes, la Seine-et-Marne. Le chef de l'Etat a repris dans ses discours les thèmes abordés dès le début de ce voyage — plus des « deux légions » sur le plan national, venu d'un pouvoir, « stable, ferme et continu » à l'intérieur, etc. Il y ajoute parfois une attaque contre les partis et « les motions de toutes sortes ». A Versailles, il avait rendu un hommage remarqué à M. Pompidou, président, qui quelques heures à ces côtés.

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3 JUIN

Par **JEAN LACOUTURE**

l'histoire contemporaine, se situe d'abord sous le signe de deux textes moins fameux. L'un vient de Bordeaux : « Le gouvernement rappelle à tous les combattants qu'aucun armistice n'est intervenu et que la de-

voir est de poursuivre la résistance... L'autre est du chancelier allemand, qui a enjoint la veille à ses généraux de s'assurer des portions de territoire allemand pris par

près de 280 kilomètres à la tête de la 7^e zone division et a fait halte pour la nuit à 40 kilomètres de Cherbourg, entre Denneville et La Haye-du-Puits, comme l'ordre de pousser en avant, lui fit faut pour cela écraser le premier barrage qu'il ait rencontré, dressé par quelques marins courageux commandés par le lieutenant de vaisseau Allardy : ce qui lui prit plusieurs heures. Mais la chevauchée reprend

vite et Cherbourg sera investi avant le soir.

A Rennes, il est 7 heures quand le grand historien Marc Bloch, capitaine de réserve, quitte son cantonnement : il se trouve nez à nez avec une colonne de blindés allemands que considèrent, hébétés, sans esquisser un geste, une double file de soldats français. Deux heures plus

Le régime

Le 16 au soir, en dépit de l'offense d'union franco-britannique téléphonique de Londres, Paul Reynaud a été remblayé par le maréchal Pétain.

Le cortège présidentiel arrive à Reims et s'arrête près de la cathédrale qu'illustre Bessonet. Sur la place, devant l'hôtel de ville, il y a assez peu de monde, mais un auditoire est jeune, il fait un accueil chaleureux et turbulent au général, qui prononce son allocution. A ses côtés se tient le maire socialiste, M. Bourvin. Quand il évoque la construction de l'Europe le général dit cette phrase : « L'Europe, c'est l'Europe ».

« Chaque nation y a son caractère, ses lois, sa souveraineté. Mais par la coopération l'Europe pourra progresser, se développer, se défendre elle-même. L'océan Atlantique jusqu'au mont de l'Oura, l'Europe pourra devenir l'élément capital de la civilisation et du progrès. »

la France depuis quatre siècles » (dont Metz, Toul, Verdun et Belfort), et des principaux ports de l'Ouest, dont Cherbourg et Brest. Il faut ajouter qu'Adolf Hitler est mieux obéi que Philippe Pétain. Mais le maréchal qui avait en d'autres temps pu modeler le moral d'une armée, pouvait-il exiger la moindre opinion ?

[illegible]

néral. Mais les vainqueurs ne daignent pas même faire halte et fon-

Lire la suite en 8^e page, 4^e col.)

Encore un mot du général qui va faire couler beaucoup d'encre : l'attribution organique de la conduite des affaires en France.

ROBERT ESCARFIT.

sons, comme aussi nos sommes satisfaits de voir s'établir avec l'union politique des relations plus normales que par le passé. Les contacts que nous avons eus avec les Français et le sentiment des Français et le

des d'accord pour acquiescer au règlement final. Ce règlement définitif du régime de la Communauté, qui sera adopté par le Conseil, ne pourra intervenir qu'après l'adoption de la Convention de la Communauté.

C'est au vu des accords intervenus le 14 janvier 1965, et notamment au regard de l'engagement pris par le gouvernement français, que le Conseil a décidé son accord à la décision capitale qui consistait à accélérer le passage de la première à la deuxième étape de la Communauté. Dans ces conditions, le

Les pouvoirs de l'Assemblée de Strasbourg

Si les six gouvernements peuvent se mettre d'accord sur ces bases, c'est-à-dire mettre en pratique l'accord relatif aux deux autres étapes de la Communauté, les questions qui vont venir sur le devant de la scène devraient donner lieu à une discussion. Si nous nous bornons à l'étape de la Communauté, la période transitoire, c'est-à-dire pour un temps où les gouvernements ne se désolent pas d'une façon irrévocable d'aucune recette, il n'y a plus de prétexte pour certains à réclamer des pouvoirs. Ce qui doit d'ailleurs, à notre avis, rester dans les limites du rôle consultatif qui lui est imparti par le traité de Rome.

Quant aux recettes provenant des droits de douane sur les produits industriels, dont le traité de Rome prévoit qu'elles pourront être affectées à la Communauté, si les six gouvernements en sont d'accord, elles pourraient être un jour l'objet d'une telle décision, tout comme les revenus agricoles. Les six États en accord à ce sujet

Une mise au point

J'ouvre ici une parenthèse au sujet de ce qui s'est passé hier au Conseil du Marché commun d'après ce qui a été rapporté d'une façon tendancieuse, sinon franchement inexacte.

La discussion a fait apparaître qu'aucune délégation n'était prête à accepter dans leur ensemble les propositions de la commission.

C'est sur les deux points essentiels qui forment la base de l'accord, le régime de la Communauté — je viens de l'expliquer. L'autre est la question de la fixation du marché unique. L'autre est la question de la fixation du marché unique. L'autre est la question de la fixation du marché unique.

recettes de ce règlement de janvier 1962 indique la ligne à suivre : à savoir, prise en charge progressive des dépenses annuées par année, de façon que la totalité de la Communauté en soit assurée. Le Marché commun entrera dans sa période définitive. En ce qui concerne les contributions des États, elles doivent être, pendant elles l'ont été depuis juillet 1962, proportionnelles aux importations effectuées en provenance des pays tiers. La clé selon laquelle les contributions des États sont calculées est donc la même que celle qui a été adoptée en 1965 est une clé déformante. Elle doit conserver ce caractère après cette date.

En 1957, et encore une fois le 14 janvier 1962, les six gouvernements ont décidé d'attribuer des recettes à la Communauté de beaucoup de dépenses annuelles (de la Communauté) en faveur de laquelle aucune raison sérieuse n'est avancée. Le gouvernement est persuadé que ce serait courir un risque grave de gaspillage, et ces dépenses annuelles, c'est le tarif extérieur mis en place, une prévision sera nécessaire pour prévoir l'accapement des droits par les pays dont les ports sont fermés. Les recettes de la Communauté sur le plan politique, c'est donc que les conditions présentes d'égalité, selon le président Kennedy, la France ne sont pas satisfaisantes. Ce sentiment contredit un mon-

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Le débat sur l'Europe politique pourrait être engagé

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À plusieurs reprises, j'ai eu l'occasion de m'exprimer à ce sujet devant l'Assemblée nationale. J'ai déjà souligné, et je le puis encore, que les discussions de la Communauté, du point de vue des dépenses, sont très sérieuses. Personne ne parle plus sérieusement, chez les gouvernements, de la Communauté, du point de vue des dépenses, sont très sérieuses. Personne ne parle plus sérieusement, chez les gouvernements, de la Communauté, du point de vue des dépenses, sont très sérieuses.

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La politique américaine au Vietnam et à Saint-Domingue

Après prétendre qu'en se retrouvant, l'est-à-dire en continuant, nous ne pourrions pas d'être inégalement désobéissants pour une grande nation amie, n'est-ce pas tout simplement un jeu ? Il s'agit du sort d'un peuple auquel nous sommes profondément attachés. Il s'agit, pour longtemps, de l'avenir des rapports entre les deux peuples de ce genre de discrimination. Il s'agit de la paix du monde. Il s'agit de la paix du monde. Il s'agit de la paix du monde.

Tout ou tard, c'est dans la voie d'une révision profonde des rapports que nous allons nous engager. Nous allons nous engager. Nous allons nous engager. Nous allons nous engager. Nous allons nous engager. Nous allons nous engager.

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
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UN IMPORTANT DÉBAT DE POLITIQUE EXT

Après le rapport présenté au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères par M. VENDROUX (U.N.R.), dont nous avons donné les conclusions dans nos éditions du 17 juin, puis le discours prononcé par M. COUVE DE MURVILLE, la discussion générale a été ouverte par M. JEAN DE LIPKOWSKI (U.N.R.). Pour le député de la Charente-Maritime, l'équilibre de la terre n'est pas une bonne chose : les Deux Grands sont hypnotisés par leur neutralisation réciproque, ce qui les rend hostiles à tout ce qui changerait la situation présente. Or l'Europe ne peut se résigner au statu quo voulu à Yalta, ni s'en remettre longtemps aux Etats-Unis du soin de résoudre le problème allemand.

L'orateur évoque le réveil du sentiment unitaire outre-Rhin. Il est persuadé que l'Allemagne n'acceptera pas une unité européenne qui consacrerait son propre partage, mais aussi que l'Europe veut, en facilitant la désatellisation des pays de l'Est, préparer les voies à un règlement allemand.

A propos des problèmes d'Extrême-Orient et d'Amérique latine, M. de Lipkowski déclare qu'on ne saurait les résoudre en classant sous l'étiquette communisme les aspirations des peuples et en envoyant des « machines » que nous avons le droit de le dire, car solidarité n'est pas synonyme de complaisance.

M. ABELIN : le gouvernement pratique un nationalisme exacerbé.

M. ABELIN reconnaît que la politique faite par le gouvernement en ce qui concerne le Marché commun avait donné des résultats positifs. Il n'en est que plus inquiet en constatant qu'il vient de proposer le renvoi au 1^{er}

janvier 1970 de certaines décisions, cédant ainsi à « une sorte de mythologie politique » et sacrifiant les intérêts de nos agriculteurs.

Selon le président du Centre démocratique, la divergence fondamentale apparue à Bruxelles porte sur le Parlement européen, que certains de nos partenaires voudraient voir élu au suffrage universel — ce qui n'est pas une proposition de « jean-foutre », puisque le général de Gaulle l'avait retenue dans sa conférence de presse de 1953.

Pour l'orateur, le point critique de l'Europe est atteint : l'action diplomatique de la France n'a abouti qu'à des mécomptes, qu'il juge de l'Europe politique, du traité franco-allemand, de l'indépendance à l'égard des Etats-Unis. Ces mécomptes sont dus à l'exaltation du nationalisme, dont le gouvernement a donné l'exemple pernicieux (applaudissements sur les bancs du Centre dém. et des socialistes).

« Jamais encore, s'écrit M. Abelin, le ministre des affaires étrangères ne s'était exprimé sur le compte de la supranationalité de façon aussi péjorative qu'il l'a fait aujourd'hui. Si l'on poursuit dans cette voie, il n'y aura pas de supranationalité, mais des nationalismes exacerbés, dont nous n'aurons pas lieu de nous réjouir.

« Notre diplomatie serait-elle inspirée par l'idée que nos partenaires européens sont prêts à accepter une sorte de protectorat américain ? Il est cependant douteux qu'ils aient plus que nous le goût de l'esclavage et que les Etats-Unis aient une telle volonté de domination. Ce qui est évident, c'est qu'une Europe unie pourrait être pour eux un partenaire égal. Or, refuser la supranationalité, c'est refuser l'Europe et admettre la dépendance à l'égard des Etats-Unis. » (Applaudissements sur les bancs du Centre dém., du R.S.D., et des socialistes.)

M. CHANDERNAGOR : c'est la « mésentente cordiale » avec l'Allemagne

M. CHANDERNAGOR (socialiste) comprend que le gouvernement revendique pour la France sa liberté d'action ; mais pour faire quelle politique ? La détente entre l'Est et l'Ouest ? Il en doute, car elle ne peut être effective que si l'alliance atlantique est puissante mais non agressive. Il est normal que nous revendiquions pour nous et pour l'Europe une place plus convenable au sein de l'alliance, mais le fait d'avoir ajouté la force de frappe à notre diplomatie ne nous a pas valu le moindre progrès ; les gestes négatifs que nous avons multipliés, suivis d'initiatives telles que celle qui concerne la Chine, ont laissé les Etats-Unis indifférents.

Que nous critiquions les Etats-Unis pour leur attitude au Vietnam et à Saint-Domingue, c'est notre droit ; mais la façon « fracassante » dont nous le faisons irrite l'opinion américaine et

(rép. ind.) rend hommage à l'œuvre accomplie par le gouvernement en ce qui concerne le Marché commun, spécialement la mise en place d'une politique agricole commune qu'il est arrivé à sortir de l'impasse en 1967 et 1968.

« Or, monsieur le ministre, ajoute le député de l'Aveyron, le processus que vous avez déclenché doit avoir pour effet qu'à partir du 1^{er} juillet 1967 droits de douane et prélèvements tomberont dans la caisse de la Communauté. Dans un régime démocratique, ce n'est pas la commission exécutive seule qui peut gérer une aussi énorme masse financière. On en arrive ainsi, fatalement, à confier au Parlement européen un certain droit de contrôle.

M. BOSCARY-MONSSERVIN : les agriculteurs français

de revenir par le Pôlé, sans supplément. Si vous partez par la Route du Sud il vous est loisible d'effectuer un retour touristique par l'Est du Sud-Est, et si vous partez par le Pôlé, vous pouvez aller à Hong-Kong, Calcutta, Bangkok, Phnom-Penh, Saigon, Manille, avec escales possibles à Téhéran, Karachi, Delhi, en 11 H 40 de vol - Départs de Paris : Mardi et Jeudi.

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« Je vous fais confiance, mais je vous supplie de rester sur la voie qui avait été tracée. (Applaudissements sur les bancs des rép. ind., du Centre dém., du R.S.D., et sur divers autres bancs.)

M. RUFFE (communiste). — M. Boscardy est un croyant constamment déçu !

M. ANDRÉ ROSSI et les membres du Rassemblement démocratique voteront le projet de loi — encore qu'il ne soit pour eux qu'une « fiche de consolation », — ce qui ne signifiera nullement

qu'ils approuvent la politique du gouvernement de l'Aisne voudrait savoir quel est la position exacte de celui-ci quant au Parlement.

Il expose les craintes de l'agriculture, les craintes de la culture, les craintes de MM. Boscardy et de MM. Rossi. Pourquoi toutes ces manœuvres de retardement, puis-je demander ? Pourquoi accepter maintenant le projet de loi ?

(Applaudissements sur les bancs du R.S.D., du Centre dém.)

LE MINISTRE : nous n'avons pas modifié notre politique

M. COUVE DE MURVILLE prend de nouveau la parole pour répondre, sans plus attendre, à ce qu'ont dit plusieurs orateurs au sujet de la politique agricole commune et de certaines informations sur les discussions de la veille à Bruxelles. Ce qu'il a déclaré tout à l'heure à la tribune, affirme-t-il, n'avait pas pour but de démentir, mais de dire la vérité. « M. Abelin a parlé de décisions prises et d'un vif conflit entre la délégation néerlandaise et moi. Or aucune décision n'a été prise, pour la raison qu'il n'y avait pas à en prendre. Le conseil a discuté pour la première fois et avec précision les propositions de la commission. Comme prévu, il a renvoyé les questions traitées à ses représentants en vue d'en reprendre l'examen à sa prochaine séance, le 28 juin. Le débat s'est déroulé, comme toujours, dans le calme et avec une courtoisie parfaite. »

Le ministre des affaires étrangères poursuit :

« Pour ce qui est de l'affectation des droits de douane, réserve faite du cas de la délégation belge, que la situation politique dans son pays ne mettait pas à même de se prononcer, aucun gouvernement n'a accepté de les mettre à la disposition de la Communauté pour le 1^{er} juillet 1967. Quatre gouvernements, dont le gouvernement français, ont toutefois accepté l'idée et sont d'accord que l'opération pourrait être pratiquée le jour où les besoins de la Communauté le justifient. Le gouvernement néerlandais ne l'a pas acceptée et préconise l'affectation du produit d'un autre impôt, la taxe sur le chiffre d'affaires par exemple.

« Sur l'Assemblée, vous connaissez la position du gouvernement : même pour ceux qui sont partisans d'étendre ses attributions, la question ne saurait se poser tant que des ressources ne sont pas effectivement attribuées de façon définitive à la Communauté. Les autres gouvernements ont adopté des positions allant d'un extrême à l'autre. Tous ont

refusé la modification de l'article 201 de l'acte sur les affectations des recettes définitives.

« S'agissant du règlement financier, je m'expose à quelques imprécisions primaires de mon collègue de l'agriculture, avec qui je travaille dans l'intérêt de la plus complète, sans même parler d'une certaine émotion, mais intentionnellement.

« Le gouvernement a été accusé de prendre la position qui retirerait la voie en place définitive de la politique agricole commune. En réalité, tout est prêt à l'origine à accepter la date du 1^{er} juillet 1967. Mais les partisans l'ont jugée peu probable, faisant valoir qu'il est difficile d'affirmer que le vote unique serait achevé le 1^{er} juillet 1967. Il a dû pas dénué de certaine valeur. Il a tout au moins servi de ne pas retenir la date du 1^{er} janvier 1967, mais plutôt une date intermédiaire qui serait fixée en fonction de la situation, les autres mesures nécessaires seraient prises. C'est ce qui a été finalement décidé.

« Sur les moyens de couvrir les charges de la Communauté, le gouvernement français n'a pas modifié sa position. Pour l'agriculture, il s'agit de faire les efforts dont elle est capable, les prix sont contenus d'un commun accord et les règlements à conclure sont appliqués le plus tôt possible. Tous ces accords ont été arrêtés et les principaux prix qui nous lient ont été arrêtés. C'est ce qui nous corne la tâche, car ce sont ces accords qui nous lient et qui nous nous n'étions pas en mesure de positions des gouvernements — elle chain, il est de même, pour les règlements, nous restons à conclure, sur la route et particulièrement.

« L'affectation du produit de ces prélèvements est un autre aspect du problème qui intéresse le

financement de la politique agricole commune. A partir du 30 juin, et jusqu'au début de la période définitive, que la commission suggère de fixer au 1^{er} janvier 1967, mais qui peut être différé jusqu'au 1^{er} janvier 1970, la commission propose de remplacer le système actuellement en vigueur par un système de pourcentage fixe. La France aurait ainsi à supporter, comme l'Allemagne, 32 % des charges. Elle est seule à avoir à se plaindre de cette proposition et elle est aussi la seule à avoir protesté, faisant

M. BETTENCOURT : on fait des Amé

Le débat se poursuit dans la soirée devant un auditoire si réduit que M. BETTENCOURT (Rép. ind.) déclare à l'intention du ministre des affaires étrangères : « Puisque nous sommes pressés en tête à tête, j'en profiterai pour vous exprimer nos appréhensions sur les relations franco-américaines et sur votre politique européenne. » L'orateur estime que l'on fait un peu trop facilement le procès des Américains, qui sont ainsi conduits à penser que leurs relations avec la France seront meilleures après le départ du général de Gaulle. Il regrette que les paroles du président de la République soient parfois déformées par des représentants de la majorité.

Pour M. Bettencourt, l'Europe des gouvernements est la seule possible pour l'instant, mais encore faut-il le dire. « Si vous voulez qu'à côté des Etats-Unis l'Europe soit une puissance mondiale, si vous voulez que la voix de la France ne s'éteigne pas, il faut accepter que notre voix devienne celle de l'Europe », déclare-t-il.

Pour M. COMTE-OFFENBACH (U.N.R.), le principal problème européen est celui de l'unité allemande. On commence à comprendre outre-Rhin que seules l'ouverture d'un dialogue avec l'Est, puis une interpénétration économique et culturelle permettront d'arriver à des accords politiques.

M. DAVOUST (Centre dém.) souhaite que la France fasse un geste en faveur du bon fonctionnement de l'O.N.U., et qu'elle prenne aussi l'initiative de proposer la réunion d'une conférence mondiale chargée de conférer les nécessaires réformes de l'Organisation internationale.

M. MER (U.N.R.) situe le contexte dans lequel va se réunir à Alger la conférence des nations afro-asiatiques. De Bandoung à Alger, explique-t-il, la situation

ORTANT DÉBAT DE POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE

janvier 1970 de certaines décisions, cédant ainsi à « une sorte de mythologie politique » et sacrifiant les intérêts de nos agriculteurs.

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a « mésestante cordiale » imagine

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« Or, monsieur le ministre, ajoute le député de l'Aveyron, le processus que vous avez déclenché doit avoir pour effet qu'à partir du 1^{er} juillet 1967 droits de douane et prélèvements tomberont dans la caisse de la Communauté. Dans un régime démocratique, ce n'est pas la commission exécutive seule qui peut gérer une aussi énorme masse financière. On en arrive ainsi, fatalement, à confier au Parlement européen un certain droit de contrôle.

M. BOSCARY-MONSSERVIN : les agriculteurs français

de revenir par le Pô, si vous partez par la R. faire un retour touristique si vous partez à Tokyo. Hong-Kong. Calcutta, Bangkok, P. avec escalas possibles s-Tokyo par la r. en 17 h 40 de vol - Dég s-Tokyo par le P.

« Je vous fais confiance, mais je vous supplie de rester sur la voie qui avait été tracée. (Applaudissements sur les bancs des rep. ind., du Centre dém., du Rass. dém. et sur divers autres bancs.)

M. RUFFE (communiste). — M. Boscary est un croyant constamment déçu !

M. ANDRÉ ROSSI et les membres du Rassemblement démocratique voteront le projet de loi — encore qu'il ne soit pour eux qu'une « fiche de consolation » — ce qui ne signifiera nullement

qu'ils approuvent la politique du gouvernement.

Le député de l'Aisne voudrait savoir quelle est la position exacte de celui-ci quant au Parlement européen.

Il exprime, à propos de l'agriculture, les mêmes craintes que MM. Boscary-Monsservin et demande : « Pourquoi toutes ces manœuvres de retardement, puis-je qu'il faudra un jour accepter l'intégration européenne ? » (Applaudissements sur les bancs du Rass. dém. et du Centre dém.)

LE MINISTRE : nous n'avons pas modifié notre politique

M. COUVE DE MURVILLE prend de nouveau la parole pour répondre, sans plus attendre, à ce qu'ont dit plusieurs orateurs au sujet de la politique agricole commune et de certaines informations sur les discussions de la veille à Bruxelles. Ce qu'il a déclaré tout à l'heure à la tribune, affirme-t-il, n'avait pas pour but de démentir, mais de dire la vérité.

« M. Abelin a parlé de décisions prises et d'un vif conflit entre la délégation néerlandaise et moi. Or aucune décision n'a été prise, pour la raison qu'il n'y avait pas à en prendre. Le conseil a discuté pour la première fois et avec précision les propositions de la commission. Comme prévu, il a renvoyé les questions traitées à ses représentants en vue d'en reprendre l'examen à sa prochaine séance, le 28 juin. Le débat s'est déroulé, comme toujours, dans le calme et avec une courtoisie parfaite. »

Le ministre des affaires étrangères poursuit :

« Pour ce qui est de l'affectation des droits de douane, réserve faite du cas de la délégation belge, que la situation politique dans son pays ne mettait pas à même de se prononcer, aucun gouvernement n'a accepté de les mettre à la disposition de la Communauté pour le 1^{er} juillet 1967. Quatre gouvernements, dont le gouvernement français, ont toutefois accepté l'idée et sont d'avis que l'opération pourrait être pratiquée le jour où les besoins de la Communauté le justifieraient. Le gouvernement néerlandais ne l'a pas acceptée et préconise l'affectation du produit d'un autre impôt, la tare sur le chiffre d'affaires par exemple.

« Sur l'assemblée, vous connaissez la position du gouvernement : même pour ceux qui sont partisans d'étendre ses attributions, la question ne saurait se poser tant que des ressources ne sont pas effectivement attribuées de façon définitive à la Communauté. Les autres gouvernements ont adopté des positions allant d'un extrême à l'autre. Tous ont

refusé la modification de l'article 201 du traité sur les affectations de recettes définitives.

« S'agissant de l'achèvement du règlement financier, je m'exprimerai avec quelque prudence en l'absence de mon collègue de l'agriculture — avec qui je travaille dans l'attente la plus complète, sans même parler d'une complète sympathie. Cette question a donné lieu à une certaine émotion, créée intentionnellement.

« Le gouvernement a été accusé de prendre une position qui retarderait la mise en place définitive de la politique agricole commune. En réalité, il était prêt à l'origine à accepter la date du 1^{er} juillet 1967. Mais ses partenaires l'ont jugé peu raisonnable, faisant valoir qu'il était difficile d'affirmer que le marché unique serait achevé le 1^{er} juillet 1967. Il a dû reconnaître que l'argument n'était pas dénué d'une certaine valeur. Il a toutefois suggéré de ne pas retenir formellement la date du 1^{er} janvier 1970, mais plutôt une date intermédiaire qui serait fixée en fonction du moment où toutes les autres décisions nécessaires seraient prises. C'est ce qui a été finalement convenu.

« Sur les moyens de couvrir les charges de la Communauté, le gouvernement n'a absolument pas modifié sa position. Pour l'agriculture, il estime que tous les efforts doivent être faits afin que les prix uniques convenus d'un commun accord et les règlements à conclure soient appliqués le plus tôt possible et en tout cas avant le 1^{er} juillet 1967. Si les principaux prix qui restent à fixer n'ont pas été arrêtés, c'est, en ce qui concerne la viande, par suite de retards dans la discussion et, pour les produits laitiers, parce que nous n'étions pas satisfaits des propositions de la commission — elle nous les remettra en octobre prochain. Il en va de même pour les règlements qui restent à conclure, sur les sucres en particulier.

« L'affectation du produit de ces prélèvements est un autre aspect du problème, qui intéresse le

financement de la politique agricole commune. A partir du 30 juin, et jusqu'au début de la période définitive, que la commission suggère de fixer au 1^{er} janvier 1967, mais qui peut être ajournée jusqu'au 1^{er} janvier 1970, la commission propose de remplacer le système actuellement en vigueur par un système en vicentages fixes. La France aurait ainsi à supporter, comme l'Allemagne, 32 % des charges. Elle est la seule à avoir à se plaindre de cette proposition et elle est aussi la seule à avoir protesté, faisant

savoir qu'elle souhaitait le maintien et l'amélioration du système actuel.

« Il n'y a rien dans tout cela qui puisse émouvoir quiconque, ni donner à croire aux paysans français que notre gouvernement a modifié si peu que ce soit sa politique, ni qu'il a sacrifié, comme on l'a dit, pour des raisons de prestige et pour poursuivre des chimères, les intérêts de l'agriculture française, qu'il a précédemment défendus avec tant d'obstination. » (Applaudissements sur les bancs de l'U.N.R.)

M. BETTENCOURT : on fait trop facilement le procès des Américains

Le débat se poursuit dans la soirée devant un auditoire si réduit que M. BETTENCOURT (Rép. ind.) déclare à l'intention du ministre des affaires étrangères : « Puisque nous sommes pressés, en tête à tête, j'en profiterai pour vous exprimer nos appréhensions sur les relations franco-américaines et sur votre politique européenne. » L'orateur estime que l'on fait un peu trop facilement le procès des Américains, qui sont ainsi conduits à penser que leurs relations avec la France seront meilleures après le départ du général de Gaulle. Il regrette que les paroles du président de la République soient parfois déformées par des représentants de la majorité.

Pour M. Bettencourt, l'Europe des gouvernements est la seule possible pour l'instant, mais encore faut-il le dire. « Si vous voulez qu'à côté des États-Unis l'Europe soit une puissance mondiale, si vous voulez que la voix de la France ne s'éteigne pas, il faut accepter que notre voix devienne celle de l'Europe », déclare-t-il.

Pour M. COMTE-OFFENBACH (U.N.R.), le principal problème européen est celui de l'unité allemande. On commence à comprendre outre-Rhin que seules l'ouverture d'un dialogue avec l'Est, puis une interpénétration économique et culturelle permettront d'arriver à des accords politiques.

M. DAVOUST (Centre dém.) souhaite que la France fasse un geste en faveur du bon fonctionnement de l'O.N.U., et qu'elle prenne aussi l'initiative de proposer la réunion d'une conférence mondiale chargée d'étudier les nécessaires réformes de l'Organisation internationale.

M. MER (U.N.R.) situe le contexte dans lequel va se réunir à Alger la conférence des nations afro-asiatiques. De Bandoung à Alger, explique-t-il, la situation

s'est renversée, « les États-Unis sont devenus la bête noire des pays du tiers monde ». Aussi la seule carte qui reste à jouer auprès de ces pays est-elle, selon l'orateur, la carte française, la carte de l'Europe.

M. FLORNOY (U.N.R.) analyse la crise de Saint-Domingue, et n'hésite pas à dire qu'il faut libérer les États d'Amérique latine de la contrainte géographique qui, en dehors de l'O.N.U., ne les fait participer qu'à l'organisation pan-américaine de l'O.E.A. L'orateur souhaite que la France manifeste tout son intérêt à la prochaine réunion du Parlement latino-américain.

M. MICHAUD (Centre dém.) énumère toutes les tentatives (jumelages, échanges de jeunes, réunions d'élus), qui « à la base » manifestent la volonté de voir l'Europe se construire, tandis que les gouvernements se débattent. L'orateur indique que ses amis du Centre démocratique veulent dans la ratification du traité une nouvelle étape vers la constitution d'un exécutif européen contrôlé par un Parlement.

M. NESSLER (U.N.R.) critique longuement la diplomatie américaine, et ajoute :

« La France a décidé de ne pas participer aux manœuvres Fallex de cet automne, organisées par l'O.T.A.N. Elle a eu raison. Il faut aller plus loin, et reconnaître qu'il n'y a plus de conflit militaire en puissance en Europe. Il faut en finir avec le mythe de l'ennemi potentiel, c'est un boulet que nous avons trop longtemps traîné. »

Enfin, M. BOROCCHO (U.N.R.), qui est député du Haut-Rhin, demande au ministre de rouvrir le dossier des Français d'Alsace-Lorraine incorporés de force dans la Wehrmacht.

La séance est levée à 23 h. 30. ANDRÉ BILLET, ANDRÉ LAURENS.

LA GUERRE DU VIETNAM ET LA SITUATION EN

DEUX MIG ABATTUS AU-DESSUS DU NORD-VIETNAM

Des chasseurs à réaction de la marine américaine ont abattu jeudi deux Mig, chasseurs de fabrication soviétique, au-dessus du Vietnam du Nord. La nouvelle a été annoncée à Saigon par un porte-parole militaire américain.

On ignore le type de ces Mig et leur nationalité. On présume qu'il s'agit d'appareils nord-vietnamiens, mais des avions américains ont déjà rencontré, dans les débuts de l'escalade aérienne, des Mig communistes chinois dans le voisinage de l'île de Hainan.

Les Mig ont été abattus par deux Phantom du porte-avions Midway qui escortaient d'autres avions américains en mission de bombardement au-dessus du Vietnam du Nord. Ils auraient été descendus à 65 kilomètres au sud de Hanoi. Le Phantom, un des chasseurs américains les plus rapides et les mieux armés, est doté de fusées Sidewinder à tête chercheuse.

Cinq formations d'avions américains décollant de deux porte-avions de la VII^e flotte ont attaqué dans la nuit de mercredi à jeudi des casernes, des ponts et des convois au Vietnam du Nord sans rencontrer de résistance de la D.C.A. C'est la première fois depuis ces jours derniers qu'il en est ainsi.

Actions de harcèlement du Vietcong

Poursuivant ses actions de harcèlement, le Vietcong a tendu mercredi une embuscade à un détachement gouvernemental à 25 kilomètres au sud-ouest de Saigon. Le militaire américain qui se trouvait avec l'unité vietnamienne a été fait prisonnier. Un hélicoptère qui se portait au secours des gouvernementaux a été abattu. L'appareil a explosé en vol, et l'un des Américains qui étaient à bord a été tué, tandis que les trois autres étaient grièvement blessés.

Le Vietcong a également attaqué les bureaux administratifs

LE PARTI COMMUNISTE INDONÉSIEN COMPTERAIT TROIS MILLIONS ET DEMI D'ADHÉRENTS

Diakarta, 17 juin (Reuter). — Le parti communiste indonésien (pro-chinois) revendique aujourd'hui plus de trois millions et demi d'adhérents. Ce chiffre a été

d'un village à 11 kilomètres de Saigon, dans le district de Tu-Doc. Le chef adjoint du village a été tué et le chef blessé.

A Hanoi on annonce que onze cents combattants des troupes américaines et sud-vietnamiennes ont été mis hors de combat dans les provinces de Tan-An et de Choïan dans le courant du mois de mai. Parmi les tués figurent 8 officiers américains et 23 vietnamiens.

L'agence d'information du Vietnam du Nord affirme d'autre part que trois avions américains ont été abattus les 14 et 15 juin dans le ciel nord-vietnamien. Le Pathet-Lao, de son côté, déclare que sept avions américains ont été abattus au Laos les 7 et 15 juin.

L'agence Chine nouvelle annonce que 2 millions de jeunes Vietnamiens du Nord se sont inscrits comme volontaires pour l'armée populaire. Ils appartiennent à une organisation de préparation civique et militaire qui forme des détachements paramilitaires avec ceux de ses membres qui sont trop jeunes pour être enrôlés dans l'armée régulière.

Washington ne désespère pas de gagner la guerre

Washington, 17 juin. — Les arguments par lesquels M. McNamara a justifié, dans sa conférence de presse de mercredi, l'envoi imminent au Vietnam d'environ vingt mille hommes de renfort, reflètent le mélange d'optimisme et de pessimisme caractéristique de la phase actuelle des méditations de la Maison Blanche sur le cours du conflit. Il va de soi que le Vietnam n'aurait pas besoin de ces troupes fraîches si, sur le terrain, la situation était « bonne ». Elle ne l'est pas. D'après les calculs du secrétaire à la défense, les forces du Vietcong, régulières et occasionnelles, représentent plus du quart des forces qui

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Ce sont les objections des dirigeants bouddhistes et catholiques, qui sont en faveur de la désignation d'un premier ministre civil. Ce sont aussi celles des autorités américaines.

L'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, le général Maxwell Taylor, a eu plusieurs entretiens mercredi avec le général Thieu, président du comité directeur de la nation, et le général Ky. Le comité aurait en principe désigné le général Ky comme chef de l'exécutif, mais les autorités américaines font des réserves, qui ont eu jusqu'ici l'effet d'un veto. Elles reprochent au général sa trop grande jeunesse — il n'a que trente-deux ans — et le fait qu'il exerce toujours un commandement actif dans les forces aériennes. Les rencontres d'hier ne semblent pas avoir résolu ce qui paraît être un conflit entre le général Taylor et le général Ky.

En attendant, les militaires vietnamiens multiplient les avertissements à la population en vue d'un durcissement de la discipline de guerre. Sur le marché central de Saigon, un « emplacement pour les exécutions publiques » a été installé avec des sacs de sable et des poteaux d'exécution, pour prévenir le peuple que les spéculateurs, les profiteurs du marché noir, etc., risquent l'exécution sommaire et en public. Des emplacements analogues sont établis dans les villes de province.

L'état-major vietnamien envisage des mesures rigoureuses pour mobiliser les jeunes Chinois en âge de porter les armes. Le nombre de Chinois mobilisables est évalué à 40 000. On rappelle que le Vietcong vient précisément d'adresser aux Chinois du Vietnam du Sud un appel les invitant à se joindre à la résistance contre les « agresseurs américains ».

L'aéroport de Saigon, fermé mercredi à la suite d'un attentat terroriste à la bombe, a été ouvert de nouveau jeudi matin. On apprend que l'hôte de l'air, Mlle Emilienne Berthelot, annoncée hier comme figurant parmi les blessés, est indemne : elle avait quitté le lieu de l'attentat quelques secondes avant l'explosion. Les blessés américains, au nombre de trente-six, sont des soldats qui allaient prendre l'avion pour rentrer aux Etats-Unis. Ils ont été hospitalisés à Saigon.

On aurait mauvaise grâce à ne pas noter qu'une telle réunion offre en tout cas un assez bel exemple de pratique démocratique. L'attention soutenue d'un millier d'étudiants et de professeurs pendant huit heures de débat, l'extrême liberté d'expression de tous ceux qui y prenaient part, la très large diffusion de cette discussion, la possibilité surtout pour les assistants d'interroger directement un ministre responsable sur un sujet aussi brûlant que le Vietnam, tout cela est fort à l'honneur des institutions britanniques comme de l'université d'Oxford.

Cela dit, les interventions présentées mercredi n'ont pas apporté d'éléments très nouveaux sur la manière dont pourrait être réglé le conflit vietnamien. Les exposés les plus attendus étaient évidemment ceux de M. Cabot Lodge et du secrétaire du Foreign Office. Mais l'ancien ambassadeur américain éprouva quelques difficultés avec son auditoire lorsqu'il affirma dans un même souffle que les Etats-Unis ne négocieraient pas avec le Vietcong, mais qu'ils étaient disposés à des négociations « sans condition préalable ».

Quant à M. Stewart, on espérait qu'il apporterait quelque lumière supplémentaire sur l'éventualité d'une initiative britannique en faveur d'un règlement pacifique et l'appui que le Royaume-Uni pouvait attendre dans ce domaine des premiers ministres du Commonwealth réunis actuellement à Londres. Mais le secrétaire au Foreign Office n'a fait qu'une très rapide allusion à ce dernier point, reprenant presque mot pour mot, en revanche, une partie de sa déclaration

geraient à l'ouverture d'un demi-million à un million de soldats américains. Guerre froide à fond cependant parce que son objectif n'est plus, et depuis longtemps, de contenir seulement le Vietcong, mais d'en briser la volonté et d'en épuiser les ressources.

Pour eux, le Vietcong a perdu la partie. Il a encore les moyens de terroriser et de risquer des actions meurtrières, non pas ceux de déclencher la bataille qui changerait la face des choses. Autrement dit, il mène un combat d'arrière-garde, et les Américains pour reconnaître

DEVANT LES ÉTUDIANTS

MM. Stewart et Cabot leurs thèses sur le

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DU VIETNAM ET LA SITUATION EN ASIE

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MM. Stewart et Cabot Lodge répètent leurs thèses sur le Vietnam

De notre correspondant particulier ALAIN JACOB

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On aurait mauvaise grâce à ne pas noter qu'une telle réunion offre en tout cas un assez bel exemple de pratique démocratique. L'attention soutenue d'un millier d'étudiants et de professeurs pendant huit heures de débat, l'extrême liberté d'expression de tous ceux qui y prenaient part, la très large diffusion de cette discussion, la possibilité surtout pour les assistants d'interroger directement un ministre responsable sur un sujet aussi brûlant que le Vietnam, tout cela est fort à l'honneur des institutions britanniques comme de l'université d'Oxford.

Cela dit, les interventions présentées mercredi n'ont pas apporté d'éléments très nouveaux sur la manière dont pourrait être réglé le conflit vietnamien. Les exposés les plus attendus étaient évidemment ceux de M. Cabot Lodge et du secrétaire du Foreign Office. Mais l'ancien ambassadeur américain éprouva quelques difficultés avec son auditoire lorsqu'il affirma dans un même souffle que les Etats-Unis ne négocieraient pas avec le Vietcong, mais qu'ils étaient disposés à des négociations « sans condition préalable ».

Quant à M. Stewart, on espérait qu'il apporterait quelque lumière supplémentaire sur l'éventualité d'une initiative britannique en faveur d'un règlement pacifique et l'appui que le Royaume-Uni pouvait attendre dans ce domaine des premiers ministres du Commonwealth réunis actuellement à Londres. Mais le secrétaire au Foreign Office n'a fait qu'une très rapide allusion à ce dernier point, reprenant presque mot pour mot, en revanche, une partie de sa déclaration

du 3 juin devant la Chambre des communes. Il a en outre insisté sur la responsabilité du Vietnam du Nord dans le conflit et fait état à ce sujet d'informations suivant lesquelles un bataillon régulier nord-vietnamien, au moins, combattrait actuellement à quelque 300 kilomètres au sud du 17^e parallèle. Qu'on ne dise pas, a ajouté M. Stewart en substance, que nous n'avons rien fait pour parvenir à un règlement. Ce sont la Chine et le Vietnam du Nord qui refusent de négocier. Tout ce que nous demandons, c'est un signe de leur part qu'ils sont disposés à parler.

Un peu déçus, étudiants et professeurs d'Oxford ont cependant applaudi spontanément M. Stewart. Ils estimaient bien lui devoir cet hommage pour s'être exposé pendant une heure à leurs questions et à leurs critiques.

DIX-SEPT INDONÉSIENS TUÉS A SARAWAK

Kuching, 17 juin (Reuter). — Dix-sept soldats indonésiens au moins ont été tués dans une embuscade tendue mardi à la frontière de Sarawak par une patrouille du régiment royal australien, qui menait sa première opération dans la région, a annoncé un porte-parole militaire.

Il a indiqué qu'une centaine d'Indonésiens avaient participé à l'engagement après avoir franchi la frontière et pénétré en territoire malaysien. La patrouille a rapporté avoir vu dix-sept Indonésiens tomber sous ses premiers tirs, et indiqué que l'artillerie avait sans doute fait d'autres victimes.

En Inde

NOUVEAUX INCIDENTS dans le territoire de Kouch

New-Delhi, 17 juin (U.P.I.). — Le cessez-le-feu en vigueur dans le territoire de Kouch depuis un mois a été rompu mardi à deux reprises, et des incidents ont opposé des forces indiennes à des forces pakistanaïses.

D'après un porte-parole indien, les Pakistanais ont eu au moins neuf tués et ont laissé sur le terrain un blessé, qui a été fait prisonnier.

ington ne désespère pas de gagner la guerre

en, 17 juin. — Les arques M. McNamara a ns sa conférence de mercredi, l'envoi im- vietnam d'environ vingt s de renfort, relèvent le optimisme et de pessim- ristique de la phase méditations de la Mai- ur le cours du conflit. si que le Vietnam n'un- oin de ces troupes frat- le terrain, la situation ne ». Elle ne l'est pas, calculs du secrétaire e, les forces du Vietcong, et occasionnelles, repré- du quart des forces qui

De notre corresp. particulier ALAIN CLÉMENT

roter, mais, visiblement, on a cessé d'y croire. Les désertions, sauvagement réprimées, comme en témoignent certaines photos publiées dernièrement dans la presse américaine, seraient en baisse, mais « il y en a encore trop », selon la formule de M. McNamara. Le secrétaire à la défense n'en a pas moins fait l'éloge du moral des unités vietnamiennes, qui ne fléchit pas, « malgré des pertes supérieures proportionnellement à celles qu'a jamais subies l'armée américaine ».

geraient à l'aventure un demi-million à un million de soldats américains. Guerre froide à fond cependant parce que son objectif n'est plus, et depuis longtemps, de contenir seulement le Vietcong, mais d'en briser la volonté et d'en épuiser les ressources.

Peuton y parvenir? Les experts du Pentagone n'en doutent plus. Pour eux, le Vietcong a perdu la partie. Il a encore les moyens de terroriser et de risquer des actions meurtrières, non pas ceux de déclencher la bataille qui changerait la face des choses. Autrement dit, il mène un combat d'arrière-garde, pour reconnaître

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France: Monthly Political Summary for May 1965

Atlantic Alliance

France's relations with members of the Atlantic Alliance and its attitude towards NATO were prominent during May. Disagreement with American policy in Vietnam was shown again early in the month by the decision to be represented by an observer only at the SEATO Conference in London. Le Monde commented that now two members of SEATO refused, totally or partly, to accord the desired endorsement of U.S. policy, which in its view was the American objective for the Ministerial meetings.


2. American action in the Dominican Republic was criticized both officially and in the press. The French representative to the United Nations condemned American "intervention". Press comments were uniformly adverse. While some papers thought that the American action was understandable (Combat), none thought that it was justified. Many recalled President Kennedy's approval of President Juan Bosch, and said that President Johnson had acted rashly, possibly on incorrect information.

3. President Johnson's speech on "narrow nationalism" only added fuel to these fires. Le Monde pointed out that it had never failed to criticize General de Gaulle if it considered criticism was warranted, but said that President Johnson's showed "that he knew badly the person of whom he spoke, because he (de Gaulle) could be reproached for many things, but not the narrowness of his views". It went on to criticize "the worst nationalism", which was that of "the powerful who do not admit that one can criticize the use they make of their power".

4. In this context the lack of argument at the NATO Council Meeting in London was welcomed as a sign of détente. Most press comments were in line with Le Monde which drew satisfaction from the fact "that no-one judged that the moment had come to cause the break-up that everyone had predicted". The achievements of the meeting, it thought, were the three power declaration on German reunification, and the opportunity it gave for the Greek and Turkish Ministers to get together over Cyprus.

5. Press rumours circulated after the meeting to the effect

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that France was going to quit NATO in 1969, which offers the first opportunity under the provisions of the Treaty. Speaking after a Cabinet meeting, M. Payrefitte said that France's position in the Alliance was not discussed "but I can tell you France is not going to leave NATO". Speaking to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly, M. Couve de Murville said that NATO required reform and 1969 could serve as a reference date for this.

6. The French decision not to participate in the NATO Fallex 66 aroused much comment, some of it to the effect that France had only emphasized her isolation (*Le Figaro*). We have been informed that this decision might have been forced on the French by a badly devised scenario for the exercise, and the question could have been settled by revising the scenario but for an unfortunate press leakage.

7. The NATO Meeting of Defence Ministers was held in Paris at the end of the month. The British initiative to have NATO contingency planning put on a more realistic basis was welcomed by the Meeting. Some press comment, and official comment to us, has taken the line that an alliance without a concrete planning organization is meaningless for a modern war, and has pointed out that the imbrication of allied forces makes French withdrawal extremely difficult.

Russia

8. Press comments following the visit of Mr. Gromyko were largely on the theme that no new ground had been broken. Foreign Ministry officials have told us that they were disappointed by the lack of evolvement of the Russian positions.

9. An agreement for the exchange of art exhibitions was announced early in the month. A fresh cultural agreement, and an agreement for the exchange of visits by atomic energy experts were also made.

10. A large Russian participation in the Air and Space Show at Paris in June is expected.

Great Britain

11. The French press followed the Queen's visit of "reconciliation" to Germany with interest. Reference to Anglo-German co-operation at Waterloo provoked some sensationalist comments, but *Le Figaro* thought it was time for "the European States ... to abolish the celebrations commemorating the victories they have won against each other".

12. The Franco-British agreement signed on 17th May for co-operation in aircraft construction was welcomed in aircraft industry circles and in the press.

13. The British Government's decision for the gradual introduction of the metric system was also hailed, *Le Monde* calling it "a step towards Europe".

../Algeria

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Algeria

14. The negotiations with Algeria on distribution of the proceeds from petroleum continued during the month. The press has reported on several occasions that they should be completed in the near future and that a visit to France (probably not to Paris) by Mr. Ben Bella is possible soon after.

15. The news that four French citizens had been arrested in Algiers and denied access to the French Consul aroused the French press. Le Figaro thought it was "an annoying affair for Franco-Algerian co-operation" and thought it could discourage the French industrialists and teachers whom Algeria greatly needed.

Spain

16. The signing of a protocol for the building in Spain of two Daphné type submarines was announced during the month.

Lebanon

17. President Helou of the Lebanon visited Paris early in the month. The Foreign Ministry commented that it was largely intended as a goodwill gesture to maintain the existing good relations.

South America

18. The visit of the President of Chile, M. Eduardo Frei, to Paris has been announced for the 7th to 10th July.

19. A visit by the President of Uruguay is also possible this year.

Ghana

20. The Ghanaian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kojo Botsio, visited Paris from 15th to 20th May.

Canada

21. The sale of Canadian uranium to France ran into difficulties when France refused to guarantee that it would be used for non-military purposes only. The French pointed out that Canada sold uranium to Britain and the United States without conditions. The Canadian Minister for Trade, Mr. Sharp, came to Paris for discussions, but the question has not yet been settled.

Internal

General de Gaulle's Tour of French Departments

22. General de Gaulle continued his "tour de France" during the month. On 14th May he paid a three hour visit to the Cher, where he inspected the radio telescope at Nançay and the Maison de Culture at Bourges.

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23. On 19th May he started a longer tour of the Vendée, Maine-et-Loire, Mayenne and Sarthe. He made many speeches during the trip, mainly on three themes: national independence, national unity and economic development. The "two hegemonies" created at Yalta" received special criticism. Most commentators have agreed that the speeches were intended for domestic consumption in preparation for the presidential elections. Calls for national unity and references to the fact that "the barriers between the classes are in the process of falling" were interpreted by some (e.g. *Le Figaro*) as a plea for the Communist vote. Emphasis on the difficulties to be overcome in the path of economic development was considered to be a deliberate attempt to give an appearance of an objective, unbiased approach to this question (*Combat*).

24. An announcement shortly after the General's return to Paris that an assassination attempt had been planned but foiled aroused a degree of alarm in the press.

25. General de Gaulle will complete the "tour" in June when he visits the Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne and Eure-et-Loire.

Opposition

26. Opposition parties were largely concerned with defining their attitude towards M. Gaston Defferre's proposal for a "Democratic Socialist Federation". The *Mouvement pour la République Populaire* (M.R.P.) held its Congress over the Ascension weekend and gave the proposal a conditional welcome.

27. The *Parti Socialiste Unifié* is almost unanimously hostile to the proposal, while the S.F.I.O., M. Defferre's own party, is split. Their Congresses will be held in June. The Communist Party is also opposed and threatens to present its own presidential candidate if M. Defferre's proposal is accepted by the Socialist Party.

Parliamentary Debates

28. There have been several fairly heated debates in the National Assembly. The first, in chronological order, was the debate on the use made by the Government of the O.R.T.F. during the municipal elections. M. Peyrefitte, who spoke for the Government, said that the Government used the radio and television to make announcements as was its right, but surprised commentators and deputies when he said that as most of the press was controlled by the Opposition, it was just that the Government should use the O.R.T.F. to restore a balance.

29. The Government's bill for the reform of the system of national service which involved the end of the principle of equality before the law for military service aroused much feeling in the press and among parliamentarians. The bill was criticized by U.N.R. members as well as the Opposition and was amended by the Parliamentary Commission. Its essential points were not changed however, but sufficiently "watered down" to be acceptable to the U.N.R. members who adopted it unanimously. The new law does not make many de facto changes in the national

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service position, and it seems that the Government's aim in introducing the law was to prepare public opinion for the introduction of an "armée de métier".

Social and Economic

30. The internal scene continued to be plagued by strikes at some of the main automobile and truck manufacturing plants.

31. It was announced on 25th May that industrial expansion had increased by 2.5% during the year, and individual consumption by less than 1.5% - the lowest figures for seven years.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE

21st June, 1965

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15

AU COURS DE LA GARDEN-PARTY DU PARLEMENT A L'ÉLYSÉE

« Faire l'Europe supranationale serait pour nous vouloir disparaître. Une confédération, oui, mais pas une fusion », déclare le général de Gaulle

Pour la dernière garden-party de son septennat, le général de Gaulle a offert jeudi à l'Élysée l'honneur des membres du Parlement. Communistes et socialistes avaient tous été invités, comme l'année dernière, l'invitation du chef de l'État. Presque tous les membres du gouvernement, conduits par M. Pompidou et les membres du bureau de l'Assemblée nationale qui accompagnaient M. Chaban-Delmas assistaient à cette réception.

Parmi les parlementaires présents, on remarquait MM. Michel Debry, Lecaune, président du M.R.P., très entouré par les journalistes ; M. Pflimlin, qui s'entretenait longuement avec MM. Couve de Murville, et Burin des Roziers, secrétaire général de l'Élysée ; M. René Pélissier, Emile Roche, président du Conseil économique et social. Les radicaux étaient peu nombreux et leur président, M. Maurice Faure, n'était pas parmi eux. On cherchait la haute silhouette de M. Pierre Marchais, mais on devait apprendre que le sénateur de la Charente n'est plus convié à l'Élysée depuis son absence lors du voyage du général de Gaulle dans son département. La cérémonie de la présentation fut longue, comme à l'habitude. Cependant, cette année, les cartes d'invitation des journalistes comportaient un point bleu qui leur faisait être dirigés directement vers les salons sans être, comme

les autres invités, présentés au chef de l'État. Puis le général, guidé par M. Pierre Dumas, secrétaire d'État chargé des relations avec le Parlement, se mêla à ses hôtes.

Détendu, souriant, parfois fatigué, il a un mot pour chacun. Il répond avec une sorte de passion à un groupe de parlementaires qui lui parlent de l'Europe. M. Bailly, député U.N.R. de Belfort, ayant fait remarquer que les populations de l'Est s'interrogent sur la politique européenne du gouvernement, le président de la République se livre alors à une véhémence critique de la notion de supranationalité, disant :

« Je ne comprends pas : on passe notre temps à expliquer la politique européenne. Nous ne voulons pas d'une Europe supranationale. Les nations, ça existe. Il y a une Italie, une Allemagne. C'est militaire, c'est militaire (1). Ce ne sont pas des entités qui peuvent disparaître comme ça. Il n'est pas question de pouvoir les fondre. Faire l'Europe supranationale serait, pour nous, vouloir disparaître. Faire une fusion n'est pas possible. Pour l'Europe, une confédération, oui, mais pas une fusion.

« Que représenterait une assemblée supranationale siégeant à Strasbourg qui n'aurait aucune prise réelle sur les intérêts nationaux de Paris, de Rome ou de Bruxelles ? Cela ne mènerait à rien. On n'imagine pas un « truc »

où des technocrates recrutés par cooptation feraient la loi depuis leurs bureaux. On peut faire des discours sur l'Europe supranationale. Ce n'est pas difficile : il est facile d'être un Jean-foutre ! »

Un parlementaire demande alors : « Mais les États-Unis ne sont-ils pas nés d'une fusion supranationale ? »

« Ça n'a aucun rapport, réplique le général. Ils sont partis de rien. L'Amérique était un terrain vierge où les pionniers n'ont trouvé que les ossements des quelques Peaux-Rouges qu'ils avaient « zigouillés ». Et d'ailleurs peu de temps après, il leur a fallu une guerre civile... et elle continue. »

« On ne peut faire confiance à personne »

M. Clerget, député U.N.R. de la Haute-Saône fait remarquer que certains pays membres du Marché commun ne respectent pas les normes de la concurrence internationale, notamment en matière industrielle.

C'est ce genre de chose, répond le chef de l'État, que le Marché commun a dans ses attributions de trancher. Si l'on n'aboutit pas à ce sujet à des accords amiables, il n'y aura pas de Marché commun et par conséquent pas d'Europe. Sous-entend-il cependant que le Marché commun est une compétition, un compromis entre intérêts différents. Il cite divers exemples, analysant le comportement national de plusieurs États et remarque incidemment à propos des Pays-Bas « C'est la psychologie profonde des Hollandais depuis Louis XIV », pour conclure : « A priori, on ne peut et on ne doit faire confiance à personne. »

« Les Américains sont engagés dans une sale histoire au Vietnam ».

A un autre moment, le président de la République, interrogé sur la situation au Vietnam, déclare :

« Il faut que les Américains qui sont engagés dans une sale histoire au Vietnam, avec leurs tanks, leurs camions, leurs avions, admettent qu'il n'y a pas que l'Union soviétique et eux. A partir de ce moment-là, ça pourra aller mieux, car nous n'avons pas de griefs contre eux. »

Avec M. Becker, député U.N.R. du Doubs, le général évoque le conflit Peugeot : « Les syndicats ont eu tort. Ils se sont placés sur un mauvais terrain en faisant grève au moment où il y avait du travail, après une période de récession. »

A un groupe d'U.N.R. de la Seine qui lui demandent quand il viendra visiter leur circonscription, il laisse tomber : « On ira peut-être vous voir ; peut-être quand les nouvelles préfectures seront installées » (2). A d'autres, il parle du lait, de l'agriculture, de logements, du service militaire, de l'axe Rhin-Rhône, des récentes élections municipales, avant de se retirer dans ses appartements sans qu'aucun des élus saisisse présents ait osé lui demander s'il donnerait ici, l'année prochaine, la première garden-party de son deuxième septennat.

ANDRÉ PASQUON.

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L'ALLOCUTION RADIOTÉLÉVISÉE DU GÉNÉRAL DE GAULLE

Un autre ordre, un autre équilibre,
sont nécessaires à la paix

Voici le texte intégral de l'allocution radiotélévisée du général de Gaulle, qui a été diffusée mardi soir à 20 heures :

Dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, où se posent tous les problèmes, où l'éventuel danger s'élève jusqu'à l'infini, où se heurtent éperamment les besoins et les ambitions des Etats, quelle est l'action de la France ?

Reconnaissons qu'ayant été autrefois un peuple colosse, en fait de population, de richesse et de puissance, nous revenons de loin pour jouer de nouveau notre rôle international. Car, il y a une centaine d'années, notre expansion démographique et économique et, du même coup, notre force, commencent à décliner. Ensuite, se succèdent les deux guerres mondiales qui nous ruinent et nous déciment, tandis que deux grands pays, les Etats-Unis et la Russie, parviennent à leur tour au sommet.

Dans cette situation actuellement diminuée la situation du renouveau, qui est à un peuple affaibli ce que celle du laissez-aller est à un homme humilié, aurait pu nous entraîner vers une décadence sans retour. D'autant plus qu'ayant pris jadis l'habitude d'être toujours au premier rang, parfois non sans outrecuidance, notre amoindrissement relatif risquait, à présent, de nous faire trop douter de nous-mêmes.

Nous aurions pu nous décourager en comparant à nos statistiques celles qui relatent la population totale de chacun des deux pays géants, ou la production globale de leurs usines et de leurs mines, ou le nombre des satellites qu'ils lancent autour de la terre, ou la masse des mégatonnes que leurs engins sont en mesure d'emporter pour la destruction.

De fait, après le sursaut de confiance et de fierté françaises qui, au cours de la dernière guerre, nous tira d'un abîme mortel et en dépit des forces vives qui se reparaissent chez nous avec une vigueur renouvelée, la tendance à l'effacement s'y était momentanément fait jour, au point d'être érigée en doctrine et en politique. C'est pourquoi des partisans eurent voulu nous rattacher corps et âme à l'Empire totalitaire.

C'est pourquoi d'autres proféraient qu'il nous fallait, non point seulement, comme c'est le bon sens, rester les alliés de nos alliés tant que ne disparaît à l'est une menace de domination, mais encore nous aboucher dans un système atlantique au sein duquel notre défense, notre économie, nos engagements, dépendraient nécessairement des armes, de l'emprise matérielle et de la politique américaines. Les mêmes, dans la même intention, entendaient que notre pays, au

lieu qu'il participât, ainsi qu'il est naturel, à une coopération organisée des nations libres de l'ancien continent, fût littéralement dirigé dans une Europe dite intégrée et qui, faite des ressorts que sont la souveraineté des peuples et la responsabilité des Etats, serait automatiquement subordonnée au protecteur d'outre-océan. Ainsi resterait-il, sans doute, des ouvriers, des paysans, des ingénieurs, des professeurs, des fonctionnaires, des députés, des ministres français. Mais il n'y aurait plus la France.

Eh bien ! le fait capital de ces sept dernières années c'est que nous avons résisté aux sirènes de l'abandon et choisi l'indépendance.

Les conditions de l'indépendance

Il est vrai que l'indépendance implique des conditions et que celles-ci ne sont pas faciles. Mais, comme on peut le voir, nous parvenons à les remplir. Dans le domaine politique, il s'agit que, sans renier notre amitié américaine, nous nous comportions en Européens que nous sommes et que, en cette qualité, nous nous appliquions à rétablir d'un bout à l'autre de notre continent un équilibre fondé sur l'entente et la coopération de tous les peuples qui y vivent comme nous. C'est bien ce que nous faisons en nous réconciliant avec l'Allemagne, en proposant à nos voisins des deux côtés du Rhin et des Alpes une réelle solidarité des Six, en reprenant avec les pays de l'Est, à mesure qu'ils émergent de leurs écrasantes contraintes, les rapports d'active compréhension qui nous liaient à eux autrefois.

Quant aux problèmes qui se posent dans le reste de l'univers, notre indépendance nous conduit à mener une action conforme à ce qui est à présent notre propre conception, savoir : qu'aucune hégémonie exercée par qui que ce soit, aucune intervention étrangère dans les affaires intérieures d'un Etat, aucune interdiction faite à n'importe quel pays d'entretenir des relations pacifiques avec n'importe quel autre, ne sauraient être justifiées.

Notre réprobation devant la guerre qui s'étend en Asie

Au contraire, suivant nous, l'intérêt supérieur de l'espèce humaine commande que chaque nation soit responsable d'elle-même, débarrassée des empiétements, aidée dans son progrès sans conditions solidaires. De là, notre réprobation devant la

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guerre qui s'étend en Asie de jour en jour et, de plus en plus, notre attitude favorable à l'égard des efforts de libération humaine et d'organisation nationale entraînés par divers pays d'Amérique latine, le concours que nous apportons au développement de bon nombre de nouveaux Etats africains, les rapports que nous nouons avec la Chine, etc. Bref, il y a maintenant une politique de la France, et elle se fait à Paris.

Au point de vue de la sécurité, notre indépendance exige, à l'ère atomique où nous sommes, que nous ayons les moyens voulus pour dissuader nous-mêmes un éventuel agresseur, sans préjudice de nos alliances, mais sans que nos alliés fient notre destin dans leurs mains. Or, ces moyens, nous nous les donnons. Sans doute nous imposent-ils un onéreux renouveau. Mais nous ne les payons pas plus cher que ceux qu'il nous faudrait fournir à l'intégration atlantique, sans être sûrement protégés pour autant, si nous continuons de lui appartenir comme auxiliaires subordonnés. Ainsi, en venant-nous au point où aucun Etat du monde ne pourrait porter la mort chez nous sans la recevoir chez lui; ce qui est, certainement, la meilleure garantie possible.

Nous préférons boire dans notre verre

Dans l'ordre économique, scientifique, technique, pour sauvegarder notre indépendance, étant obligés de faire face à l'énorme richesse de certains, sans cependant nous refuser à pratiquer avec eux des échanges de toute nature, nous devons faire en sorte que nos activités demeurent, pour l'essentiel, sous administration et sous direction françaises. Nous devons aussi soutenir coûte que coûte la concurrence dans les secteurs de pointe, qui commandent la valeur, l'autonomie, la vie de tout l'ensemble industriel, qui comportent le plus d'audaces, d'expérimentations, d'outillages perfectionnés, qui requièrent un grand nombre les équipes les plus qualifiées de savants, de techniciens, d'ouvriers. Enfin, lorsqu'il est opportun, dans une branche déterminée, de conjurer nos inventions, nos capacités, nos moyens, avec ceux d'un autre pays, nous devons souvent choisir l'un de ceux qui nous touchent de plus près et dont nous pouvons penser que la poids ne nous écrasera pas.

Voilà pourquoi nous nous imposons une stabilité financière, économique et monétaire qui nous dispense de recourir à l'aide de l'étranger; nous chignons en or l'excès de dollars importés chez nous par suite du déficit de la balance des paie-

ments américains; nous avons, depuis six ans, multiplié par six les crédits consacrés à la recherche; nous organisons un marché industriel et agricole commun avec l'Allemagne, l'Italie, la Belgique, la Hollande et le Luxembourg; nous parons le mont Blanc conjointement avec les Italiens; nous canalisons la Moselle en association avec les Allemands et les Luxembourgeois; nous nous unissons à l'Angleterre pour construire le premier avion de transport supersonique du monde; nous sommes prêts à étendre à d'autres types d'appareils civils et militaires cette collaboration franco-britannique; nous venons de conclure avec la Russie soviétique un accord relatif à la mise au point et à l'exploitation de notre procédé de télévision en couleurs. En somme, si grand que soit le verre que l'on nous tend du dehors, nous préférons boire dans le nôtre, tout en trinquant aux alentours.

Que la France soit la France !

Certes, cette indépendance, que nous pratiquons de nouveau dans tous les domaines, ne laisse pas d'étonner, voire de scandaliser, divers milieux pour lesquels l'inféodation de la France était l'habitude et la règle. Ceux-là parlent de machiavélisme, comme si la conduite la plus claire ne consistait pas justement à suivre notre propre route; ils s'alarment de notre isolement, alors qu'il n'y eut jamais plus d'empressement autour de nous. D'autre part, le fait que nous ayons repris notre faculté de jugement et d'action à l'égard de tous les problèmes semble parfois déstabiliser un Etat qui pourrait se croire, en vertu de sa puissance, investi d'une responsabilité suprême et universelle. Mais qui sait si, quelque jour, l'intérêt que ce pays ait peut avoir à trouver la France debout ne l'emportera pas, de loin, sur le désagrément qu'il en éprouve à présent? Enfin, la répartition de la nation aux mains libres, que nous sommes redevenus, modifie évidemment le jeu mondial qui, depuis Yalta, paraissait être désormais limité à deux partenaires. Mais comme, dans cette répartition de l'univers entre deux hégémonies et, par conséquent, en deux camps, la liberté, l'égalité, la fraternité des peuples ne trouvent décidément pas leur compte, un autre ordre, un autre équilibre sont nécessaires à la paix. Qui peut les soutenir mieux que nous, pourvu que nous soyons nous-mêmes ?

Francien, Breton, Alsacien, vous le voyez ! Pour nous, pour tous, autant que jamais, il faut que la France soit la France !

Vive la République !

Vive la France !

25/1/1 2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD SAVINGRAM

1.25245

FROM Australian Embassy
PARIS

Dated: 9th June, 1965
Rec'd: 16th June, 1965.

Savingram to CANBERRA 15. RESTRICTED.

Repeated to:
Bonn 5: Brussels 5: Cairo 5: Dublin 4: Geneva 11:
The Hague 5: London 11: Moscow 4: Rome 11:
Stockholm 4: Washington 13.

France: Monthly Political Summary for April 1965

Internal

General de Gaulle's television address on 27th April was expected to contain some sort of confirmation of the general impression that he will be a candidate in the presidential election in December. Statements by Prime Minister Pompidou who, when asked about a possible second mandate, said, "we can hope, think and believe at the present time that General de Gaulle can do it", increased this expectation, although some commentators pointed out that for obvious reasons General de Gaulle would leave the opposition in doubt as to his intentions until the last possible minute.

2. In the event, no specific mention was made of the election or any other domestic questions, but as Le Monde remarked: "Under the cover of an anti-American festival offered to Mr. Gromyko and to the people of the 'third world', General de Gaulle has just opened the presidential campaign."

3. The address consisted of a defence on familiar lines of the French policy of "independence" and a condemnation of the Atlantic system and supranational European unity. Reprobation of the "expanding war in Asia", support of Latin American countries, assistance to African states and development of relations with China were quoted as proof that "there is now a policy of France, and it is made in Paris". Criticisms that France is in fact being isolated were answered by references to projects being undertaken with Italy (Mont Blanc Tunnel), England (Concorde), Germany, Luxembourg (Moselle canal) and Russia (colour television) as well as the development of "an industrial and agricultural market" with the Six.

4. Most commentators agreed with Le Monde that the address was aimed at the voters although "having the appearance of not even thinking of it". Comments from both press and leading personalities have been critical, speaking of an "egoisme sacré" (Paul Reynaud) and a return to 19th Century nationalism (Maurice Faure). A few lone voices have suggested that as General de Gaulle is assured of success if he stands, this could be the start of a campaign for his "dauphin".

5. The campaigns of other candidates have been affected

.../by the .../2

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Russia

South-East Asia - The Ministers noted that "recent events" had aggravated the situation and created dangers for peace. They declared that a solution could only be found by a return to the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements.

Disarmament - The Russian Minister explained the reasons for the Soviets' proposal to convoke the U.N. Disarmament Commission and agreed with the French proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers to discuss nuclear disarmament.

8. At a subsequent press conference Mr. Gromyko expanded on some of those points. He said that France's German policy was based on "the fact that two German states exist". (French "authorized sources" hastened to dissociate the French Government from Mr. Gromyko's interpretation, and repeated that France could not recognize the German Democratic Republic.) Mr. Gromyko also let it be known that Russia did not intend to take any initiative in calling a five nuclear power conference, and criticized American intervention in Vietnam.

.. / 10.

 $\dots/2$

INWARD-SAVINGRAM

10. M. Couve de Murville will go to Moscow in autumn to continue these exchanges of views.

Germany

11. The improvement of relations with Russia placed a further strain on relations with Germany. Some press commentators thought that more attention should be paid to German susceptibilities on matters which could affect German reunification.

12. General de Gaulle's European policy was described as a "tour de valse" (Raymond Aron in Le Figaro) in which he continually changed partners. Other commentators disliked such flirtation, and thought France should lead more consistently in one direction. A French view is that German criticisms were shortsighted, as General de Gaulle's policy was aimed at achieving what the Germans wanted themselves.

13. A meeting between the Minister for Information, M. Peyrefitte, and his German counterpart, Herr von Hase, on the question of colour television reached no useful conclusion.

South-East Asia

14. France decided to be represented by an observer only at the SEATO Council Meeting in London, rather than once again be placed in the position of sole dissenter. Although this "empty chair" policy leaves the way open for France to return to full participation when the Vietnam question is settled, some commentators suggest that this decision could be the first move towards complete French withdrawal from SEATO.

15. The French welcomed United States support for an international conference on Cambodia.

16. The Vietnamese Vice-President, M. Tran Van Tuyen, visited Paris during the month and declared that he hoped to improve his country's relations with France. It is understood that he had been in contact with the neutralist Vietnamese elements during his stay in France, but that their lack of proper organization prevented them from playing a useful role.

Great Britain

17. The British Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, visited Paris early in the month and had widely publicized discussions with General de Gaulle. It was agreed that the possibilities of co-operation on aviation projects would be investigated by ministers. Mr. Wilson declared that Britain was not intending to devalue the sterling, and General de Gaulle gave an assurance that France would continue to support sterling.

18. The general theme of press commentary was that the discussions marked "L'Entente Retrouvée" (Le Figaro) and that although the conclusions reached did not go very far, this was explained by the fact that bilateral relations were starting again from zero.

.../Paraguay .../4

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
INWARD SAVINGRAM 1. 25245.

Paraguay

19. It was announced in the press that President Stroessner would visit France in October in response to the invitation from General de Gaulle.

Outer Mongolia

20. The decision to establish diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia was announced on 28th April. A separate Embassy, at least temporarily under a Chargé d'Affaires, is to be established.

Denmark

21. The King and Queen of Denmark visited Paris from 5th to 9th April, 1965.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT DEFENCE.

17th June, 1965.

SEC DS PAS(1,2,3,4) AS(JIC) S&SEA M&I M SAMT INT SA UN
FACAM AMSP EA EAMEC E ICR MT PPO PIO
PHNOM PENH SAIGON

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25/1/18
~~21/1/65~~

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

INWARD CABLEGRAM

RAD

I.24804

FROM:

DATED: 12TH JUNE, 1965.
1132

AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
PARIS.

REC'D: 12TH JUNE, 1965.
2137

1466 CONFIDENTIAL.

REPEATED LONDON 229
FROM WALKER

SOUTH PACIFIC COMMISSION.

I DISCUSSED POSITION REGARDING RATIFICATION WITH MANAC'H
11TH JUNE.

HE CONFIRMED THAT COUVE DE MURVILLE HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS
TO PROCEED WITH RATIFICATION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND IF
POSSIBLE BY SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE ENTAILING ONLY A CABINET
DECISION.

THE QUESTION WHETHER THIS IS POSSIBLE IS NOW UNDER
CONSIDERATION IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE (DE VELLELUME, WHOM
HE CALLED IN, SAID THE PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE WAS FULLY AWARE OF
THE URGENCY IMPOSED BY THE LAE CONFERENCE AND HAD TELEPHONED
THAT MORNING TO CLARIFY SOME ASPECT OF THE ADMENDMENT).

IT IS POSSIBLE HOWEVER THAT SUBMISSION TO PARLIAMENT CANNOT BE
AVOIDED IN SO FAR AS THE AMENDMENT HAS FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS.

IN THAT CASE RATIFICATION WILL TAKE LONGER AND I WOULD NOT
THINK IT POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE PARLIAMENTARY ACTION BEFORE THE
LAE CONFERENCE.

2. I VENTURED THE SUGGESTION THAT RATIFICATION WOULD NOT HAVE
ANY SUBSTANTIVE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS BUT MANAC'H SAID IT WAS
A TECHNICAL QUESTION OF FORM.

HE ASSURED ME THE DECISION AS TO WHICH PROCEDURE SHOULD
BE FOLLOWED DID NOT INVOLVE ANY POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

HE ALSO SAID THAT IF RATIFICATION WAS NOT COMPLETE BEFORE
THE CONFERENCE FRANCE WOULD NEVERTHELESS WISH SAMOA TO BE TREATED
IN ALL PRACTICAL RESPECTS AS A FULL MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION
AT THE CONFERENCE.

3. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES I DO NOT CONSIDER ANYTHING IS TO BE
GAINED BY SEEKING AN INTERVIEW WITH MR COUVE DE MURVILLE AT
THIS STAGE, BUT WE SHALL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW CLOSELY.

A/MIN. & DEPT E.A.
MIN. & DEPT TERRITORIES
P.M.'S

13TH JUNE, 1965.

SEC SEC(1, 2, 3, 4) SAS(MS) AS(JIC) LA UN PACAM AMSP
EAMEC E ER ICR PIO PPO S&SEA

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CONFIDENTIAL




AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY,
ATHENS.

In reply quote No. 251/9/5.

Memorandum No. 200

9th June 1965



The Secretary,
Department of External Affairs,
CANBERRA.

French Foreign Policy

....

Attached for your information is a report of remarks made at a businessmen's luncheon by the French Ambassador in Athens concerning French foreign policy.

2. Speaking of the Common Market, the Ambassador said it was not a closed club, but open to "all free European nations who would wish to join us and are ready to accept the rules that we have imposed upon ourselves by the Rome Treaty and its subsequent agreements". He firmly believed that "this effort of unification already accomplished will be necessarily extended to other domains, namely the political and monetary fields and the problems of defence." He said this European policy of France was not directed against anybody, but had its origin and condition in reconciliation with Germany.

3. Referring to the Atlantic Alliance, M. Bayens said it was "an elementary necessity", although this did not mean that it did not need radical modification to take account of the fact that the United States no longer has a nuclear monopoly and that Europe now seeks to assume broader international responsibilities. Hasty and dramatic transformations, however, - such as the M.L.F. or A.N.F. - would constitute "dangerous ferments of division". France maintained that the present set-up of N.A.T.O. was too costly, too heavy and too intricate, and detracted from French freedom of action and sense of responsibility. France had no wish to desert the Alliance, "but we do believe that the system must be reformed in view of the present world situation" - and France was not the only partner of this mind. The Ambassador hoped the day would come when, in agreement with the U.S.A., a settlement would be reached between Western and Eastern Europe "so as to establish a vast system from the Atlantic to the Urals in which Germany would be reunified in freedom and security."

4. The principles of French foreign policy were enunciated in terms of aid (in relation to her national income France gives more technical, economic, cultural and administrative aid than any other country) and non-intervention (because we think that the international quarrels of other people are none of our business). M. Bayens discounted suggestions that France was guided only by a desire to embarrass the United States; neither de Gaulle's visit to Latin America, recognition of Communist China nor the sale of dollars could be regarded as anti-American. "I only deplore that our policies are not better coordinated. It is not our fault." As far back as 1958

Well rounded
ground, all
this
I think.

lgl
Mr Harvey

Mr Dunn
Mr Woodberry
Mr

European Sec.

/2...

Attachment?

On some thoughts, don't bother.

lgl

we proposed to organise with the United States permanent consultation on all problems of common concern." French policy "will not guide us towards isolationism but towards a fruitful cooperation with all nations of goodwill."

5. A copy of this memorandum has been forwarded to the Australian Embassy, Paris for information.

R.N. Birch

(R.N. Birch)
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Name of Paper *The Australian*File No. *25/1/1*Published at *Canberra*Date *14/6/65*

Le grand Charles

The dominating personality of Charles de Gaulle has brought France from the brink of political chaos to a position of power and prosperity unparalleled in her recent history.

In the process, he has been accused of autocracy in internal government; selfishness and disruptiveness in international dealings.

IN TODAY'S world, where all problems arise, where the danger could reach the infinite, where the needs and ambitions of states clash fiercely, what is the action of France?

Let us recognise that having once been a Colossus of a people by virtue of population, wealth and power, we are returning from afar to play our international role once more. For, 100 years ago, our demographic and economic growth, and consequently our strength, began to decline. Then came, one after the other, the two world wars which ruined and decimated us, while two great countries, the United States and Russia, in their turn rose to the summit.

In a situation of diminished strength at that time, the temptation to give up—which is to a weakened people what apathy is to a humiliated man—could have drawn us toward a decadence from which there would be no return. All the more so, having once been accustomed to being always in the forefront, sometimes not without presumptuousness, our relative decline might have caused us then to doubt ourselves too much.

We might have become discouraged after comparing our statistics to those on the total population of each of the two giant countries, or the global production of their factories and their mines, or the number of satellites they are launching around the earth, or the mass of megatons which their missiles are capable of carrying for destruction.

Indeed, after the burst of French confidence and pride which lifted us from a fatal abyss during the last war, and

despite active forces which reappeared in our country with renewed vigor, a tendency toward self-effacement momentarily emerged to the point of being established in doctrine and in policy. That is why some partisans would have liked to bind us body and soul to the totalitarian empire. That is also why others professed that we must not only, as is sensible, remain the allies of our allies so long as a threat of domination stood in the East, but that we must also become absorbed into an Atlantic system, within which our defence, our economy and our commitments would necessarily depend on the Americans' weapons, material hold and policy.

Subordinate

The same people, with the same intention, wanted our country — instead of participating, as is normal, in organised co-operation among the free nations of the Old Continent — to be literally dissolved in a Europe described as integrated which, lacking the incentives of sovereignty of the peoples and responsibility of the states, would automatically be subordinated to the protector across the ocean. Thus, there would doubtless still be French workers, farmers, engineers, professors, officials, deputies and ministers. But there would no longer be France. Indeed, the vital fact of these last seven years is that we have resisted the sirens of surrender and have chosen independence.

It is true that independence implies conditions, and that they are not easy ones. But, as can be seen, we are succeeding in meeting them. In the political sphere, we must, without renouncing our American

To some, de Gaulle is generations out of date; others claim he is ahead of his time.

He espouses a type of nationalism unknown in France for more than a century. His view of the new France in the world community is outlined in this address, delivered recently to a nation-wide French radio and television audience.

friendship, behave like the Europeans we are and, in that capacity, attempt to re-establish, from one end of our continent to the other, an equilibrium based on understanding and co-operation among all the peoples who live on it as we do.

That is exactly what we are doing by reconciling ourselves with Germany; by proposing a real solidarity of the Six to our neighbors on both sides of the Rhine and the Alps; by resuming with the Eastern countries as they emerge from their crushing constraint, the relations of active understanding which formerly linked us to them.

With respect to the problems in the rest of the world, our independence leads us to act in accordance with our present concept, which is: that no hegemony exercised by anyone, no foreign intervention in the internal affairs of a state, no prohibition made to any country on maintaining peaceful relations with any other is justifiable.

On the contrary, in our view, the supreme interest of mankind dictates that each nation be responsible for itself, free from encroachments, aided in its progress without conditions of allegiance. Hence our repudiation of the war which is spreading in Asia day by day and more and more, our favorable attitude towards the efforts of human liberation and national organisation undertaken by various countries of Latin America, the assistance we are giving to the development of a good number of new African States, the relations we are forging with China, and so on. In short, France now has a policy, and it is being made in Paris.

From the viewpoint of security, our independence requires,

in the atomic age we live in that we have the necessary means to deter a possible aggressor ourselves, without detriment to our alliances, but without our allies' holding our fate in their hands. Now, we are giving ourselves these means. Doubtless, they force us to an effort of renewal which is praiseworthy. But these means cost us no more than those which we would have to furnish for Atlantic integration, without thereby being sure of protection, if we were to continue to belong to it as subordinate auxiliaries. Thus we are reaching the point at which no state in the world could bring death to us without receiving it itself on its own land, which is without doubt the best possible guarantee.

Free hands

In the economic, scientific and technical domain, to safeguard our independence, being required to face the enormous wealth of some — without, however, refusing to practise all types of exchanges with them — we must see that our activities, for the essential part, remain under French management and French control. We must also meet, at whatever cost, the competition in advanced sectors which determine the quality, the autonomy, the life of industry as a whole; which involve the maximum of studies, experiments and perfected tools; which require great numbers of the most highly qualified scientists, technicians and workers.

Finally, when it is opportune, in order to combine our inventions, our capabilities and our resources in a given branch with those of another country, we must often choose one of



DE GAULLE: Our

those which is closest to us and whose weight we do not think will overwhelm us.

That is why we are imposing a financial, economic and monetary stability upon ourselves which frees us from resorting to outside aid; we are converting into gold the dollar surpluses imported into our country as a result of the American balance of payments; we have over the past six years multiplied by six the funds devoted to research; we are setting up a common industrial and agricultural market with Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg; we are tunneling through Mont Blanc in co-operation with the Italians; we are developing the Moselle River along with the people of Germany and Luxembourg; we are joining with England to build the world's first supersonic passenger aircraft; we are ready to extend this French-British collaboration to other types of civil and military aircraft; we have just concluded an agreement with Soviet Russia concerning the perfection and use of our color television process.

In sum, however large may be the glass offered to us from outside, we prefer to drink from our own, while touching glasses round about.

Certainly, this independence which we are once more practicing in all areas has not failed to surprise, and even to scandalise various circles for which France's vassalage was the habit and the rule. They speak of

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DE GAULLE: Our own glass

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Machiavellism, as if the clearest conduct did not consist precisely in following our own path.

They are alarmed at our isolation at a time when there have never been more people flocking around us. In addition, the fact that we have reassumed our faculty of judgment and action in regard to all problems sometimes seems to displease a state which may believe that, by virtue of its power, it is invested with supreme and universal responsibility.

But, who knows if, some day, the advantage which this friendly country may have in finding France on her feet will not by far outweigh the annoyance which it now feels about it? Finally, the re-appearance of a nation whose hands are free, which we have again become, obviously modifies the world inter-play, which, since Yalta, seemed to be limited to two partners.

But since this division of the world between two great powers, and therefore into two camps clearly does not benefit the liberty, equality and fraternity of peoples, a different order, a different equilibrium are necessary for peace. Who can maintain this better than we — provided that we remain ourselves?

Men and women of France, as you can see, for us, for everyone, as ever, France must be France!

Long live the Republic! Long live France!

Tuesday, June 1, 1965

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LAFAYETTE REMAINS IN FRANCE

Nina Ratiani, commentator, magazine Za Rubezhom

In one of his 12 speeches made in the past two weeks, the US President solemnly reminded France of how in 1778 it "gave a hand to the States" by sending there the young and courageous General Lafayette to help fight against the English colonialists.

And what do we have now? In that self-same speech Johnson, without concealing his irritation in connection with France's political position, accused it of "narrow nationalism" and called upon it to dissolve all its independence in the "great Atlantic civilisation."

This was on the eve of the recent NATO May session which took place in London. Some people called it "a session of no event." Others said that it was like "clashes in a fog" as they apparently paid tribute to the traditional notion of London and tried to figure out, from the attitudes of the main participants, their possible steps in the nearest future. Still others said that this session marked a "frontier" in NATO's history. What they meant when they said "frontier", was that the United States, in spite of long preparations, did not manage to have its partners adopt a resolution that would approve, at least retrospectively, America's criminal actions in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. And underlying this situation, so extraordinary for the Atlantic alliance, was, first of all, France's unyielding stand.

On the even of the session the government in Paris had reaffirmed that it did not approve of America's war in Vietnam, and, moreover, announced publicly that the Cabinet session would discuss the question of recognising President Caamano in Santa Domingo, the same whom Johnson described as the head of a dangerous gang of rebels.

Thus, Rusk had to look in London for at least a temporary compromise and agree to such a vague wording of the Communique that it can very well be interpreted as the condemnation of America's policy. "The joint communique," says the London Economist, "reflected the minimal degree of agreement as, dealing briefly with the various areas where conflicts are now taking place, it solemnly emphasised that the peace was jeopardised and just as solemnly supported the right of all the peoples to choose their own governments."

The Western press admits that the Americans had no other way out. It all could have ended in the same way as at the latest SEATO session which France refused to participate and sign the communique.

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Another issue in which the US tries hard to achieve France's agreement is the "tripartite statement on Germany." Due to the objections of the President of France concerning the text of the statement, it was not issued on the eve of the 20th anniversary of the victory over Hitlerite Germany. The politicians in Bonn actually counted on the publication of the statement, for they thought that Washington, London and Paris would come out jointly on that day in support of the plans nurtured by Bonn.

Thus, the US President in his speech on ^{the} occasion of the 20th anniversary of the end of war in Europe had to perform solo the tune which those on the Rhine called so unceremoniously. It included attacks against the GDR, the support of Bonn's revanchist policy and accusations against the socialist countries. Without naming France, Johnson said ominously: "If anyone of us (meaning the participants of the Western bloc -N.R.) is unable to participate in some common cause, this will not be an obstacle to the rest."

Now Bonn has been given its "pass" says the Western press, however, not in the form and time limits it wanted. The tripartite statement has been affixed as a supplement to the communique on the NATO session. Many newspapers in Bonn describe it with disappointment as "meagre", "overcontained", "too much Europeised" (which they regard as a result of France's influence) and, naturally, "delayed." Besides, even if France did agree to sign the statement on Germany this was more a concession to Bonn than to Washington before the coming trip to the FRG of the President of France.

French diplomats are still hoping to find some modus vivendi with the Federal Republic, though the relations have certainly become cooler now speaking about the visit of the President of France scheduled for June, the newspapers say that it is prompted, first of all, by formal considerations: the Franco-German agreement provides for summit meetings twice a year. The French diplomats still apparently entertain illusions that France's position, as one of the victorious powers of the second world war and by virtue of some treaties and agreements with the FRG) will help to control in some way Bonn's desire to occupy a dominating place in Western Europe.

Naturally, Britain is also France's competitor in Africa and some other markets, as well as a power which makes suspicious claims to have "special relations" with the US. However, at present London's influence on the European continent is not a source of great anxiety to France which managed to close the doors of the Common Market to Britain. Those in Paris realise that these "special relations" stem not from Britain's strength but, on the contrary, from its weakness and a desire to find in the US some support for Britain's colonial interests in exchange for her loyalty.

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On the other hand the United States menaces French interests everywhere, both outside Europe, on the continent itself and even in France proper. Nowadays a French politician cannot count on popularity and support if he does not say that he has nothing in common with America's hazardous and aggressive policy. In the past France's own colonial gambles made it lose many positions in Asia and Africa.

There is now lively talk in the West again about France possibly leaving NATO. A characteristic sign of this is that the American press has, so to say, already begun "preparing" the Western bloc for such a turn of events by saying that France's military contribution to NATO was a very insignificant one. Besides, Stuart Alsop wrote a few days ago in his article contributed to the New York Herald Tribune that "without de Gaulle's France NATO would probably have been a more effective organisation."

When de Gaulle came to power in 1958, he demanded that France be given a greater role in NATO and that it be allowed to participate on a greater scale in working out Western decisions in all the parts of the world. At that time this proposal was described as the "triumvirate" proposals in NATO, with Washington, London and Paris making up the triumvirate. Now the situation has changed: the French government emphasises that it does not intend in the least to be responsible for the piratic actions of the new US colonialists and that it holds its own definite stand as regards different parts of the world. Thus, Lafayette prefers to remain in France.

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THE END

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LES DISCOURS DU CHEF DE L'ÉTAT

A SEGRÉ : l'indépendance et la paix.

« La nation française a des devoirs qui la dépassent elle-même et intéressent le monde entier : la France est désignée par son génie, sa vocation, sa capacité, pour être exemplaire. »

« La paix dans le monde ne peut s'établir sans un équilibre juste qui mette un terme à ce système des deux blocs, qui a été bâti à la fin de la dernière guerre et qui conduit actuellement le monde à des conflits locaux et peut-être, si cela devait continuer, à une catastrophe générale. »

« La France peut donner l'exemple parce qu'elle a les mains libres, qu'elle est indépendante, qu'elle a des alliés, mais aussi parce qu'elle a échappé à je ne sais quel areopage technocratique et irresponsable qui, en réalité, l'aurait effacée pour laisser la place à l'une ou l'autre des hégémonies. »

A CHATEAU-GONTIER : le progrès et la solidarité.

« L'avenir? Pour la France tout entière, cela s'appelle, à l'intérieur, le progrès. Il ne s'agit plus, comme au long des siècles passés, de vivre tranquille dans des conditions que l'on pourrait qualifier d'immuables. Il s'agit de vivre dans le courant suscité par l'époque moderne. Il y a un énorme changement à apporter à notre pays. Cela se fait partout, nous le voyons notamment dans les campagnes et nous le faisons à la mesure de nos moyens (...). »

« Ce développement rencontre des obstacles. D'abord, il y a eu la nécessité d'arrêter l'inflation, c'est-à-dire l'augmentation excessive des prix et des dépenses publiques. L'économie s'est adaptée à ces conditions et elle repartira pour une plus grande expansion. Il y a aussi les obstacles qui résultent des dispersions et de nos défaillances. Mais il n'empêche que, d'un bout à l'autre du pays, la transformation est en cours. »

A LAVAL : les divisions d'hier.

« Il est indispensable que les Français pratiquent entre eux la solidarité que, si souvent, ils n'ont pas connue ou cultivée. Il est indispensable qu'ils se rapprochent les uns des autres, quelles que soient leurs activités, quelle que soit leur catégorie. Il est indispensable que toutes nos organisations économiques et sociales comprennent que leurs responsabilités dépassent leurs intérêts particuliers et touchent à la communauté nationale tout entière. (...) »

« La France avance, pour ses enfants, pour son bien-être, pour sa prospérité, pour son bonheur. Mais aussi parce qu'elle est dans un monde difficile et menaçant et qu'elle doit y jouer son rôle pour la paix internationale. Nous aurions pu nous replier sur nous-mêmes et nous effacer dans des organisations à initiales, sans responsabilités, et qui auraient été conduites, en fait, par l'une ou l'autre des deux hégémonies. Mais nous avons pris la voie de l'indépendance. (...) »

« Vous ayant dit ce qu'est l'œuvre ou l'action de la France à l'intérieur et au-dehors, du même coup tous avez compris, pourquoi il est indispensable que dans cette période moderne, des institutions soient établies chez nous qui permettent à la République d'avoir la stabilité, la continuité, la responsabilité et l'efficacité sans lesquelles on ne peut rien faire. »

« Ce n'est pas en retournant à nos divisions d'hier, au kaléidoscope de gouvernements que nous avons connu que nous pourrions réaliser ce que nous avons à faire. Nos adversaires peuvent faire croire que s'ils étaient là, ils feraient autre chose. Ils y ont été et on a vu, et par conséquent la question est tranchée. »

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Foreign Affairs: De Gaulle, Mao and Russia

By C. L. SULZBERGER

ATHENS—Perhaps the summer's most interesting diplomatic development has been France's cautious effort to improve its still tenuous relations with Communist China. This is the obvious implication to be drawn from the visit to Peking of André Malraux, one of General de Gaulle's few intimates, which is seen in Paris as of "very great significance."

Malraux was charged with ascertaining China's "present and future intentions," to which France officially attaches "very considerable importance." Apparently the French are not only satisfied with the exchange of messages between de Gaulle and Mao Tse-tung but with the fact that the General's special emissary was more notably received than any other recent Western visitor.

The Long View

De Gaulle prides himself on taking the long view of history and he is convinced that China is destined to have a profound influence on global affairs. He does not today view China as a great power but he thinks it will be "truly great" in twenty years and "an enormous power" in fifty years. He now looks to that distant future.

This vision is directly related to de Gaulle's still vaguely expressed concept of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals"

in which he hopes France will play an increasingly important role. The General does not loosely use this conventional geographical definition of "Europe."

He is quite aware that such a "Europe," terminating in the heart of the Soviet Union, politically implies some future kind of partition of the U.S.S.R. This inference is deliberate. De Gaulle conjectures that the mighty China whose rise he foresees will some day pre-empt Russia's Siberian and Central Asian territories, which he considers artificially administered by Moscow since they result from "colonial" conquests.

The fact that this displeases Russia does not bother de Gaulle. He holds "that is their affair, not mine." He sees the Moscow-Peking quarrel developing along nationalistic lines, a dispute between rival neighbors, and he considers it imprudent to take an advanced position favoring either side.

The German Approach

German "Gaullists," led by former Chancellor Adenauer, share a similar approach. Adenauer now considers his earlier dream of reuniting Germany by gradual pressures, based on American military power, has faded. He therefore reckons that only if Russia is threatened in the East will it begin to relinquish territories in the West.

Therefore, he endorses French efforts to bolster China at Russia's ultimate expense.

Adenauer's approach is less philosophical than de Gaulle's. The General merely seeks to discern what history holds in store and then to exploit what he considers to be the inevitable. One aspect of this "inevitable" future, he appears to reason, is Russia's partition—not by the democratic West but by the Communist East.

De Gaulle's Disappointments

From the viewpoint of French diplomatic maneuver this is a fascinating game. De Gaulle has been successively disappointed by his relations with the United States, with Britain, with West Germany and with Russia. Therefore his gingerly diplomatic explorations seek new fields in terms of time and space.

While his policy has become increasingly independent, de Gaulle has so far carefully refrained from breaking any ties. France remains in NATO, in the Common Market, specially allied to Germany, in SEATO, flirting on and off with Moscow and seeking to improve bilateral relations with Communist East Europe. There has been no irrevocable move in any direction although France's Western commitments are loosening.

On a number of issues, the French attitude has become

more parallel to that of the Communist world in general and China in particular. It recognizes the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western frontier. It rejects all suggestions of giving Germany access to nuclear weapons. It condemns the American stand in South Vietnam. It does not participate in disarmament conferences and refuses to sign the nuclear test-ban treaty. However, on other points there has not yet been a meeting of French and Chinese minds.

What de Gaulle has done so far is to fling open many windows on the international horizon and to encourage an unfreezing of many hitherto rigid positions. If nothing else he has gained flexible vantage points for future French maneuver.

Waiting for the Oracle

Further hints will probably be expressed in his usual careful Delphic way when the General holds his semiannual press conference next month. It is also possible the Malraux voyage of discovery may eventually be followed up with a Paris visit by some Chinese dignitary.

But nothing that would commit France to discard present obligations or to assume new ones can be anticipated before the December French Presidential elections. And not even de Gaulle himself is yet completely certain whether he will run.